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SUMMARY
This thesis examines the economic effects of both international and domestic
remittances on Filipino households. The thesis investigates three main research
questions: (1) “Which household characteristics affect the probability and the size of
domestic and international remittances migrant households received?”; (2) “How do
these two sources of remittances Filipino households received affect welfare inequality
at the household level?”; (3) “How do the remittances affect the recipient household’s
expenditure patterns, especially educational expenditures?” The data mainly used for
the thesis come from the nationally representative Family Income and Expenditure
Survey (FIES) in the Philippines during the period of 1985-2006.
With regard to the first question, the thesis finds that the levels of receiving
international and domestic remittances are mutually related and reveals that there is a
displacement effect of remittances from abroad on those from within the country.
Furthermore, the thesis also revealed that several explanatory factors such as the welfare
level, the heads’ characteristics, the job-related factors, and the regional disparities are
significant to determine both the probability and the size of receiving the remittances.
Regarding the second question, the thesis shows that the receipt of international
remittances could significantly contribute to an improvement in Filipino households’
livelihoods at any welfare level and that it would cause expenditure inequality between
Filipino households to widen over time. In contrast, the receipt of remittances from
within the Philippines did not exert a significant impact on improving the welfare.
As for the last question, the thesis finds that the receipt of remittances from abroad
would increase the budget share for education as well as its absolute value. This result
supports the idea that international remittances could contribute to the future Philippine
economic growth via increase in human capital investment if the country sort out the
issues on brain drain of educated migrants’ children.
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Research on International migration and development
In the global economy, international migration has become a central issue for both
developing and developed countries or for both migrant source and host countries. Until
recently, international migration used to be from one country to another, and normally
caused permanent settlement or return migration after a period of time. However, during
the era of globalisation, there is an expansion of ‘patterns of recurring, circulatory and
onward migration which lead to greater diversity of migratory experiences as well as
more complicated cultural interactions’ (Castles, 2007: 353). Due to the diversity and
development of multicultural society resulting from international migration, research on
international migration is multifarious. To address the varied issues of international
migration, migration research should be conducted using an interdisciplinary approach
although in reality much of the research on migration has been done within the
framework of a single discipline. Actually, international migration is not a recent
phenomenon and was also recognised as an issue related to many disciplines by Jansen
(1969) who stated more than four decades ago:
‘Migration is a demographic problem: it influences sizes of populations at origin and
destination; it is an economic problem: a majority of shifts in population are due to
economic imbalances between areas; it may be a political problem: this is particularly
so in international migrations where restrictions and conditions apply to those wishing
to cross a political boundary; it involves social psychology in so far as the migrant is
involved in a process of decision-making before moving and that his personality may
play an important role in the success with which he integrates into the host society; it is
2also a sociological problem since the social structure and cultural system both of places
of origin and of destination are affected by migration and in turn affect the migrant.’
Jansen (1969: 60)
In addition to the lists of disciplines illustrated by Jansen, King (2002: 90) explained the
importance and possibility of migration studies with other disciplines such as
anthropology, history, law, study on human rights, social politics, philosophy, literature,
and media studies. In academia, an interdisciplinary approach for migration studies has
been met with general acceptance (Castles, 2007: 353). Migration scholars with
different backgrounds have been pursuing their studies on international migration. It is
very important to note, however, that ‘interdisciplinary does not mean putting many
disciplines all together’ and that ‘each [discipline] needs to fulfil a specific role as well
as contributing to migration studies as an interdisciplinary enterprise' (Castles, 2007:
353-354). Most sociological studies on international migration are concerned about the
impact of international migration on individuals, communities and societies. Castles
(2005: 354) argued that the main categories that the sociology of migration traditionally
analysed were ‘institutions, class (or stratification), integration, anomie, solidarity,
power, social order, social conflict’ and more recently ‘gender, ethnicity, identity,
agency, networks, social exclusion/inclusion and social capital’. Furthermore, Castles
(2005: 355) summarised that the comprehensive research project on the sociology of
migration would analyse ‘…the ways in which social structures, institutions and
relationships (and changes in these) help cause migration and influence the conditions
under which it takes place…’ and ‘…the ways in which international migration
(including incorporation in receiving countries or return to places of origin) affects
3social structures, institutions and relationships in all the localities involved (including
sending, transit and receiving areas)’.
Then, how does economics contribute to international migration research? The major
topics on international migration that economists have been investigating are, for
example, the determinants of international migration and remittances, the labour market
impact of international migration; and the effect of international migration and
remittances on economic development. From the above topics, the role of economics for
international migration research could be said to understand the determinants of and the
effects of international migration in both source and host societies. There is a clear
reason why the volume of migration research recently conducted by economists has
been increasing. It used to be popular for economists to use macroeconomic
determinants (such as income, the unemployment rate, and immigrant stock) to explain
net international migration flows (see for example, Vogler and Rotte, 2000; Hatton and
Williamson, 2002; Jennissen, 2004). However, there has emerged an increasing number
of data sources containing the information on migration and remittances at the micro-
level. For example, the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS), initiated by the
World Bank in 1980 and available for 34 countries1 as of December 2010, contains a
migration module with detailed migrant characteristics. Thus, many studies on
international migration and remittance have been undertaken with LSMS (for example,
Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002 for Guyana; Carletto et al, 2004, Castaldo, Litchfield, and
Reilly, 2005, Zezza et al, 2005, Carletto et al, 2006, Piracha and Vadean, 2010; Vadean
and Piracha, 2009 for Albania; Lokshin et al, 2007 for Nepal). Other research has been
1 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Ecuador,
Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Romania, Russia, Serbia, South Africa,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor Leste, and Vietnam.
4conducted with the migration data designed and collected by the researchers themselves
or with the household survey datasets (for example, Labour Force Survey (LFS) or
Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES)).
Remittances
One of the most important migration phenomena that economists have shown an
increased interest in is remittances. The effect of remittances has been one of the most
important topics on migration and development. Especially, in developing countries,
remittances from abroad appear to be a significant component, and play a key role in
contributing to their source economies. At the national level, remittances help to
stabilize the domestic economy, while at the household level it improves the welfare of
the recipient households. Remittances are mostly allocated for food, child education,
health care and housing and can contribute to poverty reduction not only for remittance-
receiving households but also households without migrants through multiplier effects
associated with increases in consumption and investment by migrants and their families.
Remittances are also used as a hedging fund for migrant households against various
risks ranging from natural disasters to sickness. It can also prevent households from
falling into poverty. On the other hand, migration and remittances could have negative
impacts on the countries, for example, through (i) brain drain, (ii) over-dependency on
remittances, (iii) inflation, (iv) high voluntary unemployment, (v) exchange rate
appreciation and (vi) a lower marginal propensity to save and invest due to moral hazard
among recipient households (Ahortor and Adenutsi, 2009). Therefore, policy-makers
should be keen to know the effects these remittances exert on economic development
and poverty in their countries. In addition to the increasing amounts of remittances,
another reason why remittances have attracted attention is that they are regarded as
more stable than other foreign currency flows to developing countries. For example,
5Gupta et al. (2008) mentioned that remittances to sub-Saharan Africa are less volatile
not only than official aid but also than foreign direct investment (FDI). It is also noted
that remittances are normally the most stable private financial flow in sub-Saharan
Africa.
Some families of migrants living in developing countries rely on remittances and can
improve their living standards. However, it is not clear whether migration actually
contributes to future development for the countries. Remittances often exacerbate social
inequality, and lead to increased concentration of land ownership because, in general,
the migrants come from the middle strata rather than the poorest groups in the areas of
origin (Castles and Miller, 1998: 148-149). To make the migration research more solid,
King (2002: 101) highlighted the importance of comparative analysis between
migratory groups within the country, or between countries, or over time. Following
King’s suggestion, this research will rely on comparative analyses by dividing the major
sample of households into various types of household groups depending on whether
they receive remittances or not, by comparing the results across countries, and by
analysing data over time.
1.2 Research questions
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effects of remittances on Filipino
households. Before examining these effects, we need to identify which characteristics
affect the receipt of remittances. Past literature on migration and remittances has
referred to altruistic and exchange motives for remittances (for example, Cox, D., 1987;
Cox, D., Eser, Z. and Jiminez, E., 1998). With an altruistic motive, migrants care about
the well-being of their children or other family members. On the other hand, with an
6exchange motive, migrants remit for services received from their parents such as
childcare, education, bequests and inheritance. To investigate the motivations of
remittances from migrants’ perspectives, the previous literature mainly exploited
migrant surveys and therefore mainly dealt with the characteristics of migrants and
those of households living with migrants in the remittance-sending countries (for
example, Brown, 1997; Brown and Connell, 2006; Markova and Reilly, 2007).
However, the main beneficiaries of the remittance incomes are migrant households.
Thus, migrant household characteristics should be considered when we look at the
determinants of remittances. The new economics of migration theory argues that
international migration is a strategic behaviour undertaken by migrant families, rather
than by individual migrants (Massey, D.S. et. al., 1998; 125).
Using a single year data on both migrant and household characteristics Alba and Sugui
(2009) found, in regard to remittance motives for overseas Filipino workers (OFWs)
and their household members remaining in the Philippines, that altruism motives seem
to dominate exchange motives for households with migrants who are likely to be the
primary bread-winners of their recipient households. This is because almost all heads
and heads’ spouses send money to support the livelihood of their family members
remaining in the Philippines. In addition, the needs of the young family members were
found to be significantly important in terms of motivations for remittances among these
households.
As Skeldon (2006) argues, a globalising world does not allow us to analyse internal and
international migration separately. In the case of the Family Income and Expenditure
Survey (FIES), which was mainly exploited for this thesis, the data on the amounts of
7remittances received from within the Philippines and those from overseas are available.
With regard to research on international remittances, it is important to consider the
mutual dependence between internal and international remittances, which is one of the
primary research aims of this thesis. However, the FIES has the detailed characteristics
on migrant households but not migrants. It is not possible to investigate a migrant’s
motivation for remittances using only the FIES, while it enables us to examine effects of
household characteristics on the receipt of remittances and to explore their changes over
time. In this thesis, we will cast light more on the role of the features of recipient
households and examine the extent to which their characteristics affect the receipt of
remittances and their amounts. In summary, our first research question is “What are the
determinants of both the probability and the size of both domestic and international
remittances received at the level of the household?” Furthermore, we also investigate
the effects of international remittances on domestic remittances. When households send
their family members abroad and they start sending remittances back to the home
country, those who used to rely on domestic transfers might not need any support from
family or relatives now living within the country. This assumes that domestic
remittances could be displaced by international remittances due to continuous and
greater amounts of financial support from migrant workers.
After understanding the determining features of migrant households, we start analysing
the effects of remittances on the households, especially their expenditure. International
remittances have been interpreted as potentially important for poverty reduction in
migrant sending countries. The receipt of remittances from abroad can directly affect
poverty through an increase in incomes or welfare levels. In the case of the Philippines,
8the poverty indices 2 significantly declined in the 1980s and 1990s whereas the
expenditure Gini increased after 1997 mainly due to the increase in the share of the
richest ten per cent of the population in total expenditure (Balisacan and Hill 2003:319).
With regard to the linkage between remittances and poverty in the Philippines, it was
argued that the direct and indirect impact of the increases in remittance flows into the
Philippines, caused by a sharp appreciation of a migrant’s host country currency against
the Philippine peso during the period of 1997-1998, could reduce poverty in the
Philippines (Yang and Martinez 2005).
In contrast to the impact of remittances on poverty, however, the link between
remittances and inequality seems less straightforward. If remittances are sent
disproportionately to better-off households, it may cause disparities between households
to widen. On the other hand, if remittances are sent to the households who are worse off,
it might lead to a contraction in inequality between rich and poor households (World
Bank, 2006:121).
There have been a number of empirical studies that have attempted to analyse which
factors influence expenditure inequality in developing countries by decomposing
inequality (see for example, Mishra and Parikh, 1992 3 for India; Tsakloglou, 1993 4 for
2 The headcount index, the poverty gap index, and the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke measure were used as the
poverty indices, (for more details, see Balisacan and Hill 2003: 340).
3 Theil’s entropy measure, Theil’s second measure, and Atkinson’s measure were used for the
decomposition analysis. Expenditure inequality in India was decomposed by regions (states) and by
sectors (urban or rural).
4 Expenditure per equivalent adult was decomposed into the following factors: regional (region and
locality of residence), demographic (age of household head) and educational (educational level of
household head). Among the factors included in the decomposition analysis, only an educational factor
accounts for a relatively large part of aggregate inequality.
9Greece; Akita et al., 1999 5 for Indonesia; Nguyen, 2008 6 for Vietnam; Balisacan and
Fuwa, 2004 7 for the Philippines). Past studies have found that the differentials in
educational attainment and in geographical location accounted for a large part of
expenditure inequality (Akita and Miyata, 2008:148). In the case of the Philippines,
using Fields (2003) decomposition, which is a regression-based inequality
decomposition approach and allows for the contribution of each explanatory variable to
inequality to be investigated, Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) found that spatial inequality,
which includes both rural-urban disparity and regional disparities, accounted for
approximately 19 per cent and 11 per cent of the total expenditure inequality in 1985
and 2000, respectively. However, there is no Philippine research exploring the effects of
the receipt of remittances on inequality using the appropriate decomposition method.
Thus, our second research question attempts to provide an insight into the effect of the
receipt of remittances on inequality. In this research, we will focus on the effect of the
receipt of remittances on expenditure differences between households with and without
remittances. In short, our second research question is “How do domestic and
international remittances affect household expenditure inequality between households
with and without the receipt of remittance incomes?”
Finally, the thesis will also look at more specific effects of remittances on household
expenditure behaviour. Households seem to have different expenditure patterns
depending on their receipt of different types of remittance. However, it is not
5 Two Theil indices (T and L) were used to measure inequality in the distribution of household
expenditures. Total inequality was decomposed into rural-urban disparity, region, age, education,
household size, and gender.
6 Gini coefficient and Two Theil indices (T and L) were used to measure inequality. Inequality was
decomposed by the receipt of international remittances. It was found that international remittances
slightly increased inequality.
7 Two Theil T indices (T and L) were used to measure inequality. Expenditure inequality was
decomposed into locality (urban or rural), region, and sector of employment.
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straightforward to measure the effect of remittances on consumption or investment. This
is because of the difficulties of separating remittances from other sources of income
(World Bank 2006, 126). Using household budget surveys would be appropriate to
investigate these effects of remittances.
Among past studies on expenditure behaviours using the Philippine household survey,
Tabuga (2007), Pernia (2008) and Ang, Sugiyarto, and Jha (2009) examined the
remittance effects on household expenditures. Except for Ang, Sugiyarto, and Jha
(2009), the above studies found that international remittance positively influenced
education expenditures. In addition, Pernia (2008) and Ang, Sugiyarto, and Jha (2009)
used ordinary least squares (OLS) and did not take into account the censored nature of
educational expenditures. On the other hand, Tabuga (2007) reported the results derived
from a censored Tobit model though she also reported the remittance effects on
education derived from the normal mean and median regression. In addition to the
careful consideration of zero educational expenditure, we cannot neglect a potential
endogeneity of reverse causality between education and remittances. This issue of
endogeneity was considered only in Ang, Sugiyarto and Jha (2009) but they did not take
into consideration the zero expenditure issue as mentioned above. For this thesis, we
simultaneously take into account both the censored nature of education expenditure as
well as a potential endogeneity of reverse causality between education and remittances
using an instrumental-variable Tobit (IV Tobit) estimator. Dealing with the above
mentioned issues discussed in the cited studies and providing the empirical estimation
results derived from the appropriate econometric analysis contributes to the field of
research concerned with remittance effects on education.
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The above mentioned past studies on Filipino households focused only on the effect of
international remittances on education and did not consider the role of domestic
remittances. In addition, the studies were conducted using a single year survey and then
we do not know the extent to which the effects of remittances on education changes
over time. In order to fill in the gap, the last empirical chapter of the thesis considers
both the effects of domestic and international remittances on education expenditure and
it also explores the change in these effects over time.
Among many expenditure items, this thesis focuses on the effects of the receipt of
remittances on education as the possession of education (or human capital) is a key
factor that helps reduce poverty especially in developing countries. In addition to the
budget share, in this thesis we also consider the absolute value of education
expenditures to examine the effects of remittances on education spending. In sum, our
last research question is “How much do domestic and international remittances
influence their education expenditure at the household level?”
1.3 The structure of the thesis
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter Two provides a global overview of
international remittance flows into developing countries. Then, it describes the trends in
international remittances into the Philippines since the 1980s and also explains the
following features of remittances sent by overseas Filipino workers (OFWs): types of
remittances; modes of remittances; places of origins of remittances; remittances by type
of migrants’ work and migrants’ gender. Chapter Two also investigates the reasons why
the total amount of remittances sent by OFWs has dramatically increased over time. To
address this question, this chapter will describe several factors: remittance channels;
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transaction costs of remittances; remittance networks and services; exchange rates; and
the international migrant stock. Furthermore, it will also explain key international
migration drivers: the economic, social and political situations in the Philippines;
increasing demand for labour in the global economy; and Philippine governmental
policies on international migration. These factors contribute to an increase in the
numbers of OFWs. Finally, the chapter will describe key roles of Philippine
governmental institutions that manage the international migration for OFWs.
Chapter Three describes the Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF) and the Family
Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), the sources of the data mainly used throughout
this thesis. The SOF provides data on the number of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs),
their socio-economic characteristics of remittances received by their families left in the
Philippines. The FIES contains information about expenditure patterns, income sources
and inequality. They provide information on sources of income (both cash and in-kind),
household characteristics (such as family size, marital status and number of children by
age group), and job-related information (such as earnings and employment status).
Furthermore, the survey asks respondents to report on a variety of private transfers,
including remittances, both in-kind and cash, from domestic sources and from overseas.
This chapter describes the scope and coverage of the datasets as well as their survey
design including sampling methodology and sampling weight. In addition, the definition
of main variables used in the thesis (e.g., remittance, family income and expenditure,
urban/rural areas) is explained and outlined here. Finally, past studies relevant to the
topics of this thesis are summarised and introduced to demonstrate both the similarity
and differences in the methodology.
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Chapter Four examines the determinants of remittances received by Filipino households
by modelling both the probability and the size of the transfer. It is important to deepen
our understanding of the determining factors of remittances as they could reduce
poverty, enable recipient families to smooth consumption patterns, and also allow
families to invest (see World Bank, 2006 Ch4; Freund and Spatafora, 2008). This
chapter investigates the features of Filipino households categorised by the status of
remittances. We will distinguish households with and without international remittances
as well as domestic remittances. In other words, the households will be divided into four
types; households who received both domestic and international remittances (dbothrem),
those who received only external remittances (dexrem), those who received only
internal remittances (dinrem), and those who received no remittances at all (dnorem).
These categories enable us to provide some insights on the differences across
households based on the nature of remittances received.
Chapter Five investigates the effects of remittances on household expenditure inequality
between households with and without the receipt of remittance incomes. Recently,
economic inequality between rich and poor in the Philippines has widened and has been
at a high level for the past three decades. For example, the estimates from the 2006
Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) revealed that the richest ten per cent
earn nineteen times more than the poorest ten per cent of Filipinos (Aldaba and
Opiniano, 2008:2). Similarly, among most developing countries, it was found that the
richest 20 per cent experienced the fastest increase in per capita expenditure. In the case
of the Philippines, per capita expenditures increased by 2.27 per cent for the richest 20
per cent, while they increased by only 1.28 per cent for the poorest 20 per cent in the
period of 1994-2003 (ADB, 2007).
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Based on past findings on widening inequality in the Philippines, it is assumed that
remittances from abroad would contribute to widening the Filipino household
expenditure disparities. In Chapter Five, the methodology is mainly developed in two
parts. First, to find evidence for the effects of the receipt of remittances on the entire
expenditure distribution, this chapter investigates the extent to which the differences in
the household expenditure distribution between households with and without receiving
remittances can be attributed to differences in characteristics of the households. The
effects of these characteristics on the conditional household expenditure distribution for
each household remittance receiving category (i.e., dbothrem, dexrem, dinrem, and
dnorem) can be estimated within a quantile regression framework. Then, I will also
decompose the welfare differences of the unconditional quantile functions between the
households with and without the receipt of remittances to examine the effect of the
receipt of remittances on expenditure gaps between the households.
Chapter Six examines the effects of remittances received by Filipino households on
household educational expenditures. The receipt of remittances could alter a
household’s expenditure pattern of consumption and investment. An Engel curve
framework can be used to analyse changes in household expenditure patterns.
Theoretically and empirically, past literature on remittances using the Engel curve
analysis will be reviewed. This chapter will then analyse the extent to which the
remittances affect the level of education expenditure among Filipino households with
due consideration to the difference in remittances from within the Philippines and from
abroad.
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In Chapter Seven, the thesis concludes and reviews the evidence on how the receipt of
international remittances would contribute to future Philippine economic growth via an
increase in education expenditure or human capital investment if the country could
resolve the issues relating to the brain drain of educated migrant workers. In addition,
the findings of the thesis reveal that the receipt of international remittances could
significantly contribute to an improvement in the livelihoods of Filipino households at
any welfare level but that it would cause expenditure inequality between Filipino
households to widen over time. In contrast, the receipt of remittances from within the
Philippines did not exert a significant impact in improving the welfare of Filipino
households.
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Chapter 2: International Remittances into the Philippines
2.1 Migration and Remittances
One of the most significant current discussions in developing countries is international
migration and development. In the global economy, international migration has become
hard to ignore in both migrant source and host countries. In migrant source countries,
generally with lower income levels than the host countries, their citizens desire better
welfare through migration. Of course, there are various reasons to migrate and it might
be misleading to generalise the motivations for migration. However, the motivations for
working abroad or receiving remittances, to some extent, can be identified using
empirical research. On the other hand, in migrant host countries, governmental policies
on employment determine the inflows of migrant workers. For example, to respond to
declining birth rates and aging societies, there is a growing demand for health-care
workers such as doctors, nurses and caregivers in developed countries such as the
United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. Likewise,
professional work, for instance, IT engineers, is in demand in many developed countries.
Moreover, the dirty, dangerous and demanding jobs (that is, the 3D jobs) are often taken
by foreign migrants in these countries as their nationals are reluctant to engage in these
sorts of jobs.
International migration leads to remittances from abroad. Total remittances into
developing countries from abroad have been growing over time. The World Bank
estimated that recorded remittances and capital flows to developing countries in 2008
exceeded US$300 billion, which is over three times greater than remittances received in
2001 (Ratha, Mohaparta and Silwal, 2009). However, the true size of remittances is
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believed to be much larger because of unrecorded flows through both formal and
informal remittance channels (Ratha, 2007). Among developing countries that received
remittances from abroad, India, China, Mexico, and the Philippines have been the top
recipients (Ratha, Mohaparta and Silwal, 2009). Some overseas migrant workers send
money back to support the livelihoods of their family members or relatives living in
their countries of origin. Others send money back home for investment or saving
purposes.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the trends in international remittances into
developing countries, especially the Philippines. This chapter shows the increasing
flows of international remittances received by Filipino households. Considering the
nexus between international migration and remittances, it is clear that the amounts of
remittances received by the recipient families increase as the numbers of migrant
workers increase. In addition to an increased stock of migrant workers, however, there
are several reasons for increasing remittances from abroad. After explaining some
features of international remittances into the Philippines, the latter part of the chapter
will mainly focus on explaining the various factors for an increase in international
remittances into the Philippines. The last section will provide a summary of this chapter.
2.2 International remittance flows into developing countries
In recent times, international remittance flows into developing countries have
dramatically increased. Figure 2.1 shows the sum of workers’ remittances and
compensation of employees received by all developing countries 8 over time. These data
8 Developing countries are defined as low- and middle-income economies in which Gross National
Income (GNI) per capita was US$11,905 or less in 2008.
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include current transfers by migrant workers, and wages and salaries earned by non-
resident workers abroad. In the World Development indicators and Global Development
Finance provided by the World Bank, migrants’ transfers, which are part of capital
transfers, are treated as workers’ remittances.
Figure 2. 1: International Remittance Flows into Developing Countries, 1980-2008 (current US$)
Source: World Development Indicators 2009
During the 1980s, the total amount of remittances into developing countries was steady
at US$ 20 billion. In the 1990s, there was a slight increase until 1998, and subsequently
the annual growth rate of total workers’ remittances and compensation of employees for
all developing countries was more erratic. Although the annual growth rate dropped
from 24.8 per cent in 2003 to 14.1 per cent in 2004, the growth rate continued to rise
between 1998 and 2003. During this period, the amount of workers’ remittances nearly
doubled from US$ 73 billion in 1998 to US$ 140 billion in 2003. Since 2004, the
growth rates of remittance flows have been remaining high within the range of 15-25
per cent and have been significantly greater than the average annual growth rate (see
Figure 2.2). This recent increase in remittance flows into developing countries made the
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total amount US$ 328 billion by 2008. The figures are nominal. But the sharpest rises
have been in periods of low inflation. Hence, the real effects have been fairly impressive.
Figure 2. 2: Percentage Growth rate of International Remittance Flows into Developing
Countries, 1981-2008
Source: World Development Indicators 2009
When it comes to the remittance receiving regions in the world, in the first half of the
1990s, Middle East & North Africa received the most remittances, while in the second
half, the amount of remittances dramatically increased in East Asia & the Pacific, South
Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean, and Europe & Central Asia (see Figure 2.3).
Figure 2. 3: The receipt of International Remittance Flows by world region, 1980-2008 (current
US$)
Source: World Development Indicators 2009
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Among all developing countries, almost all amounts of remittances have been received
by middle income countries9, while the share of remittance into low income countries10
has been slight. The total amount of remittances that middle income countries received
dramatically increased from US$ 100 billion in 2002 to US$ 300 billion in 2008. The
amount of remittances in lower 11 and upper 12 middle income countries dramatically
increased after 2000. The aggregated amount of remittances in lower and upper middle
income economies reached US$ 200 billion and US$ 100 billion in 2008, respectively
(see Figure 2.4).
9 Middle income countries are those in which 2008 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was between
US$976 and US$11,905.
10 Low income countries are those in which 2008 GNI per capita was $975 or less. The following
countries are included: Bangladesh; Benin; Bhutan; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon;
Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Congo, Rep.; Cote d'Ivoire; Eritrea;
Ethiopia; Gambia, The; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; India; Kenya; Kyrgyz Republic; Lao PDR;
Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Moldova; Mongolia; Mozambique; Myanmar;
Nepal; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Rwanda; Sao Tome and Principe;
Senegal; Sierra Leone; Solomon Islands; Somalia; Sudan; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda;
Uzbekistan; Vietnam; Yemen, Rep.; Zambia; Zimbabwe
11 Lower middle income economies are those in which 2008 GNI per capita was between US$976 and
US$3,855. They include the following countries: Includes: Albania; Algeria; Angola; Armenia;
Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Bulgaria; Cape Verde; China; Colombia;
Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt, Arab Rep.; El Salvador; Fiji; Georgia; Guatemala;
Guyana; Honduras; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Jamaica; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Macedonia, FYR;
Maldives; Morocco; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Romania; Samoa; Serbia and Montenegro; Sri Lanka;
Swaziland; Syrian Arab Republic; Thailand; Tonga; Tunisia; Ukraine; Vanuatu.
12 Upper middle income economies are those in which 2008 GNI per capita was between US$3,856 and
US$11,905. The following countries are included: Argentina; Barbados; Belize; Botswana; Chile; Costa
Rica; Croatia; Czech Republic; Dominica; Equatorial Guinea; Estonia; Gabon; Grenada; Hungary; Latvia;
Lebanon; Lithuania; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mexico; Oman; Panama; Poland; Russian Federation;
Seychelles; Slovak Republic; South Africa; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the
Grenadines; Trinidad and Tobago; Turkey; Uruguay; Venezuela, RB.
21
Figure 2. 4: The receipt of International Remittances by Income Level, 1980-2008 (current US$)
Source: World Development Indicators 2009
India, China, Mexico, and the Philippines are the top recipients among developing
countries which received remittances (Ratha, Mohaparta and Silwal, 2009). Figure 2.5
indicates that the remittances received by these countries dramatically increased since
the 1990s. A remarkable fact is a sudden rise in remittances into India and China over
these two or three years. The amount of remittances received by China was US$ 6.2
billion in 2000, which is similar to that received by the Philippines or half of that
received by India in 2000, and the remittances China received were comparable in size
to those received by India in 2004. The former is US$ 21.3 billion, whereas the latter is
US$ 21.7 billion. According to the China economic yearbook 2001, the rapid increase
in Chinese remittances from 2000 is due to China’s open policy established by the
Chinese government’s general assembly meeting in 2000. The Chinese government
viewed international labour exports as important. In this meeting, the government stated
that it is important not only to receive investment from abroad but also to invest in
foreign countries and to make inroads into foreign markets. The international labour
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exports were taken to form a part of the investment overseas. With regard to remittances
into India, it is suggested that improvements in remittance networks and services
contribute to the significant increase in the inflows of remittances by Indian workers.
Singh (2009) argued that a reduction in the transaction costs of remittances through the
formal channels and widely available remittance-receiving infrastructure has
significantly encouraged more Indian migrants to send money through the more formal
remittance channels. Mexico has experienced a decreasing trend in remittances since
2003. The growth rates of remittance clearly show that the rates in 2007 and in 2008
became lower than those between 1981 and 2008. On the other hand, the growth rates in
the Philippines have been positive and stable since 2003. When we look at the recent
growth rate of remittances, India’s is much greater than the other three countries.
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Figure 2. 5: International Remittances of the Top recipients in developing countries
Figure 2.5a: Amount (current US$), 1980-2008
Figure 2.5b: Percentage growth rate (%), 1981-2008
Source: World Development Indicators 2009
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Increases in the amount of remittances are potentially very important for developing
countries as remittances into low & middle income countries have been the second
largest source of external finance after foreign direct investment (FDI) and they have
also been greater than official development assistance (ODA). The percentage growth
rate shows that remittances have become stable income sources for developing countries
(see Figure 2.6). Remittances can be regarded as more stable than other foreign
currency flows to developing countries.
Figure 2. 6: Remittances, ODA, and FDI into Low & Middle income countries
Figure 2.6a: Amount (current US$), 1980-2007
Figure 2.6b: Percentage growth rate (%), 1981-2007
Source: World Development Indicators 2009
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2.3 Trends in international remittances into the Philippines
The Filipino economy is generally viewed as relatively weak among the set of Asian
countries. The real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita13 in the Philippines was
overtaken by Thailand in 1984, by Indonesia in 1992, and by China in 2000 (see Figure
2.7). Compared with other Asian countries, the growth rates of its real GDP per capita
in the Philippines were lower. Official statistics reveal that the real per capita GDP in
the Philippines in 2000 was close to the same level as in 1980 (Balisacan and Hill,
2003: 4). It means that the Philippines effectively lost two decades of growth between
the 1980s and the 1990s. However, recently the growth rates of real per capita GDP
have been positive and relatively stable growth has occurred.
13 Based on the 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate.
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Figure 2. 7: Real GDP per capita (based on 2005 PPP exchange rate)
Figure 2.7a: GDP per capita (US$), 1980-2008
Figure 2.7b: Percentage growth rate (%), 1981-2008
Source: World Development Indicators 2009
The 1970s were a decade of continuous expansion of per capita GDP in the Philippines.
However, a political and an economic crisis occurred in the 1980s. The former was
triggered by the assassination of former opposition leader Benigno Aquino in August
1983. The latter crisis was partly a response to this incident, but its roots lay deeper in
the economic policy settings of the 1970s. Negative external shocks further complicated
the situation. These events resulted in a sharp economic contraction in 1984-1985 (see
Figure 2.7). It made the per capita GDP growth rate even weaker than before (Balisacan
and Hill, 2003: 7). To make matters worse, per capita GDP decreased again between
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1991 and 1993 due to serious power shortages, natural disasters (especially the eruption
of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991), and the removal of U.S. military bases in 1992.14 In 1998,
there was the Asian economic crisis with a severe El Niño-induced drought. On this
occasion, the downturn was very brief (see Balisacan and Hill, 2003: 7). As noted above,
the Philippines missed out almost completely on the Asian economic boom from the
late 1970s until the mid-1990s. In particular, labour-intensive industries were more
attracted to China and other lower-wage economies within the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN). These industries bypassed the Philippines because of its
political and economic crises.
More recently, the Philippine economy has been developing for several years. In 2007,
the gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 7.3 per cent, which was the best
performance for over three decades. This economic growth was mainly driven by the
service sector which expanded by 8.7 per cent in 2007 (NEDA 2008).15 The growth in
service industry has been mainly caused by the development of the following service
sectors: business process outsourcing, tourism, telecommunications, retail trade, real
estate and housing, which were encouraged by increases in remittances from overseas
Filipino workers (OFWs) (Aldaba and Opiniano, 2008: 129).
Figure 2.8 shows the amounts of remittances sent by land-based and sea-based OFWs
and exchange rate fluctuations. The lion’s share of the remittances has been sent by
land-based workers and their remittances have dramatically increased since the 1990s.
On the other hand, the remittances by sea-based workers tripled from US$ 274.5 million
in 1998 to US$ 846.2 million in 1999 and since then have been continuously increasing.
14 It is said that the U.S. military bases contributed, directly and indirectly, as much as 5 per cent of
measured GDP (Balisacan and Hill, 2003: 10).
15 The services sector contributed 4.2 percentage points to GDP growth (NEDA 2008).
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During the Asian crisis, there was a steep increase in overseas remittances due to a
depreciation of the Philippine peso against a migrant’s currency, for example the U.S.
dollar. From 1997 to 1998, the nominal Philippine exchange rate depreciated against
currencies in OFW’s destination countries such as the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and
Singapore. However, the real effective exchange rate index, measured as a value of a
peso against a weighted average of a several foreign currencies divided by a price
deflator, appreciated (see Figure 2.8). The effect of the change in the real effective
exchange rate can be divided into three factors: nominal effective exchange rate;
domestic inflation; and foreign inflation. During the period of 1997-1998, Philippine
nominal exchange rate was depreciated against major currencies. The inflation effect in
the Philippines was stronger than other countries. This denotes that migrants send more
remittances not only because of a sharp depreciation of Philippine peso but also price
increase within the home country. Since 2004, the real effective exchange rate index has
depreciated. This might partly contribute to an increase in remittance flows. However,
exchange rate is not only a factor affecting remittance flows into the Philippines. This
will be explained in the latter of this chapter. As a consequence, the remittance flows
into the country (in, say, dollar terms) have increased continuously since then.16 In 2010
the total amount of remittances by OFWs reached US$ 18.76 billion.
16 According to the World Bank study by Sanket Mohapatra and Dilip Ratha, the rapid growth in OFW
remittances is overestimated. With taking into consideration the Philippine peso appreciation again the
US dollar and the increases in crude oil and food grains prices, they estimated that remittances only
increased by 3 per cent in real terms from 2004 to 2007 (see Jaleco 2008).
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Figure 2. 8: Overseas Filipino Workers’ remittances
Figure 2.8a: Remittance Amount (Billion US$, nominal) and real effective exchange rate
index (=100 in 2005), 1981-2008
Figure 2.8b: Growth rate of land-based workers’ remittances (standardised) and of real
effective exchange rate index (standardised), 1982-2008
Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Statistics Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) Statistics
Note: Official exchange rate is calculated as an annual average based on monthly averages. Real
effective exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange rate (a value of a peso against a
weighted average of a several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator.
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In regard to the Asian crisis, Burgess and Haksar (2005: 3) argue that remittance flows
into the Philippines during this period made the economic conditions stable. At the
macro level, we can examine the relationship between remittances and economic growth
or the impact of remittances on economic growth in developing countries. However, to
determine these relationships and the effect of remittances is not easy to untangle. For
example, the amount of remittances could affect the growth of remittance-receiving
countries, and vice-versa. This endogeneity issue makes it difficult to explain the effect
of remittances without adequate instruments (Burgess and Haksar, 2005: 11). Burgess
and Haksar (2005: 11) concluded that the studies based on the household survey, or at
the micro level, are more useful to investigate the determinants and the effect of
remittances on developing economies. Moreover, sending or receiving remittances
potentially reflect household decision-making. The new economics of migration casts a
new light on the role of households on migration research and contributed to the
integration of migration decision-making with migrant remittance behaviour and
migrant household remittance use (Stark and Bloom, 1985). In this field of research, it
proves useful to use household survey data to inform important research questions.
Another concern is the linkage between internal and international migration. As
Skeldon (2006) argues, a globalising world does not allow us to analyse internal and
international migration separately. In the case of the Family Income and Expenditure
Survey (FIES), mainly exploited for this thesis, the data on the amounts of remittances
received from within the Philippines and those from overseas are available. With regard
to research on international remittances, it is important to consider the mutual
dependence between internal and international remittances, which is one of the primary
research aims of this thesis.
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2.4 Some features of international remittances into the
Philippines
2.4.1 Types of Remittances
With regard to types of remittances, the Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF) revealed
that around 70 per cent of total remittances were cash sent, one-fourth of total
remittances were brought home by OFWs, and five per cent of total remittances
consisted of goods, whose values were calculated in cash. When we look at the average
remittance, however, the SOF also revealed that cash brought from abroad is, on
average, greater than cash sent for the family members left at home. This may be
because some OFWs send regularly only a small amount of money to sustain the
livelihoods of their families in the Philippines. Others might prefer carrying and keeping
a part of their earnings with them and not sending all of the earnings to their family
members after the end of their overseas contract work. Most OFWs tend to regularly
send money back home. The survey on Filipino migrant workers in Italy showed that 72
per cent of respondents remitted money on a monthly basis, whereas 11 per cent remit
every other month (ERCOF and IOM, 2010a: 33). On the other hand, not all OFWs
bring their remittances in cash. Some OFWs buy electrical appliances or gadgets and
bring them back to the home country. Overseas Filipinos are renowned for sending
balikbayan (or returning migrant) boxes of goods to their families in the Philippines.
According to the survey on OFWs in Italy, over three-quarters of them responded that
they send non-monetary items such as food, clothes, accessories, appliances, decorative
items, mobile phones and electronic gadgets (ERCOF and IOM, 2010a: 42).
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2.4.2 Modes of Remittances
When it comes to the modes of cash remittances sent by OFWs, over three-quarters of
total remittance money was sent through the formal banking networks. Similar findings
were detected among OFWs in Italy. The survey on Filipinos working in Italy found
that 78 per cent of survey respondents are aware of banking services and 95 per cent of
them actually use formal banking channels to send remittances, while 21 per cent send
money through money transfer organisations (MTOs) with only ten per cent using
informal remittance channels (ERCOF and IOM, 2010a: 40). With regard to the
amounts of remittances sent, on average, greater amounts of remittances have been sent
through money transfer organisations such as Western Union and MoneyGram.
Recently, there has been a shift from informal to formal remittance channels due to
increased scrutiny after the September 11 attacks and reduction in remittance costs
mainly due to technological improvements (see Ratha 2007), especially new
developments in mobile payment applications, for example, G-CASH and SMART
Padala, for Filipino migrants (see Jo Domingo 2008). Furthermore, the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP) or the Philippine central bank recently signed a Memorandum of
Agreement with member banks of the Association of Bank Remittance Officers, Inc. to
allow for faster and cheaper delivery of remittances to beneficiaries, and thereby to
promote a steady stream of international remittances from OFWs (BSP, 2009).
In addition, with regard to remittance channels, it is also said that the proportion of total
remittances sent by overseas Filipinos through informal channels declined to only less
than four per cent compared to 30 per cent more five years earlier. This is because
OFWs can send money easily through formal channels due to the efforts made by banks
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and remittance centres. Moreover, the Philippine central bank discourages OFWs to use
informal channels (e.g., illegitimate remittance centre and friends going back home)
because the bank cannot identify accurate figure of money flows into the Philippines
(Remo, 2009).
2.4.3 Places of Origins of Remittances
With regard to the places of origins of remittances sent by OFWs, the share of
remittance flows into the Philippines from the Middle East has increased. The OFW’s
deployment outlook has been favourable in the Middle East, especially in Saudi
Arabia’s construction and health industries (BSP, 2009). The second major origin of
remittances is East Asia. However, its share has been decreasing over time. Interestingly,
the average amounts of remittance sent from Africa were significant. This is because
there is a small percentage of OFWs working in Africa and also because most of them
are skilled and higher-paid workers. Among the Middle Eastern countries, Saudi Arabia
remains the country from which the largest amount of total cash remittances have been
sent by OFWs over time. However, the greatest amount of cash remittances sent by
female OFWs was from Hong Kong due to a large number of female domestic workers.
2.4.4 Remittances by Types of Migrants’ Work
In terms of types of work of OFWs, ‘Labourers and unskilled workers’ and ‘Plant and
machine operators and assemblers’ sent a large amount of remittances back to the
Philippines. This could simply be because the numbers of OFWs working as factory and
construction workers are sizeable especially in the Middle East. As for the average
amounts of remittances, highly-skilled OFWs (such as corporate executives, managers,
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proprietors, supervisors, and other professionals) sent more remittances back home, on
average. The wages of professional OFWs are higher and they could afford to send
more money back home, and thereby their average remittances could get greater than
those from any other OFWs.
2.4.5 Remittances by Migrants’ Gender
When it comes to the gender differences in remittances sent by migrant workers, there is
evidence that male OFWs sent, on average, more money back to the country from all
major OFWs’ destination countries, except for Taiwan. The OFWs only in Taiwan
exhibited little gender difference in the average remittances they sent. It is found that
this gender difference in international remittances could be mainly due to their earning
gaps in the foreign labour markets (Semyonov and Gorodzeisky, 2005:63). In addition,
using the 2004 Vietnam Migration Survey, Niimi and Reilly (2008) found the evidence
that gender differences in internal remittances are largely attributable to gender labour
market earning differentials in Vietnam.
2.5 Factors affecting international remittances into the
Philippines
There are a number of reasons for a global increase in the amount of remittances. Ratha
(2007) provided a number of explanations. First, the measurement of remittance flows
has been improving and becoming more accurate. Second, after the terrorist attacks of
September 11 in 2001, the scrutiny of remittance flows were increased. Then, there was
a big shift from informal to formal remittance channels to send remittances back to
migrants’ home countries. Third, the reduction in transaction costs of sending money
abroad has also affected the amounts of remittances received by the migrant source
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countries. Fourth, both migrants and migrant families have had more access to
remittance services due to expanding remittance networks by banks, and remittance
service providers (RSPs) such as Western Union and MoneyGram. Fifth, exchange rate
fluctuations influence migrants’ remitting patterns such as the timing and the amount of
remittances. If there is a sharp appreciation of the currency migrants earned against the
currency in their home countries, migrants have incentives to send more money back
home. Finally, there is a growth in migrant stock and their incomes. More migrants
could afford to send more money than before. Migrant remittances contribute to migrant
countries of origin, especially with the availability of more foreign exchange to finance
the dollar requirements of the economy at the macro level as well as with increasing
purchasing power of the remittance beneficiaries. This can act as a driver for economic
activities in some industries, especially the service sectors.
2.5.1 Remittance channels
Formal remittance channels are serviced by institutions authorized to engage in money
transfers, such as banks, and licensed money transfer organizations (MTOs), while all
other unauthorized channels are considered informal. In the case of the Philippines,
there have been an array of formal and informal remittance channels (see Table 2.1).
According to data from the Philippine central bank, the share of informal remittance or
money which was not sent through a formal banking channel is diminishing.
Undocumented migrants usually send money via an informal remittance channel
because of their irregular status. Informal remittances are sent door-to-door through
informal networks such as companies without partner banks and courier services. With
improvements in the reporting of remittances, the Philippines’ central bank has made
efforts to record remittances passed through informal channels since 2001. In the
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Philippines, the share of informal remittances to total cash remittances were estimated
to have decreased from 22 per cent in 2001 to three per cent in 2007 (Opiniano, 2008).
This is a function of improved reporting by the central bank and an increasing
involvement by formal financial institutions in the remittance industry (ERCOF and
IOM, 2010b: 59). Philippine banks such as Banco de Oro, Bank of the Philippine
Islands, Philippine National Bank, Allied Bank, and Metrobank have offered remittance
services for Filipinos abroad. Thus, it is getting easier for overseas Filipinos to access
remittance services abroad than before. In addition, the recent decline in the share of
informal remittances into the Philippines is also partly because the decreasing number
of overseas Filipinos with irregular status. The stock estimate of overseas Filipinos with
irregular status declined from 1.6 million in 2001 to 0.9 million in 2007 (see Table 2.2).
Table 2. 1: Formal and informal remittance channels in the Philippines
Formal channels Informal channels
 Banking Institutions
 Domestic Money Transfer Agencies
or Remittance Centres
 International Money Transfer
Agencies or Remittance Centres
 Telecommunications companies
working with banks
 Internet-based remittances
 Rural banks, cooperatives, and
microfinance institutions
 Mobile phone companies
 Post office
 “Padala” practice (bringing money
home through friends or relatives)
 Cash brought home by overseas
Filipinos
Source: ERCOF and IOM (2010b), p.58 Table17
Table 2. 2: Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos
Migrant Status As of December 2001 As of December 2007
Permanent 2,736,528 3,692,527
(36.9%) (42.3%)
Temporary 3,049,622 4,133,970
(41.1%) (47.4%)
Irregular 1,625,936 900,023
(21.9%) (10.3%)
Total 7,412,086 8,726,520
(100%) (100%)
Source: Commission on Filipinos Overseas
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2.5.2 Transaction costs of remittances
Transaction costs of remittances affect the receipt of remittances passed through formal
remittance channels. Freund and Spatafora (2008) found that high transaction costs
significantly reduce the level of recorded remittances. Higher transaction costs
encourage migrant workers to use informal channels where transaction costs can be
lower.
In Italy, there are six Philippine banks17 that have been set up and are licensed by the
Italian authorities not as banks but as money transfer agencies, to service overseas
Filipinos sending money back to the Philippines. They noticeably offer an identical
remittance fee of €8 (or US$ 11.85), differing marginally with regards delivery time and
foreign exchange spreads (ERCOF and IOM, 2010a: 26). Average costs for sending
US$200 from Italy to the Philippines via banking networks was around US$15 in 2008.
It costs US$21 on average to send the same amount of money through money transfer
organizations (MTOs). There are the geographical differences in transaction costs of
remittances depending on countries from which overseas Filipinos send their money
(see Table 2.3).
Table 2. 3: Total costs for sending US$200 to the Philippines in 2008 (in US$)
Bank Average MTO Average Total Average
From Italy 14.88 20.96 20.08
From Japan 29.54 22.44 24.82
From Saudi Arabia 9.3 9.74 9.56
From Spain N.A. 15.94 15.94
From the United Kingdom 9.38 18.46 17.56
From the United States 11.8 18.38 17.8
Source: World Bank (http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org)
17 These are Banco de Oro, Bank of the Philippine Islands, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation,
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (or Metrobank), Philippine National Bank and Land Bank of the
Philippines.
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2.5.3 Remittance networks and services
Western Union continues to be the leading money transfer organization (MTOs) serving
Filipinos abroad. Western Union has over 6,400 agent locations across the Philippines.
On the other hand, MoneyGram, the world’s second-biggest money transfer
organization, has 1,200 money-transfer locations and plans to have 900 bank locations
nationwide. Aside from their wide networks, it is also obvious that the high migrant
patronage for MTO services could be attributed to their easier accessibility to migrants
and recipients, longer working hours including during weekends and holidays, and
possibly less tedious and flexible paperwork compared to banks (ERCOF and IOM,
2010a: 26). In addition to its own outlets, Western Union has partnerships with local
banks. In Malaysia, one of them is Bumiputra Commerce Bank, which processes
remittance transactions from Filipinos using the Western Union channel (ERCOF and
IOM, 2010b: 55).
With regard to banking networks, the interconnection of the Philippines’ three major
automated teller machine (ATM) networks (i.e., Megalink, Bancnet and Expressnet) has
led to ease and increased access of withdrawals by remittance beneficiaries (ERCOF
and IOM, 2010b: 61). Moreover, three Philippine banks18 cooperate with Malaysian
commercial banks to offer remittance services to overseas Filipinos in Malaysia.
Among Malaysian banks, Maybank has branches in the Philippines and also serves
Filipino remitters (ERCOF and IOM, 2010b: 63).
For enhancing competition in the remittance industry, the Philippines’ central bank has
been screening and monitoring as well as approving applications from various financial
18 These banks are Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company or Metrobank, Bank of the Philippine Islands,
and Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation.
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institutions to open up more remittance channels. One notable example is the approval
in 2003 of mobile phone remittance payments by two large communications Philippine
companies, Smart Communications and Globe Telecoms. The mobile remittance system
has become an alternative remittance channel. The prospects of more frequent use of
mobile phone remittances would depend on how remittance charges compete with the
charges of other remittance channels. The charge for mobile phone remittances includes
the cost of text messages that recipient households receive. Including this cost makes
the remittance charge for mobile phone remittances nearly at the same level as that for
the regular remittance channels (ERCOF and IOM, 2010b: 61).
2.5.4 Exchange rates
Overseas Filipinos work in more than 200 countries abroad. They endure unpredictable
exchange rate movements when they send money back home. Due to the 1997 Asian
financial crisis, many OFWs experienced sudden changes in exchange rates. However,
the changes were different depending on OFWs’ locations. For example, the U.S. dollar
and currencies of the main Middle Eastern destinations of OFWs appreciated by 50 per
cent against the Philippine peso during the period of July 1997-October 1998. Due to
the sharp depreciation of the Philippine peso against the dollar, the amount of
remittances sent by land-based workers in the United States leaped in 1998 (see Figure
2.9). The currencies of Taiwan, Singapore and Japan also appreciated against the
Philippine currency by 26 per cent, 29 per cent, and 32 per cent, respectively, during the
same period. On the other hand, the Malaysian and Korean currencies dropped by one
per cent and four per cent, respectively (Yang, 2008: 592). The appreciation of a
currency against the Philippine peso in a migrant’s host country leads to increases in a
household’s receipt in pesos of remittances from overseas (Yang, 2008).
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In order to reduce the layers of remittance processing, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP) or the Philippine central bank granted licenses for rural banks and cooperative
banks to operate foreign currency deposit units. This gives overseas remitters the
convenience to receive their wages in foreign currencies instead of immediately
converting them into the Philippine pesos (ERCOF and IOM, 2010b: 61). Foreign
currency deposit accounts operated by rural and cooperative banks can also encourage
the flow of foreign exchange into the local banking system and provide overseas
Filipinos with an option to maintain foreign currency deposits.
Figure 2. 9: Philippine peso-U.S. Dollar Exchange rate and remittances sent by land-based
workers in the United States
Source: Author’s calculation based on BSP statistics (http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics)
2.5.5 Stock of migrant workers
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) are Filipinos who are employed abroad. OFWs
mainly consist of three types of workers: (1) overseas contract workers (OCW); (2)
workers with a valid working visa or work permits; and (3) Filipinos with non-
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immigrant visa but working full-time abroad. According to technical notes19 on the
Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF), Filipino overseas contract workers (OCW) are
defined as ‘workers who are presently and temporarily out of the country to fulfil an
overseas work contract for a specific length of time or who are presently at home on
vacation but still have an existing contract to work abroad’. 20 The OCW can be
categorised as land-based21 or sea-based22 workers. In addition, there is another type of
OFWs. They are not contract workers, but have valid working visas or work permits.
For example, crew members of foreign airplanes (such as pilots and flight attendants)
are included in this category. OFWs also include overseas Filipinos working full-time
with non-migrant visas (such as tourist/visitor, student, medical etc.). However, even if
Filipinos are working abroad, the following workers are not considered as OFWs: (1)
Filipinos who worked or are working abroad for the Philippines government (such as
Philippine embassies, missions and consulates); (2) Filipinos who are sent abroad by the
Philippine government or by private institutes for training, scholarship etc.; (3) Filipinos
who are hired abroad as consultants/advisers of international organizations (such as the
United Nation groups, International Monetary Fund, etc.) ; (4) Long-term/permanent
migrants to foreign countries.
The inclusion of some Filipino workers such as pilots and flight attendants working for
foreign air carriers and tourists and students working full-time abroad can overestimate
19 Available at http://www.census.gov.ph/data/technotes/notesof.html
20 There are some limitations of the accuracy of the SOF. First, the OFW included in the data are those
whose families still live in the Philippines as of time of survey visit. Second, the OFWs included were
those working abroad between April 1 and September 30 of the reference year. Third, the OFWs who
were at home during their vacation and left before April 1of the reference year were also included in the
data as long as they work abroad as full time employees.
21 Land-based workers are defined on the SOF as ‘overseas contract workers who are hired either by
direct hiring of an employer abroad or through the assistance of Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) or through a private and licensed recruitment agency’.
22 Sea-based workers are defined by the SOF as ‘overseas contract workers who worked or are working in
any kind of international fishing/passenger/cargo vessels….who worked or are working for a shipping
company abroad’.
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the true size of migrant workers as they are not migrant workers per se. However, they
act as a player to send remittances to the Philippines. Thus, in this thesis we decided to
use the number of OFWs not OCWs.
The OFWs have been scattered far and wide in the world. The total number of OFWs
deployed reached 1.42 million (i.e. daily average 3900 people) in 2009 (POEA, 2009).
Among them, 1.09 million OFWs are land-based, while 0.33 million workers are sea-
based. An increase in the number of deployed workers makes over 8.2 million Filipinos
(or almost ten per cent of the population) living outside the country already as of
December 2008. Nearly half of them are temporary contract workers, mostly based in
the Middle East (CFO, 2008). The top three destinations of the land-based overseas
Filipino workers (OFWs) in 2009 are Saudi Arabia (26.7 per cent of total land-based
workers), followed by United Arab Emirates (18.0 per cent) and Hong Kong (9.2 per
cent). Figure 2.10 shows the trends in the deployment of land-based OFWs over the
period 1985-2009. This figure emphasizes the sharp increase in deployment of land-
based OFWs to the Middle East since 2004. In 2009, 60 per cent of them were deployed
in the Middle East. The growth rate of the number of deployed Filipino workers in the
Middle East has been positive between 2004 and 2008, while the rate in Asian
destinations has been negative during the same period. Despite the global economic and
financial crisis, the number of sea-based OFWs leaped in 2009 as some ship owners
preferred hiring Filipinos and replaced other foreign workers with comparatively cheap,
English-speaking and well qualified Filipino seafarers.
The main destination countries of deployed land-based OFWs during the period of
1998-2009 are shown in Figure 2.11. The top destination is Saudi Arabia where more
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than a quarter of the OFWs have been deployed every year. United Arab Emirates
(UAE) and Qatar also have been dramatically exerting a strong presence as a destination.
The share of deployed land-based OFWs increased from 7.5 per cent to 18.0 per cent in
UAE and from 2.2 per cent to 8.2 per cent in Qatar between 2003 and 2009. On the
other hand, among Asian countries, Hong Kong and Taiwan have been losing their
share due to the strong presence of the Middle East though the number of the OFWs to
Hong Kong has been increasing mainly due to strong demand for female domestic
helpers.
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Figure 2. 10: Trends in the Deployment of land-based OFWs by major world group
Figure 2.10a: Number of deployed land-based OFWs, 1985-2009
Figure 2.10b: Growth rate, 1986-2009
Note: The numbers of deployed OFWs are New hires and Rehires.
Source: POEA Statistics http://www.poea.gov.ph/html/statistics.html
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Figure 2. 11: Deployed land-based OFWs by main destinations, New hires and Rehires (% of
total land-based OFWs), 1998-2009
Note: The percentage shows the share of deployed OFWs out of the total new hires and rehires land-
based OFWs.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
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Over half of the deployed OFWs are rehired. A high proportion of rehires shows the
preference of employers for migrant workers with previous work experiences abroad
(Orbeta and Abrigo, 2009: 2). Furthermore, a low share of newly hired OFWs results
from the lack of qualified skilled manpower. This is partly because of the lagging
economy and insufficient construction activity that has failed to produce the
experienced workers who could be deployed abroad (Mamanglu, 2010). Figure 2.12
clearly shows the declining share of professional OFWs since 2004. The number of the
newly hired professionals became half in 2009 from its peak in 2004.
Figure 2. 12: Trend in deployed land-based OFWs by Major Occupational Category, New hires,
2003-2009
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
Statistics
Among the newly hired OFWs, the female share has been increasing over time (see
Figure 2.13). The numbers of new female migrants have been overwhelming male
counterparts except in 2007, when more than 100,000 male migrant were newly
deployed into South Korea and Taiwan as production workers, and into Saudi Arabia as
labourers, construction workers and plumbers.
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Figure 2. 13: Gender share of Newly Hired OFWs (%), 1992-2009
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
Statistics
In 2009, 77 per cent of the newly hired land-based OFWs were production or service
workers, which are mainly dominated by male and female workers respectively (Table
2.4). In the production industry, male OFWs work as wiremen, plumbers, and welders
mostly in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. On the other hand, female service workers mainly
work as domestic helpers in Hong Kong, Kuwait, and UAE, waiters and bartenders in
Saudi Arabia and UAE, cleaners in Saudi Arabia, and caregivers and caretakers in
Taiwan (POEA, 2009).
Table 2. 4: Newly hired land-based OFWs by major occupation and gender in 2009
Major Occupational Group Male (%) Female (%) Total
Professional, Medical, Technical 25859 54.0 22026 46.0 47886
Administrative, Managerial 797 61.8 493 38.2 1290
Clerical 5408 35.1 9995 64.9 15403
Sales 3166 37.9 5182 62.1 8348
Service 21643 15.7 116578 84.3 138222
Agricultural 1077 79.8 272 20.2 1349
Production 97240 82.7 20369 17.3 117609
Others 1264 76.8 383 23.3 1645
Grand Total 156454 47.2 175298 52.8 331752
Source: POEA (2009)
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Several factors affect the trend in the number of migrant workers. At the macro level,
there are three key international migration drivers: economic, social, and cultural
backgrounds; increasing demand for labour in the global economy; and Philippine
governmental policy on international migration. Figure 2.14 shows how these three
factors cause an increase in the numbers of OFWs.
Figure 2. 14: Determining factors of the number of OFWs
Increase in the number of
Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs)
Economic, Social, historical, and
Cultural Factors (Supply Side)
Governmental Policy
Globalisation (Demand Side)
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The Philippine economic situations explain the supply side of international labour
migration. The economic situations within the Philippines are more vulnerable
compared to other Asian countries. These situations would implicitly make Filipino
workers decide to go abroad. In addition, social, historical, or cultural factors also could
drive Filipino workers to find a job abroad. On the other hand, globalisation denotes the
demand side of international labour migration. The globalisation allowed more Filipino
workers to work in more destination countries all over the world. There is a great
demand for cheap, reliable, and English-speaking labour in the world. Finally,
Philippine governmental policies on international labour migration play an important
role as an intervening factor between the first and second factors, which are highly
correlated.
2.5.5.1 Economic background
The high level of unemployment in the Philippines has naturally made overseas
employment more attractive (Balisacan and Hill, 2003: 296). In addition, compared to
other Asian countries, a lower per capita gross domestic product (GDP), higher income
inequality, and a weaker industry structure have served to push Filipino workers
overseas. There are two main reasons for the country’s poor employment performance;
weak economic growth and rapid population growth. The rapid increase in the size of
the labour force can be attributed not only to a high population growth but also to the
steady increase in the participation of women in the workforce. Unemployment among
young and educated workers is a common phenomenon in the Philippines. In the 1970s
and early 1980s, most unemployed were in the 15-24 year age group and had been
educated to primary or secondary level (Reyes, Milan, and Sanchez 1989). Even today,
youth unemployment rates remain very high at more than 15 per cent while the total
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unemployment rates fluctuate between the five and ten per cent (see Figure 2.15). An
increasing proportion of the unemployed now possess a tertiary education. The
percentage of total unemployed with at least some college education increased from 31
per cent in 1998 to 40 per cent in 2006 (see Figure 2.15). Even more telling is the
proportion with a college degree, which increased from 8.5 per cent in 1980 to 14.8 per
cent in 2000. This could be taken to imply a serious waste of human resources.
Figure 2. 15: Unemployment rates in the Philippines
Figure 2.15a: Youth unemployment and total unemployment rates, 1980-2008
Figure 2.15b: Unemployment rates by educational attainments of the unemployed, 1998-2007
Source: World Development Indicator Online
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Moreover, recently there has been an indication that the Philippine economy has
experienced the Dutch disease phenomenon. The huge inflow of remittances into the
country appreciates the Philippine peso against the currencies OFWs earned in their
destinations. This appreciation of the Philippine peso makes the domestic industries,
especially manufacturing sectors, lose their competitiveness as imported products get
relatively cheaper and domestic goods become less attractive to purchase. Amador et al.
(2007) found that remittances have led to symptoms of the Dutch disease phenomenon
in the Philippines. They found that a huge remittance flow into the country have
contributed to the appreciation of the peso in real terms as well as to the shift in output
and employment away from the tradable goods sector toward the non-tradable goods
sector.
2.5.5.2 Culture of international migration
In the early 1900s, Filipino migrants were recruited for plantation work in Hawaii due
to labour shortages caused by the Chinese exclusion acts of 1875, 1882, and 1903, and
the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1906-1907, which banned Japanese labourers. Labour
recruiters found Filipinos in Ilocos, which is an agrarian region in the Philippines, to be
an effective labour force. In this way, historically, people from the Ilocos region possess
a culture of international migration. The Ilocos region remains a major source of
international migration (Tyner, 2001: 179-180). The culture of international migration
in a certain area provides one of the key international migration drivers.
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2.5.5.3 Risk-aversion and close family ties
Most of the male OFWs are doing construction work or providing labour on the docks,
which are typically seasonal. On the other hand, female OFWs’ work may yield a more
stable annual income even though the average wage per day for female OFWs may be
less than that for male OFWs. This stability of female migrant income may be strongly
preferred by risk-averse rural families because it minimises the variance in their
household income (Lauby and Stark, 1988: 485). In addition, there seems to be another
reason why Filipino households with several children prefer to send females to work
abroad. It is found that Filipino households might interpret remittances from daughters
as more reliable rather than from sons because daughters tend to keep closer family ties
with their family members even after they get married. In Asia, there is evidence that
female migrants are more likely to send remittances than male (see for example, Niimi
and Reilly, 2008 for Viet Nam). This could be explained by the feature of some Asian
countries like the Philippines which is that ‘daughters are taught to be responsible
family members, taking care of young siblings, for example, while sons are given more
freedom and are expected to be more independent’ (Lauby and Stark, 1988: 485).
Furthermore, other research shows the evidence of the altruistic motives of migration by
Filipino females. For example, Ballescas (1992: 23) mentioned that female overseas
artists ‘…do not leave for their own selves but for the sake of their families-their parents,
their spouses and children, their brothers and sisters’. Another example of the altruism
of Filipino females is shown by Nuqui (1993: 17), who argued that ‘Filipino women
often take it upon themselves to sacrifice everything for the sake and well-being of their
family. That is why even if the jobs available to the Filipino women entail high risk or
sometimes debasement of their dignity, they just ignore the obvious danger, notably
sexual abuse and other related crimes, that awaits them and the possible stigma by
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society in the hope that their stint abroad would pay off in terms of a better quality of
life for her family’ (quoted from Tyner, 2004: 88).
2.5.5.4 Expansion of the global labour market
The second key factor is an expanding global labour market. Migrant workers are
necessary to meet current needs in most developed countries. Due to the increasing pace
and the penetration of globalisation, Filipino workers have had more opportunities to
work overseas. For example, there is a demand for Filipino nurses, care-givers, and
housemaids in aging societies. On the other hand, the contemporary penetration of
globalisation, especially trade liberalisation, also impacts on the Philippine labour
market. In the Philippine economy, changes in demand for labour lead to changes in
employment or in wages (or both). Moreover, some Filipino skilled workers work at
multinational organizations, while others go to the Gulf countries, especially Saudi
Arabia, as construction workers.
The English speaking nature of schooling in the Philippines also provides potential for
employment opportunities abroad, especially in high-income English-speaking
countries. For example, there is a demand for the following jobs: nurses in Canada,
United States, and United Kingdom; caregivers in Canada; mathematics and science
teachers as well as IT engineers in United States. Furthermore, a booming Chinese
economy has created a demand for Filipino teachers and housemaids because of their
fluency in English.
In the Philippines, the number of nursing schools has been mushrooming and generating
a huge number of graduates every year. In 2009, over 70,000 graduates passed the
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Nursing Licensure Examination (Lorenzo et al., 2009). Most exam passers are planning
to work abroad. In contrast, mathematics, science, and engineering are not popular
programs at the tertiary level. However, these subjects are very important for
technological innovation which is the engine of economic growth. Lack of scientists and
engineers may render the Philippine potential economic growth low in the future. For
the Philippine long term growth, the education sector needs to produce large numbers of
maths and science students rather than just those fluent in English (Alba, 2009).
2.5.5.5 Governmental policies and institutions for migration
The third factor influencing an increase in the number of deployed OFWs is Filipino
governmental policies for migration and remittances. The governmental policy on
overseas employment was first introduced in 1974. The 1974 Labor Code aims to
protect Filipinos who wish to work overseas, strengthen functions of government
institutions for overseas employment, and rationalise the participation of private
recruitment agencies (Orbeta, Abrigo, and Cabalfin, 2009). The government created
agencies specifically to cater for the needs of overseas workers—the Overseas
Employment Development Board, the National Seamen's Board, and the Bureau of
Employment Services—when overseas employment was introduced as a measure to
ease domestic unemployment in the 1970s. These three agencies were merged in 1982.
The Philippine government has crafted a programme that examines the employment
process from beginning to end—from application for an overseas job to a worker's
reintegration upon return (IOM, 2005). Within three decades, several institutions have
been spawned to manage almost every aspect of migration and worker deployment
(Orbeta, Abrigo, and Cabalfin, 2009). Figure 2.16 shows the current Philippine
government institutions which manage overseas migration. Here, we explain their main
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roles on international migration focusing on the following institutions: Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA); Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA); National Reintegration Center for OFWs (NRCO);
Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO); and Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
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Figure 2. 16: Philippine government institutions managing migration
Source: Orbeta, Abrigo, and Cabalfin (2009)
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(a) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was established in 1982
with the re-organization of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The
POEA is mandated to promote and monitor temporary overseas employment of Filipino
workers and to protect their rights. After promulgation of the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (or RA 8042)23, the legal mandate of the POEA was
reinforced by affirming its role of regulating private participation in the recruitment and
overseas placement of Filipino workers, and of promoting and monitoring their overseas
employment. On the other hand, pursuant to section 29 (Comprehensive Deregulation
Plan on Recruitment Activities) and section 30 (Gradual Phase-out of Regulatory
Functions) of RA 8042, the governmental policy on overseas employment was
supposed to deregulate the recruitment and overseas placement process. In 2007,
however, with RA 942224, the regulatory functions of the POEA were strengthened
(Orbeta, Abrigo, and Cabalfin, 2009). RA 9422 repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA
8042, which allowed private sectors to recruit and deploy migrant workers in an
"unregulated atmosphere" (Senate of the Philippines, 2007).
The on-site extension of the POEA is the Philippine Overseas Labor Offices (POLOs),
manned by Philippine Labour Attachés. The POLOs provide the following services:
ensuring adequate protection for OFWs through verification of labour documents;
providing on-site assistance to OFWs; seeking new employment opportunities for
23 See POEA website: http://www.poea.gov.ph/rules/ra8042.html
24 Republic Act No.9422, signed on April 10 2007, is an act to strengthen the regulatory functions of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), amending for this purpose Republic Act no.
8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995".
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Filipino job seekers; organizing socio-cultural activities and programs to help OFWs re-
integrate to Philippine communities.
(b) Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)
In 1977, under the DOLE, a Welfare and Training Fund for Overseas Workers
(WTFOW) was established. Then, in 1980, the WTFOW was renamed the Welfare
Fund for Overseas Workers (Welfund). The Welfund was mandated to provide social
and welfare services to Filipino migrant workers, such as insurance coverage, legal
assistance, placement assistance and remittance services. In 1987, with the re-
organization of the DOLE, the Welfund was renamed Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA). The OWWA is mandated to deliver welfare services and
benefits to temporary migrant workers, and to ensure sustainability and fund viability
for the continuous protection of migrant workers. The OWWA’s welfare services of
OFWs and their families include the following programs and services: insurance and
health care program; education and training programs; family welfare and assistance
programs; and workers’ assistance and on-site services (Orbeta, Abrigo, and Cabalfin,
2009). These OWWA’s operations, programs and services are funded by the
contributions which have to be paid by foreign employers for each departing OFWs,
which is currently US$25 per person. The OWWA pools and invests the money on
high-yielding financial instruments.
With regard to insurance for OFWs, on November 18 2009, the bicameral committee
approved the mandatory insurance for land-based OFWs who are hired by their
recruitment agencies though migrant workers and civil society groups have objected to
the passage of this mandatory insurance for migrants. The reason the groups have been
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campaigning against the mandatory insurance is that the insurance will benefit the
recruiters, rather the migrant workers. The mandatory insurance will also shield the
government and the recruiters from their responsibility to protect the OFWs (Ballescas,
2009 November 19 & 26). Filipino migrants and trade union groups asserted that the
insurance should be voluntary as there are already various mandatory insurance
programs for OFWs.
(c) National Reintegration Center for Overseas Filipino Workers (NRCO)
The National Reintegration Center for OFWs (NRCO), which is a part of DOLE, was
established in 2007. The NRCO aims to optimize the benefits of overseas employment
for OFWs, their families, communities and the Philippines. The role of NRCO is to act
as a one-stop centre and a networking hub of reintegration services for OFWs. The
NRCO offers the following services: counselling services; capability enhancement
services; wage employment services; assistance desk; the “Classroom Galing sa
Mamamayang Pilipino Abroad” (CGMA) project.
First, OFW counselling services guide OFWs and their families on values formation and
preparing for eventual reintegration by providing re-entry options such as employment
and investment opportunities, participating in brain-gain initiatives and retirement
programs, sharing their expertise as part of their social and economic commitments in
their respective communities. Second, OFW capability enhancement services equip
OFWs and their families with knowledge and skills to enhance the employability of
return migrants. Third, wage employment services are job search assistance for Filipino
expatriates who would like to work within the Philippines. Fourth, an assistance desk
provides face-to-face as well as on-line answers to questions of OFWs. Finally, the
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CGMA project is one of the priorities of the DOLE in support of the basic education
agenda of the government. The project aims to solicit donations from OFWs to build
classrooms in elementary and secondary public schools with critical shortages
countrywide (Orbeta, Abrigo, and Cabalfin, 2009). 25
(d) Commission on Filipino Overseas (CFO)
In 1980, the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) replaced the Office of Emigrant
Affairs, which was established in 1978. The CFO primarily registers and provides pre-
departure orientation seminars (PDOS) to permanent residents and emigrants. The
PDOS is a half-day to one-day orientation seminar required for Filipino workers to get
informational materials as well as contacts of diplomatic and labour staffs, NGOs, or
other persons that workers might need to call in case of emergencies. The PDOS
curriculum is observed not to be uniform as some PDOS contain information on
remittances, savings and investments whereas others include information on services
available as a result of OWWA membership (ERCOF and IOM, 2010a: 115). In
addition, the CFO promotes the transfer of technology, and material and financial
contributions from overseas to development activities for the communities all over the
Philippines. It also provides younger generations of overseas Filipino with opportunities
to learn Philippine history, culture, institutions and the Filipino language.26 The CFO is
also designated as the anti-trafficking focal point in the government (ERCOF and IOM,
2010b: 94).
25 See NRCO website:http://www.nrco.dole.gov.ph/
26 See CFO website: http://www.cfo.gov.ph/
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(e) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was created in 1989. The DFA enters into
bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements or arrangements with foreign countries to
promote the interests of the Philippines and overseas Filipinos. The Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (or RA8042) provided the framework for stronger
protection of OFWs with the designation of the Office of the Legal Assistant for
Migrant Workers’ Affairs (OLAMWA) under the DFA with the rank of
undersecretary.27 In 2003, the OLAMWA was renamed Office of the Undersecretary for
Migrant Workers Affairs (OUMWA). The OUMWA provides the legal and consular
assistance and services for Filipino migrant workers and overseas Filipinos in distress.
The DFA established the Overseas Absentee Voting Secretariat (OAVS), which assists
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and coordinates all election activities in all
voting posts around the world (Orbeta, Abrigo, and Cabalfin, 2009).
The above government institutions support Filipino working overseas. Initially, the
Philippine government sought to regulate the market by acting as the sending agency for
all departing workers. However, the government decided to reduce its placement
function in 1982 because it realized that market demand was so significant that acting as
an intermediary would be more efficient. Currently, the government operates a licensing
system for recruitment agencies deploying land-based workers and for manning
agencies that place Filipino seafarers, or sea-based OFWs, on ocean-going vessels or for
other related maritime activities. As of 12 June 2007, the POEA has granted licenses to
3,168 recruitment agencies. Only 1,431 (or 45 per cent) were operating in good standing.
The other agencies were no longer operating for several reasons such as cancelled
27 See DFA website: http://dfa.gov.ph/?page_id=16
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licenses or having been delisted (COA, 2008:74-75). An increase in licensed
recruitment agencies enables more Filipino workers to work overseas. In order to recruit
and deploy land-based OFWs, there are two types of recruitment agencies: private
employment agencies and service/construction contractors. Private agencies help
Philippine labour to find a job by foreign clients as principal employers, whereas
service/construction contractors provide labour through the deployment of Philippine
companies with the Philippine company receiving the foreign labour contract.
In the case of Filipino overseas temporary contract workers, the bilateral agreements
between the Philippines and the receiving countries would also be significant because a
standard employment contract is prescribed by the POEA based on minimum standards
of terms and conditions of overseas work that are negotiated with host countries as part
of the bilateral agreements concluded with them (IOM, 2005). Bilateral agreements are
concluded between migrant countries of origin and migrant host countries to manage
migration flows. As of September 2009, the Philippines has made 44 bilateral labour
agreement with 22 countries on employment, welfare and general labour cooperation,
twelve social security agreements with ten countries and 44 agreements on the
recognition of seafarers’ certificates since 1974 when the overseas employment program
began (Go, 2010). The existence of these bilateral agreements and arrangements with
migrant host countries would have a positive effect on the number of overseas Filipino
workers. According to Senate President Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada, OFWs are vulnerable
to abuse and maltreatment especially in countries with which the Philippine government
does not have bilateral labour agreements. Thus, to protect OFWs, he suggested that the
government should promote bilateral labour agreements with countries hosting OFWs
and also that the POEA should strictly enforce RA 9422, which strengthened the
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POEA’s regulatory functions against private agencies recruiting and deploying OFWs
without ensuring the workers’ protection as well as illegal recruiters (Senate of the
Philippines, 2007).
(f) Compulsory Retention of Remittances
During the 1980s, the government mandated through Executive Order (EO) 857 certain
types of overseas Filipinos to send a required percentage of remittance amounts to the
country. That executive order, approved on 13 December 1982, called on seafarers,
workers for construction companies, and professionals such as doctors, engineers,
teachers, nurses, and other professionals whose contracts provide for free-board and
lodging, to remit 70 per cent of their salaries. Other professional workers whose
contracts do not provide for free-board and lodging, domestic workers, and all other
types of overseas workers were compelled to remit 50 per cent of their earnings.28 EO
857 imposed penalties for those who did not comply with this forced remittance. If
contract workers fail to comply with the requirements of EO 857, they are suspended or
excluded from the list of eligible workers for overseas employment. In cases of
subsequent violations, they are repatriated from the job site at the expense of the
employer or at their own expense. However, this forced remittance law created a wide
protest among many OFWs and they did not follow this law. Due to the resounding
resistance of migrant workers and their families, EO 1021, promulgated on the 1st May
1985, abolished the compulsory remittance retention system under EO 857. In any case,
seafarers are required by a clause in their contracts, to retain 80 per cent of their salaries
28 See the website of The Lawphil Project, Arellano Law Foundation, in
http://www.lawphil.net/executive/execord/eo1982/eo_857_1982.html
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which are remitted by their respective manning agencies to their allottees or designated
beneficiaries (ERCOF and IOM, 2010a: 19).
2.6 Summary
This chapter has mainly described international remittances into the Philippines. First,
the chapter has shown increasing flows of international remittances into developing
countries in the last three decades. Recently, the flows have dramatically increased in
East Asia & the Pacific and in South Asia mainly because of a sudden rise in
remittances into India and China. The chapter then focused on the flows into the
Philippines. The Philippines ranks as the fourth biggest recipient of remittances
worldwide with a positive and stable inflow growth rate reaching US$ 18.76 billion by
2010. Then, the chapter explained about some features of remittances into the
Philippines in terms of their types, modes, places of origins, and the size of remittances
by types of migrants’ work and by migrants’ gender. These features will prove helpful
in understanding and interpreting the empirical findings of this thesis. Moreover, the
chapter has also explained the factors contributing to the continuous and sharp increase
in remittance flows into the Philippines. It has also focused on describing the following
factors: remittance channels; transaction costs of remittances; remittance networks and
services; exchange rate fluctuations; and the stock of OFWs. In addition, the chapter has
also explained the idiosyncratic features of key drivers of international migration for
Filipino workers. We mainly explained the following three factors: (1) economic
circumstances as well as social, historical, and cultural backgrounds; (2) increasing
demand for labour in the global economy; and (3) Philippine governmental policies on
international migration, and the chapter described the important roles of Philippine
governmental institutions in managing international migration from the Philippines.
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Chapter 3: Data on International Migration and Remittances
for the Philippines
Unlike most developing countries, the Philippines has fairly well developed statistical
data on international migration and remittances. This chapter describes the sources of
the main data used in this thesis and the definitions of the variables used for the
analyses. First, with taking advantage of the detailed information on the OFWs, this
chapter begins by describing the features of the Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF) and
then illustrates the important characteristics of Family Income and Expenditure Survey
(FIES), which are the household surveys that this thesis mainly exploits.
3.1 Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF)
3.1.1 Scope and coverage
According to the technical notes on the Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF), the SOFs
are nationwide surveys that seek to gather information on Filipino citizens including
overseas workers29 who went abroad during the last five years. Data on their remittances
are gathered using the most recent six month reference period. The SOFs are conducted
as a rider to the October round of the Philippine Labor Force Survey (LFS) every year.
As of December 2010, the SOF are available from 1993 to 2008. The SOFs provide
more accurate data on the number of OFWs, their socio-economic characteristics and
29 Data collection of the characteristics of overseas workers started in 1982 using a one-page
questionnaire in the Integrated Survey of Households (ISH) and continued until 1986. In 1987, during the
revision of the ISH Form 2 or the Labor Force Survey (LFS) questionnaire, a column indicator for
overseas contract workers (OCWs) was added to get the estimate of the number of OCWs. With the
increasing demand for information on overseas workers, the Survey on Overseas Workers (SOW) was
resumed in 1991 revising the previous questionnaire to generate more comprehensive data. Data on
international migration were gathered in the 1988 National Demographic Survey (NDS). With the
expanded coverage of the 1993 NDS on health and immunization, the section of international migration
was deleted from the NDS but recommended for inclusion in SOW starting 1992. Hence, the SOW is
renamed to SOF.
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the amount and mode of remittances, in cash and in kind, received by their families. The
SOF data, however, have the following limitations. First, the OFWs include people who
had no working visa or work permits (i.e., tourist, visitor, student, medical, and other
types of non-immigrant visas) but were employed and working full time in other
countries. Second, the OFWs covered in the survey were Filipinos working abroad
during the period of 1 April to 30 September, not for a whole year. Finally, the SOFs
have no information on the OFWs’ salaries. Thus, the remittances presented in the SOFs
would be a part of the total salary earned by the OFWs. Even acknowledging these
limitations, the SOFs represent one of the most useful data sources to capture several
features of international remittance (e.g., amounts, types and modes), and migrant
workers (e.g., age, gender, jobs, host countries, and length of stay abroad).
3.1.2 Survey design
The survey design of the SOF can be found on the National Statistics Office (NSO)
website.30 Here, we summarise some important aspects of the survey design from the
technical notes on the SOF.
Sampling methodology
The sampling design of the SOF adopts that of the Integrated Survey of Household
which uses the new master sample design starting in July 1996. The multi-stage
sampling design of the master sample consists of 3,416 sample barangays (2,045 urban
and 1,371 rural) in the expanded sample for provincial level estimates with a sub-
sample of 2,247 sample barangays designated as the core master sample for regional
30 See technical notes on the Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF)
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/technotes/notesof.html
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level estimates. In the first stage of sample selection, the list of barangays with the
household and population counts is used based on the results of the 1995 Census of
Population, and then at the second stage sampling units are selected in the enumeration
areas. The sample barangays and sample enumeration areas were selected
systematically with probability proportional to size. For the third stage, sample
households are selected from the list of households of the 1995 Census of Population.
As mentioned above, the SOF is undertaken every year as a rider survey to the October
round of the Labor Force Survey (LFS). Thus, the SOF sample households are the same
as those for the LFS. For example, the completed interview response rate for October
2000 LFS was 93.2 per cent, whereas non-response rate was 6.8 per cent.
Sampling weight
Sampling weights are the inverse of the probability of sample selection. However, the
basic sampling weights are adjusted to account for non-response bias by applying a non-
response adjustment factor at the domain level. Using the adjusted sampling weight, the
estimated numbers of OFWs during the period of 1 April to 30 September are reported
in Table 3.1. Approximately half of OFWs are from National Capital Region (NCR) or
from its neighbouring regions such as Central Luzon and Southern Luzon. However, the
current weight adjustment procedure does not take into account any sudden increase in
the number of OFWs. Thus, in a year with any significant change in the number of
OFWs, the survey estimates might generate a larger margin of error.
68
Table 3. 1 Number and Percentage Distribution of OFWs by Region of Origin, 1996-2008
Source: Index of Overseas Filipino Workers Statistics from National Statistics Office (NSO) website
(http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/datasof.html)
3.2 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES)
3.2.1 Scope and coverage
As of December 2010, the FIES in the Philippines is available every three years from
1985 to 2006. 31 This survey collects income and consumption information for a
nationally and regionally representative cross-section of Filipino households.
Undertaken by the National Statistical Office (NSO) in the Philippines, the FIES is the
only official household survey of income and expenditure patterns. The main objective
of the survey is to obtain information about expenditure patterns, income sources and
inequality. The survey provides information on sources of income (both cash and in-
kind), household characteristics (such as family size, marital status and the number of
children by age group), and job-related information (such as earnings and employment
status). Furthermore, the survey asks respondents to report on a variety of transfers,
including remittances, both in-kind and cash, from domestic sources and from overseas.
31 The FIES are also available for 1961, 1965, 1971, 1975, and 1979. The data on total cash receipt and
assistance from abroad, however, is available after the 1985 FIES. The survey conducted in 1975 and
1979 were not published because of serious under-reporting of income.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of OFWs (in thousands) 900 1,013 904 1,016 978 1,029 1,056 982 1,063 1,326 1,515 1,747 2,002
Region of origin (%)
NCR 16.2 19.1 17.8 19.5 17.6 19.4 20.5 18.5 18.3 17.4 16.4 16 14
CAR 2.4 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.2 1.7 2.0 2.3 2 2.2 2.1 1.9
Ilocos 11.8 12.5 10.2 9.4 10.1 10.1 8.5 8.4 8.1 8.7 7.6 7.7 7.8
Cagayan 5.3 5.0 5.5 3.7 5.5 5.6 5.9 6.4 5.4 4.6 5.3 5.9 5.5
Central Luzon 16.0 12.0 14.6 14.3 12.9 13.1 13.4 12.1 14.0 13.4 14.5 14.3 14.5
Southern Luzon 16.9 18.9 17.4 19.0 20.2 17.8 19.2 18.7 19.0 19.1 18.1 19.4 20.6
Bicol 3.4 2.7 3.3 3.3 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.5 3 3.1
Western Visayas 9.4 9.4 9.8 8.6 9.2 8.7 9.1 10.0 8.7 8.5 9.5 8.5 7.8
Central Visayas 4.9 4.2 4.3 5.3 5.3 4.5 3.6 5.3 4.6 5.3 5.5 5.1 5.6
Eastern Visayas 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.3 2.3 1.9 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.9
Western Mindanao 1.9 3.0 2.7 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.7 1.8 2.1 1.8 2.2 2 1.8
Northern Mindanao 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.5 2.9 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.8
Southern Mindanao 4.1 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.4 2.6 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.6 2.8
Central Mindanao 1.0 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.7 3.2 2.8 3.5 4 4.2 4.5
Caraga 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.4 1.1 1 1.2
ARMM 2.9 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.0 1.7 1.4 1.3 2.9 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.3
69
The survey’s definition of private transfers includes only inter-household transfers, so
that redistribution within the household is not measured (Cox, Hansen and Jimenez
2004: 2202; Balisacan and Hill 2003: 316).
3.2.2 Survey design
The survey design of the FIES is well explained by Ericta and Fabian (2009). Here, to
fully understand how the FIES is collected, we summarise some important aspects of
the survey design from Ericta and Fabian (2009).
Sampling methodology
With regard to sampling methodology, the FIES from 1985 and 1994 used a stratified
two-stage cluster sampling with the urban and rural classification of each province as
principal domains for the survey. Approximately 20,000 households were selected as a
national sample, which seems to be enough to provide reliable estimates of income and
expenditure levels for each province of the Philippines. The 1991 and 1994 FIES added
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which was newly created on
August 1 1989 through RA 673432, into the principal domain of the survey. Based on
the 1995 Census of Population, the master sample design was newly constructed. It used
a multi-stage sampling design with the selection of sample barangay for the first stage,
enumeration area for the second stage and households for the third stage. As a national
sample, about 41,000 sample households were interviewed for the 1997 and 2000 FIES.
Similarly, for the 2003 and 2006 FIES, the sampling frame was renewed using the 2000
32 RA 6734 is called as “An Act providing for an organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao”. See the website of The Lawphil Project, Arellano Law Foundation, in
http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1989/ra_6734_1989.html
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Census of Population and Housing. The 17 administrative regions33 were selected as a
sampling domain and around 51,000 sample households were interviewed (see Ericta
and Fabian, 2009: 12-15). In the case of the FIES, non-response rate is small. For
example, the technical notes on the 1997 FIES reports that total interview non-response
rate was only 3.6 per cent of the sample households.
Survey weight
The final survey weight is computed as the product of the base weight, the non-response
adjustment and the population weighting adjustments. However, weighted sample
distributions do not conform to population distributions. In general, sample estimates of
household counts fall short of true household counts as there is non-coverage resulting
from omission of units and from non-responses such as refusal, non-reachable areas and
others (see Ericta and Fabian, 2009: 21-23).
Comparability over time
We can compare some estimates derived from one FIES with results from another FIES
in real terms. The inflation effects can be removed by deflating the results with the
consumer price index (CPI) (see Ericta and Fabian, 2009: 26). For empirical analyses,
the CPI was used, if necessary, to remove the effects of inflation. With regard to
geographic classification, Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) is categorised as a
regional classification except for the 1985 FIES. In 1985, the provinces in this region
are divided into two classifications: Ilocos Region for Abra, Benguet, and Mountain
33 The 17 administrative regions are as follows: National Capital Region, Cordillera Administrative
Region, Ilocos, Cagayan Valley, Central Luzon, CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, Bicol, Western Visayas,
Central Visayas, Eastern Visayas, Zamboanga Peninsula, Northern Mindanao, Davao,
SOCCSKSARGEN, Caraga, and Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
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Province; and Cagayan Valley for Apayao, Ifugao, and Kainga.34 Compared to other
regions, sample size of CAR is quite small (around 2.2 per cent) in 1988. In 1985, the
percentage shares of sample households in Ilocos and Cagayan Valley are
approximately one percentage point higher each than those in 1988. These increases in
the shares would be simply because of inclusion of sample households in CAR. If we
compare regional differences between 1985 and other survey years, we should be
cautious about estimation results obtained for Ilocos Region and the Cagayan Valley.
Moreover, according to the technical notes on the 1997 FIES 35 , there is a major
difference in geographic classification between the 1994 and 1997 FIES. The 1997
FIES added the new classification of CARAGA region, located in the North-eastern
Mindanao, which was created on February 23, 1995. The CARAGA comprise the
provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte and Surigao del Sur.
The first three provinces were formerly part of Northern Mindanao whereas Surigao del
Sur was formerly part of Southern Mindanao. To avoid the usage of different regional
classification and to apply the clear and straightforward classification for the analyses in
this thesis, the regional categories for Mindanao were aggregated into one as a
Mindanao region. This enables us to compare results at the regional level even before
and after the 1997 FIES.
Data processing
The original data need to be processed for the following empirical chapters. For the
1985 FIES, five sample households were omitted because a household head’s
educational attainment was not reported, whereas due to incorrect data entry for the
same variable (i.e., the head’s education level) three households were deleted from the
34 See Annex I of Bautista and Lamberte (1990) for the regional classification of the 1985 FIES.
35 See technical notes on the 1997 Family Income and Expenditures (FIES)
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/technotes/notefies.html
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original sample households for the 2006 FIES. Table 3.2 reports the final sample
household for all the FIES as well as the numbers of original sample households and
those omitted for the empirical analysis.
Table 3. 2: Sample size of the FIES
Source: FIES
3.2.3 The Main variables
Remittance
With respect to the detailed information on remittances, the data on cash receipts from
abroad and those from within the Philippines are separately collected. The former
covers all cash receipts from all sources outside Philippine territory. These transfers
might originate from family members, non-relatives, foreign government and charitable
institutions. According to the NSO, the transfers from abroad comprise five items: (1)
cash received from a family member36 who is a contract worker37 abroad; (2) cash
received from a family member living abroad (immigrant, tourist, and those with
student visa); (3) pensions, retirements and other benefits received from the U.S.
government and other foreign government and enterprises. An example is the pension
received by World War II veterans from the U.S. government; (4) cash gifts and support
from relatives (except those under (1) and (2) categories above) or from charitable
groups and foreign government; (5) income from abroad accruing from dividends from
investment, net income from business, rental from properties and other property income.
36 The term ‘family member’ refers to an individual who would have been included as member of the
sample household had been in the Philippines at the time of the survey.
37 A contract worker is a person hired abroad for a definite period, like those in Saudi Arabia and other
Middle East countries, while non-contract workers are those who are abroad with no definite date of
return such as long-term/permanent migrants.
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Original Sample Size 16,546 18,429 24,124 24,165 38,442 39,615 42,094 38,483
Sample Omitted 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Final Sample Size 16,541 18,429 24,124 24,165 38,442 39,615 42,094 38,480
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On the other hand, cash receipts, support, assistance and relief from domestic sources
are received by family members from other families38 living in the country and from the
Philippine government. In addition, the transfers from domestic sources include cash
receipts from charitable institutions (for example, Red Cross, Department of Social
Welfare and Development etc).
Cash receipts from both abroad and within the Philippines, and gifts and other
assistance in kind39 from any of the above two sources were separately included. The
basic public use files (PUFs) of the FIES contain only the aggregated figures in terms of
both transfer from abroad and that from within the Philippines, not their figures relating
to the above fine classification. Tabuga (2007) mentions the possibility of an
overestimation of remittance amounts with inclusion of income from foreign investment
and pensions especially among high income households. However, according to Tabuga,
there seems to be no significant difference in the results even if we use a narrower
definition of remittances composed of three categories mentioned above (i.e., (1), (2),
and (4)) because there are only a few sample households with income from foreign
investment and pensions. For this thesis, due to a lack of access to the finer
classification of remittance the total amounts of transfers from abroad and domestic
sources received by each Filipino household are used as figures of international and
internal remittances received by each household.
Family Income and Expenditures
38 ‘Other families’ include those who are not enumerated as a member of the household if they are not
expected to return within 30 days from the date of their departure.
39 Gifts and other assistance in kind are measured in cash to calculate the total amount of transfers from
abroad and those from within the Philippines.
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A family is defined as a group of persons usually living together and composed of the
head and other persons related to the head by blood, marriage or adoption. For purposes
of the FIES, a single person living alone is considered as a separate family. Total family
income includes primary income and receipts from other sources received by all family
members. Primary income includes salaries and wages, compensation and net receipts
derived from family enterprises. Income from other sources includes imputed rental
values of owner-occupied dwelling units 40 , interests, rentals including landowner’s
share of agricultural products, pensions, support and the value of food and non-food
items received as gifts by the family. On the other hand, family expenditures refer to the
expenses or disbursements made by the family purely for personal consumption during
the survey year. They exclude all expenses in relation to farm or business operations,
investment ventures, purchase of real property and other disbursements which do not
involve personal consumption.
Urban/Rural Areas
Following the guidelines used in the 1980 Census of Population and Housing, areas
with the following aspects41 were categorised as urban areas: (1) in their entirety, all
cities and municipalities having a population density of at least 1,000 persons per square
kilometre; (2) slums or central districts of municipalities and cities which have a
population density of at least 500 persons per square kilometre; (3) slums or central
districts (not included in (1) and (2)), regardless of the population size, with some of
urban features such as road network, commercial and manufacturing establishments, a
town hall, church, park, cemetery, market, school, hospital, and library; (4) barangays42
having at least 1,000 inhabitants which meet the conditions set forth in (3) above, and
where the occupation of inhabitants is predominantly non-farming or non-fishing. All
areas not falling under any of the above classifications (i.e., (1) to (4)) are considered
rural. Table 3.3 reports the size and the percentage distribution of sample households in
each region with the urban/rural classifications. Overall, there seems to be no significant
change in the urbanisation category except for the 2003 FIES in which the urban aspect
was not considered.
40 Imputed rent is the estimated amount that the owner of a dwelling unit would charge if he/she were to
rent his/her entire dwelling unit monthly, unfurnished and excluding the costs for utilities.
41 See the technical notes on the 1997 FIES for more details.
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/technotes/notefies.html#data_processing
42 A barangay is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines and is the native Filipino term for
a village, district or ward.
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Table 3. 3: Number and Percentage Distribution of sample households by region and urbanity
Source: FIES
Note: Parentheses denote the share of sample households out of the grand total.
The variable identifying urban and rural areas is not available for the 2003 FIES.
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Philippines Grand Total 16,541 18,429 24,124 24,165 38,442 39,615 42,094 38,480
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Ilocos Total 1,225 1,105 1,332 1,331 1,864 1,887 2,449 2,258
(7) (6) (6) (6) (5) (5) (6) (6)
Urban 407 337 654 655 928 942 N.A. 837
(2) (2) (3) (3) (2) (2) (2)
Rural 818 768 678 676 936 945 N.A. 1,421
(5) (4) (3) (3) (2) (2) (4)
Cagayan Total 834 781 947 955 1,540 1,561 2,101 1,900
(5) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (5) (5)
Urban 227 190 341 347 554 569 N.A. 483
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
Rural 607 591 606 608 986 992 N.A. 1,417
(4) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (4)
Cluzon Total 1,684 1,925 2,630 2,616 3,728 3,770 3,389 3,114
(10) (10) (11) (11) (10) (10) (8) (8)
Urban 849 956 1,741 1,740 2,784 2,826 N.A. 1,910
(5) (5) (7) (7) (7) (7) (5)
Rural 835 969 889 876 944 944 N.A. 1,204
(5) (5) (4) (4) (2) (2) (3)
Sluzon Total 2,331 2,388 3,475 3,486 6,028 6,168 5,963 5,265
(14) (13) (14) (14) (16) (16) (14) (14)
Urban 1,134 1,110 2,149 2,161 3,911 3,999 N.A. 2,830
(7) (6) (9) (9) (10) (10) (7)
Rural 1,197 1,278 1,326 1,325 2,117 2,169 N.A. 2,435
(7) (7) (5) (5) (6) (5) (6)
Bicol Total 1,053 1,184 1,378 1,372 2,059 2,099 2,532 2,250
(6) (6) (6) (6) (5) (5) (6) (6)
Urban 313 351 569 584 951 979 N.A. 558
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (1)
Rural 740 833 809 788 1,108 1,120 N.A. 1,692
(4) (5) (3) (3) (3) (3) (4)
Wvsayas Total 1,472 1,648 1,998 1,986 2,934 3,014 2,970 2,716
(9) (9) (8) (8) (8) (8) (7) (7)
Urban 535 617 978 967 1,452 1,501 N.A. 824
(3) (3) (4) (4) (4) (4) (2)
Rural 937 1,031 1,020 1,019 1,482 1,513 N.A. 1,892
(6) (6) (4) (4) (4) (4) (5)
Cvisayas Total 1,240 1,391 1,738 1,766 2,217 2,333 2,892 2,503
(7) (8) (7) (7) (6) (6) (7) (7)
Urban 513 593 949 967 1,344 1,386 N.A. 1,222
(3) (3) (4) (4) (3) (3) (3)
Rural 727 798 789 799 873 947 N.A. 1,281
(4) (4) (3) (3) (2) (2) (3)
Evisayas Total 857 933 1,103 1,109 2,120 2,252 2,296 1,944
(5) (5) (5) (5) (6) (6) (5) (5)
Urban 248 282 428 432 1,120 1,168 N.A. 408
(1) (2) (2) (2) (3) (3) (1)
Rural 609 651 675 677 1,000 1,084 N.A. 1,536
(4) (4) (3) (3) (3) (3) (4)
Mindanao Total 3,562 4,122 5,346 5,398 10,484 10,728 11,909 10,540
(22) (22) (22) (22) (27) (27) (28) (27)
Urban 1,208 1,407 2,657 2,686 5,144 5,274 N.A. 3,276
(7) (8) (11) (11) (13) (13) (9)
Rural 2,354 2,715 2,689 2,712 5,340 5,454 N.A. 7,264
(14) (15) (11) (11) (14) (14) (19)
NCR Total 2,283 2,546 3,693 3,656 3,879 4,141 3,972 4,454
(14) (14) (15) (15) (10) (10) (9) (12)
Urban 2,283 2,546 3,693 3,656 3,879 4,141 N.A. 4,454
(14) (14) (15) (15) (10) (10) (12)
Rural 0 0 0 0 0 0 N.A. 0
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
CAR Total N.A. 406 484 490 1,589 1,662 1,621 1,536
(2) (2) (2) (4) (4) (4) (4)
Urban N.A. 198 244 248 692 739 N.A. 464
(1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (1)
Rural N.A. 208 240 242 897 923 N.A. 1,072
(1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (3)
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Relevant previous studies
Because of the richness of the datasets, large sample sizes, the availability of many
years, and a variety of important household variables, the FIES has been used by many
researchers investigating, inter alia, household income sources, expenditure behaviour,
income inequality and poverty. Fortunately, the FIES contains the information on the
amount and nature of remittances received. Therefore, the survey enables us to
undertake research on the effects of remittances, for example their effects on household
expenditure behaviour, inequality and poverty levels among households.
In order to examine the key research questions of this thesis, which are (1) determinants
of remittances, (2) the effects of remittances on expenditure inequality between
households, and (3) the effects of remittances on household educational expenditures,
we can derive a great deal of insights from using the FIES. Past studies have exploited
the advantages of the use of the FIES in this context (see for example, Alba and Sugui
(2009) for research on determinants of remittances; Balisacan (1991), Estudilo (1997),
Rodriguez (1998), Balisacan and Fuwa (2004), Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004),
Burgess and Haksar (2005), and Dakila and Dakila (2006) for studies on inequality;
Orbeta and Alba (1998), Ballesteros (2001), and Tabuga (2007) for research on
household expenditure behaviour). Lists of past studies which are relevant to the topics
of this thesis are summarised in Table 3.4.
Alba and Sugui (2009) investigated remittance motives using the combined data of the
2003 FIES and 2003 SOF. This combined data could make it possible to examine both
remittance motives of migrants and their recipient households. However, despite the
great benefit of using the combined FIES-SOF datasets, there are still several
disadvantages. For example, they are available only after 2000 FIES. Thus, the period
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of the survey years is limited only to 2000, 2003, and 2006. Moreover, combining the
FIES with the SOF reduces the number of sample households, mostly those who did not
have migrants working abroad and did not receive remittance incomes from abroad. As
a consequence, we lose huge numbers of sample households who received only
remittances from within the Philippines as well as those without any remittance incomes
at all.
Many studies focus on research on inequality using the FIES. However, among the
listed studies in Table 3.4, most of them use a single year survey. Inequality needs to be
investigated over time. There is a limited literature on inequality using the multiple
FIES. For example, Estudilo used the 1965, 1971, 1985, and 1991 FIES as the survey
conducted in 1975 and 1979 were not published due to serious under-reporting of
income. The 1961 and 1988 FIES were disregarded because there had not been any
significant change in the structure of household income from 1961 to 1965 and from
1985 to 1988. As mentioned above, the remittance information is available after the
1985 FIES. Thus, for purposes of our thesis, the survey period has to be undertaken
after 1985. Using the several FIES after 1985, Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) used Fields
(2003) decomposition technique, which is a regression-based inequality decomposition
approach and allows for the contribution of each explanatory variable to inequality to be
investigated. The Fields decomposition is quite popular and widely used for research on
inequality and provides an indication of the contribution of a set of factors to inequality
such as location and household-specific attributes in Balisacan and Fuwa (2004).
However, if we apply this decomposition technique into our analysis which compares
the welfare level between households with and without remittance incomes, household
characteristics have to be assumed to have the same effects on inequality between two
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household groups. In order to relax this strong assumption, in the empirical chapter, we
will use the Melly (2006) decomposition, which enables us to capture the receipt of
remittance incomes on inequality after controlling for each effect of household
attributes on inequality for each household group.
Among past studies on expenditure behaviour using the FIES, Tabuga (2007), Pernia
(2008) and Ang, Sugiyarto, and Jha (2009) examined the remittance effects on
household expenditures. Except for Ang, Sugiyarto, and Jha (2009), the above studies
found that international remittance positively influenced education expenditures.
However, all of them used a single year FIES. Thus, the results are not readily
interpretable over time. In addition, Pernia (2008) and Ang, Sugiyarto, and Jha (2009)
used ordinary least squares (OLS) and did not take into account the censored nature of
educational expenditures in their analysis. On the other hand, Tabuga (2007) reported
the results derived from a censored Tobit model, though she also reported the remittance
effects on education derived from the normal mean and median regression. In addition
to the careful consideration of zero educational expenditure, we cannot neglect a
potential for endogeneity through reverse causality between education and remittances.
This issue of endogeneity was considered only in Ang, Sugiyarto and Jha (2009) but
they did not take into consideration the zero expenditure issue as mentioned above. For
this thesis, we simultaneously take into account both the censored nature of education
expenditure as well as a potential endogeneity of reverse causality between education
and remittances using instrumental-variable Tobit (IV Tobit) estimator. Dealing with
the above mentioned issues discussed among the said past studies and providing the
empirical estimation results derived from the appropriate econometric analysis would
contribute to the field of research concerned with remittance effects on education.
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Table 3. 4: Lists of relevant past studies using the FIES
Authors and research topics Data
Determinants of remittances
Alba and Sugui (2009) 2003 FIES and 2003 SOF
Inequality
Balisacan (1991) 1985 FIES
Estudilo (1997) 1965, 1971, 1985, 1991 FIES
Rodriguez (1998) 1991 FIES
Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) 1985-2000 FIES
Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004) 1988 FIES
Burgess and Haksar (2005) 2000 FIES
Dakla and Dakla (2006) 1994 FIES
Expenditure behaviours
Orbeta and Alba (1998) 1991 FIES
Ballesteros (2001) 1985-1997 FIES
Tabuga (2007)
Pernia (2008)
Ang, Sugiyarto, and Jha (2009)
2003 FIES
2003 FIES
2006 FIES
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Chapter 4: The incidences and amounts of remittances
received by Filipino households
4.1 Introduction
Recently, more researchers have shown an increased interest in migration topics,
especially remittances. This is mainly because more data on migration activities have
become accessible than before. The Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS)
undertaken by the World Bank, which is a nationally representative household survey, is
a good example. Policymakers are interested in what factors could cause increases in the
amounts of international remittances into developing countries. This is because
remittances are the second largest source of external finance for developing countries
after foreign direct investment, and thereby remittances could have a huge potential to
contribute to economic development in developing countries. In recent years, there has
been an increasing amount of literature on migration and development, especially the
impact of remittances on developing countries. Some researchers have carried out
fieldwork and mainly collected information on migrants. By using these migrant datasets,
most studies on remittances have been conducted to investigate what factors influence
the decisions and the amounts of remittances sent by migrants. However, it might not be
only migrant characteristics but also household ones that affect the decisions on whether
migrants send money or not and about the amounts sent. The purpose of this chapter is
to provide an empirical account of the remittance-receiving households in the
Philippines. In order to identify the Filipino households with and without receipt of
different types of remittances, we mainly use the Family Income and Expenditure
Survey (FIES).
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As of December 2010, the FIES is available for a long period of time from 1985 to
200643 and is used to examine which household characteristics determine the receipt of
internal and international remittances among Filipino households. The advantage of
using the FIES is that we have detailed information on the Filipino households (welfare
levels, household composition, educational levels and types of work of household heads,
and places of living) for an extended period of time. More importantly, there are data on
both amounts of transfers sent from within the Philippines and amounts originally sent
from abroad. Therefore, it is possible to examine what sort of household characteristics
influence the propensity for Filipino households to receive remittances. Thus, the main
emphasis of the analysis using the FIES falls on investigating which household
characteristics are most associated with the receipt of remittances. The analysis does not
focus on migrant workers’ decisions on sending remittances. Recent studies have found
that remittances are driven by the need to support migrant workers’ families, rather than
by migrants’ investment considerations alone (see for example, Aggarwal and Spatafora,
2005). In addition, according to the new economics of migration, international
migration represents a strategic behaviour that migrant families, not individuals,
undertake (Massey, D.S. et. al., 1998; 125). We mainly follow the theory of the new
economics of migration for the analysis undertaken in this chapter. Of course, it is also
very important to look at not only the household characteristics but migrant
characteristics to investigate the determinants of remittances. However, the FIES data
have not been collected primarily for migration statistics and thus do not contain any
information on overseas migrant workers. Thus, it is not possible to investigate the
significant relationships of remitters and remittances using only the FIES.
43 Before 1985, the FIES was conducted in 1957, 1961, 1965, 1971, 1975, and 1979. However, the new
sampling methods, questionnaires, methods of collection and recall were introduced from 1985 (Ericta
and Fabian, 2009:2). Moreover, before 1985 remittances were compulsory. This means the decision to
remit was not purely an individual choice.
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In order to examine the household characteristics influencing the receipt of remittances,
we will take into consideration both domestic and international remittances. However,
receiving remittances from abroad could change the propensity to receive remittances
from within the Philippines. Far too little attention has been paid to investigating the
extent to which receiving one type of remittance is replaced by receiving another type.
Therefore, in this chapter, with regard to the determinants of remittances, we will also
investigate the displacement effect of international remittances on domestic remittances.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section examines motivations of
remittances. Section Three describes profiles of remittance-receiving households. This
chapter has three main research questions. The first question is “What are the
determinants of whether the households receive remittances or not?” The second
research question is “Which household characteristics affect the amount of receiving
remittances?” The third question is “How much does the receipt of international
remittances influence the receipt of domestic remittances?” The methodology of
examining these three questions will be explained in Section Four. Then, the empirical
results are discussed in Section Five. The last section of this chapter offers some
conclusions.
4.2 Motivations for Remittances
The literature on migration and remittances states that there are two possible
motivations for remittances: altruism and exchange (Cox, D., 1987; Cox, D., Eser, Z.
and Jiminez, E., 1998). Becker (1974) modelled and analysed altruism motives in the
household. With altruistic motive, migrants care about the well-being of their children
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or other family members. If remittances rise with the age of migrants’ parents, or with
the number of other younger siblings in the household, then it suggests that an altruism
motive makes migrants support their parents, children or younger siblings. Another
example is that if altruism is a migrant’s motivation to remit, a decline in the household
welfare should encourage more remittances (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2009). On the other
hand, with an exchange motive, migrants remit for services received from their parents
such as childcare, education, bequests and inheritance. For example, some migrants
send money back home in order to benefit from their families’ gratitude and ultimately
receive a portion of an inheritance (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2009). Another example is
the migrants’ loan repayments for the initial family investment in their education
(Piracha and Saraogi, 2011) Moreover, the exchange motive can be divided into
insurance and investment motives. If the amount of remittance increases with the level
of education of a migrant, it suggests that an exchange motive makes migrants repay
their parents’ investment in them. If the amount of remittances rises with the level of
income or assets in migrants’ household receiving the remittances, it is said that an
exchange motive also encourages migrants to maintain their rights to bequests and
inheritance (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers 1985). de la Briere et. al. (2002: 320)
summarized the expected relationship between insurance motives, investment motives
or both motives and the amount of remittances migrants send. In addition to insurance
and investment motives summarised by de la Briere et al. (2002: 320), we can also
consider the expected relationship between an altruistic motive and the amount of
remittances sent.
Table 4.1 reports the expected signs of the relationship between the probabilities of
migrants’ remitting and the determinants as a case in point. The table reveals that the
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older a household head gets, the more likely a migrant has an altruism motive to remit;
the more lost working days a recipient household has , the more remittances a migrant
with insurance motives sends; and that the greater the parents’ household income
becomes, the more money a migrant with an investment motive remit. Migrants may
have both insurance and investment motives at the same time. In this case, the expected
sign of parents’ household income on the amount of remittances migrants’ household
receive shows that investment motives dominate insurance motives (de la Briere et al.
2002: 320).
Table 4. 1: The probability of migrants’ remitting as a case in point (expected
signs of relationship)
Altruism
Motive
Insurance
Motive
Investment
Motive
Migrants’ asset and earnings + + +
Parents’ household income - - +
Number of lost working days 0 + 0
Age of household head + 0 +/-
Parents’ inheritable assets - 0 +
Number of heirs +/- 0 +/-
Source: Based on de la Briere et al. (2002) p.11
With regard to remittance motives for overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) and their
households left in the Philippines, using the 2003 FIES and SOF Alba and Sugui (2009)
found that altruism motives seem to dominate exchange motives for households with
migrants who are likely to be the primary bread-winners of their recipient households.
This is because almost all heads and heads’ spouses send money to support the
livelihood of their family left in the Philippines. In addition, the needs of the young
family members were found to be significantly important in terms of motivations for
remittances among the said households.
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As Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2009) summarised, a migrant’s motivation for remittances is
rather complex. In order to examine the motivation to remit, the rich data on migrant
and household characteristics are needed. Based on the results derived from the FIES
having only variables for households not migrants, it would be too hard to articulate
which remittance motives migrants have though some possible arguments will be made.
As with Alba and Sugui (2009), combining the FIES with the SOF enables us to
investigate remittance motives using both migrant and household characteristics.
However, it is not feasible to do this research for all the survey years (i.e., 1985-2006),
as noted in Chapter Three, as such combined datasets are available only after 2000.
Moreover, combining the two datasets reduces the number of sample households who
did not have migrants working abroad during the survey period. This means that the
sample households with domestic remittances but having no migrant as well as those
with no remittance income cannot be used for the analysis of this chapter. This is a
drawback to the research on the comparison between domestic and international
remittances as well as between households with and without remittance incomes. Hence,
in this chapter, we will cast light more on the relationship between remittances and
household characteristics. Are there any household factors influencing the incidence and
the amount of remittances? Before examining this question, we will first summarise the
profiles of remittance-receiving households in the next section.
4.3 Profile of remittance-receiving households
For research on remittances, a strong advantage of using the Family Income and
Expenditure Survey (FIES), which is a nationally representative household survey, is
the availability of both the amounts of remittances from within the Philippines and from
overseas, as mentioned in Chapter Three. The mean remittances both from within the
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country and from abroad have increased more than six-fold between 1985 and 2006.
The average remittances from abroad are nearly three times those from within the
country (Figure 4.1).
Figure 4. 1: Average amounts of remittance by type, 1985-2006
Source: Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES)
The distribution of remittance-receiving households among the sample observations of
FIES by type of the receipt of remittances is summarised in Table 4.2. Depending on the
types of remittances received, Filipino households can be classified into four categories:
no remittance (dnorem), internal remittances only (dinrem), international remittances
only (dexrem), both internal and international remittances (dbothrem). Among
Philippine households in the FIES, the majority did not receive any remittances (i.e.
dnorem). The second major household group in the FIES is one in receipt of only
internal remittances (i.e., dinrem). With regard to the international remittances, the
proportion of Filipino households who received remittances from abroad has been
steadily increasing between 1985 and 2006. In addition to the data on the amounts of
internal and international remittances received, the FIES also captures household
characteristics in detail. Mainly these characteristics consist of two parts: household
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head characteristics and household member characteristics. While the former have the
information on the household head’s gender, age, marital status, educational attainment,
and type of work, whereas the latter includes household size, age categories44, and the
number of employed members. Furthermore, the detailed information on family income
and family expenditure both in cash and in kind, which are the main feature of the FIES,
is also available.
Table 4. 2: Distribution of remittance-receiving households by type of receiving remittances
Year dnorem dinrem dexrem dbothrem
1985 8570 5460 1476 1035
(51.81%) (33%) (8.92%) (6.27%)
1988 9939 5632 1862 996
(53.93%) (30.56%) (10.10%) (5.40%)
1991 13635 6232 2932 1325
(56.52%) (25.83%) (12.15%) (5.49%)
1994 12732 6620 3093 1720
(52.69%) (27.39%) (12.80%) (7.12%)
1997 22069 9736 4627 2010
(57.41%) (25.33%) (12.04%) (5.23%)
2000 21439 11021 5048 2107
(54.12%) (27.82%) (12.74%) (5.32%)
2003 19410 13955 5058 3671
(46.11%) (33.15%) (12.02%) (8.72%)
2006 15962 13548 5067 3903
(41.48%) (35.21%) (13.17%) (10.14%)
Source: Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES)
Note: Non-Remittance receiving Households (dnorem), Internal Remittance-receiving Households
(dinrem), External Remittance-receiving Households (dexrem), Both internal and external Remittance-
receiving Households (dbothrem).
Table 4.3 reveals the profile of Filipino households. Overall, mean total family income
and expenditure are increasing over time. With regard to family composition, average
family size is decreasing from 5.5 in 1985 to 4.8 in 2006. The mean proportions of
family members employed and aged 25 and over are increasing over the period of 1985-
2006. On the other hand, the average share of family members aged less than 25 are
44 The category of household member’s age is as follows. Household member less than one year old, 1-6
years old, 7-14 years old, 15-24 years old, and 25 years old and over (or 25-59 years old and 60 years old
and over only for the 2006 FIES).
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gradually decreasing over the same period. When it comes to the characteristics of
household heads, their average age is late 40s. The majority of household heads are
male, married, and employed. As for their educational attainments, around ten per cent
of heads graduated from universities. Approximately one-third of heads finished either
elementary school or high school. With regard to the place of living, about a quarter of
the sample households are living in Mindanao in all survey years. There are
considerable differences in the characteristics of remittance-receiving households with
respect to total income and expenditure, household heads and their educational
attainment and job information, and urban/rural residence and regional information. The
mean total income and expenditure among the Philippine households with the receipt of
remittances from abroad are greater than any other households. What is interesting is
that among the households who received remittances from abroad, the proportion of
female household heads is much higher. Similarly, the share of household heads not
employed is greater among households in receipt of international remittances. These
might be because among the remittance-receiving households there are many female
parents left behind relying on remittance incomes from male partners. Moreover, the
proportion of agricultural households is much greater among non-remittance-receiving
households than remittance-receiving households. This is because agricultural
households depend on family members as labour force at home and prefer not to send
them abroad. In addition, they might not be able to afford migration costs for their
family members. When it comes to the location of sample households, the majority of
international remittance-receiving households are living in urban areas.45 From the table,
it is apparent that there are regional differences in the receipt of remittances. Among
non-remittance-receiving households, the proportion of households living in Mindanao
45 Some rural households might move to urban areas because of the receipt of international remittances.
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is higher. Households in Southern Luzon, Bicol, Western Visayas, and Eastern Visayas
have a higher propensity to receive remittances from within the Philippines. In regard to
international remittance-receiving households, the proportion of Filipino households
who live in Ilocos, Central Luzon, and National Capital Region (NCR) are greater than
other households. Furthermore, households with the receipt of both internal and
international remittances have a greater representation in Ilocos, Central Luzon,
Southern Luzon, and NCR.
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Table 4. 3: Profile of Filipino households by type of the receipt of remittances (mean)
Table 4.3a: All households (Total)
Source: Author’s computation based on the FIES.
Note: Parentheses denote the standard errors.
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Sample Size 16541 18429 24124 24165 38442 39615 42094 38480
Remittance (in peso, nominal)
Total amount received 3527 4036 6950 8949 10314 15817 16936 23244
(11627) (13185) (21934) (26447) (31327) (54130) (56568) (78242)
International remittance 2636 3092 5498 6885 7811 12271 13158 17780
(11275) (12819) (21226) (25036) (30090) (51699) (55082) (75835)
Domestic remittance 890 944 1452 2064 2503 3546 3777 5464
(2982) (3126) (5240) (7860) (8985) (14511) (12218) (18216)
Welfare Level (in peso, nominal)
Total Family Income 30212 39729 63207 82169 111188 142531 137758 163533
(27024) (35602) (56634) (71615) (97314) (197581) (250922) (201754)
Total Family Expenditure 26781 32687 51667 67836 91367 115237 114959 138895
(21668) (26024) (42469) (54838) (71821) (128630) (120646) (143130)
Family Composition
Family Size 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.1 4.8 4.8
(2.3) (2.2) (2.2) (2.2) (2.2) (2.3) (2.2) (2.2)
Share (%):
Employed 34% 33% 34% 35% 37% 38% 42% 43%
Age 0-6 17% 17% 17% 15% 16% 13% 15% 13%
Age 7-14 19% 19% 19% 19% 18% 18% 17% 17%
Age 15-24 19% 18% 18% 18% 17% 18% 17% 17%
Age 25+ 45% 46% 47% 48% 49% 51% 50% 53%
Household Head
Age 46.5 45.6 46.2 47.6 46.7 48.9 46.3 48.4
(13.9) (14.0) (14.0) (13.8) (14.0) (13.9) (14.2) (14.0)
Female (%) 14% 14% 14% 15% 15% 18% 16% 18%
Married (%) 85% 85% 84% 84% 83% 81% 82% 80%
Not Employed (%) 14% 12% 14% 15% 14% 16% 13% 15%
Education Level (%):
Pre-Elementary 34% 31% 29% 28% 26% 25% 27% 26%
Elementary 24% 35% 35% 35% 34% 32% 32% 32%
High School 34% 26% 27% 28% 31% 32% 31% 32%
University 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 11% 10% 10%
Urban households (%) 47% 47% 60% 60% 59% 59% N.A 45%
Agricultural households (%) 37% 34% 32% 30% 27% 24% 30% 27%
Regions (%):
Ilocos 7% 6% 6% 6% 5% 5% 6% 6%
Cagayan 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5%
Cluzon 10% 10% 11% 11% 10% 10% 8% 8%
Sluzon 14% 13% 14% 14% 16% 16% 14% 14%
Bicol 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 5% 6% 6%
Wvisayas 9% 9% 8% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7%
Cvisayas 7% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 7% 7%
Evisayas 5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 5% 5%
Mindanao 22% 22% 22% 22% 27% 27% 28% 27%
NCR 14% 14% 15% 15% 10% 10% 9% 12%
CAR N.A. 2% 2% 2% 4% 4% 4% 4%
91
Table 4.3b: Non-Remittance receiving Households (dnorem)
Source: Author’s computation based on the FIES.
Note: Parentheses denote the standard errors.
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Sample Size 8570 9939 13635 12732 22069 21439 19410 15962
Welfare Level (in peso, nominal)
Total Family Income 28084 39392 60511 78093 111025 143412 133750 164381
(25024) (35602) (54258) (69178) (98594) (220483) (315325) (223793)
Total Family Expenditure 24738 31852 48899 63325 88958 112437 106589 134179
(20134) (25498) (40424) (52053) (70700) (134521) (116879) (150047)
Family Composition
Family Size 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 4.9 4.9
(2.3) (2.2) (2.2) (2.2) (2.2) (2.2) (2.2) (2.2)
Share (%):
Employed 35% 35% 36% 37% 38% 40% 43% 45%
Age 0-6 17% 18% 17% 16% 16% 14% 15% 13%
Age 7-14 20% 19% 19% 19% 18% 19% 17% 17%
Age 15-24 18% 18% 18% 18% 17% 18% 18% 17%
Age 25+ 45% 45% 46% 47% 48% 50% 50% 53%
Household Head
Age 45.2 44.1 44.8 46.0 45.1 47.2 44.5 46.6
(12.9) (13.0) (13.0) (12.8) (13.1) (12.9) (13.2) (13.0)
Female (%) 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 12% 10% 12%
Married (%) 88% 88% 88% 87% 86% 84% 85% 84%
Not Employed (%) 7% 7% 8% 9% 8% 10% 7% 9%
Education Level (%):
Pre-Elementary 36% 31% 30% 29% 26% 26% 29% 28%
Elementary 25% 35% 36% 36% 33% 31% 32% 31%
High School 32% 25% 26% 27% 30% 32% 29% 31%
University 7% 9% 9% 8% 10% 12% 10% 11%
Urban households (%) 40% 45% 58% 56% 57% 57% N.A 43%
Agricultural households (%) 46% 39% 38% 37% 32% 30% 38% 35%
Regions (%):
Ilocos 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4%
Cagayan 6% 5% 5% 5% 4% 5% 6% 5%
Cluzon 7% 7% 9% 8% 8% 7% 6% 5%
Sluzon 12% 12% 13% 13% 15% 14% 12% 11%
Bicol 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4%
Wvisayas 9% 9% 8% 8% 6% 6% 6% 6%
Cvisayas 8% 8% 8% 8% 6% 6% 7% 6%
Evisayas 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 5% 4%
Mindanao 31% 30% 29% 30% 33% 34% 37% 35%
NCR 11% 13% 13% 12% 9% 10% 8% 14%
CAR N.A. 3% 2% 3% 5% 5% 5% 5%
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Table 4.3c: Internal Remittance-receiving Households (dinrem)
Source: Author’s computation based on the FIES.
Note: Parentheses denote the standard errors.
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Sample Size 5460 5632 6232 6620 9736 11021 13955 13548
Remittance (in peso, nominal)
Total amount received 2132 2544 4330 5597 8061 10018 8318 11335
(4106) (4602) (8274) (11976) (14974) (21671) (17325) (25459)
Welfare Level (in peso, nominal)
Total Family Income 23953 29597 45813 62012 80074 95181 93403 110365
(19626) (24104) (40106) (52029) (68605) (112795) (92433) (110618)
Total Family Expenditure 22661 26387 40308 54729 72130 85928 86454 102551
(17499) (19526) (32144) (42898) (55862) (93321) (75037) (88463)
Family Composition
Family Size 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.7 4.7
(2.3) (2.3) (2.2) (2.3) (2.2) (2.3) (2.3) (2.3)
Share (%):
Employed 34% 33% 34% 35% 36% 37% 41% 43%
Age 0-6 17% 17% 17% 15% 16% 13% 15% 14%
Age 7-14 19% 19% 19% 19% 18% 18% 18% 18%
Age 15-24 18% 17% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%
Age 25+ 46% 46% 48% 49% 49% 52% 50% 53%
Household Head
Age 47.4 46.9 47.7 49.2 48.5 50.7 47.1 49.2
(14.7) (15.0) (15.0) (14.7) (15.0) (14.8) (15.0) (14.6)
Female (%) 16% 14% 16% 17% 17% 20% 17% 18%
Married (%) 82% 82% 80% 79% 80% 76% 79% 78%
Not Employed (%) 15% 13% 16% 17% 16% 18% 13% 15%
Education Level (%):
Pre-Elementary 37% 36% 35% 33% 31% 31% 32% 32%
Elementary 26% 37% 37% 38% 38% 36% 36% 36%
High School 32% 22% 23% 24% 26% 27% 27% 28%
University 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 5% 5%
Urban households (%) 47% 40% 54% 57% 55% 55% N.A 40%
Agricultural households (%) 35% 36% 34% 32% 28% 26% 31% 30%
Regions (%):
Ilocos 7% 6% 6% 6% 5% 4% 5% 5%
Cagayan 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 4% 4%
Cluzon 12% 13% 13% 13% 10% 12% 8% 9%
Sluzon 18% 14% 15% 15% 15% 17% 17% 16%
Bicol 9% 10% 8% 8% 9% 8% 9% 10%
Wvisayas 10% 10% 11% 10% 11% 10% 9% 8%
Cvisayas 8% 9% 8% 8% 6% 7% 7% 7%
Evisayas 5% 7% 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 6%
Mindanao 14% 16% 16% 17% 22% 22% 23% 25%
NCR 13% 10% 12% 13% 9% 7% 8% 7%
CAR N.A. 1% 1% 1% 3% 3% 3% 3%
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Table 4.3d: External (or International) Remittance-receiving Households (dexrem)
Source: Author’s computation based on the FIES.
Note: Parentheses denote the standard errors.
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Sample Size 1476 1862 2932 3093 4627 5048 5058 5067
Remittance (in peso, nominal)
Total amount received 22034 23810 35877 39978 52362 78990 78689 95502
(26886) (29439) (45392) (49754) (63881) (114911) (122643) (166460)
Welfare Level
Total Family Income 56972 66547 103537 127469 167877 229760 245091 276325
(38578) (46360) (71239) (87773) (111541) (217811) (282850) (268539)
Total Family Expenditure 45688 51244 80387 101454 132983 177119 193523 221538
(28254) (33283) (51833) (66111) (83025) (145144) (172124) (188452)
Family Composition
Family Size 5.7 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.7
(2.5) (2.3) (2.3) (2.2) (2.2) (2.3) (2.2) (2.3)
Share (%):
Employed 27% 28% 29% 33% 31% 33% 41% 41%
Age 0-6 14% 13% 14% 12% 13% 11% 12% 11%
Age 7-14 19% 19% 19% 18% 17% 17% 16% 16%
Age 15-24 23% 22% 21% 21% 20% 20% 20% 19%
Age 25+ 45% 47% 47% 50% 50% 52% 52% 54%
Household Head
Age 49.0 47.9 48.1 49.7 49.3 51.0 48.7 49.8
(14.3) (14.1) (14.3) (14.0) (14.4) (14.1) (14.3) (13.9)
Female (%) 32% 31% 30% 28% 31% 31% 27% 29%
Married (%) 83% 82% 82% 82% 79% 79% 80% 80%
Not Employed (%) 35% 29% 32% 30% 31% 32% 27% 28%
Education Level (%):
Pre-Elementary 18% 17% 17% 16% 15% 14% 14% 14%
Elementary 21% 27% 29% 29% 28% 26% 25% 24%
High School 44% 38% 38% 40% 42% 40% 42% 41%
University 16% 18% 16% 16% 15% 19% 19% 20%
Urban households (%) 67% 66% 74% 72% 72% 72% N.A 57%
Agricultural households (%) 9% 10% 10% 10% 8% 7% 10% 11%
Regions (%):
Ilocos 13% 12% 10% 10% 10% 9% 11% 11%
Cagayan 5% 4% 3% 5% 4% 5% 6% 7%
Cluzon 17% 15% 15% 14% 14% 12% 13% 8%
Sluzon 13% 11% 17% 17% 18% 16% 12% 12%
Bicol 3% 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3%
Wvisayas 7% 8% 6% 6% 8% 8% 6% 6%
Cvisayas 4% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 6% 6%
Evisayas 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 4%
Mindanao 8% 9% 10% 11% 17% 16% 18% 19%
NCR 27% 28% 26% 25% 15% 18% 16% 17%
CAR N.A. 3% 3% 3% 5% 6% 5% 6%
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Table 4.3e: Both Internal and International Remittance-receiving Households (dbothrem)
Source: Author’s computation based on the FIES.
Note: Parentheses denote the standard errors.
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Sample Size 1035 996 1325 1720 2010 2107 3671 3903
Remittance (in peso, nominal)
Total amount received 13695 15778 26784 32297 37678 55740 54154 65838
(18340) (20835) (33253) (43736) (47752) (84439) (79964) (104151)
International remittance 10712 12704 20715 24834 28854 41476 42460 51312
(17482) (19415) (30303) (39142) (44129) (69191) (75644) (96837)
Domestic remittance 2983 3074 6069 7463 8824 14264 11693 14526
(5742) (5620) (9563) (14135) (13616) (31796) (18294) (25675)
Welfare Level (in peso, nominal)
Total Family Income 42682 50241 83517 108463 133192 172258 179681 198193
(30236) (38322) (61681) (79374) (101940) (168301) (168441) (181354)
Total Family Expenditure 38470 41954 70033 91223 115199 148784 159327 177047
(24981) (29287) (48712) (62161) (79912) (126825) (136123) (147133)
Family Composition
Family Size 5.6 5.1 5.2 5.2 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.8
(2.4) (2.2) (2.4) (2.3) (2.3) (2.3) (2.2) (2.2)
Share (%):
Employed 27% 28% 28% 30% 31% 31% 38% 38%
Age 0-6 15% 15% 14% 14% 15% 12% 14% 13%
Age 7-14 19% 19% 19% 19% 16% 17% 17% 17%
Age 15-24 20% 19% 18% 18% 17% 19% 18% 17%
Age 25+ 45% 48% 49% 49% 51% 53% 51% 53%
Household Head
Age 49.3 48.8 50.1 50.1 50.2 52.2 48.9 51.5
(15.3) (15.3) (15.9) (14.9) (15.8) (15.4) (15.5) (15.3)
Female (%) 24% 26% 28% 26% 26% 28% 26% 27%
Married (%) 79% 78% 75% 77% 75% 75% 76% 75%
Not Employed (%) 32% 29% 34% 33% 32% 33% 27% 29%
Education Level (%):
Pre-Elementary 21% 22% 19% 19% 18% 17% 15% 17%
Elementary 19% 34% 30% 32% 30% 29% 30% 30%
High School 46% 31% 39% 38% 40% 42% 42% 41%
University 13% 13% 12% 10% 11% 12% 13% 13%
Urban households (%) 67% 57% 72% 77% 71% 73% N.A 55%
Agricultural households (%) 11% 12% 9% 9% 8% 7% 8% 9%
Regions (%):
Ilocos 17% 15% 10% 8% 13% 9% 10% 12%
Cagayan 3% 2% 2% 2% 4% 2% 3% 5%
Cluzon 17% 21% 16% 18% 15% 17% 14% 16%
Sluzon 17% 16% 17% 15% 17% 19% 20% 16%
Bicol 3% 5% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5%
Wvisayas 6% 7% 7% 7% 10% 10% 7% 7%
Cvisayas 4% 4% 5% 3% 4% 6% 6% 6%
Evisayas 2% 3% 3% 2% 3% 4% 5% 4%
Mindanao 3% 7% 6% 8% 11% 13% 14% 15%
NCR 28% 20% 30% 32% 16% 13% 14% 10%
CAR N.A. 1% 1% 1% 3% 4% 3% 3%
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4.4 Econometric Methodology
In order to examine the determinants of remittances, we first assume that both internal
and international remittances are independent. It means that the probability of receiving
international remittances does not affect that of internal remittances, and vice-versa.
Then, we will take into consideration the mutual dependence between internal and
international remittances.
In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature on the determinants of
migration. Several attempts have been made to examine the determinants of being
migrants and/or remitters (Hoddinot 1992, 1994; Brown and Connel 2006; Banerjee
1984; Liu and Reilly, 2004). These previous studies have reported that migrants’
earnings, parental land holdings, migrants’ age, migrants’ educational attainment, and
migrants’ asset holdings positively affect the decisions of being migrants or remitters,
while male household heads’ educational attainment and their assets in the home
country negatively influence migrants’ remittance behaviours. Several studies have also
produced estimates of the determinants of sending remittances by migrants (for example,
Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974; Rempel and Lobdell, 1978; Banerjee, 1984; Lucas and
Stark, 1985; Knight et al., 1999; Liu and Reilly, 2004; Brown and Connell, 2006;
Markova and Reilly, 2007). However, little attention has been paid to the determinants
of receiving remittances by recipient households (for example, Piracha and Sraogi,
2011). Thus, this research complements evidence from the existing literature on
determinants of remittances. Furthermore, as mentioned before, we also have a
limitation in terms of the data on remittances. This research relies on use of household
surveys. Thus, we can only use the household-level variables for modelling purposes.
To investigate the factors influencing the receipt of remittances, we use the following
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household variables: total family expenditures; household characteristics, job-related
information, and regional information. Table 4.4 reports the definition of the variables
used in the analysis.
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Table 4. 4: Variable Description
Variable
Name
Variable
Description
Remittance
Remittance Incidence
dinrem =1 if the household received remittances from within the Philippines;
=0 otherwise
dexrem =1 if the household received remittances from abroad; =0 otherwise
Remittance Amount
inrem The amount of remittances received from within the Philippines
(Philippine pesos, in thousands)
exrem The amount of remittances received from abroad (Philippine pesos, in
thousands)
Welfare
ltotex The natural logarithm of the total family expenditures
Family composition
empsh The share of the employed members out of total household members
age 0-6 The share of the members aged between 0 and 6
age 7-14 The share of the members aged between 7 and 14
age 15-24 The share of the members aged between 15 and 24
age 25+ The share of the members aged 25 or over
Head Characteristics
hage The age of the household head
hage2 The age of the household head (squared)
hfemale =1 if the household head is female; =0 otherwise
hmarried =1 if the household head marital status is married; =0 otherwise
hedu1 =1 if household head did not finish elementary school; =0 otherwise
hedu2 =1 if the household head finished elementary school; =0 otherwise
hedu3 =1 if the household head finished high school; =0 otherwise
hedu4 =1 if the household head finished University or Post Graduate;
=0 otherwise
hnojob =1 if the household head is not employed; =0 otherwise
Urban/Rural
urban =1 if the household lives in the urban area; =0 otherwise
Farming
agri =1 if the household is an agricultural one; =0 otherwise
Region
Ilocos =1 if the household lives in Ilocos Region; =0 otherwise
Cagayan =1 if the household lives in Cagayan Valley; =0 otherwise
Cluzon =1 if the household lives in Central Luzon; =0 otherwise
Sluzon =1 if the household lives in Southern Luzon; =0 otherwise
Bicol =1 if the household lives in Bicol Region; =0 otherwise
Wvisayas =1 if the household lives in Western Visayas; =0 otherwise
Cvisayas =1 if the household lives in Central Visayas; =0 otherwise
Evisayas =1 if the household lives in Eastern Visayas; =0 otherwise
Mindanao =1 if the household lives in Mindanao; =0 otherwise
NCR =1 if the household lives in National Capital Region (NCR);
=0 otherwise
CAR =1 if the household lives in Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR);
=0 otherwise
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In order to examine the nature of remittance-receiving households in the Philippines, we
will first separately attempt to examine the determinants of the probability of internal
and international remittances using a probit model. Then, we will consider the mutual
correlation between internal and external remittances within a simultaneous equations
model using two binary variables.
4.4.1 Methodology for the probability of receiving remittances
4.4.1.1. Probit Model
A probit model is used to examine the probability of receiving remittances. The probit
model assumes that there is an underlying response variables iy defined by the
regression relationship.
(4-1) iii uXy 
 ' (i=1……….N)
In practice, iy is unobservable. The dummy variable iy , which we can observe and
denotes whether households receive remittances or not, is defined as:
iy =1 if iy >0
(4-2)
iy =0 otherwise
From the relations (4-1) and (4-2), we get the equation (4-3).
(4-3) Prob( 1iy )=Prob( 'ii Xu  )=Prob( 
'
ii Xu  ) = )(
'iX
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where )( is the function of the standard normal distribution. Then, the likelihood
functions for the probit model to determine the probability to receive internal ( 1 ) and
external remittances ( 2 ) are written, respectively as follows:
(4-4)    


N
i
yy XX
1
)1(
11111
11 (1)( 
(4-5)    


N
i
yy XX
1
)1(
22222
22 )(1)( 
where y1 and y2 are the dummy variables on whether households receive remittances
from within the Philippines and abroad, respectively. () denotes the cumulative
distribution function. Taking natural logarithms where )(log eL  yields the log
likelihood function for the probit model as:
(4-6)      


N
i
e
N
i
e XyXyL
1
1
'
11
1
1
'
111 1log)1(log 
(4-7)      


N
i
e
N
i
e XyXyL
1
2
'
22
1
2
'
222 1log)1(log 
Our object is to find the unknown parameters 1 and 2 which maximise the above log
likelihood functions. If the regressor X is a continuous variable, marginal effects will
be computed, whereas if X is a dummy variable, the impact effects will be calculated
(see Greene, 2007).
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4.4.1.2. Bivariate Probit Models
The question which we consider next concerns the issue of whether the receipts of
internal and external remittances are mutually dependent. In this case, the errors may be
correlated, that is, 0),( 21  uuCov , thus we need to estimate the equations (4-6) and
(4-7) simultaneously. The parameter  measures the degree of correlation in the
unobservables between two equations. Given that  is positive (negative), it appears
that households with unobserved characteristics that suggest they should receive
remittances from abroad are more (less) likely to receive domestic remittances. This
simultaneous equations model with two binary variables is also called the bivariate
probit model. The bivariate probit model can be written as follows:
1111 uXy 
  , 1y = 1 if 01 
y
= 0 otherwise
(4-8)
2222 uXy 
  , 2y = 1 if 02 
y
= 0 otherwise
where 0)()( 21  uEuE , 1)()( 21  uVaruVar , and 0),( 21  uuCov .
The joint probabilities to receive both internal and international remittances, only
internal remittances, only international remittances, and no remittance are written as
follows. For convenience, let 111 cX  and 222 cX  .
(4-9) 11 = Prob  ,,]1,1[ 2121 ccBVNyy 
(4-10) 10 = Prob   ,,]0,1[ 2121 ccBVNyy
(4-11) 01 = Prob   ,,]1,0[ 2121 ccBVNyy
(4-12) 00 = Prob  ,,]0,0[ 2121 ccBVNyy 
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where BVN denotes the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate normal
distribution. The likelihood function for the bivariate probit is given by:
(4-13) 


)1)(1(
00
)1(
01
)1(
1011
21212121 yyyyyyyy
bip
Taking natural logarithms where )(log eL  yields the log likelihood function for the
bivariate probit model as:
(4-14)    
   
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By maximising the above log likelihood function, the parameters we estimate ( 1 , 2
and  ) can be computed. For a continuous variable, Z , which appears in 1X  and 2X  ,
the marginal effects of the bivariate probit model can be estimated, while the impact
effects can be calculated for a dummy variable, D, which also appear in 1X  and 2X 
(see Appendix).
A Wald test for the bivariate probit model tests the null hypothesis that  equals zero
(see Table 4.5). The null hypothesis is rejected for the 2000 and 2003 FIES. This means
that it is more appropriate to use the bivariate probit to investigate the determinants of
the decision of the receipt of remittances for these two survey years. On the other hand,
for the rest of the years, we can rely on the univariate probit models. In brief, our
findings which will be presented in the next section will be derived from the bivariate
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probit model for 2000 and 2003 and from the probit model for the other survey years.46
In 2000, the parameter  was significantly negative. One explanation for the negative
 is that Filipino households with unobservable characteristics associated with the
receipt of international remittances are dependent more on family members working
abroad and are less likely to receive financial support from those within the country. On
the other hand,  was positive and significant in 2003. This means that the
unobservable factors move the probability of receiving both domestic and international
remittances in the same direction. However, the issue of identification of the 
parameter is a difficult one. The presence of continuous measures used for the analysis
serves, to some extent, to identify the  parameter. Ideally, we would need variables in
one equation but not the other to identify the correlation term. Unfortunately, this did
not prove possible only using the FIES. Thus, we need to interpret the results around the
correlation coefficients reported in Table 4.5 with some degree of caution. The issue of
identification, we believe, is perhaps more adequately addressed using the instrumental
variable (IV) probit modelling approach as examined later in the chapter.
Table 4. 5: The correlation of the residuals (  ) from two remittance equations in the bivariate
probit models
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
46 Appropriate comparison of the estimation results between the univariate probit and the bivariate probit
models can be made because if there is no correlation of the error terms the bivariate probit results are
equivalent to those derived from the univariate probit.
1985 FIES 1988FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
rho -0.0083 -0.0157 -0.0171 0.0124 -0.0028 -0.0543*** 0.0377*** 0.0003
(0.0176) (0.0164) (0.0142) (0.0132) (0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0101) (0.0101)
Wald test of rho=0 0.2215 0.9243 1.4657 0.8783 0.0639 25.0879 13.9724 0.0007
Prob > chi2 = 0.638 0.336 0.226 0.349 0.800 0.000 0.000 0.979
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4.4.2 Methodology for the amount of receiving remittances
In this section, we will first conduct a censored regression model to investigate the
factors that affect the amounts of the receipt of remittances received from within the
Philippines and those from abroad, separately. Then, the simultaneous censored
regression model will be used to examine determinants of remittances taking into
account the mutual correlation between internal and international remittances.
With regard to the determinants of the amount of remittances migrants send to their
family members living in their home country, the early literature used three econometric
methodologies; ordinary least squares (OLS), Heckman two-step procedures, and Tobit
models. First, it may be problematic to use OLS regression analysis for the estimation
of the determinants of the size of remittances because this analysis does not take into
account the households with migrants who did not remit. Hoddinott (1992) argued that
some previous studies have not taken into consideration zero remittance observations
(Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974; Rempel and Lobdell, 1978; Knowles and Anker, 1981).
Thus, these results could be potentially misleading. In the case of non-remitters, we
obviously have no data on their remittances. This means that the amount of remittances,
which is the dependent variable in remittance functions, is censored at zero. Tobin
(1958) emphasized the problem of the censored regression in another context. With
Tobit models47, which were first used by Tobin (1958), we assume that there is only one
remittance decision, in which the decisions as to whether to remit or not and how much
to remit occur simultaneously. This may be viewed as a strong assumption, but one that
47 Maddala (2001: 335-336) mentioned the limitation of the Tobit model. He argued that ‘The simple
censored regression model (or the Tobit model) is applicable only in those cases where the latent variable
can, in principle, take negative values and the observed zero values are consequence of censoring and
nonobservability (Maddala, 2001: 336)’. He also said that if the observed zero values are due to the
decisions of individuals, not to censoring, the proper method would be to model the decisions that cause
the zero observations rather than use the Tobit model mechanically (Maddala, 2001: 335).
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is empirically testable. Furthermore, Hoddinott (1992: 209) has noted that some
previous theoretical literature on migration and remittances did not make any distinction
between factors influencing the decision of whether to remit and the level of remittances.
Among the earlier literature on migration and remittances, Banerjee (1984) examined
the determinants of the decision to remit and of the amount remitted by migrants in
Delhi to their place of origin with the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure, which
distinguishes between factors which determine the decision to remit and those which
determine the size of the remittance flow. The decision to remit is estimated by a probit
model, whereas the size of the remittance is estimated by an OLS model with a
correction term for potential selection effects.
With regard to past studies on the remittance functions, with OLS analysis, Johnson and
Whitelaw (1974) investigated the size and the determinants of urban-rural remittances
sent by urban workers in Nairobi. Rempel and Lobdell (1978) examined the extent and
the determinants of urban-rural remittances in Kenya. In addition, Knowles and Anker
(1981) also explained the characteristics and determinants of remittances and transfers
in Kenya using household survey data. On the other hand, by using Tobit regression
analysis, Brown (1997) estimated the size of overseas remittances based on the survey
data on Tongan and Western Samoan migrants in Sydney, whereas Knight et. al. (1999)
investigated the size of urban-rural remittances sent by migrants who were employed in
enterprises in four Chinese cities (Beijing, Shenzen, Wuhan, and Suzhou). Moreover,
Markova and Reilly (2007) also used the Tobit model to investigate to what extent the
role of a migrant’s legal status affects the amount of remittances sent by Bulgarian
immigrants in Madrid. As an example of remittance research using a Heckman
procedure, Hoddinott (1994), and Brown and Connell (2006) derived a remittance
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function by controlling for the censorship bias. The data on migrants in Western Kenya,
and the data on nurses from Fiji, Tonga and Samoa in Australia and New Zealand were
used, respectively. Furthermore, Lucas and Stark (1985) estimated a remittance
equation with the National Migration Study of Botswana 1978-79 by taking into
account the censorship bias using the same procedure. Banerjee (1984), Hoddinott
(1992), and Liu and Reilly (2004) showed both results of Tobit and Heckman model.
These studies consider the size and the determinants of urban-rural remittances sent by
migrants in Delhi, in Kenya, and in China, respectively.
In the literature mentioned above, there are some unique features of the datasets used.
First, almost all studies used single-year data. A great deal of effort has been made on
the empirical analysis of remittance functions. What seems to be lacking, however, is
the analysis of the changes of remittance function over time. The survey years of the
FIES used for this chapter are between 1985 and 2006. The richness of these data
allows us to make a comparative analysis of many issues related to remittance
behaviour over time. Second, compared with the data used in the previous studies, the
sample sizes of the FIES are large. Thus, it provides more adequate data to address our
key research questions on migration and remittances. Third, sample observations are
migrants in the above previous research and many studies in the field of the
determinants of remittances focussed on migrants. Therefore, previous studies mainly
dealt with the characteristics of migrants and those of households living with migrants
in the remittance-sending countries. On the other hand, in the case of the FIES, we can
treat migrant household characteristics in greater detail as the data are on migrant
households and not on migrants. Thus, the main emphasis of this chapter falls on the
characteristics of the remittance-receiving households to examine the role of origin
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household-level determinants of remittances. The new economics of migration theory
argues that international migration is a strategic behaviour undertaken by migrant
families, rather than by individual migrants (Massey, D.S. et. al., 1998; 125). The
determinants of remittances would be influenced not only by the characteristics of
migrants, but also by those of migrant households. It is said that remittance is an
outcome of household decision-making (Stark and Bloom, 1985). Thus, it is better to
use both information on migrants and households, if both types of data are available.
Therefore, family characteristics of the migrants are likely to be as important factors as
migrant characteristics themselves.
4.4.2.1. Tobit model
As shown above, when it comes to the size of remittances, it is problematic to analyse
the determinants of remittances received by households with OLS regression analysis
because some households receive no remittance income at all. Here, we have two
options for the analysis: the Heckman two step-procedure and the Tobit model. In the
case of the former method, we need at least one variable in the selection equation not
included in the regression equation in order to identify the parameter on the selectivity
term. 48 In the case of FIES, however, we could not find appropriate variables
influencing the decision to remit and not the level of remittances.49 Thus, in this chapter,
48 For example, as a suitable instrument for the specification of the selection equation, Amuedo-Dorantes
and Pozo (2006) used the per capita count of Western Union offices as a proxy variable indicating
accessibility of recipient households to remittance services in regions. However, for this thesis, we
decided not to use this because it would strongly correlate with regional variables and also as in addition
to Western Union various remittance service providers are available for overseas Filipinos as mentioned
in Chapter Two. Furthermore, due to geographical diversity with the nature of archipelagic country, even
the regions near from Metro Manila have some remote islands. Thus, it would be difficult to apply the
said variable to capture the regional accessibility to remittance services.
49 The availability of possible instruments can be investigated by separately running the regression for the
probability and the level of remittances. This result is the same as those derived from the Two-Part model
with same covariates for two remittance equations. The first part of the model is a binary outcome
equation using the probit or logit regression to determine the probability of remittances, while the second
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a censored Tobit model is used which does not require these identifying variables. We
define the remittance equation of the Tobit model as:
(4-15) uXY ii 

'
where Y is a partial latent dependent variable, X is a vector of remittance determining
variables,  is a vector of fixed unknown coefficients to be estimated, and u ~ N(0, 2).
Thus:
 ii YY if ii uX 
' > 0 and
(4-16)
0iY if ii uX 
'  0
where iY represents the actual amount of remittances received by the i
th household.
Thus, iY is either positive ( 0iY ) or zero ( 0iY ). The likelihood function for the
standard censored Tobit model is as follows where we drop the independent subscripts:
(4-17)
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where 12 y if 02 Y , and 02 y if 02 Y .
part exploits the linear regression only using the subsample with positive remittance amounts to examine
the determinants of its level. These two parts are assumed to be independent and are estimated separately.
The coefficient estimates of the Two-Part model were reported in the Appendix.
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1Y and 2Y denote the amount of remittances received from the Philippines and from
abroad, respectively. 1y and 2y are the dummy variables on whether households
receive remittances from within the Philippines and from abroad, respectively. 1 and
2 are the standard deviation of the error term in each of the two separate Tobit models.
Taking natural logarithms where )(log eL  yields the log likelihood function for the
Tobit model as:
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Our object is to find the unknown parameters (i.e., 1 and 2 , 1 and 2 ) to maximise
the above log likelihood functions. In addition to the Tobit coefficient results, the
marginal effects of the Tobit models are computed as follows.
(4-21) Marginal effects = )( ii Z ( )2,1i
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(4-22) Impact effects = ]0,,|[]1,,|[  DYXYEDYXYE jiijii ( )ji 
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4.4.2.2. Bivariate Tobit Model
In the case of a simultaneous equations model with both censored variables (i.e., the
bivariate Tobit model here), the structural equation system can be written as follow.
(4-23) 1111  


 XY , ),0( 11

 YMAXY
(4-24) 2222  


 XY , ),0( 22

 YMAXY
where ],[ 21  ~ ]),,(),0,0[( 22112211 BVN
The null hypothesis of the bivariate Tobit model that the degree of correlation in the
unobservables between the two equations (4-23) and (4-24) is zero is strongly rejected
at the one per cent level of significance (see Table 4.6). The diagnostic test result
justifies the use of a bivariate Tobit model to examine the determinants of the amounts
of internal and international remittances. This also means that using a univariate Tobit
model could be misleading when investigating the determinants of remittances from
within the country and from overseas as the sizes of these remittances Filipino
households rely on would not be independent of each other. Therefore, in the next
section, our findings will mainly rely on the estimation results derived from the
bivariate Tobit model. Furthermore, the parameter  was significant and negative over
time. The negative  denotes that there is a trade-off between domestic and
international remittances in terms of their amounts Filipino households received. This
leads us to further investigation on the effect of international remittances on domestic
remittances explained in the next section.
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Table 4. 6: The correlation of the residuals (  ) from two remittance equations in the bivariate
Tobit models
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
Like the bivariate probit model, there is also, however, a potential problem in the
identification of  in the bivariate Tobit model as the receipts of remittances from
abroad or those from within the Philippines are not randomly assigned. In order to
address this identification issue, further data is required, and this is discussed below but
such data are only available by merging the FIES and the SOF only for three of our
survey years (2000, 2003 and 2006).
4.4.3 The effect of International Remittances on Domestic Remittances
When households send their family members abroad and they start sending remittances
back to the home country, those who used to rely on domestic transfers might not need
any support from family or relatives living within the country. This means that domestic
remittances could be displaced by international remittances due to continuous and
greater amounts of financial support from migrant workers. In order to capture this
displacement effect of international remittances, we then add the international
remittance variable into the internal remittance equations in the probit model and the
Tobit model which are explained above. However, this adding variable would generate
a potential problem for a two-way relationship between internal and international
remittances. In order to correct for this possible endogeneity problem, we use the
instrumental variable (IV) estimation with instruments which affect remittances from
rho -0.1089 *** -0.0986 *** -0.0864 *** -0.0616 *** -0.0895 *** -0.0850 *** -0.0630 *** -0.0922 ***
(0.0142) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0101) (0.0097) (0.0054) (0.0082) (0.0059)
2003 FIES 2006 FIES1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES
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abroad but do not directly affect those from within the country except the effect through
those from abroad.
The instruments used are derived from migrant characteristics (i.e., educational
attainment, length of stay in destination country, gender, and age). The migrants’
educational attainment, gender and age are used as proxy measures of their income as
the wage of migrants is not available in the SOF. Migrants with high educational
attainment and older migrants are assumed to have higher earnings, and thereby the
amounts of money they can send would be greater. We use the completion of tertiary
education as a dummy instrumental variable. The age of migrant workers is used as a
continuous instrument. With regard to the effect of migrants’ educational level on the
amounts of remittances they send, Alba and Sugui (2009) found that compared to
Filipino migrants who finished the tertiary education, the amounts of remittances sent
are estimated to decline by 56 per cent and 31 per cent for those who only finished
elementary and secondary education respectively. The period of stay abroad as a
migrant worker would also increase the level of money they send. Migration costs are
often deducted from the first six month’s salary of migrants by the recruitment agencies
or employers. Thus, at the beginning of stay in destination country, migrants could not
have any money to send back home. Moreover, under new work environment, they
might not be familiar with modes of remittances. In order to capture these relationships
between the length of stay abroad and remittance amounts, we add the number of
months when migrants stay abroad as a possible instrument. This assumption is
supported by the finding of Alba and Sugui (2009) which reported that the length of
stay abroad is estimated to exert a positive linear effect of the length of stay abroad on
amounts remitted. They found that each month of stay increases the remittance amounts
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by one per cent. Furthermore, the gender of migrants could potentially affect the amount
of international remittances they send. As mentioned in Chapter Two, there is evidence
that male Filipino migrant workers sent, on average, more remittances back to the home
country from almost all major destination countries due to the gender earning gaps. In
addition to this, based on the 2003 FIES and SOF, Alba and Sugui (2009) also found
that male migrants sent 16 per cent more than female counterparts due to the higher
earning capacities of male migrants. Whether a migrant is female is added as a dummy
variable into the sets of potential instruments. These variables of characteristics of
Filipino migrants would be uncorrelated with the decision on receiving remittances
from within the country as they do not directly determine the incidence or the level of
domestic remittances.
The Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) do not contain any information on
migrants but the Survey of Overseas Filipinos (SOF) do. The use of the linked data of
the FIES and the SOF enables us to deal with both migrant and household
characteristics and the data is available only after 2000. The sample households used for
the computation are those with only international remittances (i.e., dexrem) and those
with both domestic and international remittances (i.e., dbothrem). By comparing these
two household groups, we will investigate how much international remittances displace
domestic remittances. For this chapter, the estimation results derived from the 2003
FIES only will be reported in the results section.
In order to investigate which migrant characteristics can be selected as better
instruments, we tested three important issues: (1) over-identifying restrictions; (2) weak
instruments; (3) regressor exogeneity.
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The identifying instruments have to be uncorrelated with the errors. This validity of an
instrument cannot be tested in the just-identified case, whereas it is possible to test the
validity of over-identifying instruments in an overidentified model (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2010: 191). We report the Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-square statistic
(see Newey, 1987; Lee, 1992) and test the joint null hypothesis that all instruments are
valid, meaning that they are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded
from the estimated equation. If the null hypothesis is rejected, this casts doubt on the
validity of the instruments.
We assume that the chosen instruments are valid. Our second concern is about whether
the selected instruments are weak. When instruments are weak, point estimators derived
from the instrumental-variable (IV) estimators are biased and Wald tests of the
coefficient on the endogenous variable become unreliable. We report several tests of
weak instruments such as the Anderson-Rubin (AR) test, the conditional likelihood ratio
(CLR) test, and the combination of the Lagrange multiplier (LM) and the J over-
identification tests. All of these tests are robust to weak instruments as the instruments
get weaker, the confidence interval around the parameter of interest gets wider. Thus, if
the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the endogenous variable (i.e., exrem) is zero
cannot be rejected, the chosen instruments are weak.
We also test whether a regressor is endogenous. If there is little difference in the results
between models with and without treating it as an endogenous regressor (i.e., probit and
ivprobit models, tobit and ivtobit models for this chapter), then we conclude that the
regressor is exogenous. We conduct the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test of
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endogeneity (see Durbin, 1954; Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978). If the robustified DWH
test rejects the null hypothesis that a regressor (i.e., exrem) is exogenous, we conclude
that it is endogenous.
The tests are reported by examining all possible combinations of four migrant
characteristics as potential instruments (see the Appendix for details). Based on all the
results, we concluded that the completion of tertiary education, the length of stay in
destination country, and the gender provide an adequate set of instruments for the model
determining the incidence of domestic remittances (i.e., dinrem), while the gender and
the age of migrant workers are chosen as the potentially best instruments for the model
with the level of domestic remittances (i.e., inrem). The selected instruments satisfy all
the above-mentioned conditions for their use as identifying instrumental variables.
However, with a small statistic obtained from the tests of weak instruments as well as
with wider confidence sets derived from the tests, some caution must be applied as there
might be still need to correct for weak instruments.
4.5 Estimation Results
As mentioned in the previous section, with regard to the probability of remittances, our
findings rely on the bivariate probit models for the 2000 and the 2003 FIES and on the
probit model for the rest of the survey years (i.e., the 1985-1997 FIES and the 2006
FIES), whereas the estimation results derived from the bivariate Tobit model will be
used for all survey years to investigate the factors influencing the level of remittances.
First, this section attempts to answer our research question, “What are the determinants
of both the probability and the size of remittances received at the level of the
household?”. The results of the marginal effects of each explanatory variable in all
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models used for the analyses are reported in the Appendix. Then, the section also
provides the results about the displacement effect of international remittances on
domestic remittances.
4.5.1 Determinants of remittances
In Section 4.3, profiles of Filipino households are shown depending on their receipt of
remittances. However, it is still not clear what characteristics affect the receipt of
remittances. With regard to their incidence and the amount, regression analyses were
used to examine the determinants of remittances. The determining factors used for the
analyses are household welfare levels, family composition, household head
characteristics, job-related information, and geographical disparity. In the same order of
these explanatory variables, the results are reported and interpreted below.
Household welfare level
We focus on the estimated coefficients of the logarithm of total family expenditure (i.e.,
ltotex). In addition to the average remittance effect on the welfare at the mean across all
sample households, we exploit piecewise linear splines using knots based on quintile
values of the logarithm of total household expenditure. 50 This allows us to further
investigate the impact of household welfare at different parts of the welfare distribution
(e.g., by welfare quintile here) on the receipt of international and domestic remittances.
The estimation results are reported in Table 4.7 for international remittances and Table
4.8 for domestic remittances.
50 In Stata, the command mkspline is used to create variables containing a linear spline of total household
expenditure.
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Table 4. 7: Marginal effects of household expenditure levels on international remittances
Table 4.7a: Probability of international remittances by welfare level
Table 4.7b: Level of international remittance by welfare level (in ‘000 pesos)
Note: Welfare effects are reported by expenditure quintile (Bottom 20%, Bottom 20%-40%, Middle, Top
20%-40%, Top 20%). Parentheses denote standard errors. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *
significant at 10%
1985 FIES 1988FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Welfare level
ltotex 0.1019*** 0.0819*** 0.1048*** 0.1090*** 0.0979*** 0.1104*** 0.1347*** 0.1441***
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0041)
Welfare quintile
Bottom 20% 0.1707*** 0.0918*** 0.1018*** 0.0971*** 0.1015*** 0.1224*** 0.1093*** 0.1251***
(0.0347) (0.0280) (0.0245) (0.0278) (0.0199) (0.0166) (0.0204) (0.0227)
Bottom 20%-40% 0.0599* 0.0765** 0.0772*** 0.1628*** 0.1400*** 0.1544*** 0.1780*** 0.1345***
(0.0346) (0.0330) (0.0299) (0.0322) (0.0239) (0.0235) (0.0250) (0.0290)
Middle 0.1067*** 0.0676** 0.1624*** 0.0389 0.1124*** 0.1197*** 0.1373*** 0.1886***
(0.0289) (0.0303) (0.0265) (0.0290) (0.0211) (0.0207) (0.0216) (0.0249)
Top 20%-40% 0.1489*** 0.1299*** 0.1133*** 0.2053*** 0.1060*** 0.1444*** 0.1824*** 0.1997***
(0.0198) (0.0211) (0.0184) (0.0214) (0.0154) (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0170)
Top 20% 0.0609*** 0.0510*** 0.0715*** 0.0478*** 0.0538*** 0.0547*** 0.0848*** 0.0821***
(0.0101) (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0124) (0.0093) (0.0075) (0.0078) (0.0094)
1985 FIES 1988FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Welfare level
ltotex 1.7631*** 1.9508*** 3.7225*** 4.8931*** 5.2937*** 9.6051*** 10.6978*** 16.8868***
(0.0826) (0.0995) (0.1443) (0.1881) (0.1650) (0.3544) (0.3792) (1.1489)
Welfare quintile
Bottom 20% 2.3315*** 1.5344*** 2.9144*** 3.0107*** 4.2228*** 7.7501*** 6.0997*** 10.0405***
(0.4618) (0.4848) (0.6488) (0.8765) (0.7987) (1.0844) (1.2335) (2.1113)
Bottom 20%-40% 0.8633* 1.3998*** 2.1121*** 4.9636*** 5.6719*** 10.0337*** 10.2556*** 10.7962***
(0.4459) (0.5339) (0.7610) (0.9670) (0.9196) (1.4827) (1.4493) (2.4214)
Middle 1.5683*** 1.3544*** 4.2913*** 2.0461** 5.1721*** 8.4740*** 9.3016*** 17.8587***
(0.3575) (0.4806) (0.6649) (0.8568) (0.8015) (1.2801) (1.2510) (2.3982)
Top 20%-40% 2.0834*** 2.5974*** 4.0743*** 7.0972*** 5.3580*** 10.4487*** 10.1946*** 14.3756***
(0.2572) (0.3523) (0.4808) (0.6684) (0.6051) (0.9748) (0.8853) (1.4622)
Top 20% 1.8429*** 2.1555*** 4.1074*** 5.5020*** 5.4997*** 10.0921*** 13.1587*** 22.2397***
(0.1761) (0.2417) (0.3531) (0.4987) (0.4522) (0.8228) (0.8660) (2.2362)
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Table 4. 8: Marginal effects of household expenditure levels on domestic remittances
Table 4.8a: Probability of domestic remittances by welfare level
Table 4.8b: Level of domestic remittance by welfare level (in ‘000 pesos)
Note: Welfare effects are reported by expenditure quintile (Bottom 20%, Bottom 20%-40%, Middle, Top
20%-40%, Top 20%). Parentheses denote standard errors. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *
significant at 10%
What is interesting is that an increase in the household expenditure level has a positive
effect on the probability and the level of international remittances received by Filipino
households, while it has the opposite effect on domestic remittances. For example, from
the 2000 FIES of Table 4.7, it was found that a one per cent increase in total household
expenditure, on average and ceteris paribus, increases the probability of receiving
international remittances by around 0.0011 probability points and also raises the
amounts by 96 pesos. In contrast, a one per cent decrease in total household expenditure
was estimated to increase the probability of receiving remittances from the Philippines
by around 0.0011 probability points and their levels by 52 pesos (see Table 4.8). Based
on the results, it is conjectured that the richer the households are, the more international
1985 FIES 1988FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Welfare level
ltotex -0.1015*** -0.0940*** -0.1098*** -0.1106*** -0.1116*** -0.1135*** -0.1097*** -0.1111***
(0.0077) (0.0073) (0.0060) (0.0063) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0052)
Welfare quintile
Bottom 20% -0.0569* -0.1158*** -0.0838*** -0.1830*** -0.1122*** -0.1142*** -0.1355*** -0.1686***
(0.0297) (0.0277) (0.0225) (0.0231) (0.0182) (0.0140) (0.0169) (0.0186)
Bottom 20%-40% -0.0230 -0.0113 -0.1283*** -0.0734** -0.0551** -0.0713*** 0.0072 0.0097
(0.0462) (0.0421) (0.0334) (0.0351) (0.0273) (0.0263) (0.0283) (0.0312)
Middle -0.0785 -0.1213*** -0.1309*** -0.0857** -0.1254*** -0.1404*** -0.0946*** -0.0974***
(0.0487) (0.0462) (0.0356) (0.0377) (0.0284) (0.0280) (0.0295) (0.0315)
Top 20%-40% -0.2266*** -0.0934** -0.1146*** -0.1222*** -0.1841*** -0.1660*** -0.1642*** -0.1507***
(0.0400) (0.0374) (0.0292) (0.0308) (0.0238) (0.0228) (0.0226) (0.0240)
Top 20% -0.0960*** -0.1230*** -0.0877*** -0.0966*** -0.0685*** -0.0717*** -0.1333*** -0.1250***
(0.0232) (0.0237) (0.0199) (0.0200) (0.0166) (0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0146)
1985 FIES 1988FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Welfare level
ltotex -0.0570 -0.1203*** -0.2965*** -0.2694*** -0.6086*** -0.5231*** -0.2436*** 0.1482
(0.0356) (0.0337) (0.0457) (0.0736) (0.0650) (0.1075) (0.0899) (0.1397)
Welfare quintile
Bottom 20% 0.0607 -0.1366 -0.1073 -0.9753*** -0.5349*** -0.5833*** -0.7795*** -1.3609***
(0.0908) (0.0912) (0.1316) (0.1890) (0.1875) (0.1937) (0.1896) (0.2803)
Bottom 20%-40% 0.0059 0.0795 -0.6940*** -0.5539* -0.3553 -0.8942** 0.4307 0.9934**
(0.1478) (0.1559) (0.2111) (0.3123) (0.3144) (0.4207) (0.3422) (0.4983)
Middle -0.0135 -0.1011 -0.4532* -0.0487 -0.8859** -0.7684 0.0981 0.0532
(0.1704) (0.1900) (0.2498) (0.3653) (0.3536) (0.5027) (0.4044) (0.5753)
Top 20%-40% -0.4914*** -0.3816** -0.5143* -1.2182*** -1.5168*** -3.4781*** -1.5101*** -1.3585*
(0.1873) (0.1862) (0.2671) (0.4085) (0.3434) (0.7477) (0.5262) (0.7012)
Top 20% 0.1734 -0.0328 0.2960 1.3039*** 0.3853 2.6896*** 0.5650 2.0947***
(0.1756) (0.1550) (0.2550) (0.4666) (0.3047) (0.8150) (0.5848) (0.7701)
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remittances they receive, while the poorer they are, the more likely they are to rely on
domestic remittances.
Taking into consideration the nonlinear relationship between two variables and using
welfare quintiles, we can further investigate in detail how much the household welfare
level affects the receipt of remittances in terms of their incidences and levels. Table 4.7
revealed that if the household expenditure increases at the same rate, the probability of
receiving international remittances increases the most among the middle welfare groups.
On the other hand, with regard to the level, we could not find any obvious pattern.
However, our findings might suggest that in recent years the top welfare group (i.e.,
Top 20 per cent) tends to have a high propensity to receive more remittances from
abroad as their welfare level goes up. Based on the 2006 FIES, it was found that a one
per cent increase in their welfare increases the amount of international remittances by
222 pesos (or US$ 4.33) among this group, which is more than twice the increase
among the bottom 20 per cent group. When it comes to the relationship between
domestic remittances and the welfare level, it was found that a decline in the household
welfare raises the incidence of receiving the remittances at any welfare level but it does
not affect the level of the remittances in the same way. It was also found that it raised
the amounts only among the bottom 20 per cent and the top 20-40 per cent groups. In
2006, a one per cent decrease in the welfare was found to increase the amount remitted,
on average and ceteris paribus, by only 13.6 pesos (or US$ 0.265) among these groups
(see Table 4.8).
As mentioned above, we found that across the survey years an increase in a household
welfare level increases the probability of international remittances and the amount a
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household receives. What interests us now is the temporal change in the effect of the
welfare. The t-tests reported in Table 4.9 show how significant the changes are by
comparing the results in 1994, in 2000, and in 2006 of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8. The t-
tests revealed that between 2000 and 2006, the welfare effects on both the probability
and the amount of international remittances significantly increased. This increase is
mainly accounted for by a rise among the middle, the top 20-40 per cent, and the top 20
per cent welfare groups. This rise in the effects among the middle and the top groups
would contribute to widening the welfare gap between rich and poor. The effects of
international remittances on an increase in the expenditure gap will be investigated in
Chapter Five. With regard to domestic remittances, among the poorest of the poor the
complementary effect of the remittances on welfare loss declined from 1994 to 2000
and significantly increased during 2000-2006. This result suggests that the poorer
households are more likely to rely on remittances from family members living within
the home country over the latter period. Among the poor, their family and relatives
might have less chance to work abroad as many of them are unqualified to work
overseas and also because the cost of migration is enormous for them and they cannot
afford it.
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Table 4. 9: The t-tests for temporal changes in the effects of welfare levels on remittances
Table 4.9a: Probability of remittances
Table 4.9b: Level of remittances (in ‘000 pesos)
Note: Welfare effects are reported by expenditure quintile (Bottom 20%, Bottom 20%-40%, Middle, Top
20%-40%, Top 20%).
Parentheses denote standard errors. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
When we look at the effects of the welfare levels on remittances, the results should be
interpreted with caution because of a potential endogeneity problem. The receipt of
remittance income can improve the welfare level, thus the result of the welfare effects
on the decision and the amount of receiving remittances may be biased without
controlling for this potential endogeneity. The later rounds of the FIES (i.e., the 2000,
2003 and 2006 FIES) contain some variables influencing household welfare level such
as ownership of household assets. These did not, however, provide valid instruments as
Welfare level
-0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.034 *** 0.035 ***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Welfare quintile
Bottom 20% 0.069 ** -0.054 ** 0.014 0.025 0.003 0.028
(0.027) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032) (0.028) (0.036)
Bottom 20%-40% 0.002 0.081 ** 0.083 * -0.008 -0.020 -0.028
(0.044) (0.041) (0.047) (0.040) (0.037) (0.043)
Middle -0.055 0.043 -0.012 0.081 ** 0.069 ** 0.150 ***
(0.047) (0.042) (0.049) (0.036) (0.032) (0.038)
Top 20%-40% -0.044 0.015 -0.029 -0.061 ** 0.055 ** -0.006
(0.038) (0.033) (0.039) (0.026) (0.022) (0.027)
Top 20% 0.025 -0.053 *** -0.028 0.007 0.027 ** 0.034 **
(0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016)
Domestic Remittances International Remittances
1994-2000 2000-2006 1994-2006 1994-2000 2000-2006 1994-2006
Welfare level
-0.254 * 0.671 *** 0.418 *** 4.712 *** 7.282 *** 11.994 ***
(0.130) (0.176) (0.158) (0.401) (1.202) (1.164)
Welfare quintile
Bottom 20% 0.392 -0.778 ** -0.386 4.739 *** 2.290 7.030 ***
(0.271) (0.341) (0.338) (1.394) (2.374) (2.286)
Bottom 20%-40% -0.340 1.888 *** 1.547 *** 5.070 *** 0.763 5.833 **
(0.524) (0.652) (0.588) (1.770) (2.839) (2.607)
Middle -0.720 0.822 0.102 6.428 *** 9.385 *** 15.813 ***
(0.621) (0.764) (0.681) (1.540) (2.718) (2.547)
Top 20%-40% -2.260 *** 2.120 ** -0.140 3.352 *** 3.927 ** 7.278 ***
(0.852) (1.025) (0.812) (1.182) (1.757) (1.608)
Top 20% 1.386 -0.595 0.791 4.590 *** 12.148 *** 16.738 ***
(0.939) (1.121) (0.900) (0.962) (2.383) (2.291)
Domestic Remittances International Remittances
1994-2000 2000-2006 1994-2006 1994-2000 2000-2006 1994-2006
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they were also correlated with the probability of receiving remittances either from
abroad or from within the Philippines. In addition, even if some variables only found in
the last three rounds can be used as instruments, they would not permit investigating
comparable specifications during the period of 1985-2006. Unfortunately, we do not
have appropriate instruments to resolve this potential endogeneity of the household
welfare measure due to the limitations of the variables available from the FIES. This is
clearly an important issue for future research, however.
Family composition
In order to investigate the effects of family composition on the receipt of remittances,
this research used the following age categories (age 0-6, age 7-14, age 15-24, and age
25 and over). The research found that households with a higher share of family
members over 25 years old have the greater probability and amount of receiving
international remittances than any other households. This means that the need for
remittances is the greatest when households members are 25 years and older. Alba and
Sugui (2009) mentioned that altruistic and insurance motives would be consistent with a
positive coefficient for this age group especially for migrants who are not primary
bread-winners. While with regard to domestic remittances, the estimation results also
found that if households have a higher share of family members under 15 years of age,
it significantly raises the incidence of the receipt of domestic remittances but not their
amounts. This might be driven by altruistic or insurance motives because domestic
remittances would be sent from family members, relatives or siblings living remotely
for specific purposes especially because of lack of money for food and/or child
education.
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Household head characteristics
The age of a household head has a significant impact on the probability of receiving
remittances. It was found that the age and the remittances have a U-shaped relationship.
With regard to the probability of receiving remittances, the turning points could be
found at the age of 24-33 years old for domestic remittances and 39-46 years old for
international remittances. Actually, the average age of household head is late 40s (see
Table 4.3). This finding suggests that the older a household head is, the higher the
incidence and the amount of remittances a Filipino household has. This remitting
behaviour can be motivated by altruism if migrants send money to care for an aging
head, or it might be driven by investment motives if they are planning to go back and
therefore concentrate their investment within the home country.
When it comes to the gender of a household head, female headed households are more
likely to receive international remittances than those with a male household head and
also tend to have more amounts of the remittances. The households with a female head,
which would be in a more financially vulnerable position, might need or have to rely on
support for their livelihoods from families or relatives working abroad. If this is true,
migrants send remittances mainly for altruistic reasons.
In terms of a household head’s marital status, the estimation results found that having a
married household head increased the probability and the level of receiving
international remittances. This result could be explained by the fact that most of Filipino
migrant workers are married and that they send money back to support the livelihoods
of their families or relatives left in the home country (see Table 4.10). If migrants send
remittances to support them and to improve their living conditions, the motive is
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altruistic. On the other hand, households with a married head have a significantly lower
probability and level of receiving domestic remittances. This is probably because the
financial situation of the households is relatively better than other households and they
don’t need to rely on money transfers from family members working within the country.
Table 4. 10: Share of OFWs by Marital Status (%)
Source: Ducanes and Abella (2008) p.13 Annex Table1
The educational attainment of a household head also yields some interesting results. The
results suggest that having a household head with a high school education significantly
increases the probability and the level of the receipt of international remittances
compared to the households having a head who did not finish even elementary
education. On the other hand, having a household head who completed a tertiary
education decreases the probability of receiving domestic remittances but had no
significant effect on the probability of receiving international remittances except for the
cases of the 1988 and 1991 FIES. Also, it seems not to contribute to an increase in the
amount of international remittances received. This is because the livelihoods of the
Year Single Married Others Total
1988 36.8 61.6 1.6 100
1989 35.1 63.2 1.7 100
1990 29.7 68.1 2.2 100
1991 33.7 63.6 2.7 100
1992 35.4 60.5 4.1 100
1993 33.3 64.2 2.5 100
1994 38.5 58 3.5 100
1995 40.9 55.9 3.2 100
1996 37.8 59.2 3.0 100
1997 33.9 62.9 3.3 100
1998 37.3 58.6 4.1 100
1999 36.6 59.6 3.8 100
2000 35.2 60.8 3.9 100
2001 37.1 58.5 4.4 100
2002 35.5 59.3 5.2 100
2003 30.3 64.8 4.8 100
2004 32.9 62.5 4.6 100
Marital Satus
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household with a household head who completed university or postgraduate school
could be less vulnerable and they don’t need to rely on remittance incomes, whereas the
household head with lower educational attainment has to send members of the family
abroad and depend on their money transfers from abroad to sustain the livelihoods due
to lack of job opportunities within the country.
Job-related factors
An increase in the share of employed family members significantly reduces the
probability of remittances received both from within the Philippines and from abroad.
The household with a higher share of employed family members might not need to rely
on remittance incomes. Conversely, if there are lower shares of the employed among the
Filipino households, they tend to depend on financial support from family members or
relatives living either in the Philippines or overseas. In addition, the employment status
of a household head also influences the receipt of remittances. It was found that having
a household head with no job significantly increases the probability and the amount of
receiving international remittances. It is clear that these households rely on remittance
incomes sent by family members working abroad and so among these households, there
might be a heavy dependency on international remittances. If migrants send money to
help their non-working head, they are motivated by altruism. While if migrants think
they can have a coinsurance agreement with their families in the home country in which
they send remittance to support their families during tough time and the families then
support them when they face some problems in their destination, their remitting
behaviour is driven by insurance motives. Of course, it is possible that after receiving
remittance incomes from family members working abroad, some migrant families quit
their jobs and fail to find a new job.
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Furthermore, if the household earns their income mainly through agricultural activities,
the probability of receiving either internal or international remittances declines.
Agricultural households might be reluctant to send their family members to work
abroad as they are an essential work force for their labour intensive activities. These
agricultural households would possibly want their family members to stay together and
help in agricultural activities. In addition, these households would have lack of access to
information on overseas employment and also they might not afford to work abroad due
to the high opportunity cost as well as the actual cost of migration.
Geographical disparity
Surprisingly, the latest available household data (2006 FIES) reveals that households
not living in the National Capital Region (NCR) had a higher probability of receiving
either internal or international remittances compared to those living in the NCR and also
received higher levels. The results of this research found a general increasing trend in
the dependency on remittance incomes outside the NCR. This finding suggests that
Filipino households living in NCR might have been less dependent on remittance
incomes compared to households in other regions. If we look at the percentage
distribution of OFWs derived from the 2008 Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF), it was
found higher in Central Luzon, South Luzon, and Mindanao regions than in NCR (see
Table 4.11). There are more recruitment agencies for overseas employment in NCR and
the surrounding regions such as Central and South Luzon. Most of OFWs deployed
from the provinces in Mindanao go to the Middle-East. Their families are under
extremely poor conditions and they have to send a family member at any cost to survive.
Based on the data from the FIES, it was also revealed that the share of sample
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households living in NCR received international remittances has been declining over
time (see Table 4.3). These features of the Filipino households could affect the results
of this study. Moreover, the recent increase in the dependency of Filipino households
living outside the NCR on remittance incomes, especially those from abroad could
result from a lack of adequate employment opportunities in non-NCR regions.
Table 4. 11: Percentage Distribution of OFWs in 2008, by gender and region of origin (%)
Region Total Male Female
Total No of OFWs (in '000) 2,002 1,034 968
Percentage Distribution of OFWs (%)
Ilocos 7.8 5.6 10.2
Cagayan Valley 5.5 2.8 8.4
Central Luzon 14.5 17.2 11.7
South Luzon 20.6 24.3 16.7
Bicol 3.1 3.4 2.7
Western Visayas 7.8 7 8.6
Central Visayas 5.6 7.2 3.9
Eastern Visayas 2.9 2.9 2.9
Mindanao 16.4 12.1 20.6
NCR 14 16.2 11.7
CAR 1.9 1.1 2.7
Total 100 100 100
Source: Survey on Overseas Filipinos 2008
Note: The estimates cover overseas Filipinos whose departure occurred within the last five years and
who are working or had worked abroad during the past six months (April to September) of 2008.
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4.5.2 The effect of International Remittances on Domestic Remittances
When Filipino households receive remittances from abroad, they might no longer need
to rely on any financial support from families or relatives living within the home
country or would lose incentives to receive such domestic money transfers because of
their smaller amounts. This effect of the receipt of international remittances displacing
the receipt of domestic remittances becomes greater as the size of remittances from
abroad increases. Hence, in this section we first investigate the effect of international
remittances on domestic remittances by simply including the variable denoting the
amount of international remittances (i.e., exrem), rather than the incidence (i.e., dexrem),
into the domestic remittance equations in the probit and Tobit models.
Table 4. 12: Marginal effects of international remittances on the receipt of domestic remittances
Table 4.12a: Probability of domestic remittances
Table 4.12b: Level of domestic remittances (in ‘000 pesos)
Table 4.12c: t-tests for temporal changes in the effects of international remittances
Note:
(a) exrem denotes the amount of international remittances (in ‘000 pesos).
(b) Parentheses denote standard errors. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
(c) Remittance equations include controls for household welfare quintiles, family composition,
household head characteristics (age, gender, marital status, educational attainment, employment
status), urban/rural, farming, and regions. All coefficient estimates are reported in the Appendix.
Table 4.12 reports only the estimation results of the marginal effects of international
remittances. The results show that an increase in the amount of international remittances
decreased the incidence and the amount of domestic remittances households received.
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
exrem -0.0052*** -0.0037*** -0.0021*** -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0010*** -0.0006*** -0.0006***
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
exrem -0.0292*** -0.0208*** -0.0185*** -0.0181*** -0.0234*** -0.0164*** -0.0129*** -0.0156***
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0052) (0.0022) (0.0036)
1994-2000 2000-2006 1994-2006
exrem 0.0005 ** 0.0004 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0017 0.0008 0.0025
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0048)
1994-2000 2000-2006 1994-2006
Probability of domestic remittances Level of domestic remittances
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However, the t-test revealed that the effects of international remittances on the
incidence of the receipt of domestic remittances have been significantly weakening over
time while there was no significant temporal change in the effects on the level of
domestic remittances.
Next, we move on to a potential problem for a two-way relationship between domestic
and international remittances. When this reverse causation occurs, the explanatory
variables are correlated through their error terms. In this situation, standard regression
analyses provide biased and inconsistent estimates. To correct for this possible
endogeneity problem, we use the instrumental variable (IV) estimation technique. If
there are valid and relevant instruments available, we can obtain consistent estimates.
We consider four potential identifying instruments which are based on migrant
characteristics derived from the SOF (i.e., educational attainment, length of stay in
destination country, gender, and age). As mentioned before, these four migrant
characteristics are used as proxy measures of their income as the wages of migrants are
not available in the SOF. In order to investigate which migrant characteristics can be
selected as better instruments, we tested three important issues on the instrumental
variables: (1) over-identifying restrictions; (2) weak instruments; (3) regressor
exogeneity. Based on the all test results reported in the appendix, we concluded that the
completion of tertiary education, the length of stay in destination country, and the
gender are the better set of instruments for the model determining the incidence of
domestic remittances (i.e., dinrem), while the gender and the age of migrant workers are
chosen as the best instruments for the model with the level of domestic remittances (i.e.,
inrem). Table 4.13 shows the estimation results. The term ivprobit and ivtobit denotes
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the probit and Tobit models with this IV technique. The coefficients on the instruments
used have the expected sign. The educational attainment and the age of migrants and the
migrant’s length of stay in the host country increase the amount of international
remittances that the recipient household received though the age effect is not
statistically significant, while households with female migrants receive less money. The
selected instruments pass the tests corresponding to regressor exogeneity, over-
identifying restrictions, and weak instruments although the results must be interpreted
with caution because the test statistic of weak instruments is relatively small and the
confidence intervals obtained from these tests are wider than the confidence interval
from the Wald test. Furthermore, for the level of domestic remittances, the Wald test of
exogeneity does not strongly reject the null hypothesis that the exrem variable is
exogenous.
The results reveal that an increase in the amount of international remittances decreases
the incidence of receiving domestic remittances and their level. Among the households
who received remittances from abroad, for example an increase in the amount of
international remittances by 1,000 pesos (or US$ 18.4) decreased the probability of
receiving domestic remittances by 0.0018 probability points, which is three times
greater than the estimates derived from the model without considering the endogeneity
problem reported in Table 4.12. Similarly, it also reduced the amount of domestic
transfers received by 126.9 pesos (or US$ 2.3). These displacement effects of
international remittances are nearly ten times greater than the model without
instrumental variables. After controlling for endogeneity, the international remittances
variable was found to decrease the amount of domestic remittances by around 12.7 per
cent, on average and ceteris paribus. This seems to be a significant effect because there
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is a huge difference in the absolute amount between domestic and international
remittances. Importantly, this implies that the receipt of international remittances not
only helps the recipient households but also remitters living within the Philippines.
These family members sending domestic remittances might need to send less or have no
need to send money. This enables them to increase their disposable income and
improves their welfare. On the other hand, heavy reliance on international money
transfers might be risky. During the tough economic times like the global economic and
financial crisis, some migrant workers were displaced or retrenched. Moreover, the
sharp appreciation of the Philippine peso against the currency migrants earned also
affected the amount of the remittances. International remittances are vulnerable to these
external shocks and can be volatile. In order to hedge the risk of dropping into poverty,
it might be important for some households to keep depending on both sources of
remittances.
131
Table 4. 13: ivprobit and ivtobit estimation results using 2003 FIES
Table 4.13a: Probability of domestic remittances (or dinrem)
Note: (a) * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) exrem* denotes the predicted value of the amount of international remittances derived from the
first stage regression.
Dependent variable:
Explanatory variables Coef.
Robust
Std. Err. Coef.
Robust
Std. Err. dy/dx
Delta-
method
Std. Err.
Instruments variables
Migrant's education level
(=1 if completed tertiary; =0 otherwise)
20.121 *** 7.1309
Length of stay abroad (months) 0.4162 *** 0.1326
Female migrant (=1 if female; =0 if male) -11.683 ** 5.7173
Remittance amount
exrem* -0.0059 *** 0.0019 -0.0018 *** 0.0006
Welfare
ltotex 119.74 *** 7.3283 0.6567 *** 0.2524 0.2007 ** 0.0829
Family composition
empsh -15.286 12.407 -0.2072 0.1393 -0.0633 0.0426
age0-6 -49.003 * 25.551 0.0806 0.3561 0.0246 0.1085
age7-14 10.654 14.378 0.2735 0.1702 0.0836 0.0515
age15-24 -6.4160 11.785 -0.1811 0.1397 -0.0554 0.0427
(age25+ omitted)
Head characteristics
hage -0.3603 1.1110 -0.0400 *** 0.0143 -0.0023 ** 0.0011
hage2 -0.0089 0.0115 0.0003 ** 0.0002
hfemale 58.824 *** 6.8946 0.2910 * 0.1510 0.0889 * 0.0486
hmarried 47.898 *** 7.1876 0.1498 0.1434 0.0458 0.0450
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 -16.521 *** 6.4248 -0.0700 0.0981 -0.0214 0.0302
hedu3 -31.971 *** 8.3118 -0.2458 ** 0.1053 -0.0751 ** 0.0329
hedu4 -43.897 *** 11.311 -0.3639 *** 0.1203 -0.1112 *** 0.0376
hnojob 27.334 *** 6.6005 0.2980 *** 0.0804 0.0911 *** 0.0257
Farming
agri -8.4281 8.0178 -0.2705 * 0.1480 -0.0827 * 0.0447
Region
Ilocos 55.285 *** 9.4625 0.2263 0.1729 0.0692 0.0544
Cagayan 46.383 *** 9.5271 -0.0250 0.1965 -0.0077 0.0599
Cluzon 5.8524 8.0342 -0.0255 0.1182 -0.0078 0.0361
Sluzon 45.539 *** 11.326 0.5160 *** 0.1113 0.1577 *** 0.0361
Bicol 63.705 *** 19.842 0.2531 0.2406 0.0773 0.0750
Wvisayas 55.750 *** 10.978 0.2790 0.1742 0.0853 0.0551
Cvisayas 52.469 *** 17.450 0.3697 ** 0.1839 0.1130 * 0.0581
Evisayas 38.417 ** 18.566 0.5119 ** 0.2081 0.1565 ** 0.0647
Mindanao 44.249 *** 9.8717 0.1097 0.1672 0.0335 0.0519
(NCR omitted)
CAR 60.915 *** 15.203 0.2033 0.2177 0.0621 0.0678
constant -1360.0 *** 90.513 -6.9249 ** 2.9633
/athrho 0.6005 * 0.3281
/lnsigma 4.7357 *** 0.0510
rho 0.5374 0.2333
sigma 113.95 5.8096
Test of regressor exogeneity (H0: exrem is exogenous.) Wald test of exogeneity (H0:/alpha = 0)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test chi2=11.84 p-value= 0.0006 chi2(1)= 3.35
Test of over-identifying restrictions (H0: all instruments are valid.) Prob > chi2= 0.0672
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-
sq statistic chi2=3.864 p-value= 0.1449
Tests of weak instruments (H0: exrem*=0) Wald chi2(25) 180.25
Wald test chi2=5.07 p-value= 0.0243 Prob > chi2 0.0000
Conditional Likelihood Ratio test statistic=6.31 p-value= 0.0161 Log pseudolikelihood -13826.748
Anderson-Rubin test chi2=10.11 p-value= 0.0176 Number of obs 2072
Lagrange Multiplier & J
overidentification test H0 is rejected
Structural equation Marginal effects
exrem dinrem dinrem
First stage regression
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Table 4.13b: Level of domestic remittances in ‘000 pesos (or inrem)
Note: (a) * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) exrem* denotes the predicted value of the amount of international remittances derived from the
first stage regression.
Dependent variable:
Explanatory variables Coef.
Robust
Std. Err. Coef.
Robust
Std. Err. dy/dx
Delta-
method
Std. Err.
Instruments variables
Female migrant (=1 if female; =0 if male) -12.094 *** 4.6035
Migrant's age (years) 0.4946 0.3490
Remittance amount
exrem* -0.3572 * 0.2158 -0.1269 0.0893
Welfare
ltotex 124.50 *** 7.4618 47.212 * 27.682 16.778 11.494
Family composition
empsh -14.147 12.604 -11.582 * 6.4533 -4.1162 * 2.4713
age0-6 -49.133 * 25.824 -9.1893 15.627 -3.2658 5.7864
age7-14 4.4852 14.525 9.4655 6.6685 3.3639 2.4406
age15-24 -12.727 11.912 -6.1696 5.9190 -2.1926 2.2090
(age25+ omitted)
Head characteristics
hage -0.2924 1.1142 -1.0338 * 0.5638 -0.1413 0.1102
hage2 -0.0091 0.0116 0.0063 0.0059
hfemale 57.240 *** 6.9906 18.252 14.003 6.4867 5.6237
hmarried 46.109 *** 7.1337 10.012 11.619 3.5580 4.4754
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 -16.234 ** 6.4485 -3.1782 4.7298 -1.1295 1.7649
hedu3 -30.380 *** 8.1613 -9.3978 7.0725 -3.3399 2.8096
hedu4 -37.428 *** 10.432 -16.794 * 9.0601 -5.9684 3.7325
hnojob 29.038 *** 6.6284 15.699 * 7.5530 5.5793 * 3.1885
Farming
agri -9.9009 8.0073 -9.3525 * 5.4992 -3.3238 2.1049
Region
Ilocos 57.961 *** 9.4075 16.279 13.600 5.7855 5.3845
Cagayan 50.504 *** 9.4817 8.2601 11.693 2.9355 4.4261
Cluzon 8.2534 8.0194 0.0968 5.0358 0.0344 1.7910
Sluzon 46.606 *** 11.373 19.150 11.665 6.8055 4.7784
Bicol 65.928 *** 19.725 17.656 16.679 6.2747 6.4939
Wvisayas 62.492 *** 10.887 19.233 14.204 6.8351 5.6949
Cvisayas 59.786 *** 17.535 21.881 14.673 7.7761 5.9237
Evisayas 46.518 ** 18.384 33.790 * 17.298 12.009 * 6.9939
Mindanao 51.295 *** 9.6948 12.682 11.749 4.5069 4.5981
(NCR omitted)
CAR 66.243 *** 15.135 19.841 15.457 7.0514 6.1474
constant -1419.7 *** 91.716 -531.49 * 315.73
/alpha 0.3184 0.2164
/lns 3.3355 *** 0.0929
/lnv 4.7398 *** 0.0509
s 28.093 2.6106
v 114.42 5.8278
Test of regressor exogeneity (H0: exrem is exogenous.) Wald test of exogeneity (H0:/alpha = 0)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test chi2=11.83 p-value= 0.0006 chi2(1)= 2.16
Test of over-identifying restrictions (H0: all instruments are valid.) Prob > chi2= 0.1412
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-
sq statistic chi2=1.506 p-value= 0.2197
Tests of weak instruments (H0: exrem*=0) Wald chi2(25) 34.68
Wald test chi2= 3.66 p-value= 0.0556 Prob > chi2 0.0941
Conditional Likelihood Ratio test statistic=6.94 p-value= 0.0136 Log pseudolikelihood -15679.068
Anderson-Rubin test chi2=8.35 p-value= 0.0154 uncensored observations 492
Lagrange Multiplier & J
overidentification test Number of obs 2072H0 is rejected
Marginal effect
inremexrem inrem
First stage regression Structural equation
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4.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has investigated the determinants of receiving either domestic or
international remittances using probit and bivariate probit models. Furthermore, by
using Tobit and bivariate Tobit models, the determinants of the size of the remittances
were investigated. One of the more significant findings to emerge from this chapter is
that the amounts of domestic and international remittances are mutually related, whereas
the probabilities are not interrelated except for 2000 and 2003. Furthermore, it was also
revealed that several explanatory factors such as the level of total household expenditure,
the household heads’ characteristics, the job-related information, and the regional
disparities are significant in determining both the incidence and the size of remittances.
Based on the results of explanatory factors, possible explanations on motivations for
remittances were also made. However, these motives are too complex to articulate.
Depending on the situation of migrants or recipient households, different motives can be
applied. More detailed information on determining variables, especially those for
migrants, will help identify which motives could be driving remitting behaviour.
In this chapter, we found that an increase in the household welfare level increases the
incidence and the amount of international remittances while it decreases those of
domestic remittances. However, the results should be interpreted with caution because
there is still an issue of welfare endogeneity here. The receipt of remittance incomes can
improve the welfare level, thus the result could be potentially biased without controlling
for this potential endogeneity. We could not solve this issue here due to a lack of
appropriate instruments. Clearly, further research and better data are required to explore
this issue further.
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In addition to examining the factors influencing the receipt of remittances in terms of
the incidence and the level, we also investigated the effect of international remittances
on the receipt of domestic remittances. However, to estimate this effect, there is another
potential endogeneity problem of a two-way relationship (or reverse causality) between
internal and international remittances. To correct for this potential problem, we used
instrumental variable (IV) estimation with instruments which affect international
remittances but not directly domestic transfers. By merging the 2003 SOF with the 2003
FIES, we consider four migrant characteristics (i.e., migrant’s educational attainment,
gender, age, as well as length of stay abroad as a migrant) as possible instrumental
variables. In order to select the better set of instruments, we tested three important
issues: (1) over-identifying restrictions; (2) weak instruments; (3) regressor exogeneity.
Based on the all test results, we concluded that the completion of tertiary education, the
length of stay in destination country, and the gender provide the best set of instruments
for the model of the incidence of domestic remittances (i.e., dinrem), whereas migrant’s
gender and age are optimal identifying instruments for the model with the level of
domestic remittances (i.e., inrem).
Our findings revealed that among the households who received international remittances,
an increase in the amount of remittances from abroad significantly decreased both the
incidence of domestic remittances received and their level. These findings support the
idea that there is a displacement effect of international remittances on domestic
remittances. This is because the receipt of remittances from abroad would contribute
more to improving the household welfare than those from within the country because of
the greater value amounts. This displacement effect has a positive impact not only on
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the recipient but also family members who live within the Philippines and send
domestic remittances. After the recipient households received international remittances,
these family members might need to send less than before or have no need to send
money any more. This enables them to increase their disposable income and helps
improve their welfare. On the other hand, however, the receipt of remittances from
abroad might widen the gap in the welfare between households with and without the
remittances. This research on the effect of remittances on the welfare and its inequality
will be pursued in the next chapter.
With altruistic motives, migrants frequently send money to support the livelihoods of
their families and relatives in the home country. This is one of the greatest economic
benefits for the recipients. However, overseas migration costs substantial sums even at
the household level. There are several costs that need to be paid. Migrant workers or
households have to raise money for migration (e.g., airfare, visa etc.). Migration costs
are often deducted from the first six month’s salary of migrants by the recruitment
agencies or employers. This is a huge front-end cost. Among households, there is also a
psychological cost of separation due to the migration of their members. The cost can be
tremendous among some migrant households especially if family members left behind
miss a person working overseas so much. It is possible that some potential migrant
workers have no motivations for migration because they do not want their families to be
separated. This psychological aspect of motivations for migration is always difficult to
examine and is well beyond the scope of this chapter.
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Chapter 5: Remittances and their effects on Household
Expenditure Inequality in the Philippines before and after a
set of crises during the late 1990s
5.1 Introduction
In the early history of development economics, remittances were not considered as a
key factor for developing countries. In the global economy, however, remittances
especially from abroad have become a central issue and have been interpreted as
potentially important for poverty reduction in developing countries. The receipt of
remittances from abroad directly affects poverty through an increase in the income of
their recipients, while receiving remittances also indirectly influences poverty through
their impact on economic growth, inflation, exchange rates, and access to capital (World
Bank, 2006:118). Recently, researchers have shown an increased interest in using
household survey data to investigate the effects of remittances. Using the household
survey, previous research has concluded that international remittances reduced poverty
(Adams, 2004; Gustafsson and Makonnen, 1993; Yang and Martinez, 2005; Taylor et
al., 2005; Lokshin et al., 2007). At the national level, Adams and Page (2005) found the
evidence that international remittances could significantly reduce poverty based on data
from international migration, remittances, inequality, and poverty for 71 developing
countries. In addition, it is said that remittances from abroad had more impact on
reducing poverty for the poorest of the poor (World Bank, 2006:121). In the case of the
Philippines, the poverty indices 51 significantly continued to decline in the 1980s and
1990s whereas the expenditure Gini increased after 1997 mainly due to the increase in
the share of the richest ten per cent of the population in total expenditure (Balisacan and
Hill 2003:319). With regard to the linkage between remittances and poverty in the
51 The headcount index, the poverty gap index, and the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke measure were used as the
poverty indices, (for more details, see Balisacan and Hill 2003: 340).
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Philippines, it was argued that the direct and indirect impact of the increases in
remittance flows into the Philippines, caused by a sharp appreciation of a migrant’s
currency against the Philippine peso during the period of 1997-1998, could reduce
poverty in the Philippines (Yang and Martinez 2005). In contrast to the impact of
remittances on poverty, the link between remittances and inequality seems to be less
clear. If remittances are sent disproportionately to better-off households, it may cause
disparities between households to widen. On the other hand, if remittances are sent to
the households who are worse off, it might lead to a contraction in inequality between
rich and poor households (World Bank, 2006:121).
Table 5. 1: The expenditure Gini coefficient, 1985-2006 (by receipt of remittances)
Source: Author’s computation based on FIES
The Gini coefficient on grouped (or Total) households, measured on a per capita
household expenditure basis, increased to 0.464 in 2000. This was the highest Gini
coefficient recorded over time (see Table 6.1). We also computed the Gini coefficient
by types of the receipt of remittances: no remittances (dnorem), international
remittances only (dexrem), internal remittances only (dinrem), both internal and
international remittances (dbothrem). Within non-remittance receiving households (i.e.,
dnorem), the inequality of expenditure distribution was higher than remittance receiving
households (i.e., dexrem, dinrem, dbothrem) and dramatically increased in 2000.
However, we do not exactly know the extent to which the receipt of remittances
contributes to the level of increased expenditure inequality.
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Total 0.385 0.387 0.406 0.405 0.409 0.464 0.445 0.445
dnorem 0.378 0.387 0.400 0.401 0.413 0.481 0.454 0.458
dexrem 0.351 0.354 0.369 0.370 0.360 0.401 0.410 0.416
dinrem 0.353 0.348 0.366 0.372 0.376 0.402 0.387 0.385
dbothrem 0.338 0.357 0.386 0.355 0.359 0.387 0.389 0.393
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When we look at the effect of remittances on poverty and inequality, remittance
incomes can be treated as a simple exogenous income transfer that migrants sent, or as a
potential substitute for domestic earnings to examine the effect of each type of
remittance on inequality. For the latter, past studies found it important to estimate the
counterfactual loss of income that migrants might experience due to migration to
examine the effect on poverty and inequality of income (see Ratha, 2007; McKenzie
and Sasin, 2007; Adams, 2006).
Instead of income, however, in this section household expenditure will be used as the
welfare metric to investigate inequality across those Filipino households with and
without remittances. There are several reasons why expenditure is used as a measure of
well-being. First, household expenditure is a direct measure of well-being. Second
expenditure is less subject to underreporting bias. For example, in the case of the FIES,
there is a serious underreporting bias of property income and entrepreneurial income
among the upper-income group and an underestimation of non-cash income among the
lower-income group. Third, especially in developing countries, expenditure is better
measured than income for poor households because income might be somewhat lumpy
among poor households such as agricultural workers due to shocks like natural disasters,
and also because the measurement of self-employed income is notoriously inaccurate
(see Meyer and Sullivan, 2003 Deaton, 1997: 26-32; World Bank, 2001:17; Estudillo,
1997: 72; Akita and Miyata, 2008: 149). Moreover, another advantage to using an
expenditure measure is that the consumption is much closer to a logarithmic normal
distribution than is the income distribution (Battistin, Blundell, and Lewbel, 2007).
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Thus, it is more appropriate to take the logarithm of expenditure in the expenditure
equations used in our analysis.
There have been a number of empirical studies that have attempted to analyse which
factors influence expenditure inequality in developing countries by decomposing
inequality (see for example, Mishra and Parikh, 1992 52 for India; Tsakloglou, 1993 53
for Greece; Akita et al., 1999 54 for Indonesia; Nguyen, 2008 55 for Vietnam; Balisacan
and Fuwa, 200456 for the Philippines). Past studies have found that the differentials in
educational attainment and in geographical location accounted for a large part of
expenditure inequality (Akita and Miyata, 2008:148). In the case of the Philippines,
using Fields (2003) decomposition, which is a regression-based inequality
decomposition approach and allows for the contribution of each explanatory variable to
inequality to be investigated, Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) found that spatial inequality,
which includes both rural-urban disparity and regional disparities, accounted for
approximately 19 per cent and 11 per cent of the total expenditure inequality in 1985
and 2000, respectively. The contribution of spatial inequality has decreased over time,
whereas the importance of family size to expenditure inequality has increased especially
in the 1990s. Another main factor contributing to the variance in household expenditure
is the educational level of the household head. It is revealed that about one-third of the
52 Theil’s entropy measure, Theil’s second measure, and Atkinson’s measure were used for the
decomposition analysis. Expenditure inequality in India was decomposed by regions (states) and by
sectors (urban or rural).
53 Expenditure per equivalent adult was decomposed into the following factors: regional (region and
locality of residence), demographic (age of household head) and educational (educational level of
household head). Among the factors included in the decomposition analysis, only an educational factor
accounts for a relatively large part of aggregate inequality.
54 Two Theil indices (T and L) were used to measure inequality in the distribution of household
expenditures. Total inequality was decomposed into rural-urban disparity, region, age, education,
household size, and gender.
55 Gini coefficient and Two Theil indices (T and L) were used to measure inequality. Inequality was
decomposed by the receipt of international remittances. It was found that international remittances
slightly increased inequality.
56 Two Theil T indices (T and L) were used to measure inequality. Expenditure inequality was
decomposed into locality (urban or rural), region, and sector of employment.
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total expenditure inequality can be explained by a household head’s educational
attainment from 1985 to 2000. In addition, a household head’s employment status and
access to infrastructure 57 were also significant factors in determining expenditure
inequality (see Balisacan and Fuwa, 2004: 12).
The primary aim of this chapter is to examine the effect of the receipt of different types
of remittances on household expenditure differences among Filipino households. In
particular, the analysis focuses on changes before and after the crises which were
comprised of a combination of the economic crisis and the severe drought which
occurred in the period covering 1997 to 1998. A key research question is to establish if
Filipino households without any remittances in the poorest segment of the population
represent the most vulnerable group in the Philippines during both the economic crisis
in 1997 and the severe drought of 1998. The impact of these crises might persist long
after the crises were over. Thus, we decided to compare two survey periods which are
before and after the above-mentioned crises. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the FIES
are available every three years from 1985 to 2006. For the analysis in this chapter, we
focused on the 1994 and 2000 FIES. The two survey years span a period before and
after the Asian economic crisis as well as the drought attributed to El Niño. If we find
evidence that there is a positive and significant impact of remittances on a household's
expenditure among the group that received remittances in the above survey period,
receiving remittances could thus significantly affect poverty reduction by improving the
welfare of the poorer Filipino households. This also means that if poor households
without remittances had actually received remittances, it could have assisted in terms of
improving their living conditions. It is quite important for policymakers to know the
57 Access to electricity was used as a representative infrastructure variable.
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counterfactual impact of the receipt of remittances, especially on the poor in their
countries. If receiving remittances could have more impact on improving the
expenditure level of the poor rather than the rich, expenditure gaps between rich and
poor would contract over time. On the other hand, if receiving remittances could
improve a poor household’s expenditure less than that of a rich household, the
differences could widen over time. So far, however, there has been little discussion
about such a counterfactual analysis with regard to the effects of the receipt of different
types of remittance on expenditure inequality not only between poor households with
and without remittance income but also between rich and poor households among
remittance-receiving households.
For the counterfactual analysis, we will investigate the per capita expenditure
differentials between households with and without remittances and examine the extent
to which welfare differentials originate from differences in household characteristics
(i.e., endowment differences) and differences in household expenditure patterns caused
by the receipt of remittances (i.e., treatment differences) in the welfare equations, which
can be expressed differently depending on the type of remittance receipt. The Oaxaca
(1973) / Blinder (1973) decomposition can be used to estimate these effects under the
assumption of the exogeneity of remittance receipt which means that remittances are
treated as an exogenous income transfer that the recipient households received. This
standard decomposition technique focuses only on average effects. When we look at the
inequality between rich and poor, estimating only average treatment effects is unhelpful.
It is more useful to use the quantile decomposition approach which estimates quantile
endowment and treatment differences using quantile regression analysis. This
decomposition enables us to examine the entire portrait of inequality among households
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from all parts of the conditional household expenditure distribution. To our knowledge,
no research has been conducted to examine the effects of remittances on inequality
using such a decomposition method at selected quantiles of welfare levels.
The Philippines is renowned as one of the countries which receive a large amount of
remittances from abroad. However, there are a lot of households which also receive
remittances from within the Philippines, especially from near Metro Manila such as
central and southern Luzon. Thus, in this chapter, Filipino households are classified into
four categories depending on the types of remittances received: no remittances (dnorem),
internal remittances only (dinrem), international remittances only (dexrem), both
internal and international remittances (dbothrem). It is likely that these four categories
of remittance receipt exert a distinctive impact on expenditure inequality between rich
and poor.
The empirical analysis of the impact of remittances on inequality begins by providing a
brief overview of remittances and the Philippine economy during a set of crises in the
late 1990s. It will then go on to outline an econometric framework to investigate the
determinants of household expenditure depending on the types of remittances received
and also provide an explanation of the decomposition methodology used in the analysis.
This methodology, which was introduced by Melly (2006), can decompose expenditure
differences in the conditional distribution using a quantile regression method. In recent
years, there has been some literature on examining wage inequality using this quanitle
decomposition analysis (for example, Burda, Fitzenberger, Lembcke and Vogel 2008;
Naticchioni, Ricci and Rustichelli 2008; Wahlberg 2008). After explaining the
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decomposition technique used, the empirical results are discussed. Finally, this chapter
offers some conclusions.
5.2 Philippine economy during the 1990s
In the Philippines, average per capita household expenditures declined in 1994 by two
per cent from their level in 1991. This was mainly due to the impact of the economic
contraction over the period of 1992-1993. Then, GDP growth accelerated from 1995 to
1997 because of renewed political stability and strengthened policy and institutional
reforms. Real mean expenditure was approximately 21 per cent higher in 1997
compared to 1994. However, the overall growth rate slowed between 1998 and 2000
because of the impact of the combination of the Asian financial crisis, the El Niño
phenomenon in 1998, and political uncertainty (Balisacan and Hill, 2003: 318-319).
There are a number of reports describing the impact of the Asian crisis on Philippine
households since the crisis erupted in late 1997 (see Lim 1999; Reyes et al., 1999; Datt
and Hoogeveen, 2003). However, informed discussion has been constrained by a lack of
representative household survey data. The data could be used to investigate changes in
the economic well-being of various household groups, for example, household
economic conditions before the crisis, changes in these conditions during the crisis, and
the impact of government policies and programs implemented to address the crises
(Balisacan and Hill, 2003: 336).
In the case of the Philippines, what has complicated the analysis of the impact of the
crises on the poor households was that the Asian economic crisis was concurrent with
the onset of a severe drought caused by the El Niño phenomenon in many parts of the
country. Using the 1998 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS), Datt and Hoogeveen
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(2000) estimated that the combined impacts of the above two external shocks accounted
for approximately a five per cent reduction in average living standards, a nine per cent
increase in the incidence of poverty, and an 11 and a 13 per cent increase in the depth
and severity of poverty, respectively. These findings suggest that the El Niño shock
accounted for the largest share of the overall impact on poverty. Given the overlap of
two national surveys covering the crises period, that is, the 1997 FIES and the 1998
APIS, Balisacan (2001) found that households, which had reported experiencing the
adverse effects of the crises such as a rise in prices, or a reduction in wages as well as
the El Niño phenomenon, were generally concentrated among the poorer households.
Loss of domestic jobs affected the middle deciles of the expenditure distribution more,
while loss of overseas jobs was more likely to affect the upper expenditure deciles.
Households responded differently to the Asian economic crisis and to the El Niño
phenomenon depending on their household attributes, and most importantly pre-crisis
living standards and location. The panel data analysis suggested that the households’
probabilities of not eating out, of taking children out of school, or of increasing their
working hours were inversely related to their pre-crisis living standard. Thus, it
appeared that a macro-economic shock like the Asian crisis tended to hit most severely
and, systematically, the poorest groups in Philippine society. On the other hand, the
probability of receiving assistance and relief from the public sector or from other
households was not significantly related to pre-crisis living standards. These findings
suggested that social safety nets, whether from formal or informal sources, did not have
a pro-poor bias during the crises (Balisacan and Hill, 2003: 336-337). Following these
findings, it could be said that during the crises the most vulnerable group in the
Philippines was the poor, especially the poor who did not receive any financial support,
such as remittance incomes, from their family members or relatives. During the Asian
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financial crisis, with regard to the volume of overseas remittances, there was a steep
increase in 1998. It is said that the sudden depreciation of the Philippine exchange rate
during the Asian economic crisis actively increased the size of remittances from the
OFWs (Yang, 2006). Then, before and after the crises, to what extent could remittances
sent by family members working either abroad or within the Philippines, or in both
places financially assist the expenditure levels of the Filipino households, especially
those of the poor? The sets of crises (that is, the Asian financial crisis, the severe
drought, and political uncertainty) might differentially impact the expenditure patterns
of each Filipino household with and without remittances. However, such a detailed
analysis is beyond the scope of the current study. In this chapter, the above three types
of shock to Filipino households will be regarded as a set of crises that occurred over the
period of 1997-1998 and the contribution of the receipt of remittances to the
differentials in the levels of total expenditure per capita of pre-crises and of post-crises
Filipino households will be examined.
5.3 Methodology of Analysis
5.3.1 Conditional quantile regression
The methodology is mainly outlined in two parts. In the first part, to find evidence for
the effects of the receipt of remittances on the entire conditional expenditure distribution
(including the poor, the middle, and the rich), we begin by investigating the extent to
which the differentials in the household expenditure distribution between households
with and without receipt of remittances can be attributed to differences in the
characteristics of these households. The impacts of the characteristics on the conditional
expenditure distribution for each household category can be estimated using a quantile
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regression framework (see Koenker and Bassett 1978; Koenker and Hallock 2001;
Koenker 2005). The conditional quantile function, )|( Xq y  , given the set of covariates
X , can be expressed using a linear specification as follows:
(5-1) )()|(  iy XXq  for all )1,0(
where iy is the dependent variable and denotes the natural logarithm of per capita total
household expenditure, iX is a matrix of all explanatory variables, )( are the
different quantile coefficient vectors to be estimated. The subscript i refers to the
household. We assume that all quantiles of y conditional on X are linear in X . Then,
the conditional quantiles of y can be estimated by linear quantile regression in the
specific percentiles, )1,0( .
It is arguable that the allocation of households across the four remittance categories is
not random and some correction for selectivity bias is thus required. However, there are
a number of reasons why this is not done here. First, the absence of adequate identifying
instruments remains a problem. Second, although Buchinsky (1998, 2001) and Albrecht,
van Vuuren and Vroman (2009) have developed selection correction procedures for
quantile regression models, these are fairly complex to implement and require relatively
large sample sizes to work effectively. Third, and most relevant given our approach, the
Melly (2006) decomposition has not been modified to incorporate the use of selection
effects.
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5.3.2 Decomposition of unconditional quantile regression
There is an advantage of the unconditional quantile regression over the conditional
quantile regression by Koenker and Bassett (1978). The estimated coefficients are
regarded as the effects of changes in the distribution of covariates on the quantiles of the
unconditional distribution of the dependent variable (see Le and Booth, 2010: 5-6). The
second part of the procedure is to decompose the welfare differences ( qˆ ) of the
unconditional quantile functions between the households with and without remittances
(denoted by ),ˆ,(ˆ remrem Xq  and ),ˆ,(ˆ noremnorem Xq  ) at any welfare level ( ) as
follows:
(5-2)  
 ),ˆ,(ˆ),ˆ,(ˆ
),ˆ,(ˆ),ˆ,(ˆ),ˆ,(ˆ),ˆ,(ˆ
noremnoremremnorem
remnoremremremnoremnoremremrem
XqXq
XqXqXqXq



 , )1,0(
where ),ˆ,(ˆ remnorem Xq  is the estimated counterfactual quantile function outlined by
Melly (2006), who gives a detailed explanation on this approach and its statistical
properties. 58 This quantile function denotes the welfare levels for dnorem if their
endowments were the same as the remittance-receiving households (i.e., dinrem, dexrem,
or dbothrem). The first bracketed term denotes the effect of coefficients (or the quantile
58 If the number of simulations used in the Machado and Mata (2005) procedure goes to infinity, it is
noted that the decomposition technique by Melly (2006) is numerically identical to the decomposition
approach proposed by Machado and Mata (2005), which has been used in various applications to estimate
counterfactual conditional wage distributions (for example, see Pham and Reilly 2009). Using a large
number of quantile regression (e.g., 99, one for each percentile from 1 to 99), the Melly (2006)
decomposition can be a more straightforward and efficient decomposition method because the Machado
and Mata (2005) method use a simulation approach where quantiles are drawn at random, which is
computationally demanding and becomes quite cumbersome for datasets with more than a few thousand
observations (see Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo, 2010: 60).
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treatment effects) and the second represents the effect of household characteristics (or
the quantile endowment effects).59
To determine the level of household expenditure, the expenditure equations used in the
analysis will include the following set of explanatory variables: family composition,
household head’s characteristics (such as gender, age, marital status, educational
attainment, and employment status), and geographical location, which includes rural-
urban and regional differences. As Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) noted, in the Philippines
household head’s educational attainment and location (including both rural-urban
disparity and regional disparities) accounted for a significantly large portion of
expenditure inequality. Other household head’s characteristics (gender, age, marital
status, and employment status) are also used in the analysis following Balisacan and
Fuwa (2004). It is also found that agriculture has consistently had the lowest mean
living standard among all sectors. So, in addition to the above explanatory variables, we
add a dummy variable to identify whether households earn their income mainly from
agricultural activities or not. We assume that not only the receipt of remittances but also
the household characteristics affect household expenditure gaps between households
with and without remittances. Although the FIES collected a good deal of information
on Filipino households as shown above, there are some limitations with these data. For
example, the FIES have the information on educational attainment only for the
household head, but not for all family members. It only enables us to investigate how
household heads’ educational attainment, not other family members’ educational levels,
would affect the differences in household expenditure. In addition, we cannot capture
the number within the different age categories, for example, those aged over 60 with the
59 The stata command rqdeco, which is provided by Melly (2007), was used to compute the quantile
endowment and treatment effects.
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exception of the 2006 FIES. This could affect, for example, the expenditure on health
care. Moreover, there is the possibility of sample selection bias. The receipt of a
remittance type is potentially not random and consequently households with and
without remittance incomes potentially have different characteristics. Sample selection
bias arises when some component of the remitting decision is relevant to the
expenditure determining process. We can control for this using selection correction
procedures, but these are not well developed in the quantile regression framework. In
addition, the FIES have no information on factors influencing the remitting decision.
Thus, we are not able to obtain good and valid instruments. Thus, here we do not
explicitly deal with selection correction. Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 report the definition of
the variables and the summary statistics of the data used in the analysis, respectively. In
the next section, the results of the quantile treatment and endowment effects on
expenditure inequality at the  th quantile of the unconditional distribution of the total
household expenditure will be discussed.
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Table 5. 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Variable Description
Welfare
lpctotex The natural logarithm of per capita total family expenditures (in pesos)
Remittance
dnorem =1 if the household received no remittance; =0 otherwise
dinrem =1 if the household received only internal remittances; =0 otherwise
dexrem =1 if the household received only external remittances; =0 otherwise
dbothrem =1 if the household received both internal and external remittances; =0
otherwise
Family composition
empsh The share of household employed members out of total household members
age 0-6 The share of the members with greater than 1 and less than 7 year old
age 7-14 The share of the members with greater than 7 and less than 15 years old
age 15-24 The share of the members with greater than 15 and less than 25 year old
age 25+ The share of the members with 25 year old and over
Head Characteristics
hfemale =1 if the household head is female; =0 otherwise
hage The age of the household head
hage2 The square of the age of the household head
hmarried =1 if the household head marital status is married; =0 otherwise
hedu1 =1 if household head did not finish elementary school; =0 otherwise
hedu2 =1 if the household head finished elementary school; =0 otherwise
hedu3 =1 if the household head finished high school; =0 otherwise
hedu4 =1 if the household head finished University or Post Graduate; =0 otherwise
hnojob =1 if the household head is not employed; =0 otherwise
Urban/Rural
urban =1 if the household lives in the urban area; =0 otherwise
Farming
agri =1 if the household is an agricultural one; =0 otherwise
Region
Ilocos =1 if the household lives in Ilocos Region; =0 otherwise
Cagayan =1 if the household lives in Cagayan Valley; =0 otherwise
Cluzon =1 if the household lives in Central Luzon; =0 otherwise
Sluzon =1 if the household lives in Southern Luzon; =0 otherwise
Bicol =1 if the household lives in Bicol Region; =0 otherwise
Wvisayas =1 if the household lives in Western Visayas; =0 otherwise
Cvisayas =1 if the household lives in Central Visayas; =0 otherwise
Evisayas =1 if the household lives in Eastern Visayas; =0 otherwise
Mindanao =1 if the household lives in Mindanao; =0 otherwise
NCR =1 if the household lives in National Capital Region (NCR); =0 otherwise
CAR =1 if the household lives in Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR); =0
otherwise
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Table 5. 3: Summary Statistics
1994 FIES 2000 FIES
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Welfare
lpctotex (nominal) 9.302 0.735 9.822 0.784
lpctotex (real) 9.679 0.735 9.822 0.784
Remittance
dnorem 52.7% 54.1%
dinrem 27.4% 27.8%
dexrem 12.8% 12.7%
dbothrem 7.1% 5.3%
Family composition
empsh 0.353 0.223 0.378 0.235
age 0-6 0.149 0.181 0.131 0.169
age 7-14 0.191 0.19 0.182 0.19
age 15-24 0.178 0.202 0.177 0.204
age 25+ 0.482 0.235 0.509 0.246
Head Characteristics
hfemale 15.2% 17.5%
hage 47.6 13.8 48.9 13.9
hmarried 83.5% 80.6%
hedu1 27.6% 25.3%
hedu2 35.3% 31.7%
hedu3 28.5% 32.0%
hedu4 8.5% 11.0%
hnojob 15.2% 16.3%
Urban/Rural
urban 59.8% 59.4%
Farming
agri 30.2% 24.4%
Region
Ilocos 5.5% 4.8%
Cagayan 4.0% 3.9%
Cluzon 10.8% 9.5%
Sluzon 14.4% 15.6%
Bicol 5.7% 5.3%
Wvisayas 8.2% 7.6%
Cvisayas 7.3% 5.9%
Evisayas 4.6% 5.7%
Mindanao 22.3% 27.1%
NCR 15.1% 10.5%
CAR 2.0% 4.2%
Number of Obs 24165 39615
Note: Standard errors are reported only for continuous variables. CPI=68.6 in
1994 and CPI=100 in 2000.
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5.4 Empirical Results
5.4.1 Conditional quantile regression results
Before moving on to the detailed analysis on the effects of the receipt of remittances on
the expenditure inequality, we report the household welfare level depending on the
types of the remittances. Table 5.4 shows per capita household expenditures of the
households with and without remittances. The welfare of households with only
international remittances (i.e., dexrem) was the greatest for both survey years. This
result is consistent at the 10th, 50th and 90th welfare level. The expenditure gaps between
median and rich households account for most of the gaps between rich and poor. So, the
mean per capita expenditures are greater than the median estimates regardless of the
receipt of remittances. This means that the welfare distribution is skewed to the right.
Table 5. 4: Per capita household expenditures (in pesos) and their gaps by types of remittances
Source: Author’s computation based on the FIES.
Note: Parentheses denote the percentage.
Next, we examine the effects of the receipt of remittances on household expenditures.
Assuming that between households, regardless of remittance incomes, there is no
difference in the effects of household characteristics on expenditure levels, we
Per capita expenditure mean 10th 50th 90th mean 10th 50th 90th
Total 14702 4444 10436 29484 26340 7153 17210 52105
dnorem 13326 4178 9371 26794 24848 6860 15998 49029
dexrem 22720 7183 17878 42983 41476 11954 31002 78841
dinrem 12309 4186 9110 23028 20459 6710 14353 37328
dbothrem 19679 6656 15603 36432 36025 11308 25679 64827
Expenditure Gaps No. of Obs 50th-10th 90th-50th 90th-10th No. of Obs 50th-10th 90th-50th 90th-10th
Total 24165 5992 19048 25041 39615 10057 34895 44952
(23.9) (76.1) (100) (22.4) (77.6) (100)
dnorem 12732 5194 17422 22616 21439 9138 33032 42169
(23.0) (77.0) (100) (21.7) (78.3) (100)
dexrem 3093 10695 25105 35800 5048 19049 47838 66887
(29.9) (70.1) (100) (28.5) (71.5) (100)
dinrem 6620 4923 13919 18842 11021 7643 22976 30618
(26.1) (73.9) (100) (25.0) (75.0) (100)
dbothrem 1720 8946 20829 29775 2107 14371 39148 53519
(30.0) (70.0) (100) (26.9) (73.1) (100)
1994 FIES 2000 FIES
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conducted pooled regression analysis. The remittance dummy variables (i.e., dexrem,
dinrem, and dbothrem) are included into the welfare equation which capture how much
the receipt of remittances contributes to the expenditure level. Table 5.5 and Table 5.6
summarise the coefficient estimates of the remittance variables. The former reports the
results derived from the mean regression and the quantile regressions at the specific
quantiles (10th, 50th, and 90th), while the latter provides the estimates from the
interquantile regressions between the said quantiles (i.e., 50th-10th, 90th-50th, and 90th-
10th).
Table 5. 5: Pooled regression on expenditure levels (lpctotex)
Table 5.5a: Effects of remittances on expenditure levels
Table 5.5b: t-tests for temporal change in the effects of remittances on expenditure levels
Note:
(a) Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
(b) These equations include controls for family composition, household head characteristics (age,
gender, marital status, educational attainment, employment status), urban/rural, farming, and regions.
All coefficient estimates are reported in the Appendix.
Table 5.5 reveals that at the mean as well as the above quantiles of the household
expenditure, with other things being the same, households who received international
remittances had higher welfare levels and those with domestic remittances got lower
levels compared to non-remittance receiving households. So, given that the assumption
of this pooled regression analysis, the receipt of international remittances seems to have
a significant and positive effect on household welfare. Moreover, this effect is greater
mean 10th 50th 90th mean 10th 50th 90th
dexrem 0.235 *** 0.216 *** 0.228 *** 0.256 *** 0.291 *** 0.275 *** 0.292 *** 0.332 ***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.019) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
dinrem -0.064 *** -0.045 *** -0.074 *** -0.061 *** -0.080 *** -0.047 *** -0.083 *** -0.085 ***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
dbothrem 0.146 *** 0.145 *** 0.136 *** 0.143 *** 0.235 *** 0.234 *** 0.242 *** 0.225 ***
(0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.024) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019)
1994 FIES 2000 FIES
mean 10th 50th 90th
dexrem 0.056 *** 0.059 *** 0.064 *** 0.076 ***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.016) (0.024)
dinrem -0.016 * -0.002 -0.009 -0.024
(0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017)
dbothrem 0.089 *** 0.089 *** 0.106 *** 0.082 ***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.021) (0.031)
1994 FIES-2000 FIES
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among the rich. On the other hand, the negative coefficient of the receipt of domestic
remittances suggests that Filipino households with such remittances were significantly
poorer than those with no remittances. The t-test shows that regardless of welfare level,
the effect was significantly greater in 2000 than 1994 (see Table 5.5b). In order to
investigate whether international remittances contribute to widening the welfare gaps
between rich and poor, the inter-quantile regression was estimated. In 2000, a
coefficient estimate of the international remittance dummy (i.e., dexrem) on the gaps
between 90th and 10th percentile was found to be statistically significant and positive
(see Table 5.6a). This supports evidence that the receipt of international remittances
widened the inequality between rich and poor in that year. The result also finds that this
inequality is mainly accounted for by the welfare gaps between the middle and affluent
groups. However, the t-test reported in the table shows that the significant temporal
changes in the effects of remittances on welfare differences were not found between
1994 and 2000 (see Table 5.6b).
Table 5. 6: Interquantile regression (pooled) on expenditure gaps (lpctoex)
Table 5.6a: Effects of remittances on expenditure gaps
Table 5.6b: t-tests for temporal change in the effects of remittances on expenditure gaps
Note:
(a) Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
(b) These equations include controls for family composition, household head characteristics (age,
gender, marital status, educational attainment, employment status), urban/rural, farming, and
regions. All coefficient estimates are reported in the Appendix.
dexrem 0.012 0.028 0.040 0.017 0.040 ** 0.057 ***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020)
dinrem -0.030 ** 0.013 -0.016 -0.036 *** -0.002 -0.038 ***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
dbothrem -0.009 0.007 -0.002 0.007 -0.016 -0.009
(0.019) (0.028) (0.031) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026)
1994 FIES 2000 FIES
50th-10th 90th-50th 90th-10th 50th-10th 90th-50th 90th-10th
50th-10th 90th-50th 90th-10th
dexrem 0.005 0.012 0.017
(0.024) (0.025) (0.032)
dinrem -0.006 -0.015 -0.022
(0.016) (0.016) (0.021)
dbothrem 0.016 -0.023 -0.007
(0.028) (0.035) (0.040)
1994 FIES-2000 FIES
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Here, we relax the assumption that between households, regardless of the receipt of
remittance incomes, there is no difference in the effects of household characteristics on
expenditure levels. We conduct the separate regression analysis for each household
group (i.e., dnorem, dexrem, dinrem, and dbothrem). The mean regression analysis
reported in Table A5.3 in the appendix reveals that the effects of some household
characteristics on the welfare operate in opposite directions. For example, in 2000,
households with a female or married head had higher welfare among those who
received only international remittances (i.e., dexrem) on average and ceteris paribus,
while lower among those with the receipt of domestic remittances (i.e., dinrem) or with
no remittances (i.e., dnorem).
Table 5.7 reports the results of conditional quantile regression and contains the effects
of covariates included in the analysis on the level of household expenditure per capita
for each household category across the following percentiles (10th, 50th, and 90th). The
tables reveal that the effects of some household characteristics on the household welfare
significantly differ between rich and poor. In 1994, the effect of the share of the
employed was the greatest for the rich among the households who received domestic
remittances and non-remittance receiving households, while for the poor among those
with the receipt of remittances from abroad. On the other hand, among all household
categories the effect gets bigger for the rich than the poor household in 2000. Having a
highly-educated household head affects the expenditure level positively and its effect
gets greater. Regardless of whether the household received remittances, the effect was
greater among the affluent group. It was also revealed that households with an
unemployed head had even higher welfare for the middle and the rich groups if they
received international remittances and for the rich households with the receipt of
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domestic remittances. This means that households with an unemployed head heavily
rely on remittance incomes either from abroad or from within the Philippines. The
receipt of remittances could increase the expenditure even though household heads are
not working either due to lack of job opportunities within the country or to retirement
because of the age or disability. For the poor households, however, the amount of
remittances they received might not be enough to improve their welfare level.
157
Table 5. 7: Quantile regression results
Table 5.7a: the 1994 FIES
Note: Parentheses for each percentile in the columns of the 1994 and 2000 FIES denote standard errors with 200 bootstrap replications for standard error estimates.
Parentheses in the column of gaps between the 1994 and 2000 FIES denote the standard errors in the case of unequal variance. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-
tailed).
10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th
empsh 0.2032 *** 0.2918 *** 0.3579 *** 0.3789 *** 0.2493 *** 0.2530 ** 0.1966 *** 0.2818 *** 0.3607 *** 0.4321 *** 0.3008 *** 0.1534
age 0-6 -1.3755 *** -1.4166 *** -1.3284 *** -1.1124 *** -1.2495 *** -1.3826 *** -1.3883 *** -1.2860 *** -1.3911 *** -1.1076 *** -1.1411 *** -1.3905 ***
age 7-14 -1.0561 *** -1.0963 *** -1.0813 *** -0.7927 *** -0.9014 *** -1.0518 *** -0.9414 *** -1.0342 *** -1.0834 *** -0.8440 *** -0.9283 *** -0.9037 ***
age 15-24 -0.4452 *** -0.5907 *** -0.5683 *** -0.3726 *** -0.5456 *** -0.6052 *** -0.4729 *** -0.4584 *** -0.4765 *** -0.3177 *** -0.4364 *** -0.4446 ***
(age25+ omitted)
hfemale -0.0369 -0.0052 0.0775 * 0.1468 *** 0.2174 *** 0.2831 *** 0.0064 0.0629 ** 0.1158 ** 0.1123 0.2427 *** 0.1449 **
hage -0.0146 *** -0.0150 *** -0.0148 *** -0.0201 ** -0.0116 * -0.0305 *** -0.0151 *** -0.0093 *** -0.0156 ** -0.0101 -0.0107 -0.0209 **
hage2 0.0001 ** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0002 ** 0.0001 0.0003 ** 0.0001 *** 0.00004 0.0001 * 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 **
hmarried -0.0420 -0.0493 ** -0.0404 0.1049 ** 0.0846 * 0.0396 -0.0337 -0.0938 *** -0.1263 ** 0.0065 -0.0048 -0.1750 **
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.1141 *** 0.1372 *** 0.1571 *** 0.1160 ** 0.1144 ** 0.2089 *** 0.0859 *** 0.1078 *** 0.1485 *** 0.1406 ** 0.1150 *** 0.1517 **
hedu3 0.3349 *** 0.3955 *** 0.4974 *** 0.3389 *** 0.3160 *** 0.4813 *** 0.2972 *** 0.3455 *** 0.4268 *** 0.3177 *** 0.3502 *** 0.4207 ***
hedu4 0.7793 *** 0.9257 *** 1.0519 *** 0.7189 *** 0.7596 *** 0.8819 *** 0.7160 *** 0.7867 *** 0.9320 *** 0.7070 *** 0.7302 *** 0.8373 ***
hnojob -0.0304 -0.0054 0.0145 0.1001 ** 0.0981 *** 0.1077 * -0.0079 0.0104 0.1201 *** 0.0155 0.0832 * 0.0758
urban 0.1009 *** 0.1407 *** 0.1415 *** 0.1087 *** 0.1831 *** 0.1625 *** 0.1351 *** 0.1309 *** 0.1635 *** 0.0986 * 0.1458 *** 0.0492
agri -0.1895 *** -0.2494 *** -0.2995 *** -0.2079 *** -0.3007 *** -0.2810 *** -0.1474 *** -0.2153 *** -0.2030 *** -0.1863 *** -0.1530 *** -0.2448 **
Ilocos -0.5380 *** -0.5046 *** -0.5144 *** -0.5699 *** -0.4482 *** -0.4377 *** -0.4959 *** -0.5188 *** -0.6054 *** -0.6443 *** -0.5641 *** -0.5301 ***
Cagayan -0.5095 *** -0.4430 *** -0.3545 *** -0.5326 *** -0.2117 *** -0.0850 -0.5475 *** -0.4878 *** -0.5014 *** -0.5650 ** -0.2134 * -0.0470
Cluzon -0.3254 *** -0.2540 *** -0.2627 *** -0.3507 *** -0.2168 *** -0.2457 *** -0.2882 *** -0.2694 *** -0.3138 *** -0.2385 *** -0.2050 *** -0.2477 ***
Sluzon -0.3962 *** -0.2849 *** -0.2019 *** -0.3051 *** -0.1541 *** -0.1000 * -0.3265 *** -0.2825 *** -0.2920 *** -0.2605 *** -0.1818 *** -0.2166 ***
Bicol -0.6240 *** -0.5359 *** -0.5284 *** -0.5384 *** -0.3665 *** -0.3267 *** -0.6184 *** -0.6087 *** -0.5393 *** -0.6477 *** -0.4614 *** -0.4452 ***
Wvisayas -0.4840 *** -0.3805 *** -0.3552 *** -0.3987 *** -0.1730 *** -0.1838 ** -0.4355 *** -0.4548 *** -0.4638 *** -0.4148 *** -0.4389 *** -0.4013 ***
Cvisayas -0.7236 *** -0.5521 *** -0.4766 *** -0.6702 *** -0.4764 *** -0.3585 *** -0.7776 *** -0.7085 *** -0.5980 *** -0.7067 *** -0.5153 *** -0.3329
Evisayas -0.6659 *** -0.6161 *** -0.5435 *** -0.6720 *** -0.5275 *** -0.5965 *** -0.6956 *** -0.6403 *** -0.6281 *** -0.6929 *** -0.7227 *** -0.8226 ***
Mindanao -0.6127 *** -0.4826 *** -0.3861 *** -0.5337 *** -0.4205 *** -0.3494 *** -0.6579 *** -0.5647 *** -0.4887 *** -0.4983 *** -0.4624 *** -0.3282 ***
(NCR omitted)
CAR -0.3800 *** -0.3166 *** -0.2929 *** -0.5660 *** -0.3698 *** -0.3660 *** -0.3998 *** -0.4850 *** -0.3098 *** -0.2706 ** -0.4208 *** -0.5266 ***
constant 9.8529 *** 10.2705 *** 10.6625 *** 9.7965 *** 10.1713 *** 11.1679 *** 9.8074 *** 10.1598 *** 10.8051 *** 9.5799 *** 10.0512 *** 11.1925 ***
Pseudo R2 0.3088 0.3718 0.3913 0.2873 0.2840 0.2769 0.3118 0.3392 0.3459 0.2847 0.2930 0.2494
dnorem dexrem dinrem dbothrem
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Table 5.7: Quantile regression results (continued)
Table 5.7b: the 2000 FIES
Note: Parentheses for each percentile in the columns of the 1994 and 2000 FIES denote standard errors with 200 bootstrap replications for standard error estimates.
Parentheses in the column of gaps between the 1994 and 2000 FIES denote the standard errors in the case of unequal variance. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-
tailed).
10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th
empsh 0.2944 *** 0.3142 *** 0.4302 *** 0.2727 *** 0.3941 *** 0.4506 *** 0.2585 *** 0.2309 *** 0.3046 *** 0.3235 *** 0.1985 ** 0.3593 ***
age 0-6 -1.3111 *** -1.3977 *** -1.3261 *** -1.2994 *** -1.1095 *** -1.1722 *** -1.2335 *** -1.3344 *** -1.4899 *** -1.3346 *** -1.4385 *** -1.3821 ***
age 7-14 -0.9706 *** -1.0446 *** -1.0660 *** -0.8825 *** -0.8838 *** -0.9961 *** -0.9295 *** -1.0674 *** -1.1717 *** -0.8548 *** -1.1219 *** -1.2887 ***
age 15-24 -0.5191 *** -0.5635 *** -0.5917 *** -0.3756 *** -0.3636 *** -0.5287 *** -0.3584 *** -0.4409 *** -0.5066 *** -0.3798 *** -0.5444 *** -0.4822 ***
(age25+ omitted)
hfemale -0.0229 -0.0331 -0.0181 0.2452 *** 0.2871 *** 0.2540 *** -0.0136 0.0198 0.0169 0.0710 0.1496 *** 0.1433 ***
hage -0.0092 *** -0.0086 *** -0.0093 ** -0.0191 *** -0.0231 *** -0.0146 * -0.0094 ** -0.0147 *** -0.0199 *** -0.0112 -0.0136 * -0.0454 ***
hage2 0.00003 0.00005 ** 0.0001 ** 0.0001 ** 0.0002 *** 0.0001 0.00003 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 ***
hmarried -0.0172 -0.0533 ** -0.0951 *** 0.1381 *** 0.1232 *** -0.0366 -0.0100 -0.0699 *** -0.1391 *** -0.0205 -0.0081 -0.0449
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.1124 *** 0.1140 *** 0.1359 *** 0.1848 *** 0.1531 *** 0.2608 *** 0.1365 *** 0.1427 *** 0.1576 *** -0.0284 0.1239 *** 0.2335 ***
hedu3 0.3294 *** 0.3885 *** 0.5193 *** 0.3856 *** 0.3960 *** 0.5532 *** 0.2822 *** 0.3515 *** 0.4549 *** 0.2475 *** 0.3337 *** 0.4361 ***
hedu4 0.8843 *** 1.0325 *** 1.2142 *** 0.8065 *** 0.8265 *** 0.9670 *** 0.8004 *** 0.9866 *** 1.2009 *** 0.6613 *** 0.8280 *** 0.9315 ***
hnojob -0.0163 -0.0121 0.0222 0.0469 0.1148 *** 0.1637 *** 0.0183 0.0090 0.1199 *** 0.0377 0.1010 ** 0.1759 **
urban 0.1656 *** 0.1784 *** 0.2059 *** 0.1452 *** 0.1895 *** 0.1838 *** 0.1313 *** 0.1647 *** 0.1992 *** 0.1860 *** 0.1739 *** 0.1464 ***
agri -0.1821 *** -0.2438 *** -0.3023 *** -0.2079 *** -0.3054 *** -0.3234 *** -0.1177 *** -0.1885 *** -0.2819 *** -0.1885 *** -0.1808 *** -0.3196 ***
Ilocos -0.4806 *** -0.4883 *** -0.4969 *** -0.3916 *** -0.3923 *** -0.3659 *** -0.4772 *** -0.4382 *** -0.3096 *** -0.3351 *** -0.5167 *** -0.6307 ***
Cagayan -0.3822 *** -0.3413 *** -0.3105 *** -0.3616 *** -0.3243 *** -0.3520 *** -0.4080 *** -0.3724 *** -0.3664 *** -0.4015 ** -0.4644 *** -0.4136 ***
Cluzon -0.2448 *** -0.2777 *** -0.2785 *** -0.2522 *** -0.2379 *** -0.2374 *** -0.2841 *** -0.2691 *** -0.2961 *** -0.2265 *** -0.2937 *** -0.3790 ***
Sluzon -0.2690 *** -0.2279 *** -0.2339 *** -0.1416 *** -0.1207 *** -0.0997 ** -0.3720 *** -0.2988 *** -0.2414 *** -0.1532 ** -0.1796 *** -0.2021 **
Bicol -0.5384 *** -0.5189 *** -0.5021 *** -0.4830 *** -0.3244 *** -0.3672 *** -0.6437 *** -0.5229 *** -0.4956 *** -0.4583 *** -0.4842 *** -0.4175 ***
Wvisayas -0.5029 *** -0.4469 *** -0.3919 *** -0.3731 *** -0.2372 *** -0.1557 ** -0.4904 *** -0.4635 *** -0.3600 *** -0.2713 *** -0.3125 *** -0.3787 ***
Cvisayas -0.6754 *** -0.5821 *** -0.4684 *** -0.4667 *** -0.3760 *** -0.2521 *** -0.7847 *** -0.6109 *** -0.4689 *** -0.4895 *** -0.6209 *** -0.4656 ***
Evisayas -0.6917 *** -0.6224 *** -0.5370 *** -0.5350 *** -0.5304 *** -0.2316 *** -0.6733 *** -0.6298 *** -0.5240 *** -0.6012 *** -0.6305 *** -0.7105 ***
Mindanao -0.6164 *** -0.5438 *** -0.5054 *** -0.6360 *** -0.5372 *** -0.4177 *** -0.7009 *** -0.5991 *** -0.5356 *** -0.5485 *** -0.5896 *** -0.4892 ***
(NCR omitted)
CAR -0.3847 *** -0.3363 *** -0.2365 *** -0.2889 *** -0.2673 *** -0.3466 *** -0.4939 *** -0.4071 *** -0.3315 *** -0.1485 * -0.2619 *** -0.2762 **
constant 10.0375 *** 10.5457 *** 11.0045 *** 10.1775 *** 10.7203 *** 11.2282 *** 10.0391 *** 10.7039 *** 11.4122 *** 10.2164 *** 10.8689 *** 12.2262 ***
Pseudo R2 0.3147 0.3909 0.4129 0.2768 0.2756 0.2495 0.2661 0.3138 0.3478 0.2459 0.2810 0.3052
dnorem dexrem dinrem dbothrem
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5.4.2 Quantile Decomposition results of Expenditure Inequality
Table 5.8 reports the unconditional quantile decomposition results of the expenditure
differences at the specific percentiles (10th, 50th, and 90th) in the case of the 1994 and the
2000 FIES, but also includes the mean regression results of the standard mean Oaxaca/
Blinder decomposition. In the table, the quantile endowment effect (QEE) tells us how
strong the difference is due to differences in household characteristics, while the
quantile treatment effect (QTE) shows how strong the effect is attributable to
differentials in household expenditure relationships across the remittance categories.
The gaps in each effect between 1994 and 2000, which reveal the trends in expenditure
differences among Filipino families over time, are also shown on the right-hand side of
Table 5.8. 60
The table shows the extent of the endowment and treatment effects on the welfare
differences comparing expenditure per capita of non-remittance receiving households
(i.e., dnorem) and remittance receiving households (i.e., dinrem, dexrem, and dbothrem).
For example, among the poor households (at the 10th percentile of the expenditure
distributions), expenditure per capita of dexrem were 0.567 log points in 1994 and 0.603
log points in 2000 higher than that of dnorem. Holding the characteristics determining
dexrem constant, 0.242 log points (or 42.7 per cent) in 1994 and 0.296 log points (or
49.1 per cent) in 2000 of the foregoing differences are due to treatment differences. The
remaining differences of 0.325 log points (or 57.3 per cent) in 1994 and 0.307 log
points (or 50.9 per cent) in 2000 are due to differences in the distribution of the
characteristics between households with and without international remittances.
60 With the t-test for unequal variances (see for example, Ruxton 2006), we tested whether the
endowment and treatment effects were statistically different between two survey years.
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Table 5. 8: Decomposition results of the expenditure differences in distribution (including mean results)
1994 FIES 2000 FIES Gaps (2000-1994)
Total QEE QTE Total QEE QTE Total QEE QTE
dexrem Mean 0.575 *** 0.322 *** 0.253 *** 0.584 *** 0.263 *** 0.321 *** 0.009 -0.059 *** 0.068 ***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016)
10th 0.567 *** 0.325 *** 0.242 *** 0.603 *** 0.307 *** 0.296 *** 0.036 -0.018 0.054 ***
(0.020) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.025) (0.017) (0.021)
50th 0.619 *** 0.351 *** 0.267 *** 0.624 *** 0.271 *** 0.353 *** 0.006 -0.080 *** 0.086 ***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017)
90th 0.519 *** 0.276 *** 0.243 *** 0.503 *** 0.194 *** 0.309 *** -0.016 -0.082 *** 0.066 ***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.028) (0.021) (0.025)
dinrem Mean -0.047 *** 0.012 -0.060 *** -0.126 *** -0.061 *** -0.065 *** -0.078 *** -0.073 *** -0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
10th 0.005 0.034 *** -0.029 *** -0.008 0.009 -0.017 *** -0.013 -0.025 *** 0.012
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
50th -0.033 *** 0.016 * -0.050 *** -0.118 *** -0.052 *** -0.065 *** -0.084 *** -0.069 *** -0.016
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
90th -0.125 *** -0.064 *** -0.062 *** -0.261 *** -0.178 *** -0.083 *** -0.135 *** -0.114 *** -0.022
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017)
dbothrem Mean 0.453 *** 0.287 *** 0.166 *** 0.438 *** 0.179 *** 0.259 *** -0.015 -0.108 *** 0.093 ***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019)
10th 0.494 *** 0.312 *** 0.181 *** 0.517 *** 0.266 *** 0.250 *** 0.023 -0.046 *** 0.069 ***
(0.025) (0.016) (0.025) (0.022) (0.012) (0.020) (0.033) (0.020) (0.032)
50th 0.497 *** 0.322 *** 0.174 *** 0.456 *** 0.193 *** 0.262 *** -0.041 -0.129 *** 0.088 ***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.019) (0.012) (0.015) (0.026) (0.018) (0.021)
90th 0.339 *** 0.204 *** 0.135 *** 0.330 *** 0.058 *** 0.273 *** -0.009 -0.147 *** 0.138 ***
(0.028) (0.018) (0.027) (0.028) (0.018) (0.023) (0.040) (0.026) (0.036)
Note:
a) Quantile endowment effects (QEE), Quantile treatment effects (QTE)
b) Parentheses for each percentile in the columns of the 1994 and 2000 FIES denote standard errors with 200 bootstrap replications for standard error estimates.
c) Parentheses in the column of gaps between the 1994 and 2000 FIES denote the standard errors in the case of unequal variance. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01 (two-tailed).
d) Internal Remittance-receiving Households (Inrem), External Remittance-receiving Households (Exrem), Both internal and external Remittance-receiving
Households (Bothrem).
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The most obvious result to emerge from Table 5.8 is that compared to Filipino
households with no remittance incomes (i.e., dnorem), the households which receive
international remittances (i.e., dexrem or dbothrem) have the greater treatment effects at
any percentile of the per capita household expenditure distribution and the effects are
getting larger after the crises with other things held constant. This result may be
explained by the fact that households receiving remittances from abroad could smooth
their budget constraints and would have higher propensities to spend rather than
households without remittance incomes. Especially, as the conditional quantile
regression results revealed that having a female or an unemployed household head,
regardless of the household expenditure level, could significantly increase the welfare
level in 2000 among households who had received international remittances, compared
to households who did not receive any remittance income. Clearly, international
remittance-receiving households with a female or an unemployed household head
would rely heavily on remittance incomes from their family members working abroad.
On the other hand, with regard to the household expenditure differences between
households with and without remittances from within the Philippines, the quantile
treatment effects are always negative and recorded no statistically significant difference
at any quantile between 1994 and 2000. This means that households in the receipt of
remittances from within the Philippines have a lower propensity to spend than those
with no receipt of remittance, with other things the same, over the period of 1994-2000.
In particular, the effects of household heads’ high educational attainment on the welfare
level were significantly lower among the domestic remittance-receiving households
than non-remittance-receiving households in 2000. An explanation for this is that
households with highly educated heads and which do not rely on remittances could be
better-off due to better job opportunities within the Philippines, compared with
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households which depend on remittances from within the country. The findings in this
chapter reveal that the receipt of international remittances could significantly contribute
to an improvement in Filipino households’ livelihoods at any welfare level and could be
a major factor in increasing household expenditure inequality between Filipino
households in the period of 1994-2000. Unlike the conditional quantile regression
results reported in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, unconditional quantile decomposition
analysis revealed that the receipt of international remittances increases the household
welfare the most among the middle welfare group. The remittances enable the middle
class to climb up the economic ladder and it makes the welfare gaps widen between the
poor and the middle rather than the middle and the rich welfare groups.
After the receipt of the remittances, households could spend broadly across several
expenditure items such as food, education, housing, health care, durables and leisure.
Among these items, international remittance recipient (RR) households are likely to
increase the share of expenditures on education and housing (see Table 5.9). Education
seems to be one of the main usages of international remittances. Its share increased from
3.8 per cent to 4.5 per cent among RR households and the gap in education expenditures
between households with and without the remittances widened during the period of
1994-2000. If receiving the remittances actually contributes to an increase in
educational expenditures, it could make the households improve not only their welfare
but household characteristics such as educational attainments and the number of school
attending children. The continuous receipt of the remittances will make endowments of
the recipient households better and it would contribute to a steady increase in the
welfare level in the longer term. In addition, another finding of this research is that
households could not significantly have improved their welfare even if they had
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received remittances from within the Philippines due to the relatively small amounts of
such transfers. Households who receive domestic remittances are likely to have the
lower welfare levels than non-remittance recipients. This was mainly because they have
the lower endowments as well as the lower propensity to spend. The results tell us that
the differences in household characteristics between households with and without either
international remittances or domestic remittances accounted for the gaps in the welfare
level. However, even after controlling for the effects of endowments, we found that the
receipt of international remittances significantly changes household expenditure patterns
and it can make the households improve their welfare level.
Table 5. 9: Shares of Household Expenditure among International Remittance Recipient (RR)
and Non-Recipient (NR) Households, 1994-2000
Note: t-test denotes the mean comparisons between 1994 and 2000. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05
RR NR t-test RR NR t-test
Expenditure Items
Food 48.5% 57.3% -8.7% ** 39.80 44.9% 54.5% -9.6% ** 52.73
Education 3.8% 2.3% 1.5% ** 15.53 4.5% 2.7% 1.8% ** 20.47
Health Care 2.3% 1.7% 0.6% ** 6.96 2.3% 1.4% 0.8% ** 11.82
House 14.8% 10.6% 4.2% ** 25.11 14.7% 11.4% 3.3% ** 25.80
Durables 2.0% 1.4% 0.6% ** 6.54 2.1% 1.2% 1.0% ** 12.63
No. of Obs 4813 19352 7155 32460
1994 FIES 2000 FIES
Gap Gap
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5.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has attempted to investigate the effect of the receipt of remittances on
household expenditure inequality in the Philippines over periods before and after the
Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the severe drought of 1998 when the inequality of the
welfare distribution dramatically increased. Three different analyses were used at mean
and at the specific quantile (i.e., 10th, 50th, and 90th) based on the types of the receipt of
remittance incomes (i.e., dinrem, dexrem, and dbothrem) in the period of 1994-2000
using the Philippine Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES). First, ordinary
least square (OLS) and conditional quantile regressions were used with remittance
dummy variables which capture the effects of the receipt of remittances on the
household welfare level. Assuming that there is no difference in the effects of household
characteristics on the welfare level between households who received remittances and
those who did not, we found that the receipt of international remittances significantly
increased their livelihoods and that its effect increased from 1994 to 2000 at any
selected point on the welfare distribution. Second, conditional interquantile regressions
were used to investigate whether the remittances contributed to widening the welfare
gaps between the poor and the middle and the affluent households. The results show
that in 2000 the receipt of international remittances significantly increased the gaps
between rich and poor, which were mainly explained by the differences between the
middle and the rich groups. This implies that the remittances contributed the most to the
rich and it could thus increase the welfare inequality. Finally, an unconditional quantile
decomposition approach was used to estimate the endowment and remittance effects on
the quantiles of the unconditional distribution of the welfare. The result revealed that
even after controlling for the effect of household characteristics on the level of
household expenditure, the study found that receiving international remittances change
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household expenditure patterns causing expenditure gaps between Filipino households
to widen between 1994 and 2000. One of the more significant findings to emerge from
the unconditional quantile decomposition is that unlike conditional quantile regressions,
the receipt of international remittances contributed to an improvement in the welfare of
the middle class the most followed by the rich, and widens the welfare differences
between poor and middle welfare households.
In contrast, the receipt of remittances from within the Philippines did not exert a
significant impact on improving the welfare of Filipino households. The results of this
study also suggest that widening the expenditure inequality in the Philippines from 1994
to 2000 is mainly accounted for by the receipt of international remittances. These
money transfers from abroad are often used to improve their welfare level. A case in
point is child education. Some migrant workers go abroad and remit to send their
children to better schools, in many cases to private schools. This important relationship
between remittances and education will be examined in Chapter Six.
The results also indicate that there is an importance in dealing with the expenditure
differentials by taking into account the types of households in terms of the receipt of
remittances. The current findings add to our understanding of the expenditure gaps
between Filipino households which do or do not receive international remittances as
well as domestic ones. The quantile decomposition results for this study enhance our
understanding of the welfare gaps as we can decompose the gaps at any point of the
welfare distribution. The result of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach which
decomposes the mean expenditure differentials needs to be interpreted with caution
because the mean expenditure gaps reported in this chapter are significantly different
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from the median and other quantile expenditure differences. It was found that mean
expenditure differentials were smaller than the median ones (see Table 5.8). Suggesting
that focusing on the mean regression decomposition analysis could lead researchers or
policymakers to underestimate the effect of remittances on the household welfare and
actually it does not give any clues to understanding the gaps between rich and poor.
Further investigations are needed to estimate the effect of remittances on the inequality
with due consideration of the issue of sample selection bias mentioned before. There is,
therefore, a need for more detailed information on the decisions of remitting and
migration itself to enable us to apply the quantile regression procedure which can deal
with this type of selection issue, as developed by Buchinsky (1998, 2001) and Albrecht,
van Vuuren and Vroman (2009), though it is acknowledged that these are very
complicated procedures to implement and ideally require considerably larger sample
sizes than those currently available to us.
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Chapter 6: The effects of remittances on education
expenditures among Filipino households
6.1 Introduction
The Philippines is one of the major labour-exporting and remittance receiving countries
in the world. It is estimated that more than 1.4 million Filipino workers went abroad in
2009 (POEA, 2009). As of December 2008, over 8.2 million Filipinos (or almost ten per
cent of the population) live outside the country. Nearly half of them are temporary
contract workers, mostly based in Middle East countries (CFO, 2008). The top three
destinations of the land-based overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) in 2009 are Saudi
Arabia (26.7 per cent of total land-based workers), followed by United Arab Emirates
(18.0 per cent) and Hong Kong (9.2 per cent). About 80 per cent of Filipino workers
emigrating each year are land-based, and the remaining 20 per cent are seamen, which
constitute almost one quarter of the world's seamen on commercial vessels (IOM, 2005).
In terms of remittances, the total amount of remittances sent by OFWs reached 18.76
billion US dollars in 2010 which accounts for almost ten per cent of the Philippines
GDP.61 The considerable amount of these remittances from abroad has attracted the
attention of governments, international organizations, and the academic community,
especially on their potential to benefit the economy and recipient households.
The remittances transferred from abroad potentially influence the households’ spending
behaviour. A typical example of a positive use of remittances is to finance education for
migrant family members as it becomes a part of human investment that contributes to a
61 According to the World Economic Outlook Database (IMF, April 2011), the nominal gross domestic
product (GDP) in the Philippines was 188.719 billion US dollars in 2010.
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long term economic growth. In fact, one of the main reasons many Filipino working
abroad send remittances back to the Philippines is because of education for their
children or siblings. Therefore, this chapter focuses on examining the effects of
remittances on education spending at the household level by looking specifically at
whether the education spending among households that received remittances is
significantly higher than those with no remittance incomes. In doing so, it employs both
statistical and a variety of econometric methods to confirm the overall robustness of the
results. The next two sections briefly summarise the key features of education in the
Philippines to establish the context for the analysis. The following section describes the
key findings from the previous literature on the effects of remittances on education
spending to date and highlights the contributions of this chapter especially in using the
complete data series and methodological approach. Section Four then describes the data
used followed by Section Five that outlines the empirical methodology adopted in this
study. Section Six discusses the main results that inform the conclusions and policy
implication summarised in the last section.
6.2 Education in the Philippines
The education system in the Philippines is strongly influenced by the American system,
which consists of primary, secondary and tertiary levels. For primary education, there
are six compulsory grades in public schools, and seven in some private schools. For
secondary education, there are just four grades. Thus, students leave secondary school at
the age of 15 or 16. Tertiary education starts from the age of 16. Tertiary education
levels are divided into college, masters and doctorate level.
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The English speaking nature of schooling in the Philippines provides the basis for a
potential employment opportunity abroad, especially in English-speaking countries. For
example, there is a demand for nurses in Canada, United States, and United Kingdom,
caregivers in Canada, mathematics and science teachers as well as IT engineers in
United States. Furthermore, a booming Chinese economy has created a demand for
Filipino teachers and housemaids because of their fluency in the English language. With
regard to Philippine nurses, the number of nursing schools has mushroomed and
generates a huge number of graduates every year. In 2009, over 70,000 graduates passed
nursing licensure examinations (Lorenzo et.al, 2009). Most successful candidates plan
to work abroad. In contrast, mathematics, science, and engineering are not popular
programs at the tertiary level though these subjects are very important for technological
innovation which provides a potential engine for economic growth.
Table 6.1 reports the recent school enrolment ratios in selected Asian countries, which
is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that
officially corresponds to the level of education. In the case of the Philippines, in 2005,
the primary, secondary and tertiary school gross enrolment ratios were 112.5 per cent62,
85.2 per cent and 28.1 per cent respectively. These figures can be compared favourably
with some economically more advanced Asian countries such as Malaysia, Thailand,
and China although the enrolment ratios for tertiary education in Malaysia and in
Thailand are higher. The level of educational attainment in the Philippines is relatively
high compared to neighbouring countries and returns to education are substantial (see
Hossain and Psacharopoulos, 1994; Maluccio, 1998; Sakellariou, 2004). However, the
62 School enrolment ratios with a value in excess of 100 per cent could be explained by the incidence of
under-aged and/ or over-aged school enrolment. As for over-aged enrolment, it would be explained by
late entrance into primary education or the incidence of repetition. In many developed countries, primary
education is mandatory. Thus, primary school enrolment ratios are usually 100 per cent.
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quality of education in the Philippines has been declining due to the modest state budget
for basic education, which is less than three per cent of GDP (Alba, 2009).
Table 6. 1: School Enrolment Ratios by the level of education and by gender
Malaysia Thailand China Philippines Indonesia Vietnam
Primary Education 95.8 97.1 112.8 112.5 117.3 94.5
Male 96.0 99.6 113.5 113.1 119.4 97.6
Female 95.6 94.6 112.0 111.8 115.1 91.3
Secondary Education 76.4 70.3 74.3 85.2 63.1 75.8
Male 71.6 69.0 74.2 80.7 63.5 76.7
Female 81.4 71.6 74.5 90.0 62.8 74.8
Tertiary Education 32.0 43.0 20.3 28.1 17.1 16.0
Male 27.9 40.7 20.8 25.3 19.0 18.7
Female 36.4 45.4 19.8 31.0 15.1 13.2
Note: The figures are based on Year 2005, except for Malaysia, where data is collected in 2004.
Source: World Development Indicators 2007.
As for gender differences, the female enrolment ratios for secondary and tertiary
education in the Philippines are significantly larger than the male enrolment rates. These
features are also reported for Malaysia and Thailand as well.
In the Philippines, as for secondary education, there has been an increasing trend
towards public education in the 1990s (Orbeta, 2003: 18). This might be explained by
the free secondary education policy as mandated by the Free Public Secondary
Education Act of 1988 (or RA 6655). The reduction in the educational costs arising
from this act could make the incidence of child labour in the Philippines less likely.63
With regard to tertiary education, it is much more obvious that there is a disparity in
school attendance of school-age population due to household income (see Orbeta, 2003:
62). The school enrolment in this level is predominantly private.64 In the Philippines,
63 According to the 1999 Annual Poverty Indicator Survey, the incidence of child labour in the
Philippines in the 12-17 age group exceeds ten per cent (Sakellariou, 2006: 475).
64 The public tertiary schools consist of state universities and colleges and other public institutions,
whereas private tertiary schools are subdivided into sectarian and non-sectarian institutions.
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unlike many other Asian countries, the enrolment in higher education has always been
dominated by private education and there are a large number of private tertiary
education institutions across the country (see Table 6.2).
Table 6. 2: Distribution of Tertiary Education Institutions by region and by type (as of July 18,
2002)
Region
Public
Schools
Private
Schools TOTAL Private/Public
Ilocos 7 68 75 9.7
Cagayan 8 44 52 5.5
Central Luzon 15 126 141 8.4
Southern Luzon 18 197 215 10.9
Bicol 20 91 111 4.6
Western Visayas 17 76 93 4.5
Central Visayas 7 87 94 12.4
Eastern Visayas 14 47 61 3.4
Western Mindanao 6 38 44 6.3
Northern Mindanao 7 49 56 7.0
Southern Mindanao 5 76 81 15.2
Central Mindanao 6 65 71 10.8
NCR 20 247 267 12.4
CAR 7 23 30 3.3
ARMM 9 13 22 1.4
Caraga 4 35 39 8.8
Grand Total 170 1282 1452 7.5
% to Total 11.7% 88.3% 100%
Souce: Orbeta (2003) p.19, Table 9
However, the enrolment ratio in the private tertiary schools decreased from 89.7 per
cent in the period of 1970-1971 to 73.1 per cent in the period of 2000-2001 (see Orbeta,
2003:18). This is because many households found private education less affordable. As
for the difference in education expenditures between public and private institutions,
private school unit costs vary widely and their variation is determined by school quality
and location. While public school unit costs are also very variable, the costs are largely
determined by school enrolment size. The costs are less expensive with larger
enrolments. Table 6.3 reports the detailed tertiary education expenditure depending on
the type of institutions. The total education expenditure for tertiary level is 1.7 times
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higher in the private than in the public sector. The largest gap is for tuition and other
fees, which cost 3.8 times more in private institutions.
Table 6. 3: Tertiary Education expenditure (in Philippine pesos) by type in 1995
Public Private
Private/Public
Ratio
Level % to Total Level % to Total Level
Tuition and other fees 1908 13.6% 7190 29.8% 3.8
PTA 80 0.6% 231 1.0% 2.9
Other fees 655 4.7% 1253 5.2% 1.9
Books 922 6.6% 1717 7.1% 1.9
School supplies 779 5.5% 1091 4.5% 1.4
Other materials 812 5.8% 1481 6.1% 1.8
Uniforms 1748 12.4% 2062 8.5% 1.2
Transport 3308 23.6% 3706 15.3% 1.1
Board and lodgings 3833 27.3% 5422 22.4% 1.4
Total 14045 100% 24153 100% 1.7
Note: Tertiary education includes technical, vocational education & training
Source: Orbeta (2003) p.15, Table 6
With regard to the participation in higher education, it is known to be skewed towards
richer households. In public schools selective admission discriminates against poor
students, whereas in the private schools high-quality institutions have both selective
admissions procedures and higher tuition fees (Orbeta, 2003:33). The disparity in the
tertiary school attendance based on household income is more evident in rural than in
urban areas. Maximum and minimum differences in school attendance rates across
income groups reveal that the gaps in tertiary school attendance rates within rural
Filipino households widened from 21.6 per cent to 30.7 per cent between 1988 and
2000, while the differences within urban families increased by just 3.8 percentage
points from 16 per cent to 19.8 per cent (see Table 6.4). Between 1988 and 2000, the
total attendance rates for tertiary level increased both in urban and rural areas, except
for the poor in urban areas. The rates were higher in urban areas compared to rural areas
across all income groups in 1988, whereas there was a significant increase in school
attendance rates among rural households in the middle and high income deciles in 2000.
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This shows the clear evidence that among Filipino households living within both urban
and rural areas the disparity in access to higher education between rich and poor has
grown from 1988 to 2000.
Table 6. 4: School attendance of tertiary education by income deciles by location, 1988-2000
1988 2000
Changes
(2000-1988)
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Total 36.2 25.6 38.4 32.3 2.2 6.7
Lowest Income 1 37.0 22.0 29.5 23.5 -7.5 1.5
2 34.9 21.4 36.2 23.8 1.3 2.4
3 25.5 19.8 25.8 26.8 0.3 7.0
4 28.0 22.0 31.4 33.3 3.4 11.3
5 33.1 24.6 32.2 33.2 -0.9 8.6
6 30.4 26.8 34.2 36.0 3.8 9.2
7 37.4 24.0 38.3 42.2 0.9 18.2
8 36.5 33.1 39.5 34.8 3.0 1.7
9 41.5 41.4 45.6 54.2 4.1 12.8
Highest Income 10 41.4 39.2 45.6 46.7 4.2 7.5
Max-Min Differences 16.0 21.6 19.8 30.7
Note: Primary 10-12 years; Secondary 13-16 years; Tertiary 17-24 years
Source: Orbeta (2003) p. 63, Table 24
6.3 Effects of Remittances on Household Education Expenditures
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the effect of remittances on
household expenditure patterns (see for example, Adams, 2005 for Guatemala; Castaldo
and Reilly, 2007 for Albania; Yang, 2004 and Tabuga, 2007 for the Philippines). There
is some evidence that the receipt of remittances stimulates expenditure in education. For
example, it was found that the sudden depreciation of the Philippine exchange rate
during the Asian economic crisis increased remittances from the OFWs and also
increased educational expenditures in the Philippines (Yang, 2004). Moreover, in
Guatemala, Adams (2005) suggested that, at the margin, households receiving
international remittances spend more on education than do households with internal
remittances. Furthermore, using the 2003 Family Income and Expenditure Survey
(FIES), Tabuga (2007) also found that remittance from abroad positively influenced an
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increase in the budget share of education among those Filipino households with
members aged between 7 and 24 years. Furthermore, it has recently been argued that it
seems to be common for OFW parents to say that the primary reason for working
abroad is to provide a good education for their children (PIDS, 2008: 3; Edillon, 2008:
21). It is found that education expenditure of OFW families is nearly twice that of non-
OFW families (PIDS, 2008: 4; Edillon, 2008: 29).
Households seem to have different expenditure patterns depending on their receipt of
different types of remittance. However, it is not straightforward to measure the impact
of remittances on consumption or investment. This is because remittances are fungible.
For example, even if migrants send remittances for a child’s education, recipient
households might not use the remittance for the original intended purpose and could
spend it in different ways. Also, it seems not possible to divide remittance incomes into
the amount of each expenditure item the households purchased. Furthermore, it is also
difficult to separate remittances from other sources of income (World Bank 2006, 126).
Using household budget surveys would be appropriate to investigate the effect of
remittances on changes in household expenditure patterns. By using Filipino household
surveys, this chapter focuses on analysing the effect of the receipt of international
remittances on changes in household expenditure on education.
In the last few years, several studies have been devoted to an investigation of the effect
of remittances on a migrant household’s expenditure pattern (Adams, 1998, 2005;
Castaldo and Reilly, 2007; Taylor and Mora, 2006; Zarate-Hoyos, 2004; Tabuga, 2007).
Using data from the 469 households on a wide range of topics, including income,
expenditures, education, employment, migration, and household assets in rural Pakistan,
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Adams (1998) concluded that all remittance income is not the same. It was found that
households who received external remittances tended to treat such earnings from abroad
as temporary shocks to income and were more likely to invest them. By contrast,
households who received internal remittances tended to treat such earnings as a mixture
of permanent and transitory income, which should be used for both consumption and
investment activities. Moreover, Adams (2005) used a large household data set from
Guatemala to analyse how the receipt of internal remittances (from Guatemala) and
international remittances (from the United States) affected the marginal spending
behaviour of households on various consumption and investment goods. It was found
that households who received remittances actually spent less at the margin on
consumption – food and consumer goods and durables – than did households with no
remittances. Instead of spending on consumption, households receiving remittances
tended to spend more on investment goods, like education, health and housing. It is
known from previous studies that a large amount of remittances goes into education. At
the margin, households receiving internal and international remittances spent 45 and 58
per cent more, respectively, on education than households who receive no remittances.
These increased expenditures on education represent an investment in human capital.
Like other studies, Adams (2005) also found that remittance-receiving households spent
more at the margin on housing. This increase in expenditures on housing represents a
type of investment for the migrant as well as a means for boosting local economic
development through creating new income and employment opportunities for both
skilled and unskilled workers. Similarly, Castaldo and Reilly (2007) investigated the
extent to which the expenditure patterns of Albanian households are affected by the
receipt of migrant remittances. They found that households who received internal
remittances did not behave differently from those who did not receive this source of
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transfer. On the other hand, households who received remittances from abroad spent, on
average, a lower share of their expenditure on food and a higher share on durables than
households who did not receive this type of transfer. In addition, Taylor and Mora
(2006) examined how migration affects household expenditure patterns using the
Mexico National Rural Household Survey of 2003, surveyed in January and February,
which has 1,782 sample households in rural Mexico. They concluded that households
with migrants abroad have higher marginal budget shares for investment, health and
durable consumption, whereas they have smaller shares for food and housing. On the
other hand, households that have migrants working in Mexico have higher marginal
budget shares for health, housing, services, and education, while they have smaller
shares for supermarkets, durable consumption, and investments. Furthermore, using
another Mexican survey, the Mexican Income and Expenditure Survey for 1989, Zarate-
Hoyos (2004) also examined the expenditure patterns of remittance-receiving
households. It concluded that households that receive remittances have higher budget
shares in investment than those that do not receive remittances. It was also noted that
households with remittances have smaller income elasticities for current consumption
and for durable consumption than those with no remittances. In the case of the
Philippine research, Tabuga (2007) examined the influence of remittances from abroad
on Filipino families’ expenditure patterns with respect to various commodity groups
using the 2003 FIES and found that remittances induce households to spend more on
education, medical care, housing, consumer goods, leisure, and durable goods, and to
spend less on food, especially on eating-out. Moreover, using the 2006 FIES, Ang,
Sugiyarto, and Jha (2009) examined the effect on household expenditure share on
several expenditure items such as food, education, health, housing, tobacco & alcohol,
gifts, and leisure activities. They used the instrumental variable technique to address the
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endogeneity bias caused by reverse causation between remittance and household
expenditure. With regard to the impact of remittances on education, they found that
households with the receipt of international remittances had a lower budget share of
education compared to those without remittance incomes though this particular result
was not found to be statistically significant.
6.4 Data
Education
In the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) household education expenditure
is defined as the sum of tuition fees, study allowance away from home, books, school
supplies, and other education supplies. As of December 2010, the FIES in the
Philippines is available every three years from 1985 to 2006. With regard to the
Philippine education policy, however, the free secondary education policy was
mandated by the Free Public Secondary Education Act (or RA 6655) in 1988. Therefore,
we cannot simply compare the impacts of remittances on the household educational
expenditure patterns before and after 1988 because public secondary education has
become free after 1988 and Filipino households would have quite different motivations
to spend remittance incomes on education before and after 1988. Hence, in this chapter,
our research focuses on comparing the results from the data available after 1988.
With regard to the mean budget share on education expenditures, the FIES results show
that the share of all Filipino households rose, on average, from 3.0 per cent in 1988, to
3.5 per cent in 1994, to 4.1 per cent in 2000, and to 4.0 per cent in 2006. In real terms
(standardised at 2005 prices by CPI), the absolute value of average education
expenditures also increased from 4,864 pesos in 1988, to 6,461 pesos in 1994, and to
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9,057 pesos in 2000 but slightly declined to 8,110 pesos in 2006 (see Table 6.5). This
trend of the education expenditures is the same regardless of whether or not remittances
are received. By distinguishing households with and without international remittances
as well as domestic remittances, they are divided into four types; households who
received both domestic and international remittances (dbothrem), those who received
only external remittances (dexrem), those who received only internal remittances
(dinrem), and those who received no remittances at all (dnorem). The mean education
expenditures among the dexrem households were greater than other households. They
were twice and three times as much as the dnorem households’ and the dinrem
households’, respectively (see Table 6.5). From the above results, we assume that there
would be a strong relationship between the international remittances households
received and their education expenditures. Needless to say, other factors, for example
the numbers of students and their age, and household welfare levels, also affect the level
of education expenditures. We will analyse the effects of remittances and other
household characteristics on education later in this chapter.
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Table 6. 5: The average share (edush) and the average absolute value (educ) of education
expenditures among households who spent on education (Philippine pesos, in real terms),
1988-2006
Note: CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005)
Remittances
Furthermore, the FIES ask respondents to report on a variety of transfers, including
remittances, both in-kind and cash, from domestic sources and from overseas. With
respect to the detailed information on remittances, the data on cash receipts from abroad
and those from within the Philippines are separately collected. For the FIES, cash
receipts from both abroad and within the Philippines and gifts and other assistance in
kind65 from any of the above two sources were separately reported in the datasets.
However, the basic public use files of the FIES have only the aggregated figures of both
65 Gifts and other assistance in kind are measured in cash to calculate the total amount of domestic and
international remittances.
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
Total
educsh 0.030 0.035 0.041 0.040
educ (in real) 4,864 6,461 9,057 8,110
No. of Obs 12,664 17,857 28,833 27,188
Share (%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
dnorem
educsh 0.028 0.033 0.038 0.035
educ (in real) 4,503 5,742 8,279 6,964
No. of Obs 6,780 9,370 15,669 11,008
Share (%) (53.5%) (52.5%) (54.3%) (40.5%)
dinrem
educsh 0.026 0.029 0.035 0.032
educ (in real) 3,375 4,347 5,761 4,605
No. of Obs 3,710 4,718 7,714 9,365
Share (%) (29.3%) (26.4%) (26.8%) (34.4%)
dexrem
educsh 0.045 0.052 0.061 0.061
educ (in real) 9,593 11,752 17,263 16,586
No. of Obs 1,449 2,438 3,869 3,910
Share (%) (11.4%) (13.7%) (13.4%) (14.4%)
dbothrem
educsh 0.035 0.042 0.053 0.054
educ (in real) 6,415 9,329 12,767 12,345
No. of Obs 725 1,331 1,581 2,905
Share (%) (5.7%) (7.5%) (5.5%) (10.7%)
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transfers from abroad and from within the Philippines, not figures relating to the fine
classification (Tabuga, 2007). Thus the total amounts of transfers from abroad and
domestic sources are used in the analysis.
The number of sample households depending on their receipt of remittances and their
average amount of remittances received, which were derived from the FIES, are
reported in Table 6.6. Among households who received only external remittances (or
dexrem) or those with both internal and external remittances (or dbothrem), the mean
values of remittances have continuously increased in nominal terms in the survey years
and are much bigger than that of total remittances though they slightly declined in real
terms from 2000 to 2006. On average, households who received remittances only from
abroad (or dexrem) have the higher mean values of remittances than any other
households (i.e., dnorem, dinrem, and dbothrem).
Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 report the definition of the variables used in the analysis and the
summary statistics of the 1988, the 1994, the 2000 and the 2006 FIES used in the
analysis, respectively.
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Table 6. 6: Type of remittances received and their average amounts (in Philippine pesos),
1988-2006
Note:
(a) The amounts of remittances are shown both in nominal and in real terms. Thus, the
exchange rate and inflation rate are not considered to estimate the average amount of
remittances received.
(b) CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005)
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
Total
Amount (in nominal) 4,036 8,949 15,817 23,244
Amount (in real) 10,926 13,045 15,817 16,856
No. of Obs 18,429 24,165 39,615 38,480
Share (%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
dinrem
Amount (in nominal) 2,544 5,597 10,018 11,335
Amount (in real) 6,887 8,159 10,018 8,220
No. of Obs 5,632 6,620 11,021 13,548
Share (%) (30.6%) (27.4%) (27.8%) (35.2%)
dexrem
Amount (in nominal) 23,810 39,978 78,990 95,502
Amount (in real) 64,455 58,277 78,990 69,255
No. of Obs 1,862 3,093 5,048 5,067
Share (%) (10.1%) (12.8%) (12.7%) (13.2%)
dbothrem
Amount (in nominal) 15,778 32,297 55,740 65,838
Amount (in real) 42,712 47,080 55,740 47,743
No. of Obs 996 1,720 2,107 3,903
Share (%) (5.4%) (7.1%) (5.3%) (10.1%)
dnorem
No. of Obs 9,939 12,732 21,439 15,962
Share (%) (53.9%) (52.7%) (54.1%) (41.5%)
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Table 6. 7: Definition of the variables used in the analysis
Note: CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005).
Variable Name Variable Description
Education
edush The budget share for education expenditure among all households
educsh if educ>0 The budget share for education expenditure among households who spent on education
educ (in real) The education expendiutres (Philippine pesos in real terms) among all households
educ (in real) if educ>0 The education expenditures (Philippine pesos in real terms) among households who spent on education
Welfare
totex(in real) The total family expenditures (Philippine pesos in real terms)
lpctotex The natural logarithm of the total family expenditures per capita
Remittance
Remittance incidence
dnorem =1 if the household received no remittance; =0 otherwise
dinrem =1 if the household received only internal remittances; =0 otherwise
dexrem =1 if the household received only external remittances; =0 otherwise
dbothrem =1 if the household received both internal and external remittances; =0 otherwise
Remittance amount
inrem (in real) The amount of remittances received from within the Philippines (Philippine pesos in thousands in real terms)
exrem (in real) The amount of remittances received from abroad (Philippine pesos in thousands in real terms)
Family composition
totmember The number of total household members
age 7-14 =1 if there is a member aged between 7 and 14; =0 otherwise
age 15-24 =1 if there is a member aged between 15 and 24; =0 otherwise
Head characteristics
hfemale =1 if the household head is female; =0 otherwise
hage The age of the household head
hmarried =1 if the household head marital status is married; =0 otherwise
hedu1 =1 if household head did not finish elementary school; =0 otherwise
hedu2 =1 if the household head finished elementary school; =0 otherwise
hedu3 =1 if the household head finished high school; =0 otherwise
hedu4 =1 if the household head finished University or Post Graduate; =0 otherwise
hnojob =1 if the household head is not employed; =0 otherwise
Urban/Rural
urban =1 if the household lives in the urban area; =0 otherwise
Farming
agri =1 if the household is an agricultural one; =0 otherwise
Region
Ilocos =1 if the household lives in Ilocos Region; =0 otherwise
Cagayan =1 if the household lives in Cagayan Valley; =0 otherwise
Cluzon =1 if the household lives in Central Luzon; =0 otherwise
Sluzon =1 if the household lives in Southern Luzon; =0 otherwise
Bicol =1 if the household lives in Bicol Region; =0 otherwise
Wvisayas =1 if the household lives in Western Visayas; =0 otherwise
Cvisayas =1 if the household lives in Central Visayas; =0 otherwise
Evisayas =1 if the household lives in Eastern Visayas; =0 otherwise
Mindanao =1 if the household lives in Mindanao; =0 otherwise
NCR =1 if the household lives in National Capital Region (NCR); =0 otherwise
CAR =1 if the household lives in Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR); =0 otherwise
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Table 6. 8: Summary Statistics
Table 6.8a: the 1988 FIES
Note: Standard errors are reported only for continuous variables.
CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005).
Education
educsh 0.021 0.041 0.019 0.039 0.017 0.036 0.035 0.058 0.025 0.045
educsh if educ>0 0.030 0.047 0.028 0.045 0.026 0.042 0.045 0.062 0.035 0.050
educ (in real) 3343 9268 3072 8501 2223 6691 7466 16166 4670 9246
educ (in real) if educ>0 4864 10844 4503 9975 3375 8005 9593 17761 6415 10309
Welfare
totex(in real) 114854 91441 111919 89593 92718 68609 180059 116949 147415 102909
lpctotex 8.577 0.698 8.528 0.698 8.440 0.626 9.083 0.663 8.900 0.650
Family composition
totmember 5.337 2.234 5.451 2.202 5.191 2.268 5.288 2.275 5.118 2.215
age 7-14 0.583 0.596 0.567 0.574 0.573
age 15-24 0.538 0.542 0.512 0.596 0.532
Head characteristics
hfemale 0.137 0.090 0.144 0.306 0.255
hage 45.6 14.0 44.1 13.0 46.9 15.0 47.9 14.1 48.8 15.3
hmarried 0.850 0.880 0.820 0.821 0.776
hedu1 0.307 0.31 0.359 0.172 0.221
hedu2 0.348 0.35 0.371 0.266 0.343
hedu3 0.257 0.249 0.221 0.380 0.309
hedu4 0.088 0.09 0.048 0.181 0.126
hnojob 0.122 0.067 0.134 0.289 0.286
Urban/Rural
urban 0.466 0.454 0.405 0.657 0.572
Farming
agri 0.335 0.386 0.359 0.099 0.124
Region
Ilocos 0.060 0.039 0.063 0.119 0.147
Cagayan 0.042 0.050 0.035 0.039 0.019
Cluzon 0.104 0.072 0.128 0.154 0.207
Sluzon 0.130 0.121 0.144 0.114 0.164
Bicol 0.064 0.055 0.098 0.021 0.046
Wvisayas 0.089 0.085 0.105 0.077 0.068
Cvisayas 0.075 0.075 0.092 0.047 0.040
Evisayas 0.051 0.050 0.065 0.024 0.028
Mindanao 0.224 0.300 0.160 0.087 0.074
NCR 0.138 0.127 0.099 0.283 0.200
CAR 0.022 0.027 0.012 0.035 0.007
No. of Obs
(% of total)
No. of Obs (if educ>0)
(% of total Obs)
Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
1449 725
(68.7%) (68.2%) (65.9%) (77.8%) (72.8%)
(5.4%)
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
12664 6780 3710
(100%)
9939
(53.9%)
5632
(30.6%)
1862
(10.1%)
Total dnorem dinrem dexrem dbothrem
18429 996
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
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Table 6.8b: the 1994 FIES
Note: Standard errors are reported only for continuous variables.
CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005).
Education
edush 0.026 0.050 0.024 0.047 0.021 0.042 0.041 0.064 0.033 0.055
educsh if educ>0 0.035 0.055 0.033 0.053 0.029 0.047 0.052 0.069 0.042 0.059
educ (in real) 4775 12308 4226 11500 3098 8528 9263 17841 7219 15559
educ (in real) if educ>0 6461 13932 5742 13077 4347 9830 11752 19355 9329 17122
Welfare
totex(in real) 128355 103760 119819 98492 103555 81169 191965 125091 172607 117616
lpctotex 9.302 0.735 9.209 0.721 9.162 0.674 9.784 0.693 9.662 0.66
Family composition
totmember 5.288 2.207 5.415 2.16 5.118 2.28 5.152 2.181 5.243 2.258
age 7-14 0.591 0.606 0.585 0.541 0.583
age 15-24 0.53 0.531 0.506 0.577 0.534
Head characteristics
hfemale 0.152 0.097 0.167 0.285 0.257
hage 47.6 13.8 46 12.8 49.2 14.7 49.7 14.0 50.1 14.9
hmarried 0.835 0.868 0.794 0.823 0.768
hedu1 0.276 0.29 0.329 0.156 0.194
hedu2 0.353 0.361 0.378 0.289 0.320
hedu3 0.285 0.266 0.243 0.399 0.382
hedu4 0.085 0.084 0.051 0.156 0.105
hnojob 0.152 0.085 0.166 0.304 0.325
Urban/Rural
urban 0.598 0.557 0.572 0.725 0.767
Farming
agri 0.302 0.370 0.322 0.097 0.093
Region
Ilocos 0.055 0.038 0.06 0.099 0.081
Cagayan 0.040 0.048 0.026 0.047 0.020
Cluzon 0.108 0.080 0.130 0.139 0.178
Sluzon 0.144 0.133 0.154 0.166 0.151
Bicol 0.057 0.053 0.082 0.027 0.038
Wvisayas 0.082 0.079 0.100 0.064 0.068
Cvisayas 0.073 0.081 0.081 0.048 0.031
Evisayas 0.046 0.047 0.060 0.025 0.022
Mindanao 0.223 0.297 0.169 0.113 0.085
NCR 0.151 0.118 0.127 0.247 0.319
CAR 0.020 0.026 0.010 0.025 0.009
No. of Obs
(% of total)
No. of Obs (if educ>0)
(% of total Obs)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean
17857 9370 4718 2438 1331
(73.9%) (73.6%) (71.3%) (78.8%) (77.4%)
(7.1%)
Total dnorem dinrem
(100%)
12732
(52.7%)
6620
(27.4%)
3093
(12.8%)
24165 1720
dexrem dbothrem
Std. Dev.
185
Table 6.8c: the 2000 FIES
Note: Standard errors are reported only for continuous variables.
CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005).
Education
edush 0.030 0.056 0.028 0.053 0.024 0.049 0.047 0.072 0.040 0.068
educsh if educ>0 0.041 0.062 0.038 0.059 0.035 0.056 0.061 0.077 0.053 0.074
educ (in real) 6592 18844 6051 17874 4033 15332 13231 26114 9580 20272
educ (in real) if educ>0 9057 21577 8279 20462 5761 18052 17263 28639 12767 22518
Welfare
totex(in real) 149578 166962 145943 174608 111534 121131 229901 188396 193122 164619
lpctotex 9.822 0.784 9.76 0.783 9.634 0.691 10.343 0.737 10.198 0.713
Family composition
totmember 5.122 2.280 5.267 2.235 4.931 2.343 5.003 2.264 4.934 2.329
age 7-14 0.563 0.582 0.552 0.524 0.525
age 15-24 0.524 0.529 0.494 0.561 0.538
Head characteristics
hfemale 0.175 0.119 0.201 0.315 0.279
hage 48.9 13.9 47.2 12.9 50.7 14.8 51.0 14.1 52.2 15.4
hmarried 0.806 0.841 0.756 0.786 0.746
hedu1 0.253 0.260 0.309 0.137 0.171
hedu2 0.317 0.308 0.363 0.264 0.291
hedu3 0.320 0.317 0.268 0.404 0.422
hedu4 0.110 0.116 0.059 0.195 0.116
hnojob 0.163 0.099 0.181 0.324 0.332
Urban/Rural
urban 0.594 0.575 0.549 0.717 0.727
Farming
agri 0.244 0.297 0.257 0.067 0.067
Region
Ilocos 0.048 0.037 0.042 0.091 0.087
Cagayan 0.039 0.047 0.024 0.046 0.024
Cluzon 0.095 0.070 0.118 0.120 0.167
Sluzon 0.156 0.142 0.172 0.161 0.194
Bicol 0.053 0.046 0.081 0.027 0.041
Wvisayas 0.076 0.059 0.103 0.082 0.098
Cvisayas 0.059 0.056 0.072 0.044 0.058
Evisayas 0.057 0.058 0.069 0.034 0.038
Mindanao 0.271 0.337 0.220 0.160 0.128
NCR 0.105 0.103 0.069 0.180 0.126
CAR 0.042 0.045 0.030 0.055 0.039
No. of Obs
(% of total)
No. of Obs (if educ>0)
(% of total Obs) (72.8%) (73.1%) (70.0%) (76.6%) (75.0%)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
28833 15669 7714 3869 1581
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean
(5.3%)
Total dnorem dinrem
(100%)
21439
(54.1%)
11021
(27.8%)
5048
(12.7%)
39615 2107
dexrem dbothrem
Std. Dev.
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Table 6.8d: the 2006 FIES
Note: Standard errors are reported only for continuous variables.
CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005).
Education
edush 0.028 0.058 0.024 0.053 0.022 0.049 0.047 0.077 0.040 0.070
educsh if educ>0 0.040 0.066 0.035 0.061 0.032 0.056 0.061 0.083 0.054 0.077
educ (in real) 5730 17659 4803 16269 3183 10760 12799 27675 9188 22210
educ (in real) if educ>0 8110 20544 6964 19203 4605 12687 16586 30493 12345 24976
Welfare
totex(in real) 130736 134723 126298 141233 96527 83267 208525 177383 166648 138491
lpctotex 10.08 0.787 10.01 0.795 9.876 0.677 10.60 0.786 10.40 0.716
Family composition
totmember 4.817 2.240 4.921 2.214 4.740 2.258 4.749 2.288 4.754 2.198
age 7-14 0.534 0.535 0.546 0.505 0.524
age 15-24 0.497 0.502 0.476 0.534 0.506
Head characteristics
hfemale 0.180 0.121 0.184 0.291 0.268
hage 48.4 14.0 46.6 13.0 49.2 14.6 49.8 13.9 51.5 15.3
hmarried 0.804 0.836 0.780 0.805 0.752
hedu1 0.263 0.280 0.315 0.143 0.169
hedu2 0.316 0.307 0.359 0.241 0.298
hedu3 0.320 0.306 0.276 0.415 0.407
hedu4 0.101 0.108 0.050 0.201 0.127
hnojob 0.155 0.088 0.150 0.276 0.288
Urban/Rural
urban 0.449 0.430 0.396 0.568 0.553
Farming
agri 0.275 0.349 0.303 0.109 0.090
Region
Ilocos 0.059 0.039 0.046 0.108 0.117
Cagayan 0.049 0.049 0.042 0.073 0.049
Cluzon 0.081 0.054 0.089 0.084 0.160
Sluzon 0.137 0.115 0.163 0.117 0.162
Bicol 0.058 0.036 0.098 0.030 0.051
Wvisayas 0.071 0.060 0.085 0.064 0.073
Cvisayas 0.065 0.064 0.070 0.061 0.058
Evisayas 0.051 0.043 0.065 0.040 0.044
Mindanao 0.274 0.352 0.246 0.195 0.155
NCR 0.116 0.139 0.072 0.173 0.098
CAR 0.040 0.049 0.026 0.056 0.033
No. of Obs
(% of total)
No. of Obs (if educ>0)
(% of total Obs)
Std. Dev.Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean
(70.7%) (69.0%) (69.1%) (77.2%) (74.4%)
Total dnorem dinrem dexrem dbothrem
27188 11008 9365 3910 2905
Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean
(100%) (41.5%) (35.2%) (13.2%) (10.1%)
38480 15962 13548 5067 3903
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6.5 Methodology of Analysis
6.5.1 Engel Curve Framework
The receipt of remittances could affect a household’s consumption and investment
behaviour. To analyse the expenditure patterns of households with and without
receiving remittances, many studies have used an Engel curve framework (Adams,
2005; Castaldo and Reilly, 2007; Taylor and Mora, 2006; Zarate-Hoyos, 2004; Tabuga,
2007). An Engel curve shows the households’ budget shares on specific types of goods
out of total household expenditure. There are several models for the Engel curve. Past
studies highlighted the features of these models (see Leser, 1963; Prais and Houthakker,
1955: 87). For this framework, one popular functional form is the Working-Leser model
(Working 1943; Leser 1963). This model assumes that the budget shares of each
household expense (for example, food, clothing, housing, education, and health care
etc.) are linearly related to the logarithm of total expenditure. This Working-Leser
model was developed to take into account several factors which might affect the budget
shares of different types of goods (Deaton 1997). The main focus of this chapter is to
examine how the receipt of international remittances affects a household’s expenditure
on education over time while taking into account various household characteristics.
Therefore, the dummy variable capturing the receipt of remittances from abroad is
added to the explanatory variables of the functional form together with the following
explanatory variables: family composition, household head’s characteristics (such as
gender, age, marital status, educational attainment, and employment status), and
geographical location. The model can be expressed as follows.
(6-1) iiiiiiiiiiii vdbothremdexremdinremZpctotexvbXeducsh   )ln( ,
ni ,2,1
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In addition to the above model, we also consider the following model with the absolute
value of education expenditure as a dependent variable to examine the effect of
remittances on the level of education expenditures. The model is given by:
(6-2) iiiiiiiiiiii dbothremdexremdinremZpctotexvbXeduc   )ln( ,
ni ,2,1
where ieducsh and ieduc are the budget share and the absolute value of education
expenditure in household i, respectively. iX  is a vector of all the variables
corresponding to the i th households including the intercept term, b is a vector of the
unknown parameters, and iv and i are error terms that captures the unknown variation
in the expenditure budget share for the i th household and for which standard
econometric assumptions are made. The ipctotex is the total household expenditure per
capita in household i. iZ  is a vector of the other household and regional characteristics
for the i th household. The  and  are unknown parameters we estimate, and  is
also an unknown parameter vector to be estimated. The idinrem , idexrem , and
idbothrem are the dummy variables capturing whether or not the household receives
internal remittances only, international remittances only, or both internal and
international remittances, respectively. The i , i , and i are unknown parameters that
when estimated provide some judgment on the estimated effect of the receipt of
different types of remittances on changes in the education expenditure in household i.
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With regard to the effect of remittances on education, we can also estimate how much
remittance incomes affect education by adding the variables of the amounts of
remittances into the education equation instead of remittance dummies (i.e., dinrem,
dexrem, and dbothrem). The model can be written as follows:
(6-3) iiiiiiii vexreminremZpctotexeducsh   )ln( , ni ,2,1
Ideally, the equation should be estimated as part of a wider expenditure system using
the seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE) approach since the error terms are
assumed to be correlated across the equations for expenditure items. However, the only
advantage to such an approach would be more efficient estimates. Given our sample
sizes are reasonably large, this is not seen as providing a great advantage in the current
case. In addition, estimating these systems within the framework of the limited
dependent variable (LDV) models such as probit or Tobit estimators is not
straightforward. In any event, our primary research theme is around educational
expenditures, not other categories in this chapter.
In addition to estimating the above education expenditure share equation, we can also
consider the model with the absolute value of education expenditures as a dependent
variable. The model is given by:
(6-4) iiiiiiii exreminremZpctotexeduc   )ln( , ni ,2,1
where iinrem and iexrem are the amounts of domestic and international remittances in
household i, respectively.
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6.5.2 Censored Regression Model
When there are households with no education expenditures, it is reasonable to use the
censored regression model, such as the Tobit, the Heckman, or Powell’s censored least
absolute deviations (CLAD) estimators, to take into consideration zero education
expenditure observations. The Heckman (1979) two-step procedure allows us to
distinguish between factors that determine the decision to have a non-zero budget of
education expenditure and those that determine its level. The decision for the
expenditure is estimated by the probit model, whereas its amount is estimated by
ordinary least squares (OLS) model with a correction for selection. However, as with
our earlier empirical analysis, we could not obtain appropriate instruments to control for
selectivity for our analysis. 66 Therefore, in this chapter, we focus on two other
estimators: the Tobit and the CLAD estimators.
6.5.2.1 Tobit estimator
The Tobit models, which were first used by Tobin (1958), can be written in the
following form.
(6-5) nivbXw iTOBITii ,,1),,0max(  ; ),0(~ 2iv
where the dependent variable iw and the regression vector iX  are observed for each i
th
household, while the parameter vector TOBITb and normally distributed error term iv are
66 As with Chapter Four, we also report the coefficient estimates of the Two-Part model which separately
run the regression for the probability and the level of remittances. The probability is determined using the
probit model, while the level is estimated by the linear regression using the subsample with positive
remittance amounts. The estimation results were reported in the Appendix. The estimation results reveal
that during the whole survey years there is no single variable which influence only the selection of
remittances, not the level.
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not observed. The Tobit model assumes that the decisions as to whether to spend on
education or not and how much to spend on it occur simultaneously. The parameter
values TOBITbˆ and ˆ for a censored Tobit model are found by maximising the following
natural logarithm of the likelihood function.
(6-6)
where 1iD if 0iw , and 0iD if 0iw .
6.5.2.2. Instrumental-variable Tobit (IV Tobit) estimator
The issue of endogeneity appears when the explanatory variables are correlated with the
error terms given a potential for reverse causality between education and remittances.
The instrumental variable (IV) estimator is used to solve these problems as it provides
unbiased and consistent estimates for the variables of interest (see Baum, 2006). We
assumed that there would be a potential problem for two-way relationships between the
education expenditure and the amount of remittance incomes. To correct for this
possible endogeneity problem, we used IV estimation with instruments which affect the
level of international remittances but not directly education expenditures except through
their effect from remittance incomes from abroad. The instruments selected for the
analysis are ownership of durables. These variables should be uncorrelated with the
education spending decision as the ownership of such items is unlikely to directly affect
a child’s education. In contrast, the variables would be highly correlated with the level
of international remittances (see Ang, Sugiyarto, and Jha, 2009; Cattaneo, 2010).
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Moreover, there is evidence that the proportion of households with some durables (such
as a TV set, a refrigerator, a washing machine) is higher among those who received
international remittances (Tullao, Cortez and See, 2007). Filipino households having
more TV sets, refrigerators, washing machines tend to rely more on income transfers
from abroad, which are readily available and more stable income flows.
The data on the ownership of durable goods are only available for the 2003 FIES and
the 2006 FIES and thereby the IV estimation results can be obtained for these two
survey years. For this chapter, the estimation results derived from the 2006 FIES only
will be reported in the results section. In addition, in this chapter we control for the
potential endogeneity of international remittances only and not domestic remittances.
There are two reasons for this approach. First, we could not find satisfactory identifying
instruments for the latter measure. Second, some of the tests used to determine the
validity of instruments are only available for a model containing one endogenous
regressor. Moreover, unlike Chapter Four, we decided not to use migrant characteristics
as possible instruments because the use of the linked data of the FIES and the SOF
drops the sample households receiving only domestic remittances and those without any
remittance incomes. This makes it difficult to examine the effects of both domestic and
international remittances on education expenditures and compare them.
Using the 2006 FIES, we investigate which variables provide valid instruments. We
consider three potential instruments, which are the presence of a refrigerator, of a
washing machine, and of a television set.67 In order to select the better combination of
67 It is possible to combine three instruments and create one variable denoting the wealth of households.
However, using a single instrument variable makes us lose our options to select the appropriate
instrument and also it would be more correlated with the welfare variable (measured by per capita total
family expenditure) used in this chapter.
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these potential instruments, we again tested for: (1) over-identifying restrictions; (2)
weak instruments; (3) regressor exogeneity.
The tests are reported for all possible combinations of three potential instruments (see
Appendix in detail). Based on the all results, we concluded that the ownership of a
washing machine and of a television set are selected as the best instruments for the
model with the share of education expenditures as a dependent variable, while the
ownership of all three items (i.e., a washing machine, a television set, and a refrigerator)
are chosen for the model with their absolute value. The selected instruments satisfy the
necessary conditions for valid instrumental variables.
6.5.2.3 Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) estimator
In contrast to the standard estimators of the censored regression model such as Tobit or
other maximum likelihood approaches, Powell’s (1984, 1986a) CLAD estimator, which
is a generalization of the least absolute deviations estimator for the linear regression
model, is robust to heteroscedasticity and is consistent and asymptotically normal for a
wide class of error distributions (see Arabmazar and Schmidt, 1981; Vijverberg, 1987;
Amemiya, 1985:383). Furthermore, if the assumptions of homoscedasticity or
independence of the residuals are violated, the conventional standard errors using a
method suggested by Koenker and Bassett (1982) are not robust. The use of bootstrap
standard errors is suggested in the literature (see Rogers, 1993). Some empirical studies
have suggested that heteroscedasticity causes greater bias in standard maximum
likelihood estimation than nonnormality (Powell, 1986b). Powell’s CLAD estimator
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is found by minimising the sum of absolute deviations of iw from the median
function for iw , that is, over all explanatory variables. It is given by:
(6-7)      


n
i
CLADii
n
i
CLADitCLAD bXwn
bXmw
n
bS
11
,0max1,1
where  CLADi bXm , is the median of iw , which is some known function of the
regressors iX  and unknown parameters CLADb . However, suppose the error term iu is
continuously distributed with median zero, and that the density function is positive at
zero, so that the median of iu is unique. Then, it is easy to verify that the median
function for iw is expressed as  CLADibX ,0max . This function means that the median
of iw is CLADibX  if the probability that 0iw is less than one-half, whereas the median
of iw is zero if the probability that 0iw exceeds one-half (see Powell, 1984).
The stata command clad, which is provided by Jolliffe, et al. (2000), was used for
Powell’s CLAD estimator. For this command, Buchinsky’s (1994) iterative linear
programming algorithm (ILPA) was used. Buchinsky’s algorithm works with the
following steps. First, the ILPA estimates a quantile regression for the full sample, and
then deletes the observations for which the predicted value of the dependent variable is
less than zero. Second, another quantile regression is estimated on the new sample, and
again negative predicted values are dropped. Finally, convergence occurs when there
are no negative predicted values on two consecutive iterations.
CLADbˆ
 CLADibX ,0max
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6.6 Estimation Results
6.6.1 Mean comparison
In this section, we briefly examine the features of education expenditures using average
figures. The estimated figures will be reported with the following categories: by welfare
levels of households and by their places of living. The average share of education
expenditures is also compared with other expenditure items at the end of this section.
Household Spending on Education
Table 6.9 shows the mean household expenditure on education depending on their
welfare level, measured by per capita total family expenditure. By welfare quintiles,
higher–income groups tended to spend more in absolute terms on education
expenditures than lower-income groups.
Table 6. 9: Sample Mean Household Expenditure on Education by welfare level (Philippine pesos,
in real terms)
Note: (a) Welfare level is measured by per capita total family expenditure
(b) CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005)
In 1988, among all quintile groups, mean household expenditure on education declined
from 1985 in real terms. This would be mainly because of the benefits of free public
secondary education. Since then, the average household educational expenditure has
been increasing significantly for the top quintile groups, while other groups have
 Welfare Level
First quintile
(0-20%)
Second quintile
(20-40%)
Third quintile
(40-60%)
Fourth quintile
(60-80%)
Fifth quintile
(80-100%)
8,234 9,409
15,392 14,118 15,967 19,242 23,049 30,278 26,491 28,518
6,452 6,147 6,742 7,873 9,831 10,049
2,250 2,230
3,566 3,259 3,683 4,232 4,893 5,237 3,991 4,231
2,200 1,795 2,136 2,287 2,651 2,894
2003 2006
1,014 938 1,022 1,155 1,321 1,423 1,191 1,143
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
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experienced the relatively stable levels of household expenditure on education over time.
During the period of 1997-2000, there was a sharp increase in educational expenditure
among the fifth quintile group. This would be partly because of a dramatic increase in
the amount of international remittances into the Philippines. The sudden depreciation of
the Philippine exchange rate during the 1997 Asian economic crisis increased
remittances from the OFWs and also could increase educational expenditures in the
Philippines (see Yang, 2004).
Table 6.10 reveals that since 1985 the average educational expenditure has been greater
in National Capital Region (NCR) than any other regions. There was a sharp increase in
household expenditure on education between 1997 and 2000, especially among
households in NCR and CAR. The mean household expenditure on education has been
continuously decreasing. In 2006, it declined to the same level as that in 1997. The total
mean household expenditure on education is still larger in NCR than other regions.
Table 6. 10: Sample Mean Household Expenditure on Education by region (Philippine pesos, in real
terms)
Source: Author’s computation based on the FIES
Note: (a) * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005)
However, with regard to the average household expenditure on education, the data must
be interpreted with caution because mean values of educational expenditure in each
quantile of the household welfare were smaller among households living in NCR
 Region 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
Ilocos 6,457 4,353 5,317 6,754 8,837 9,579 7,106 7,943
Cagayan 6,384 4,790 6,513 8,174 8,772 9,568 8,769 9,773
Cluzon 7,200 5,564 6,019 6,961 8,519 10,190 9,956 11,353
Sluzon 6,026 6,030 6,873 8,759 9,556 11,350 9,679 10,565
Bicol 5,528 3,999 4,363 5,021 6,570 6,963 7,227 6,214
Wvisayas 4,134 4,389 4,901 4,921 8,129 8,561 6,628 6,765
Cvisayas 3,365 3,287 4,461 3,927 5,452 7,180 7,019 7,857
Evisayas 2,724 3,258 3,437 2,788 5,408 6,739 5,982 6,732
Mindanao 4,501 4,336 4,132 5,235 6,300 6,375 5,314 5,919
NCR 8,507 8,216 9,034 10,802 12,518 18,177 15,435 13,078
CAR N.A. 6,311 8,702 8,683 10,424 14,307 11,241 12,488
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compared to other regions. In short, educational expenditures in NCR are, on average,
higher than that in other regions without taking into account the household welfare level,
while mean expenditure on education in each welfare quintile in NCR is lower than that
in non-NCR. This situation results from the high proportion of NCR households in the
top welfare quintile group. Nearly half of the households in NCR who had spent on
education were rich households. Thus, even if the mean of educational expenditure in
each quintile is lower in NCR, the mean value across the whole distribution can be
higher than that in other regions (see Table 6.11).
Table 6. 11: Mean Educational Expenditure/ budget share for education in 2006
Total
First
Quintile
Second
Quintile
Third
Quintile
Fourth
Quintile
Fifth
Quintile
Households with
Educ>0 (Total)
Mean Educational
Expenditure 8616 1074 2091 3836 8677 27402
(21826) (1852) (3783) (7576) (15458) (39910)
Mean Budget Share
for Education 0.040 0.017 0.024 0.032 0.048 0.076
(0.066) (0.024) (0.038) (0.056) (0.077) (0.091)
No. of Observation 27188 5438 5437 5438 5437 5438
(% of total) (100%) (20.0%) (20.0%) (20.0%) (20.0%) (20.0%)
Households with
Educ>0 (in NCR)
Mean Educational
Expenditure 13078 463 869 1391 4223 22552
(28737) (471) (983) (3948) (9972) (36908)
Mean Budget Share
for Education 0.034 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.020 0.051
(0.059) (0.004) (0.009) (0.022) (0.044) (0.069)
No. of Observation 3021 18 111 418 926 1548
(% of total) (100%) (0.6%) (3.7%) (13.8%) (30.7%) (51.2%)
Households with
Educ>0 (in Non-NCR)
Mean Educational
Expenditure 8058 1076 2116 4040 9592 29331
(20735) (1855) (3815) (7768) (16208) (40888)
Mean Budget Share
for Education 0.040 0.017 0.025 0.034 0.054 0.085
(0.067) (0.024) (0.038) (0.058) (0.081) (0.097)
No. of Observation 24167 5420 5326 5020 4511 3890
(% of total) (100%) (22.4%) (22.0%) (20.8%) (18.7%) (16.1%)
Note: (a) Welfare level is measured by per capita total family expenditure.
(b) Values in parentheses under mean figures denote standard errors.
Source: Author’s computation based on the 2006 FIES
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In addition to the mean figures, the median plot of educational expenditure, its
logarithm, and the budget share for education over household welfare levels, measured
by percentile ranks of per capita total household expenditure also yields the same result
(see Figure 6.1). All of these three results clearly revealed that at the median level
households in NCR tend to spend less on education or to allocate a smaller budget for
education compared to those living in any other regions. There would be several reasons
to explain this interesting finding on education expenditures. First, households not in
NCR might have more children attending schools. Table 6.12 shows the average
number of children aged 7-14. Households living in the NCR region had fewer kids on
average. Especially among the rich group, the mean figures are smaller. Moreover, most
of the NCR households have only one child aged 7-14 (see Figure 6.2). All of these
results tell us that the NCR households who spent on education are categorised into the
rich welfare group and they are likely to have fewer children and spend higher
expenditure per student. Due to the differences in the number of kids, the average total
education expenditures of NCR households can be lower than non-NCR households
depending on the welfare cut-off points. As mentioned above, however, most of them
are in the top welfare group. Thus, overall the mean figure of education expenditures of
households in NCR was higher than households in non-NCR (see Table 6.11). Of
course, the number of kids would not be only an answer for the higher total education
expenditures in non-NCR by welfare quintiles. Parents in non-NCR might prefer
sending their kids to private schools because there might be no good public schools in
the region. In NCR, there are more and better public schools, so even households in the
top quintile group would be willing to send their kids there.
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Figure 6. 1: Median-Spline plots of Educational Expenditure
Figure 6.1a: Educational Expenditure vs Percentile Rank of per capita total household
expenditure
Figure 6.1b: Logarithm of Educational Expenditure vs Percentile Rank of per capita total
household expenditure
Figure 6.1c: Budget Share for Educational Expenditure vs Percentile Rank of per capita total
household expenditure
Source: Author’s computation based on the 2006 FIES
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Table 6. 12: The average number of family members aged 7-14 among households who
spent on education, in 2006
Note: (a) Welfare level is measured by per capita total family expenditure
(b) Parentheses denote the standard errors of the mean figures.
Source: Author’s computation based on the 2006 FIES
Total FirstQuintile
Second
Quintile
Third
Quintile
Fourth
Quintile
Fifth
Quintile
Ilocos 1.270 2.190 1.579 1.223 0.872 0.710
(0.028) (0.086) (0.057) (0.051) (0.050) (0.056)
No of Obs 1557 189 373 417 337 241
Cagayan 1.279 1.946 1.470 1.183 0.902 0.910
(0.029) (0.075) (0.058) (0.051) (0.057) (0.068)
No of Obs 1330 204 332 350 245 199
Cluzon 1.313 2.135 1.843 1.499 1.150 0.886
(0.024) (0.124) (0.066) (0.046) (0.040) (0.042)
No of Obs 2191 96 313 565 640 577
Sluzon 1.334 2.185 1.708 1.394 1.042 0.828
(0.018) (0.052) (0.047) (0.038) (0.032) (0.029)
No of Obs 3810 536 637 770 946 921
Bicol 1.584 2.307 1.696 1.303 0.978 0.663
(0.031) (0.057) (0.055) (0.061) (0.066) (0.060)
No of Obs 1662 492 428 323 229 190
Wvisayas 1.352 2.205 1.561 1.070 0.905 0.676
(0.026) (0.057) (0.046) (0.051) (0.054) (0.048)
No of Obs 1919 405 503 400 327 284
Cvisayas 1.365 2.013 1.443 1.252 0.982 0.761
(0.029) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.055) (0.058)
No of Obs 1715 462 332 322 331 268
Mindanao 1.436 1.999 1.514 1.162 0.925 0.736
(0.013) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031)
No of Obs 7498 2375 1862 1409 1063 789
NCR 1.090 2.167 2.099 1.782 1.249 0.724
(0.020) (0.283) (0.126) (0.057) (0.036) (0.023)
No of Obs 3021 18 111 418 926 1548
CAR 1.329 2.016 1.732 1.282 1.023 0.722
(0.035) (0.084) (0.077) (0.080) (0.067) (0.054)
No of Obs 1105 193 231 220 213 248
Total Obs 27,188 5,438 5,437 5,438 5,437 5,438
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Figure 6. 2: The number of family members aged 7-14 among households who spent on education,
in 2006
Source: Author’s computation based on the 2006 FIES
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As for the shares of household expenditure, on average, based on the Family Income
and Expenditure Survey (FIES) 2000-2006, it was found that Filipino households with
the receipt of remittances from abroad have larger budget shares of education, health,
durable goods, transport and communications, and housing as well as lower shares of
food compared to non-remittance receiving households (see Ang, Sugiyarto, and Jha,
2009:17). The same trends in household propensities to spend were shown even for a
longer period of 1985-2006. The gaps between Remittance Recipient (RH) and Non-
Recipient (NR) households in mean shares of most expenditure items were significantly
different based on the results of t-tests. Since 1988, the gap in share of education
expenditure between two household groups has been widening from 1.3 per cent in
1988 to 2.1 per cent in 2006. Moreover, from 2000, the share of transportation &
communication expenses have increased and the differences in this budget share have
significantly widened (see Table 6.13). Based on the statistical evidence that there is a
significant difference in the education expenditure between households with and
without the receipt of international remittances, we move on to examining the extent to
which remittances affect education expenditure.
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Table 6. 13: Shares of Household Expenditure among International Remittance Recipient (RR) and Non-Recipient (NR) Households 1985-2006
Note: t denotes t statistic of mean comparison t-test with unequal sample sizes and variance
p denotes p-value of t-test with unequal sample sizes and variance. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES
t-test t-test t-test t-test
RR NR Gap t p RR NR Gap t p RR NR Gap t p RR NR Gap t p
No. of Observation 2511 14030 2858 15571 4257 19867 4813 19352
Expenditure Items
Food 50.9% 60.9% -10.0% ** 34.35 0.0000 49.9% 58.7% -8.8% ** 32.14 0.0000 49.0% 57.9% -8.9% ** 39.01 0.0000 48.5% 57.3% -8.7% ** 39.8 0.0000
Education 4.0% 2.2% 1.8% ** 14.58 0.0000 3.2% 1.9% 1.3% ** 12.56 0.0000 3.4% 2.0% 1.4% ** 16.17 0.0000 3.8% 2.3% 1.5% ** 15.53 0.0000
Health Care 2.3% 1.7% 0.6% ** 6.08 0.0000 2.0% 1.4% 0.6% ** 6.278 0.0000 1.9% 1.4% 0.5% ** 6.97 0.0000 2.3% 1.7% 0.6% ** 6.964 0.0000
House 13.5% 9.6% 3.9% ** 18.46 0.0000 13.8% 9.7% 4.1% ** 19.27 0.0000 14.3% 10.1% 4.2% ** 23.96 0.0000 14.8% 10.6% 4.2% ** 25.11 0.0000
Durables 1.8% 0.6% 1.2% ** 10.48 0.0000 1.7% 1.0% 0.8% ** 7.357 0.0000 1.8% 1.0% 0.8% ** 9.60 0.0000 2.0% 1.4% 0.6% ** 6.544 0.0000
Tansport & Communication 3.9% 2.9% 1.0% ** 11.66 0.0000 4.3% 3.4% 0.8% ** 9.447 0.0000 4.7% 3.8% 0.9% ** 11.33 0.0000 4.2% 3.4% 0.8% ** 12.65 0.0000
Household Operation 2.3% 2.2% 0.1% ** 2.93 0.0034 2.5% 2.3% 0.2% ** 3.525 0.0004 2.6% 2.6% 0.0% 0.40 0.6888 2.3% 2.3% 0.0% 0.51 0.6098
Personal Care 2.5% 1.8% 0.7% ** 14.53 0.0000 3.8% 3.1% 0.7% ** 12.24 0.0000 3.8% 3.1% 0.7% ** 11.64 0.0000 3.7% 3.2% 0.5% ** 12.01 0.0000
Clothing, Footwear etc. 4.1% 3.3% 0.8% ** 12.59 0.0000 4.7% 4.1% 0.5% ** 7.685 0.0000 4.0% 3.7% 0.2% ** 5.01 0.0000 3.8% 3.4% 0.4% ** 8.215 0.0000
Water, Gas, Electricity etc. 5.5% 6.2% -0.7% ** 11.06 0.0000 5.6% 5.7% -0.1% ** 2.164 0.0305 6.1% 6.1% 0.0% 0.16 0.876 6.0% 5.8% 0.2% ** 4.046 0.0001
Leisure 2.9% 2.0% 0.9% ** 10.35 0.0000 2.9% 2.2% 0.7% ** 9.292 0.0000 3.1% 2.2% 0.9% ** 11.93 0.0000 3.1% 2.5% 0.6% ** 8.721 0.0000
Others 6.3% 6.7% -0.4% ** 3.67 0.0002 5.8% 6.5% -0.7% ** 5.873 0.0000 5.4% 6.2% -0.8% ** 8.67 0.0000 5.4% 6.0% -0.6% ** 7.141 0.0000
1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
t-test t-test t-test t-test
RR NR Gap t p RR NR Gap t p RR NR Gap t p RR NR Gap t p
No. of Observation 6637 31805 7155 32460 8729 33365 8970 29510
Expenditure Items
Food 47.0% 55.0% -8.1% ** 43.3 0.0000 44.9% 54.5% -9.6% ** 52.73 0.0000 44.2% 54.2% -9.9% ** 60.38 0.0000 43.3% 52.7% -9.3% ** 55.55 0.0000
Education 3.9% 2.4% 1.5% ** 17.9 0.0000 4.5% 2.7% 1.8% ** 20.47 0.0000 4.1% 2.2% 1.9% ** 25.50 0.0000 4.4% 2.3% 2.1% ** 24.57 0.0000
Health Care 2.4% 1.6% 0.7% ** 11.1 0.0000 2.3% 1.4% 0.8% ** 11.82 0.0000 2.4% 1.6% 0.9% ** 13.84 0.0000 3.0% 1.9% 1.1% ** 14.45 0.0000
House 14.6% 11.2% 3.4% ** 24.1 0.0000 14.7% 11.4% 3.3% ** 25.80 0.0000 13.8% 10.8% 3.0% ** 26.63 0.0000 13.5% 10.8% 2.6% ** 23.65 0.0000
Durables 2.5% 1.8% 0.7% ** 8.66 0.0000 2.1% 1.2% 1.0% ** 12.63 0.0000 2.6% 1.4% 1.2% ** 14.99 0.0000 2.2% 1.4% 0.8% ** 10.75 0.0000
Tansport & Communication 4.8% 3.6% 1.2% ** 19.1 0.0000 6.2% 4.2% 1.9% ** 29.09 0.0000 6.9% 4.7% 2.2% ** 36.31 0.0000 7.2% 5.6% 1.6% ** 25.36 0.0000
Household Operation 2.0% 2.0% 0.1% * 1.8 0.0723 2.0% 1.8% 0.2% ** 7.51 0.0000 2.1% 1.7% 0.3% ** 12.30 0.0000 2.1% 1.8% 0.3% ** 10.57 0.0000
Personal Care 3.9% 3.3% 0.6% ** 15.1 0.0000 4.1% 3.6% 0.5% ** 13.83 0.0000 4.2% 3.8% 0.4% ** 14.24 0.0000 4.1% 3.8% 0.3% ** 11.43 0.0000
Clothing, Footwear etc. 3.9% 3.2% 0.6% ** 15.8 0.0000 3.1% 2.6% 0.5% ** 15.01 0.0000 3.2% 2.7% 0.5% ** 16.72 0.0000 2.6% 2.2% 0.4% ** 16.97 0.0000
Water, Gas, Electricity etc. 5.9% 5.6% 0.2% ** 5.65 0.0000 6.9% 6.7% 0.1% ** 3.12 0.0018 6.9% 6.6% 0.3% ** 7.23 0.0000 8.1% 7.5% 0.7% ** 14.39 0.0000
Leisure 3.1% 2.3% 0.8% ** 13.1 0.0000 3.3% 2.3% 1.0% ** 17.28 0.0000 3.2% 2.3% 0.8% ** 16.13 0.0000 3.4% 2.5% 1.0% ** 16.20 0.0000
Others 6.3% 7.9% -1.6% ** 20.5 0.0000 5.9% 7.5% -1.6% ** 20.95 0.0000 6.4% 8.0% -1.6% ** 22.37 0.0000 6.1% 7.6% -1.5% ** 21.87 0.0000
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6.6.2 Engel Curve Framework
6.6.2.1 Tobit estimator
Effects of remittances
The effects of remittances on education expenditures are investigated using the Tobit
estimators, which are mean regression models, were reported in Table 6.14. All other
estimation results are found in the Appendix. Assuming a linear relationship between
education expenditures and total household expenditures, the most important result to
emerge from this research is that the receipt of remittances from abroad significantly
increases the budget share of education as well as the amount of education expenditures.
With regard to remittance incidences on education, on average and ceteris paribus,
receiving international remittances raises the percentage share of education out of total
household expenditure by 0.4-0.5 of a percentage point. These figures are much smaller
than the differences in the share of education expenditure between households with and
without international remittances reported in Table 6.13. With regard to the absolute
value of education expenditure, the average amounts of education expenditures
increased due to the receipt of remittances from abroad by approximately 875 pesos in
1988 and to around 1,423 pesos in 2006 (see Table 6.13). Receiving remittances from
within the Philippines increased the share of education expenditures after 2000 and their
level in 2000. When it comes to remittance amounts, both domestic and international
remittances significantly increased the share and the level of education expenditures.
Interestingly, the coefficient estimates of domestic remittances are greater than
international remittances. This tells us that if households receive the same amount of
money transfer either from within the country or from abroad, they spend more on
education with the receipt of domestic remittances. It also means that a greater
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proportion of remittance incomes, even if with the lower absolute amounts, would be
used for education purposes among households receiving domestic remittances
compared to those receiving international remittances. A possible explanation of this is
that international remittances are allocated for purposes including food, clothing,
education and savings or investment such as real estate, small enterprise, or family-
owned business. ADB (2006: 157) reported that around 20 per cent of Filipino
recipients use the remittances for education, while there are approximately 28 per cent
who invest the money into savings (11.7 per cent), housing (12. 6 per cent), and
business (3.4 per cent). There is no available data on the use of domestic remittances.
However, our findings from the model with remittance incomes treated as an exogenous
regressor imply that a greater proportion of the remittances is allocated into education
expenditures. It might be possible to say that in general domestic remittances tend to
have higher propensities to support educational expenses. However, as mentioned in
Table 6.6, on average the amount of international remittances is much greater than
domestic remittances. Thus, the actual increase in education expenditures is also bigger
among households with the receipt of remittances from abroad. It is consistent with the
results of remittance incidences. Furthermore, we need to treat the remittance variable
as an endogenous regressor in the education expenditure equation using the instrumental
variable model mentioned in the previous section.
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Table 6. 14: The Tobit estimation results of the effects of remittances on education
Table 6.14a: The share of education expenditures (or educsh)
Table 6.14b: The absolute value of education expenditures (or educ)
Note:
(a) Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
(b) These equations include controls for household welfare level, household head characteristics (age,
gender, marital status, educational attainment, employment status), urban/rural, farming, and regions.
All coefficient estimates are reported in the Appendix.
(c) CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005)
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
Remittance incidence
dinrem 0.00041 0.00008 0.00139*** 0.00122***
(0.00034) (0.00036) (0.00032) (0.00032)
dexrem 0.00432*** 0.00424*** 0.00513*** 0.00559***
(0.00075) (0.00066) (0.00058) (0.00060)
dbothrem 0.00167** 0.00283*** 0.00457*** 0.00505***
(0.00077) (0.00073) (0.00081) (0.00062)
Remittance amount
inrem 0.000089*** 0.000053*** 0.000053*** 0.000075***
(0.000014) (0.000011) (0.000007) (0.000008)
exrem 0.000024*** 0.000036*** 0.000021*** 0.000026***
(0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000002) (0.000002)
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
Remittance incidence
dinrem -4.97 -19.51 228.98** 99.68
(62.20) (69.01) (96.45) (73.68)
dexrem 875.00*** 838.05*** 1001.44*** 1423.32***
(173.35) (152.30) (171.39) (170.83)
dbothrem 183.69 548.18*** 586.96*** 866.96***
(139.44) (172.38) (205.13) (164.52)
Remittance amount
inrem 16.92*** 17.49*** 20.83*** 26.25***
(2.66) (2.25) (2.05) (2.12)
exrem 8.63*** 13.62*** 11.00*** 14.46***
(0.70) (0.78) (0.62) (0.54)
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Temporal change in the effects of remittances
The t-test of the effects of remittances on education reported in Table 6.15 examines
whether or not temporal change in the effects is significant. The result reveals that
between 2000 and 2006, there was a significant increase in the effects of both the
incidence and the amount of international remittances on education expenditures (see
Table 6.15b). This means that money transfers from abroad were used more for
education compared to previous periods. Similarly, during the same period, it was also
found that the effects of the amount of domestic remittances get larger. If households
receive 1,000 pesos as domestic remittances, they increase their expenditures on
education by 5.42 pesos from 20.83 pesos in 2000 to 26.25 pesos in 2006, all other
things being held constant.
Table 6. 15: The t-test of the effects of remittances on education
Table 6.15a: The share of education expenditures (or educsh)
Table 6.15b: The absolute value of education expenditures (or educ)
Note: Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
1988-1994 1994-2000 2000-2006 1988-2006
Remittance incidence
dinrem -0.00033 0.00131*** -0.00017 0.00081*
(0.00050) (0.00048) (0.00045) (0.00047)
dexrem -0.00008 0.00089 0.00046 0.00127
(0.00100) (0.00088) (0.00083) (0.00096)
dbothrem 0.00116 0.00174 0.00048 0.00338***
(0.00106) (0.00109) (0.00102) (0.00099)
Remittance amount
inrem -0.000036** 0 0.000022** -0.000014
(0.000018) (0.000013) (0.000011) (0.000016)
exrem 0.000012** -0.000015*** 0.000005* 0.000002
(0.000005) (0.000004) (0.000003) (0.000004)
1988-1994 1994-2000 2000-2006 1988-2006
Remittance incidence
dinrem -14.54 248.49** -129.3 104.65
(92.90) (118.60) (121.37) (96.42)
dexrem -36.95 163.39 421.88* 548.32**
(230.75) (229.28) (241.99) (243.38)
dbothrem 364.49 38.78 280 683.27***
(221.72) (267.94) (262.95) (215.66)
Remittance amount
inrem 0.57 3.34 5.42* 9.33***
(3.48) (3.04) (2.95) (3.40)
exrem 4.99*** -2.62*** 3.46*** 5.83***
(1.05) (1.00) (0.82) (0.88)
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Effects of welfare levels
In order to interrogate household welfare effects, we also assume a relationship between
household welfare and education expenditures. Here, we focus on the estimation
coefficients of the logarithm of per capita total family expenditure (i.e., lpctotex). In
addition, we exploit piecewise linear splines using knots based on quintile values of
total household expenditure per capita. 68 This enables us to further examine the effect
of the welfare level at different parts of the welfare distribution (e.g., by welfare quintile
here) on education expenditures. The estimation results are reported in Table 6.16. We
found strong evidence that the household welfare level positively affects both the share
and the level of educational expenditure. Taking into consideration the welfare level, the
estimation results revealed that among the fourth welfare quintile group, not the top
quintile, a one per cent change in per capita household expenditure could make the
budget share of education increase the most. In terms of the absolute amount of
education expenditure, however, the impact of an increase in per capita expenditure was
the greatest among the top welfare group except in 1994 and for the fourth quintile
group in 1994. These results suggest that among the fourth quintile group, households
tend to shift their priority on education and thus its budget share would increase the
most as their welfare level goes up. While the top group relatively increases their level
of expenditure on education mainly due to the general preference of private to public
education or because of further spending on education (e.g., private cram schools or
tutors) as their welfare increases.
68 In Stata, the command mkspline is used to create variables containing a linear spline of total household
expenditure per capita.
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Table 6. 16: The Tobit estimation results of the effects of household welfare levels on education
Table 6.16a: The share of education expenditures (or educsh)
Table 6.16b: The absolute value of education expenditures (or educ)
Note:
(a) Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
(b) These equations include controls for remittance receipts, household head characteristics (age,
gender, marital status, educational attainment, employment status), urban/rural, farming, and
regions. All coefficient estimates are reported in the Appendix.
(c) CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005)
Temporal change in the effects of welfare levels
Like the effects of remittances, the t-test was conducted to investigate the extent to
which changes in the effects over time are statistically significant (see Table 6.17).
Overall, the welfare effects on the share of education expenditures as well as their level
have increased during the period of 1988-2006 mainly because the effects increased
among the fourth quintile and the top groups. The welfare effects on the absolute value
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
Welfare level
lpctotex 0.00622*** 0.00792*** 0.00874*** 0.01005***
(0.00036) (0.00034) (0.00030) (0.00032)
Welfare level by quintiles
Bottom 20% 0.00157** 0.00177** 0.00432*** 0.00318***
(0.00075) (0.00076) (0.00066) (0.00064)
Bottom20-40% 0.00449*** 0.00724*** 0.00708*** 0.00701***
(0.00150) (0.00143) (0.00125) (0.00125)
Middle 0.00776*** 0.00896*** 0.00803*** 0.01056***
(0.00183) (0.00185) (0.00153) (0.00155)
Top20-40% 0.01025*** 0.01454*** 0.01616*** 0.01730***
(0.00178) (0.00174) (0.00137) (0.00140)
Top20% 0.00547*** 0.00573*** 0.00645*** 0.00867***
(0.00124) (0.00109) (0.00086) (0.00090)
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
Welfare level
lpctotex 2085.01*** 2866.07*** 4228.88*** 3914.31***
(94.44) (94.46) (148.08) (114.46)
Welfare level by quintiles
Bottom 20% 182.12 116.96 746.07*** 486.32***
(116.40) (124.95) (139.24) (136.56)
Bottom20-40% 706.78*** 1531.75*** 1673.61*** 1267.08***
(210.30) (215.98) (230.76) (229.97)
Middle 1784.29*** 1807.89*** 2216.11*** 2297.13***
(293.56) (299.57) (343.97) (290.76)
Top20-40% 2671.05*** 4788.41*** 4538.49*** 5008.86***
(455.31) (379.57) (563.37) (366.64)
Top20% 3717.53*** 4597.93*** 8469.53*** 7024.02***
(485.33) (383.25) (689.59) (415.05)
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of education expenditures significantly increased from 1994 to 2000, while declined
during the period of 2000-2006 though it was only significant at the ten per cent level.
This trend is the same as mean education expenditures reported in Table 6.5. A drop in
the effects for the latter period occurred mainly because it declined significantly among
the top welfare group. One possible explanation might be that richer households are
more likely to have fewer children and thereby an increase in welfare levels does not
simply lead to an increase in the total household expenditure for education.
Table 6. 17: The t-test of the effects of household welfare levels on education
Table 6.17a: The share of education expenditures (or educsh)
Table 6.17b: The absolute value of education expenditures (or educ)
Note: Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
1988-1994 1994-2000 2000-2006 1988-2006
Welfare level
lpctotex 0.0017*** 0.00082* 0.00131*** 0.00383***
(0.00050) (0.00045) (0.00044) (0.00048)
Welfare level by quintiles
Bottom 20% 0.00020 0.00255** -0.00114 0.00161
(0.00107) (0.00101) (0.00092) (0.00099)
Bottom20-40% 0.00275 -0.00016 -0.00007 0.00252
(0.00207) (0.00190) (0.00177) (0.00195)
Middle 0.00120 -0.00093 0.00253 0.00280
(0.00260) (0.00240) (0.00218) (0.00240)
Top20-40% 0.00429* 0.00162 0.00114 0.00705***
(0.00249) (0.00221) (0.00196) (0.00226)
Top20% 0.00026 0.00072 0.00222* 0.0032**
(0.00165) (0.00139) (0.00124) (0.00153)
1988-1994 1994-2000 2000-2006 1988-2006
Welfare level
lpctotex 781.06*** 1362.81*** -314.57* 1829.3***
(133.57) (175.64) (187.16) (148.39)
Welfare level by quintiles
Bottom 20% -65.16 629.11*** -259.75 304.2*
(170.77) (187.08) (195.03) (179.44)
Bottom20-40% 824.97*** 141.86 -406.53 560.3*
(301.45) (316.07) (325.79) (311.63)
Middle 23.60 408.22 81.02 512.84
(419.43) (456.13) (450.40) (413.18)
Top20-40% 2117.36*** -249.92 470.37 2337.81***
(592.77) (679.31) (672.17) (584.58)
Top20% 880.40 3871.6*** -1445.51* 3306.49***
(618.41) (788.93) (804.86) (638.60)
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6.6.2.2 Instrumental-variable Tobit (IV Tobit) estimator
In addition to the Tobit estimation, to validate our findings on the effect of the receipt of
remittances on the education expenditures, the instrumental-variable Tobit (IV Tobit)
estimator was reported in Table 6.18. As mentioned in the previous section, we use the
ownership of durable goods as an instrument to control for potential endogeneity issues
on the relationships between education expenditures and remittance incomes. The data
on the ownership of durables are only available for the 2003 FIES and the 2006 FIES,
and thereby the IV estimation results can be obtained for these two survey years. For
this chapter, the 2006 FIES was used for the analysis.
We consider three potential instruments (i.e., a washing machine, a television set, and a
refrigerator) and conduct the tests of over-identifying restrictions, weak instrumentation,
and regressor exogeneity by examining all possible combination of three instruments in
order to find the optimal choice of instruments. All results of the tests are reported in the
appendix. The results concluded that the ownership of a washing machine and of a
television set provide the best set of identifying instruments for the model with the share
of education expenditures (i.e., educsh) as a dependent variable, while all three variables
are chosen for the model with the absolute amount of education expenditures (i.e., educ).
It could be argued that the receipt of remittances is actually influenced by the
acquisition of these ‘white goods’. However, in the current application, the acquisition
of these ‘white goods’ clearly predates by a number of years the receipt of the
international remittances, which was in the last 12 months so the causality is working in
only one direction. Nevertheless, the question remains as to why the ownership of
‘white goods’ influences the receipt of international remittances. One possible
argument is that once Filipino households have owned ‘white goods’ their demand to
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upgrade and renew them increases and international remittances provides one readily
available income flow which facilitates their purchase – hence an anticipated positive
relationship. Another possible explanation for the causality and positive relationship
between the ownership of durables and international remittances might be that
households with a greater number of durable products would have a higher propensity
to spend and therefore, in order to retain their lifestyle, they expect to receive more
income transfers from abroad as they cannot afford to do it with their own domestic
income alone.
Table 6.18 shows that the chosen instruments pass all relevant tests. In the first stage
regression, the coefficients on the instruments are positive and statistically significant.
This means that the numbers of ownership of the selected durable products are
positively correlated with the amount of international remittances, suggesting that
households having the more durable goods have a strong potential for being dependent
on remittance incomes from abroad. In addition, the Wald test of exogeneity strongly
rejects the null hypothesis that the amount of international remittances (or exrem) is
exogenous for both models.
Like the results derived from the Tobit model, the IV Tobit result also revealed that
regardless of their sources, remittance incomes significantly raises both the share of and
the absolute value of educational expenditures. After controlling for endogeneity,
however, an increase in the amount of international remittances by 1,000 pesos
increases, on average and ceteris paribus, the share of education by 0.0289 percentage
points and its level by 158 pesos, which are much greater than 0.0026 percentage points
and 14 pesos suggested by the Tobit estimation results in Table 6.14. The IV Tobit
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result also found that international remittances exert greater effects on both the share of
and the level of household education expenditures than domestic remittances. This is the
opposite of the Tobit model without an endogenous regressor. Filipino households who
receive remittances from within the country are poorer, and these poor households who
rely on domestic remittances tend to spend less on education than other households and
spend more on immediate needs, for example, to deal with hunger among families and
losses associated with natural disasters.
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Table 6. 18: The IV Tobit estimation results on education using the 2006 FIES
Table 6.18a: The share of education expenditures (or educsh)
Note: (a) * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) exrem* denotes the predicted value of the amount of international remittances derived from
the first stage regression.
Dependent variable:
Explanatory variables Coef.
Robust
Std. Err. Coef.
Robust
Std. Err. dy/dx
Delta-
method
Std. Err.
Instrument variables
Washing machine (number) 10.27 *** 1.110
Television set (number) 5.032 *** 1.036
Remittance amount
exrem* 0.000541 *** 0.000094 0.000289 *** 0.000049
inrem -0.218 *** 0.052 0.000296 *** 0.000052 0.000158 *** 0.000027
Welfare
lpctotex 28.05 *** 1.619 0.008895 *** 0.003199 0.004744 *** 0.001731
Family composition
age7_14 11.36 *** 0.961 0.043192 *** 0.001555 0.023035 *** 0.000915
age15_24 7.438 *** 0.698 0.040700 *** 0.001153 0.021706 *** 0.000701
Head characteristics
hfemale 41.77 *** 2.041 -0.011809 *** 0.004434 -0.006298 *** 0.002334
hage -0.231 *** 0.034 0.000024 0.000039 0.000013 0.000021
hmarried 33.08 *** 1.753 0.002907 0.003822 0.001551 0.002046
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 -3.986 *** 0.926 0.008813 *** 0.001030 0.004700 *** 0.000543
hedu3 -6.142 *** 1.339 0.020779 *** 0.001306 0.011082 *** 0.000682
hedu4 -7.709 *** 2.687 0.030019 *** 0.002295 0.016010 *** 0.001214
hnojob 29.25 *** 1.703 -0.019912 *** 0.003120 -0.010619 *** 0.001616
Urban/Rural
urban -4.648 *** 0.815 -0.002817 *** 0.001079 -0.001502 *** 0.000579
Farming
agri 4.966 *** 0.589 -0.004233 *** 0.000989 -0.002258 *** 0.000523
Region
Ilocos 17.74 *** 1.779 0.017624 *** 0.002600 0.009399 *** 0.001417
Cagayan 9.479 *** 1.618 0.033363 *** 0.002611 0.017793 *** 0.001427
Cluzon 12.27 *** 2.471 0.012938 *** 0.002351 0.006900 *** 0.001273
Sluzon 10.37 *** 1.724 0.020208 *** 0.001913 0.010777 *** 0.001050
Bicol 12.04 *** 1.868 0.023041 *** 0.002288 0.012288 *** 0.001249
Wvisayas 14.40 *** 1.777 0.022133 *** 0.002343 0.011804 *** 0.001283
Cvisayas 16.09 *** 2.075 0.022537 *** 0.002506 0.012019 *** 0.001372
Evisayas 16.61 *** 3.051 0.023968 *** 0.003004 0.012782 *** 0.001639
Mindanao 11.34 *** 1.593 0.025288 *** 0.001886 0.013486 *** 0.001045
(NCR omitted)
CAR 10.26 *** 1.958 0.037862 *** 0.002834 0.020192 *** 0.001551
constant -315.0 *** 17.18 -0.163041 *** 0.035368
/alpha 0.000 *** 0.000
/lns -2.728 *** 0.012
/lnv 4.176 *** 0.086
s 0.065 0.001
v 65.11 5.595
Test of regressor exogeneity (H0: exrem is exogenous.) Wald test of exogeneity (H0:/alpha = 0)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test chi2=20.13 p-value= 0.000 chi2(1)= 26.45
Test of over-identifying restrictions (H0: all instruments are valid.) Prob > chi2= 0.000
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum
chi-sq statistic chi2=1.466 p-value= 0.226
Tests of weak instruments (H0: exrem*=0) Wald chi2(24)
Wald test chi2=44.22 p-value= 0.000 Prob > chi2
Conditional Likelihood Ratio test statistic=53.04 p-value= 0.000 Log pseudolikelihood
Anderson-Rubin test chi2=54.51 p-value= 0.000 Uncensored obs
Lagrange Multiplier & J
overidentification test Number of obs
First stage regression Structural equation Marginal effects
exrem educsh educsh
H0 is rejected
5323
0.000
-185993
27188
38480
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Table 6.18b: The absolute value of education expenditures (or educ)
Note: (a) * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) exrem* denotes the predicted value of the amount of international remittances derived from
the first stage regression.
Dependent variable:
Explanatory variables Coef.
Robust
Std. Err. Coef.
Robust
Std. Err. dy/dx
Delta-
method
Std. Err.
Instrument variables
Refrigerator (number) 6.094 *** 0.979
Washing machine (number) 7.713 *** 0.959
Television set (number) 4.317 *** 0.802
Remittance amount
exrem* 334.0 *** 34.7 158.2 *** 15.3
inrem -0.216 *** 0.052 137.5 *** 26.1 65.1 *** 12.3
Welfare
lpctotex 26.82 *** 1.555 180.2 1106.2 85.3 524.5
Family composition
age7_14 11.04 *** 0.936 11257.1 *** 551.3 5331.8 *** 274.8
age15_24 7.244 *** 0.688 8748.1 *** 379.4 4143.5 *** 194.3
Head characteristics
hfemale 41.37 *** 2.041 -11346.9 *** 1669.5 -5374.4 *** 756.1
hage -0.250 *** 0.034 39.1 *** 14.3 18.5 *** 6.7
hmarried 32.48 *** 1.785 -4285.7 *** 1467 -2029.9 *** 682.4
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 -4.228 *** 0.944 1742.3 *** 348.5 825.2 *** 164.0
hedu3 -6.789 *** 1.392 4221.0 *** 467.2 1999.2 *** 219.0
hedu4 -8.665 *** 2.776 11585.8 *** 1001.7 5487.5 *** 472.5
hnojob 29.18 *** 1.701 -10424.9 *** 1146.5 -4937.7 *** 514.5
Urban/Rural
urban -4.508 *** 0.813 750.1 ** 375.1 355.3 ** 176.7
Farming
agri 5.258 *** 0.589 -278.5 285.6 -131.9 135.0
Region
Ilocos 17.28 *** 1.775 -719.4 952.5 -340.7 449.9
Cagayan 9.246 *** 1.618 3510.8 *** 884.0 1662.9 *** 422.3
Cluzon 12.54 *** 2.477 -86.3 945.0 -40.9 447.5
Sluzon 10.03 *** 1.721 2224.7 *** 772.7 1053.7 *** 368.9
Bicol 11.66 *** 1.872 2950.7 *** 886.3 1397.6 *** 422.3
Wvisayas 13.88 *** 1.777 1370.5 * 830.0 649.1 395.3
Cvisayas 15.33 *** 2.078 1509.6 944.3 715.0 449.6
Evisayas 15.85 *** 3.054 1626.0 1240.6 770.1 589.8
Mindanao 10.43 *** 1.581 2637.8 *** 733.0 1249.4 *** 350.9
(NCR omitted)
CAR 10.04 *** 1.958 4592.6 *** 971.4 2175.3 *** 464.6
constant -301.3 *** 16.559 -18409.3 12291.7
/alpha -295.9 *** 33.143
/lns 9.831 *** 0.024
/lnv 4.175 *** 0.086
s 18601.9 455.3
v 65.07 5.587
Test of regressor exogeneity (H0: exrem is exogenous.) Wald test of exogeneity (H0:/alpha = 0)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test p-value= 0.000 chi2(1)= 79.71
Test of over-identifying restrictions (H0: all instruments are valid.) Prob > chi2= 0.0000
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum
chi-sq statistic p-value= 0.900
Tests of weak instruments (H0: exrem*=0) Wald chi2(24)
Wald test p-value= 0.000 Prob > chi2
Conditional Likelihood Ratio test p-value= 0.000 Log pseudolikelihood
Anderson-Rubin test p-value= 0.000 Uncensored obs
Lagrange Multiplier & J
overidentification test Number of obs
educ
Marginal effects
H0 is rejected
exrem educ
First stage regression Structural equation
chi2=29.89
chi2=0.212
chi2=154.93
chi2=294.06
statistic=293.87
2282.65
0.0000
-526778
27188
38480
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6.6.2.3 Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) estimator
Furthermore, and perhaps more interestingly, taking into consideration non-normality
and homoscedasticity of the error terms in the Tobit model, our results using the CLAD
procedure showed that there was a strong evidence of a higher level of expenditure on
education when the households received remittances from abroad compared to those
with no remittance income (see Table 6.19). This result corresponds with the earlier
results shown above. Thus, our findings derived from all estimation procedures used in
this chapter are broadly in agreement with Adams’s (2005) findings which revealed that
the receipt of remittances from abroad induce households to increase the education
expenditure. At the median level, if households received international remittances, they
significantly increased their education expenditure by 540-680 pesos, other things held
constant. Compared to the CLAD results, the Tobit estimation results were greater. It
could be taken to suggest that the Tobit model overestimates the effect of international
remittances on education expenditure although both results revealed evidence of a
positive effect of the receipt of international remittances on education.
Table 6. 19: The CLAD estimation results of the effects of remittances on education expenditures
(or educ)
Note:
(a) Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
(b) These equations include controls for household welfare level, household head characteristics (age,
gender, marital status, educational attainment, employment status), urban/rural, farming, and regions.
All coefficient estimates are reported in the Appendix.
(c) CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005)
Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME
Remittance Incidence
dinrem -81.57275 -29.152 -216.251 -74.106 595.6771 171.162 1458.2** 274.133
(232.48) (377.75) (509.92) (985.46)
dexrem 1567.397*** 560.143 1578.442*** 540.910 1982.116*** 569.543 3637.771*** 683.878
(274.90) (363.44) (663.57) (1093.30)
dbothrem 1036.951*** 370.577 1865.123*** 639.151 1263.569 363.075 3931.692*** 739.134
(333.29) (470.11) (1087.91) (1057.06)
Remittance Amount
inrem 26.89594*** 10.587 34.36305*** 11.939 46.12908* 13.576 50.8708* 10.469
(10.52) (11.40) (17.00) (25.71)
exrem 15.45862*** 6.085 22.14917*** 7.696 23.54781*** 6.930 31.0494*** 6.390
(2.69) (4.58) (4.45) (7.58)
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
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6.6.3 Effects of household characteristics on education
In addition to the above findings on the effect of the receipt of remittances on education
expenditure, there were also some significant effects of household characteristics on
education. For example, the results clearly show that, not surprisingly, having a school
age child positively affects the share and the level of education expenditure. Moreover,
if a household head is female or married, it also raises education expenditures. This is
because married or female heads would put their priority more on education for their
children. In addition, a strong positive relationship was also found between the higher
educational attainment of a household head and education expenditures. If household
heads are well-educated, they are likely to spend more on education for their family
members. They would know how important education is to climb up the economic
ladder. Thus, they are willing to spend more on education. On the other hand, there are
negative factors of household characteristics on educational expenditures. For instance,
if a household head is not working or is engaging in agricultural activities, households
have a lower propensity to spend for education. The households with such a head of
household could not afford to send their children to schools. They would want the
children to earn some monies to help their families rather than to go for study.
6.6.4 Geographical disparities
With regard to the relationship between education expenditures and geographical
disparities, the Tobit models revealed that households living in the urban areas would
have lower budget shares on education than in rural areas though these impacts were
statistically significant only after 2000 but not so great. In addition to the urban-rural
disparity, our findings of the effects of regional disparities on educational expenditures
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revealed that households not living in National Capital Region (NCR) significantly have
had higher educational expenditure, on average and ceteris paribus, compared to
households in NCR over time. In other words, households living in NCR tend to have a
lower level of mean educational expenditure than those in any other regions with other
things being equal. This is consistent with the features of educational expenditure taking
into consideration the household welfare levels by quintiles which are reported in Table
6.11 and Figure 6.1.
When we consider the effects of regional disparities, it is quite useful to normalize their
effects as a deviation from an overall weighted average (see Krueger and Summers,
1988; Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt, 1997; Zanchi, 1998; Bellony and Reilly, 2009).
With this normalization, we can easily interpret the regional coefficients compared to
the overall regional weighted average. The detailed explanation on how to compute the
normalized regional coefficients and standard errors are reported in the Appendix. Table
6.20 shows the estimation results of the normalized regional disparities on the level of
education expenditure. Our findings of the normalised effects of regional disparities on
the educational expenditure revealed that households living in Central Luzon and NCR
had the lower educational expenditure than the overall regional weighted mean. In 2006,
the level of educational expenditure is significantly lower in NCR than the national
mean, while it is higher in Mindanao and CAR.
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Table 6. 20: Normalized regional effects on the absolute value of education
expenditures (or educ)
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
Ilocos -226.05 122.22 -177.43 -301.56
(0.779) (0.302) (0.374) (0.735)
Cagayan 204.74 486.04 151.99 416.12
(0.549) (0.900) (0.286) (0.846)
Cluzon -444.68* -589.67** -842.25** -344.34
(1.902) (2.306) (2.525) (0.833)
Sluzon 97.36 141.12 -361.73 224.50
(0.358) (0.564) (1.333) (0.787)
Bicol 220.37 315.09 565.91 625.43
(0.786) (1.047) (1.037) (1.433)
Wvisayas 202.80 -120.12 115.30 127.34
(0.842) (0.521) (0.354) (0.409)
Cvisayas 116.35 -32.34 197.24 423.13
(0.438) (0.133) (0.567) (1.190)
Evisayas 94.04 -199.76 628.45 671.51
(0.299) (0.707) (1.591) (1.621)
Mindanao 38.33 294.56* 156.50 268.61*
(0.241) (1.754) (1.010) (1.706)
NCR -148.77 -433.51 -452.20 -1951.58**
(0.553) (1.566) (0.976) (4.747)
CAR 220.49 1027.59 1376.03** 992.42*
(0.406) (1.319) (2.483) (1.828)
Overall
Variability 148.77 433.51 452.20 1951.58
Note:
(a) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using
two-tailed tests.
(b) The numbers in parentheses are t-statistic.
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6.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has investigated how receiving remittances affects the Filipino household’s
education expenditures based on the 1988, the 1994, the 2000, and the 2006 Family
Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES). By using the Engel curve framework, it set out
to determine the effect of the receipt of remittances on the budget share and the absolute
value of education expenditures controlling for a number of household characteristics
derived from the FIES. The mean and median effects of remittances on education
expenditures are examined by taking into account their censored nature.
With regard to the effects of remittances, we consider the issue of endogenity that there
is a potential reverse causality between education and remittances. Under this situation,
the explanatory variables are correlated with the error terms and it provides the unbiased
and consistent estimates. To correct for this possible endogeneity, the instrumental
variable (IV) method was used with ownership of durables as identifying instruments.
We consider three potential instruments, which are the presence of a refrigerator, of a
washing machine, and of a television set. In order to select the better combination of
these potential instruments, we tested three important issues on instrumental variables:
(1) over-identifying restrictions; (2) weak instruments; (3) regressor exogeneity. Based
on these tests, we concluded that the ownership of a washing machine and of a
television set provide the best instruments for the model with the share of education
expenditures (i.e., educsh) as a dependent variable, while all three variables are chosen
for the model with the absolute amount of education expenditures (i.e., educ).
The most obvious finding to emerge from this study is that regardless of the estimation
methods, the receipt of remittances from abroad increases Filipino households’
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education expenditures in terms of its budget share as well as its level. If households
receive remittances from family members abroad, these transfers could significantly
ease the financial constraints on Filipino households. Using the instrumental-variable
(IV) Tobit estimators, this study has also found that the effects of international
remittances both on the share of and the absolute amount of education expenditures are
greater than domestic remittances. This result supports the idea that international
remittances could contribute to the future economic growth via an increase in human
capital investment. Needless to say, a sufficient supply of quality education is necessary
to maximise the benefits of investment in education by remittance receiving Filipino
households (Aldaba and Opiniano, 2008: 14). The study has also shown that school-age
population and the budget share of education expenditure have a significantly positive
correlation as one would expect. It was also shown that generally a household raises
education expenditures if a household head had a higher educational attainment. An
implication of this finding is the possibility that education expenditure inequality
between rich and poor might widen due to the reproduction of educated children by
their educated parents as this may represent the transmission mechanism for inter-
generational inequality. Moreover, the conclusions drawn from this study are that
households in the rural and urban areas were not different in the effect on the share for
education expenditure in recent years. Its impact of the rural-urban disparity on
education, rather, has contracted over time. However, on average and ceteris paribus,
households living in the capital city significantly had the lower budget share for
education compared to those not living in NCR between 1994 and 2000. This may be
mainly because NCR households are richer but are likely to have fewer children and
spend more expenditure on education per child. Thus, the total household expenditures
can be lower in NCR. Moreover, this might be simply because costs of other things are
222
relatively higher (e.g., utilities, rents etc.) which act to diminish the budget share and the
level devoted to educational expenditures.
The findings of this study add to a growing body of literature on the significant role of
remittances from abroad on human capital development in developing countries. The
methods used for this study can be applied to other household expenditure categories.
The most important limitation lies in the fact that we could not distinguish the
expenditure for state provided education from that of private education due to the
limitations of the datasets used in the analysis. Filipino households would have a
different propensity to spend on public and private education. More detailed
information on the education expenditure would help us to establish a greater degree of
accuracy on this matter.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
This thesis has sought to examine the economic effects of the receipt of remittances on
Filipino households. If migrant households receive remittances from their family
members, the household’s consumption or investment behaviour could be changed.
Moreover, the increase in remittances might make the inequality between rich and poor
widen even if the living standards for the poor improved. Based on the Family Income
and Expenditure Survey (FIES) in the Philippines over the period of 1985-2006, the
thesis investigated three main research questions: (1) “What household characteristics
affect the probability and the size of both domestic and international remittances
Filipino households received?”; (2) “How do the domestic and international
remittances the households received affect welfare inequality, measured by per capita
total household expenditure, at the household level?”; (3) “How much do the domestic
and international remittances also affect education expenditure at the household level?”
This concluding chapter summarises the main results and conclusions from each chapter
in turn. It also discusses the contributions, limitations of this thesis as well as some
suggestions for future research, and considers the policy implications of the results
obtained in this DPhil research.
Chapter Two provided a global overview of increasing international remittance flows
into developing countries. It also described the trends in international remittances into
the Philippines since the 1980s. In the case of the Philippines, the lion’s share of the
remittances has been sent by land-based overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) and their
remittances have dramatically increased in the 1990s. During the Asian crisis, there was
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a steep increase in overseas remittances due to a depreciation in the Philippine peso
against a migrant’s currency, for example the U.S. dollar. From 1997 to 1998, nominal
Philippine exchange rate depreciated against currencies in OFW’s destination countries
such as the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore. However, the real effective
exchange rate index, measured as a value of a peso against a weighted average of a
several foreign currencies divided by a price deflator, appreciated. The effect of the
change in real effective exchange rate can be divided into three factors: nominal
effective exchange rate; domestic inflation; and foreign inflation. During the period of
1997-1998, Philippine nominal exchange rate was depreciated against major currencies.
The inflation effect in the Philippines was stronger than other countries. This denotes
that migrants send more remittances not only because of a sharp depreciation of
Philippine peso but also price increase within the home country. Since 2004, the real
effective exchange rate index has depreciated. This might partly contribute to increase
in remittance flows into the Philippines though there are several factors affecting the
remittance flows, which were explained in the latter of this chapter. After that, the
remittance flows into the Philippines have increased continuously even during the
global economic and financial crisis which commenced in September 2008. In 2010 the
total amount of remittances by OFWs reached US$ 18.76 billion. In addition to the
trend in remittance flows into the Philippines, this chapter also showed the following
features of the OFW’s remittances: types of remittances; modes of remittances; places
of origins of remittances; remittances by types of migrants’ work and migrants’ gender.
As mentioned above, Chapter Two also explained the main reasons why the total
amount of remittances sent by OFWs has dramatically increased over time. In order to
answer this question, this chapter described several factors: remittance channels;
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transaction costs of remittances; expanding remittance networks and improving
remittance services; exchange rate fluctuations; and an increasing stock of international
migrants. Furthermore, it also explained key international migration drivers: the
economic situation in the Philippines; increasing demand for labour in the global
economy; and Philippine governmental policies on international migration. These
factors have contributed to an increase in the numbers of deployed OFWs. Finally, the
chapter described key roles of Philippine governmental institutions managing
international migration for OFWs.
Chapter Three outlined the Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF) and the Family Income
and Expenditure Survey (FIES), which are the sources of the data mainly used
throughout this thesis. This chapter described their scope and coverage as well as the
survey design including sampling methodology and sampling weight. In addition, the
definition of main variables used in the thesis (e.g., remittance, family income and
expenditure, urban/rural areas) was explained here. Finally, past studies relevant to the
topics of this thesis were summarised and introduced to show the similarity and
differences in the methodology.
Chapter Four examined the determinants of remittances by modelling the probability
and the size of remittances received by the recipient households. It is important to
deepen our understanding of determining factors of remittances as they could reduce
poverty, enable recipient families to smooth consumption, and also allow the families to
invest (see World Bank, 2006; Freund and Spatafora, 2008). Filipino households were
categorised by the status of remittances. The households were divided into four types;
households who received both domestic and international remittances (dbothrem), those
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who received only external remittances (dexrem), those who received only internal
remittances (dinrem), and those who received no remittance (dnorem). This
categorisation enabled us to provide some insights on the differences across households
based on the nature of remittance receipt.
The chapter first examined the determinants of the probability to receive either internal
or international remittances using both probit and bivariate probit models. Then, by
using the Tobit and the bivariate Tobit models, the determinants of the size of
remittances that Filipino households received from within the Philippines or from
overseas were investigated. One of the more significant findings to emerge from this
chapter is that the levels of receiving internal and international remittances are mutually
related, whereas the probabilities are not interrelated except for 2000 and 2003.
Furthermore, it was also revealed that several explanatory factors such as the level of
total household expenditure, the head of household characteristics, the job-related
information, and the regional disparities are significant factors in determining both the
probability and the size of receiving remittances from within the country and from
abroad. Based on the results of explanatory factors, possible explanations on
motivations for remittances were also made. However, these motives are too complex to
articulate. Depending on the situation of migrants or recipient households, different
motives can be applied. It is necessary to acquire more detailed information on the
determining variables, especially those for migrants, to identify by which motives
remitting behaviour would be driven.
In this chapter, we found that an increase in the household welfare level increases the
incidence and the amount of international remittances while it decreases those of
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domestic remittances. However, the results should be interpreted with caution because
there is still an issue of welfare endogeneity here. The receipt of remittance incomes can
improve the welfare level, thus the result can be biased without controlling for this
endogeneity issue.
In addition to examining the factors influencing the receipt of remittances in terms of
the incidence and the level, we also investigated the effect of international remittances
on the receipt of domestic remittances. However, to estimate this effect, there is also a
potential endogeneity problem of a two-way relationship (or reverse causality) between
internal and international remittances. In order to control for this problem, we used
instrumental variable (IV) estimation with instruments that were taken to affect
international remittances but not directly domestic transfers. By merging the 2003 SOF
into the 2003 FIES, we considered four migrant characteristics (i.e., migrant’s
educational attainment, gender, age, as well as length of stay abroad as a migrant) as
possible instrumental variables. These migrant characteristics are used as proxy
measures of their income as the wages of migrants are not available in the SOF. In order
to select the better selection of the instruments, we tested three important issues on
instrumental variables (i.e., over-identifying restrictions, weak instruments, and
regressor exogeneity,) and concluded that the completion of tertiary education, the
length of stay in destination country, and the gender are the better set of instruments for
the model of the incidence of domestic remittances (i.e., dinrem), whereas migrant’s
gender and age are used as the potentially best instruments for the model with the level
of domestic remittances (i.e., inrem).
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Finally, a key finding of this chapter provided the evidence of the displacement effect of
international remittances on domestic remittances. Among the Filipino households with
remittances from abroad, it was found that the level of remittances from within the
country decreased as the amount of international remittances increased. The receipt of
remittances from abroad would contribute more to improve the household welfare than
those from within the country because of the greater amounts. This displacement effect
has a positive impact not only on the recipient but also family members who live within
the Philippines and send domestic remittances. After the recipient households received
international remittances, these family members might need to send less than before or
have no need to send money any more. This enables them to increase their disposable
income and helps improve their welfare. However, the receipt of remittances from
abroad might widen the gap in the welfare between households with and without the
remittances.
Chapter Five investigated the effect of remittances on welfare inequality, which was
measured by per capita total household expenditure. Recently, the economic inequality
between rich and poor in the Philippines is widening at historically high levels for the
past three decades. For example, income Gini indices estimated with the 2006 FIES
revealed that the richest ten per cent earns nineteen times more than the poorest ten per
cent of Filipinos (Aldaba and Opiniano, 2008:2). Similarly, among most developing
countries, it was found that the richest 20 per cent experienced the fastest increase in per
capita expenditure than the bottom 20 per cent. In the case of the Philippines, per capita
expenditures increased by 2.27 per cent for the richest 20 per cent, while by only 1.28
per cent for the poorest 20 per cent in the period of 1994-2003 (ADB, 2007).
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Based on past findings on widening inequality in the Philippines, it was assumed that
remittances from abroad would contribute to a widening of the Filipino households’
expenditure disparities more so than remittances from within the Philippines would. In
order to investigate the effect of the receipt of remittances on expenditure differences
among Filipino households, three different analyses were used at mean and at the
specific quantile (i.e., 10th, 50th, and 90th) based on the types of the receipt of remittance
incomes (i.e., dinrem, dexrem, and dbothrem) in the period of 1994-2000 using the
Philippine Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES).
First, ordinary least square (OLS) and conditional quantile regressions were used with
remittance dummy variables to capture the effects of the receipt of remittances on the
household welfare level. Assuming that there is no difference in the effects of household
characteristics on the welfare level between households who received remittances and
those who did not, we found that the receipt of international remittances significantly
increased their livelihoods and that its effect has increased from 1994 to 2000 at any
point of the welfare distribution.
Second, conditional interquantile regressions were used to investigate whether the
remittances contributed to widening the welfare gaps between the poor and the middle
and the affluent households. The results show that in 2000 the receipt of international
remittances significantly accounted for the gaps between rich and poor, which were
mainly explained by the differences between the middle and the rich groups. This means
that the remittances contributed the most to the rich and it would increase the welfare
inequality.
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Finally, an unconditional quantile decomposition approach was used to estimate the
endowment and remittance effects on the quantiles of the unconditional distribution of
the welfare. The result revealed that even after controlling for the effect of household
characteristics on the level of household expenditure, the study has also found that
receiving international remittances change household expenditure patterns, make the
households have higher propensity to spend, and then cause expenditure gaps between
Filipino households to widen between 1994 and 2000. One of the more significant
findings to emerge from the unconditional quantile decomposition is that unlike
conditional quantile regressions, the receipt of international remittances contributes to
improvement in the welfare the most among the middle class followed by the rich and it
affects widening the welfare differences between poor and middle welfare households.
In contrast, the receipt of remittances from within the Philippines did not exert a
significant impact on improving the welfare of Filipino households. The results of this
study also suggest that widening the expenditure inequality in the Philippines from 1994
to 2000 is mainly accounted for by the receipt of international remittances. These
money transfers from abroad are often used to improve their welfare level. A case in
point is child education. Some migrant workers go abroad and remit to send their
children to better schools, in many cases to private schools. This important relationship
between remittances and education was then examined in Chapter Six.
The results of Chapter Five indicate that there is an importance in dealing with the
expenditure differentials by taking into account the type of households in terms of the
receipt of remittances. The quantile decomposition results enhance our understanding of
the expenditure differences as we can decompose the gaps at any point of the welfare
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distribution. The results of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach, which
decomposes the mean expenditure differentials, need to be interpreted with caution
because the mean expenditure gap is significantly different from the median and other
quantile expenditure differences. It was found that mean expenditure differentials were
smaller than the median ones. This suggested that focusing on the mean regression
decomposition analysis could lead researchers or policymakers to underestimate the
effect of remittances on expenditure inequality.
Chapter Six investigated the effect of receiving remittances on a Filipino household’s
educational expenditure behaviour. The receipt of remittances might alter a household’s
expenditure patterns on consumption and investment. An Engel curve framework was
used to analyse the changes in household expenditure patterns. Theoretically and
empirically, the past literature on the Engel curve analysis was also reviewed. And then,
by using the FIES, this chapter analysed the Filipino household expenditure patterns of
education with due consideration of the difference in international remittances as well as
those from within the Philippines. In the chapter, the censored nature of educational
expenditure was addressed using both the Tobit and CLAD models.
With regard to the effects of remittances, we consider the issue of endogenity that there
is a potential reverse causality between education and remittances. Under this situation,
the explanatory variables are correlated with the error terms and it provides unbiased
and inconsistent estimates. In order to control for this possible endogeneity, the
instrumental variable (IV) method was used with ownership of durables as possible
instruments. As explained in the chapter, the ownership of such items should be
uncorrelated with the education spending decision as it is unlikely to directly affect
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expenditure for child education. In contrast, these variables would be highly correlated
with the level of international remittances. We consider three potential instruments,
which are the presence of a refrigerator, of a washing machine, and of a television set as
there is evidence that the proportion of households with some durables (such as a TV set,
a refrigerator, a washing machine) is higher among those who received international
remittances (Tullao, Cortez and See, 2007). Filipino households having more TV sets,
refrigerators, washing machines tend to rely more on income transfers from abroad,
which are readily available and more stable income flows for the recipient households.
It could be argued that the receipt of remittances is actually influenced by the
acquisition of these ‘white goods’. However, in the current application, the acquisition
of these ‘white goods’ clearly predates by a number of years the receipt of the
international remittances, which was in the last 12 months so the causality is working in
only one direction. Nevertheless, the question remains as to why the ownership of
‘white goods’ influences the receipt of international remittances. One possible
argument is that once Filipino households have owned ‘white goods’ their demand to
upgrade and renew them increases and international remittances provides one readily
available income flow which facilitates their purchase – hence an anticipated positive
relationship. Another possible explanation for the causality and positive relationship
between the ownership of durables and international remittances might be that
households with greater number of durable products would have higher propensity to
spend and therefore in order to keep their lifestyle they expect to receive more income
transfers from abroad as they cannot afford to do so with their own domestic income.
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In order to select the better combination of the potential instruments, we tested three
important issues on instrumental variables: (1) over-identifying restrictions; (2) weak
instruments; (3) regressor exogeneity. Based on these tests, we concluded that the
ownership of a washing machine and of a television set is selected as the potentially
best instruments for the model with the share of education expenditures (i.e., educsh) as
a dependent variable, while all three variables are chosen for the model with the
absolute amount of education expenditures (i.e., educ).
The most obvious finding to emerge from this chapter is that the receipt of remittances
from abroad increases both the Filipino household’s budget share for education and the
absolute amount. If households receive remittances from family members abroad, these
transfers could significantly ease the financial constraints of Filipino households. The
instrumental-variable (IV) Tobit estimators were used to control for the possible
endogeneity problem for two-way relationship between education and remittances. In
this chapter, we controlled for a potential endogeneity of international remittances only,
not domestic remittances as we could not find good instruments to control and also
because some tests used to select of instruments are only available for the model with
only one endogenous regressor. Using this IV tobit model, Chapter Six has also found
that the effects of international remittances both on the share of and the absolute amount
of education expenditures are greater than domestic remittances. This result supports the
idea that international remittances could contribute to the future economic growth via
increase in human capital investment. Needless to say, a sufficient supply of quality
education is necessary to maximise the benefits of investment in education by
remittance receiving Filipino households (Aldaba and Opiniano, 2008: 14). This study
has also shown that the shares of school-age population and the budget share of
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education expenditure have significant positive correlations. It was also shown that
generally the households raise the budget share for education if their household heads
had acquired higher education. An implication of this finding is the possibility that
education expenditure inequality between rich and poor might widen due to the
reproduction of the educated children by their educated parents as this may represent the
transmission mechanism for inter-generational inequality. Moreover, the conclusions
drawn from this study are that between being households in the rural and urban areas
did not exhibit a significant effect on the share for education expenditure in recent years.
Its impact of the rural-urban disparity on education, rather, has contracted over time.
However, on average and ceteris paribus, households living in the capital city
significantly had a lower budget share for education compared to those not living in
National Capital Region (NCR) between 1994 and 2000. This may be mainly because
NCR households are richer but are likely to have fewer children and spend more
expenditure on education per child. Thus, the total household expenditures can be lower
in NCR. Moreover, this might simply be because costs of other things are relatively
higher in NCR (e.g., utilities, rents etc.) which act to diminish the share and the level of
education expenditures for households in this region. Furthermore, parents in non-NCR
might prefer sending their kids to private schools because there might be no good public
schools in the region. In NCR, there are more and better public schools, so households
would be willing to send their kids there and have lower spending on education with
other things being equal.
It should be pointed out that the empirical analyses conducted in this thesis are certainly
not without limitation. As for the study on the determinants of remittances conducted in
Chapter Four, the most important limitation lies in the fact that there is no information
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on migrants in the FIES. Adding migrant characteristics into the existing explanatory
variables in the analysis would help us to establish a greater degree of accuracy on this
matter. In Chapter Five, further experimental investigations are needed to estimate the
effect of remittances on the inequality with due consideration of the issue of sample
selection bias. There is, therefore, a definite need for more detailed information on the
decision of remitting or migration as well as development of quantile regression
procedure which can deal with the issue in an accessible way. As far as the effect of
remittances on education expenditure in Chapter Six, the most important limitation lies
in the fact that we could not distinguish the expenditure on public education from that
on private education due to the limitation on the datasets used in the analysis. Filipino
households may have a different propensity to spend on public and private education.
More detailed information on the education expenditures would thus help us to establish
a greater degree of accuracy on this matter. Despite these limitations, this thesis has
made an important contribution towards our understanding of the effect of remittances
on Filipino households.
One important policy implication may be drawn from the findings of this thesis. The
Philippine governmental policy on overseas employment goes back to the 1970s as a
measure to ease domestic unemployment. The 1974 Labor Code aims to protect
Filipinos who wish to work overseas, strengthen functions of government institutions
for overseas employment, and rationalize the participation of private recruitment
agencies (Orbeta, Abrigo, and Cabalfin, 2009). The Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 (or RA 8042) established a higher standard of protection of OFWs
and promoted the welfare of migrant workers and their families. In the Section Two of
RA 8042, we can find the following statements:
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“While recognizing the significant contribution of Filipino migrant workers to the
national economy through their foreign exchange remittances, the State does not
promote overseas employment as a means to sustain growth and achieve national
development. The existence of the overseas employment program rests solely on the
assurance that the dignity and fundamental human rights and freedoms of the Filipino
citizens shall not, at any time, be compromised or violated. The State, therefore, shall
continuously create local employment opportunities and promote the equitable
distribution of wealth and the benefits of development.”
Section Two (c) Declaration of Policies, RA 8042
The above statements are out of touch with current economic situation in the Philippines.
In reality, the Philippine government has been managing overseas employment and
leveraging remittance flows into the country for sustainable national development.
The results of this thesis support the idea that the receipt of international remittances
could enhance the budgets for education among households in the Philippines. While
the receipt of international remittances could significantly contribute to an improvement
in Filipino households’ livelihoods at any welfare level, it would cause expenditure
inequality between Filipino households to widen over time. Effective drugs tend to have
side effects: They are something of a double-edged sword. Even if the receipt of
remittances contributed to the human capital development via increase in educational
expenditure in the short run, there will be a possibility of brain drain when the educated
children will not be able to find decent jobs or jobs matching their skills. Local
employment opportunities are still lacking. Today, the youth unemployment rates
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remain very high at 17 per cent. The worst of it is that now an increasing proportion of
the unemployed possess a tertiary education. Nevertheless, this causes a serious waste
of human resources within the Philippines as well as more educated workers leaving the
country. International remittances could contribute to the future Philippine economic
growth via an increase in human capital investment. However, the outcomes of
migration policies depend on whether there are more decent job opportunities locally as
well as successful reintegration of overseas Filipinos into Philippine society in all
senses: economically, socially, and psychologically. In conclusion, without better local
employment and business or investment opportunities, the policy of heavy reliance on
international remittance flows can hurt the country by worsening welfare inequality
between rich and poor as well as through the large-scale emigration of skilled workers
over time.
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Appendix I Estimation Results
Chapter 4
Table A4. 1: Probit marginal effect estimation results
Table A4.1a: Domestic Remittances (y=dinrem)
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
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(0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0108) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0154)
Cluzon 0.0709*** 0.1503*** 0.0129 0.0197 -0.0218** 0.1419*** 0.0432*** 0.2654***
(0.0168) (0.0162) (0.0122) (0.0126) (0.0103) (0.0120) (0.0122) (0.0115)
Sluzon 0.0598*** 0.0578*** -0.0340*** -0.0613*** -0.0746*** 0.0817*** 0.0593*** 0.2121***
(0.0155) (0.0152) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0089) (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0109)
Bicol 0.0461** 0.1249*** -0.0101 -0.0224 0.0259* 0.1272*** 0.0598*** 0.3054***
(0.0200) (0.0194) (0.0153) (0.0156) (0.0133) (0.0145) (0.0137) (0.0126)
Wvisayas -0.0081 0.0322* 0.0001 -0.0536*** 0.0090 0.1175*** 0.0366*** 0.1800***
(0.0176) (0.0169) (0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0118) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0133)
Cvisayas -0.0761*** 0.0066 -0.0900*** -0.1426*** -0.0969*** 0.0411*** -0.0752*** 0.0947***
(0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0125) (0.0120) (0.0106) (0.0135) (0.0124) (0.0140)
Evisayas -0.1006*** 0.0395* -0.0537*** -0.0902*** -0.0636*** 0.0124 0.0124 0.1781***
(0.0194) (0.0205) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0118) (0.0134) (0.0140) (0.0148)
Mindanao -0.2039*** -0.1193*** -0.1912*** -0.2049*** -0.1768*** -0.0837*** -0.1687*** 0.0177
(0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0093) (0.0097) (0.0082) (0.0095) (0.0097) (0.0110)
(NCR omitted)
CAR N.A. -0.1804*** -0.2006*** -0.2364*** -0.1606*** -0.0591*** -0.1629*** -0.0307*
N.A. (0.0205) (0.0143) (0.0137) (0.0103) (0.0137) (0.0131) (0.0166)
Wald chi2 1160.35 1285.78 1574.92 1544.59 2415.81 2884.46 2694.52 3007.93
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0560 0.0562 0.0575 0.0526 0.0559 0.0625 0.0518 0.0638
Log pseudolikelihood -10461.108 -11361.323 -14135.106 -14752.388 -22338.992 -23589.605 -25935.824 -23701.513
Number of obs 16541 18429 24124 24165 38442 39615 40408 36852
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Table A4.1: Probit marginal effect estimation results (continued)
Table A4.1b: International Remittances (y=dexrem)
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
1985 FIES 1988FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
ltotex 0.1019*** 0.0819*** 0.1048*** 0.1090*** 0.0979*** 0.1104*** 0.1347*** 0.1441***
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0041)
empsh -0.1310*** -0.1561*** -0.1838*** -0.1495*** -0.1835*** -0.1770*** -0.1328*** -0.1510***
(0.0140) (0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0145) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0129)
age0-6 -0.0437** -0.1221*** -0.1100*** -0.1109*** -0.1132*** -0.1426*** -0.1189*** -0.1013***
(0.0186) (0.0192) (0.0184) (0.0203) (0.0144) (0.0150) (0.0159) (0.0187)
age7-14 -0.0155 -0.0524*** -0.0576*** -0.0608*** -0.0823*** -0.1242*** -0.0879*** -0.0631***
(0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0159) (0.0174) (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0136) (0.0156)
age15-24 -0.0038 -0.0393*** -0.0475*** -0.0440*** -0.0418*** -0.0650*** -0.0625*** -0.0455***
(0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0153) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0130)
(age25+ omitted)
hage -0.0043*** -0.00003 -0.0040*** -0.0013 -0.0017* -0.0028*** -0.0050*** -0.0047***
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011)
hage2 0.00005*** 0.000005 0.00005*** 0.00002* 0.00002*** 0.00003*** 0.00006*** 0.00005***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
hfemale 0.1779*** 0.1822*** 0.2087*** 0.1996*** 0.2005*** 0.1905*** 0.1577*** 0.1756***
(0.0162) (0.0148) (0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0107) (0.0100) (0.0104) (0.0101)
hmarried 0.0598*** 0.0583*** 0.0664*** 0.0858*** 0.0668*** 0.0778*** 0.0581*** 0.0745***
(0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0076) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0065) (0.0071)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.0089 0.0047 0.0192*** 0.0133* 0.0165*** 0.0276*** 0.0178*** 0.0252***
(0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0073) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0065)
hedu3 0.0219*** 0.0248*** 0.0513*** 0.0457*** 0.0395*** 0.0445*** 0.0466*** 0.0584***
(0.0071) (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0085) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0072)
hedu4 0.0048 0.0340*** 0.0176* 0.0116 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0053 0.0134
(0.0096) (0.0114) (0.0102) (0.0110) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0096)
hnojob 0.0661*** 0.0730*** 0.0732*** 0.0832*** 0.0748*** 0.0702*** 0.0496*** 0.0615***
(0.0093) (0.0097) (0.0087) (0.0092) (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0074) (0.0078)
urban -0.0065 -0.0136** -0.0186*** -0.0055 -0.0135*** -0.0191*** N.A. -0.0247***
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0044) (0.0044) N.A. (0.0050)
agri -0.0670*** -0.0663*** -0.0728*** -0.0856*** -0.0807*** -0.0813*** -0.0823*** -0.0964***
(0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0062) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0052)
Ilocos 0.1020*** 0.1490*** 0.1428*** 0.1148*** 0.2255*** 0.1824*** 0.1941*** 0.3267***
(0.0143) (0.0169) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0148) (0.0140) (0.0133) (0.0150)
Cagayan 0.0060 -0.0099 -0.0152 0.0250 0.0909*** 0.0700*** 0.0956*** 0.2398***
(0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0124) (0.0152) (0.0142) (0.0134) (0.0130) (0.0163)
Cluzon 0.0198** 0.0327*** 0.0257*** 0.0213** 0.0453*** 0.0494*** 0.1098*** 0.1394***
(0.0089) (0.0096) (0.0086) (0.0093) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0104) (0.0117)
Sluzon -0.0100 -0.0204*** 0.0068 -0.0160** 0.0103 0.0088 0.0183** 0.0649***
(0.0072) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0076) (0.0095)
Bicol -0.0385*** -0.0566*** -0.0526*** -0.0619*** -0.0410*** -0.0245*** -0.0255*** 0.0397***
(0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0092) (0.0099) (0.0083) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0130)
Wvisayas -0.0124 -0.0264*** -0.0231*** -0.0299*** 0.0494*** 0.0550*** 0.0459*** 0.1181***
(0.0090) (0.0085) (0.0088) (0.0095) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0104) (0.0133)
Cvisayas -0.0319*** -0.0461*** -0.0327*** -0.0732*** -0.0092 0.0086 0.0300*** 0.0844***
(0.0086) (0.0083) (0.0090) (0.0084) (0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0101) (0.0129)
Evisayas -0.0261** -0.0399*** -0.0160 -0.0436*** -0.0034 -0.0039 0.0283** 0.1190***
(0.0110) (0.0104) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0116) (0.0156)
Mindanao -0.0803*** -0.0823*** -0.0648*** -0.0766*** -0.0192*** -0.0131** 0.0095 0.0638***
(0.0055) (0.0060) (0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0072) (0.0090)
(NCR omitted)
CAR N.A. 0.0249 0.0203 -0.0153 0.0467*** 0.0655*** 0.0624*** 0.1559***
N.A. (0.0180) (0.0176) (0.0165) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0130) (0.0165)
Wald chi2 2442.40 2310.57 3354.63 3249.70 4729.63 4780.23 5330.34 4746.90
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.2437 0.1963 0.1970 0.1719 0.1702 0.1664 0.1678 0.1524
Log pseudolikelihood -5327.137 -6389.7331 -9027.0946 -9990.1156 -14675.215 -15597.724 -16610.535 -16553.151
Number of obs 16541 18429 24124 24165 38442 39615 40408 36852
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Table A4. 2: Bivariate probit marginal effect estimation results
Table A4.2a: Domestic Remittances (y=dinrem)
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
1985 FIES 1988FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
ltotex -0.0994*** -0.0911*** -0.1060*** -0.1131*** -0.1117*** -0.1012*** -0.1188*** -0.1114***
(0.0088) (0.0079) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0056)
empsh -0.0445* -0.0917*** -0.1449*** -0.1079*** -0.1147*** -0.1442*** -0.1177*** -0.1265***
(0.0229) (0.0200) (0.0176) (0.0179) (0.0139) (0.0130) (0.0151) (0.0157)
age0-6 0.1583*** 0.0957*** 0.0464* 0.0899*** 0.0885*** 0.0528*** 0.1282*** 0.1915***
(0.0318) (0.0294) (0.0243) (0.0259) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0217) (0.0233)
age7-14 0.1343*** 0.0610** 0.0491** 0.0888*** 0.0670*** 0.0538*** 0.1471*** 0.1492***
(0.0278) (0.0255) (0.0213) (0.0221) (0.0169) (0.0166) (0.0187) (0.0195)
age15-24 0.0508** 0.0002 -0.0253 0.0137 0.0156 0.0227 0.0449*** 0.0652***
(0.0237) (0.0213) (0.0182) (0.0195) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0148) (0.0162)
(age25+ omitted)
hage -0.0042** -0.0037** -0.0029* -0.0019 0.0001 -0.0022* -0.0020 -0.0009
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014)
hage2 0.00007*** 0.00007*** 0.00006*** 0.00005*** 0.00003*** 0.00005*** 0.00005*** 0.00005***
(0.00002) (0.00002 (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
hfemale -0.0118 -0.0043 0.0259** -0.0001 0.0159 0.0196** 0.0298*** 0.0134
(0.0163) (0.0148) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0097) (0.0092) (0.0106) (0.0101)
hmarried -0.0565*** -0.0626*** -0.0573*** -0.0696*** -0.0300*** -0.0375*** -0.0296*** -0.0354***
(0.0164) (0.0149) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0094) (0.0091) (0.0102) (0.0101)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 -0.0029 0.0094 -0.0014 -0.0002 0.0049 0.0232*** 0.0171** 0.0234***
(0.0107) (0.0093) (0.0078) (0.0083) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0069) (0.0073)
hedu3 0.0117 -0.0059 0.0030 -0.0084 -0.0187** 0.0035 -0.0012 0.0055
(0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0094) (0.0099) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0079) (0.0082)
hedu4 -0.0184 -0.0544*** -0.0321** -0.0512*** -0.0675*** -0.0463*** -0.0515*** -0.0756***
(0.0178) (0.0157) (0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0116) (0.0119)
hnojob 0.0407*** 0.0383*** 0.0149 0.0255** 0.0261*** 0.0101 -0.0187* -0.0051
(0.0140) (0.0134) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0086) (0.0079) (0.0099) (0.0095)
urban 0.0439*** -0.0305*** -0.0219*** 0.0289*** -0.0051 0.0054 N.A. 0.0323***
(0.0098) (0.0089) (0.0071) (0.0074) (0.0057) (0.0055) N.A. (0.0066)
agri -0.0822*** -0.0653*** -0.0594*** -0.0486*** -0.0714*** -0.0733*** -0.1067*** -0.0924***
(0.0101) (0.0091) (0.0075) (0.0082) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0064) (0.0069)
Ilocos 0.0387** 0.0779*** -0.0079 -0.0623*** -0.0279** 0.0240* -0.0517*** 0.1296***
(0.0189) (0.0194) (0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0129) (0.0138) (0.0135) (0.0146)
Cagayan -0.1005*** -0.0878*** -0.1494*** -0.2012*** -0.1429*** -0.1000*** -0.1336*** 0.0773***
(0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0111) (0.0124) (0.0132) (0.0156)
Cluzon 0.0710*** 0.1502*** 0.0132 0.0195 -0.0218** 0.1413*** 0.0386*** 0.2652***
(0.0167) (0.0161) (0.0121) (0.0127) (0.0104) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0116)
Sluzon 0.0594*** 0.0568*** -0.0334*** -0.0616*** -0.0746*** 0.0795*** 0.0590*** 0.2121***
(0.0155) (0.0152) (0.0109) (0.0113) (0.0089) (0.0103) (0.0110) (0.0109)
Bicol 0.0451** 0.1223*** -0.0113 -0.0215 0.0259* 0.1217*** 0.0619*** 0.3053***
(0.0200) (0.0196) (0.0151) (0.0157) (0.0133) (0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0127)
Wvisayas -0.0083 0.0312* -0.0004 -0.0536*** 0.0090 0.1177*** 0.0346*** 0.1799***
(0.0175) (0.0167) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0134)
Cvisayas -0.0762*** 0.0052 -0.0891*** -0.1431*** -0.0970*** 0.0404*** -0.0782*** 0.0946***
(0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0107) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0140)
Evisayas -0.1004*** 0.0380* -0.0532*** -0.0904*** -0.0636*** 0.0118 0.0110 0.1780***
(0.0192) (0.0204) (0.0152) (0.0156) (0.0119) (0.0129) (0.0142) (0.0149)
Mindanao -0.2039*** -0.1201*** -0.1890*** -0.2060*** -0.1769*** -0.0805*** -0.1727*** 0.0176
(0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0095) (0.0099) (0.0084) (0.0091) (0.0099) (0.0110)
(NCR omitted)
CAR N.A. -0.1771*** -0.1960*** -0.2396*** -0.1607*** -0.0528*** -0.1699*** -0.0309*
N.A. (0.0204) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0106) (0.0131) (0.0137) (0.0167)
rho -0.0083 -0.0157 -0.0171 0.0124 -0.0028 -0.0543*** 0.0377*** 0.0003
(0.0176) (0.0164) (0.0142) (0.0132) (0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0101) (0.0101)
Wald test of rho=0 0.2215 0.9243 1.4657 0.8783 0.0639 25.0879 13.9724 0.0007
Prob > chi2 = 0.6379 0.3363 0.226 0.3487 0.8004 0.0000 0.0002 0.9793
Wald chi2 3675.026 3608.109 4906.914 4688.766 7138.564 7643.963 8074.292 7726.003
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood -15788.13 -17777.77 -23216.46 -24815.91 -37107.04 -39200.07 -42616.72 -40314.71
Number of Obs 16541 18429 24124 24165 38442 39615 40408 36852
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Table A4.2: Bivariate probit marginal effects estimation results (continued)
Table A4.2b: International Remittances (y=dexrem)
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
1985 FIES 1988FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
ltotex 0.1005*** 0.0798*** 0.1018*** 0.1110*** 0.0979*** 0.1009*** 0.1421*** 0.1443***
(0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0054) (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0044)
empsh -0.1298*** -0.1537*** -0.1811*** -0.1507*** -0.1836*** -0.1693*** -0.1354*** -0.1511***
(0.0141) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0148) (0.0108) (0.0100) (0.0118) (0.0130)
age0-6 -0.0429** -0.1192*** -0.1075*** -0.1129*** -0.1133*** -0.1321*** -0.1256*** -0.1015***
(0.0185) (0.0191) (0.0181) (0.0206) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0166) (0.0188)
age7-14 -0.0150 -0.0510*** -0.0562*** -0.0621*** -0.0824*** -0.1151*** -0.0937*** -0.0633***
(0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0157) (0.0177) (0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0142) (0.0157)
age15-24 -0.0036 -0.0385*** -0.0467*** -0.0446*** -0.0418*** -0.0602*** -0.0656*** -0.0456***
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0137) (0.0155) (0.0109) (0.0104) (0.0113) (0.0130)
(age25+ omitted)
hage -0.0043*** -0.0001 -0.0039*** -0.0013 -0.0017* -0.0027*** -0.0051*** -0.0047***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011)
hage2 0.00005*** 0.000005 0.00005*** 0.00002* 0.00002*** 0.00003*** 0.00006*** 0.00005***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
hfemale 0.1762*** 0.1794*** 0.2057*** 0.2016*** 0.2006*** 0.1813*** 0.1621*** 0.1758***
(0.0165) (0.0149) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0109) (0.0098) (0.0107) (0.0102)
hmarried 0.0590*** 0.0569*** 0.0646*** 0.0873*** 0.0668*** 0.0717*** 0.0612*** 0.0746***
(0.0067) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0079) (0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0069) (0.0071)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.0088 0.0046 0.0188*** 0.0136* 0.0165*** 0.0262*** 0.0181*** 0.0252***
(0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0074) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0065)
hedu3 0.0217*** 0.0243*** 0.0504*** 0.0464*** 0.0395*** 0.0416*** 0.0484*** 0.0585***
(0.0070) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0086) (0.0063) (0.0060) (0.0067) (0.0072)
hedu4 0.0047 0.0330*** 0.0170* 0.0121 -0.0017 -0.0027 -0.0047 0.0135
(0.0095) (0.0113) (0.0100) (0.0112) (0.0077) (0.0072) (0.0084) (0.0096)
hnojob 0.0656*** 0.0720*** 0.0720*** 0.0839*** 0.0748*** 0.0664*** 0.0518*** 0.0616***
(0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0087) (0.0093) (0.0071) (0.0063) (0.0077) (0.0078)
urban -0.0063 -0.0135** -0.0184*** -0.0057 -0.0135*** -0.0176*** N.A. -0.0247***
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0044) (0.0042) N.A. (0.0050)
agri -0.0664*** -0.0653*** -0.0715*** -0.0865*** -0.0807*** -0.0768*** -0.0842*** -0.0964***
(0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0052)
Ilocos 0.1012*** 0.1474*** 0.1402*** 0.1166*** 0.2256*** 0.1746*** 0.2008*** 0.3268***
(0.0143) (0.0168) (0.0152) (0.0154) (0.0150) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0150)
Cagayan 0.0056 -0.0103 -0.0161 0.0268* 0.0909*** 0.0625*** 0.1026*** 0.2399***
(0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0120) (0.0156) (0.0144) (0.0127) (0.0136) (0.0163)
Cluzon 0.0197** 0.0329*** 0.0252*** 0.0215** 0.0453*** 0.0497*** 0.1126*** 0.1393***
(0.0088) (0.0095) (0.0085) (0.0094) (0.0084) (0.0081) (0.0107) (0.0118)
Sluzon -0.0098 -0.0198*** 0.0063 -0.0158** 0.0103 0.0101 0.0176** 0.0648***
(0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0080) (0.0069) (0.0064) (0.0078) (0.0095)
Bicol -0.0380*** -0.0551*** -0.0514*** -0.0627*** -0.0410*** -0.0207** -0.0274*** 0.0396***
(0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0090) (0.0101) (0.0084) (0.0088) (0.0096) (0.0130)
Wvisayas -0.0122 -0.0257*** -0.0226*** -0.0300*** 0.0495*** 0.0546*** 0.0472*** 0.1180***
(0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0086) (0.0096) (0.0098) (0.0094) (0.0107) (0.0133)
Cvisayas -0.0317*** -0.0452*** -0.0326*** -0.0735*** -0.0092 0.0091 0.0325*** 0.0844***
(0.0085) (0.0082) (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0105) (0.0129)
Evisayas -0.0261** -0.0390*** -0.0161 -0.0436*** -0.0034 -0.0034 0.0291** 0.1190***
(0.0108) (0.0102) (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0103) (0.0093) (0.0120) (0.0156)
Mindanao -0.0797*** -0.0810*** -0.0646*** -0.0767*** -0.0192*** -0.0140** 0.0130* 0.0638***
(0.0056) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0073) (0.0065) (0.0061) (0.0076) (0.0090)
(NCR omitted)
CAR N.A. 0.0230 0.0177 -0.0137 0.0468*** 0.0601*** 0.0689*** 0.1561***
N.A. (0.0176) (0.0172) (0.0169) (0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0136) (0.0166)
rho -0.0083 -0.0157 -0.0171 0.0124 -0.0028 -0.0543*** 0.0377*** 0.0003
(0.0176) (0.0164) (0.0142) (0.0132) (0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0101) (0.0101)
Wald test of rho=0 0.2215 0.9243 1.4657 0.8783 0.0639 25.0879 13.9724 0.0007
Prob > chi2 = 0.6379 0.3363 0.226 0.3487 0.8004 0.0000 0.0002 0.9793
Wald chi2 3675.026 3608.109 4906.914 4688.766 7138.564 7643.963 8074.292 7726.003
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood -15788.13 -17777.77 -23216.46 -24815.91 -37107.04 -39200.07 -42616.72 -40314.71
Number of Obs 16541 18429 24124 24165 38442 39615 40408 36852
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Table A4. 3: Two-Part model Coefficient estimates on Domestic Remittances
Table A4.3a: the 1985-1994 FIES
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
slection level slection level slection level slection level
ltotex -0.2654*** 1.6546*** -0.2535*** 1.5566*** -0.3146*** 3.2622*** -0.3032*** 4.9169***
(0.0201) (0.2066) (0.0196) (0.1628) (0.0172) (0.2563) (0.0174) (0.5547)
empsh -0.1112* -2.3970*** -0.2397*** -3.1335*** -0.4093*** -3.6178*** -0.2994*** -5.7950***
(0.0592) (0.3186) (0.0538) (0.3340) (0.0507) (0.5076) (0.0485) (0.8092)
age0-6 0.4178*** -2.2622*** 0.2687*** -3.1009*** 0.1417** -4.7875*** 0.2400*** -6.1758***
(0.0833) (0.5202) (0.0793) (0.5717) (0.0701) (0.8615) (0.0701) (1.1196)
age7-14 0.3534*** -1.7011*** 0.1696** -1.9421*** 0.1464** -2.7090*** 0.2392*** -4.0539***
(0.0728) (0.3955) (0.0691) (0.3856) (0.0616) (0.6634) (0.0600) (0.9411)
age15-24 0.1336** -0.8181** 0.0032 0.7366* -0.0703 0.5677 0.0353 0.7824
(0.0622) (0.3973) (0.0580) (0.4215) (0.0529) (0.6375) (0.0530) (1.1987)
(age25+ omitted)
hage -0.0108** -0.0668** -0.0102** -0.1532*** -0.0081* -0.2258*** -0.0052 -0.3505***
(0.0052) (0.0286) (0.0048) (0.0430) (0.0043) (0.0636) (0.0044) (0.0988)
hage2 0.0002*** 0.0006** 0.0002*** 0.0014*** 0.0002*** 0.0020*** 0.0001*** 0.0032***
(0.00005) (0.0003) (0.00005) (0.0004) (0.00004) (0.0006) (0.00004) (0.0009)
hfemale -0.0363 0.5179** -0.0198 1.5763*** 0.0650* 2.0017*** 0.0055 2.0188***
(0.0417) (0.2627) (0.0392) (0.3271) (0.0341) (0.4820) (0.0332) (0.6737)
hmarried -0.1495*** -0.4586* -0.1711*** -0.3346 -0.1666*** -1.0494** -0.1814*** -2.1834***
(0.0412) (0.2585) (0.0384) (0.2895) (0.0330) (0.4510) (0.0325) (0.6577)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 -0.0080 -0.0464 0.0252 -0.1340 -0.0054 -0.0714 -0.0001 0.2132
(0.0282) (0.1239) (0.0253) (0.1160) (0.0227) (0.1811) (0.0227) (0.2622)
hedu3 0.0298 0.0423 -0.0176 0.3137* 0.0057 -0.0894 -0.0213 0.0771
(0.0293) (0.1264) (0.0308) (0.1798) (0.0271) (0.2683) (0.0268) (0.3662)
hedu4 -0.0490 0.1509 -0.1547*** 0.7262* -0.0965** 3.0460*** -0.1425*** 0.4957
(0.0474) (0.3201) (0.0451) (0.3848) (0.0400) (0.7940) (0.0399) (0.9157)
hnojob 0.1035*** 1.2231*** 0.0988*** 0.7096*** 0.0389 1.9207*** 0.0716** 1.9213***
(0.0359) (0.2509) (0.0354) (0.2614) (0.0303) (0.3810) (0.0292) (0.5296)
urban 0.1156*** -0.0124 -0.0823*** -0.0483 -0.0623*** -0.3778** 0.0787*** -0.4503**
(0.0256) (0.1042) (0.0243) (0.1222) (0.0206) (0.1550) (0.0202) (0.2113)
agri -0.2153*** -0.3255*** -0.1754*** -0.4821*** -0.1710*** -0.7264*** -0.1375*** -0.5704**
(0.0268) (0.0891) (0.0252) (0.0977) (0.0227) (0.1420) (0.0227) (0.2334)
Ilocos 0.0972** -0.7888*** 0.1986*** 0.0854 -0.0298 -0.6372 -0.1721*** 0.2370
(0.0481) (0.2551) (0.0497) (0.3128) (0.0438) (0.4422) (0.0437) (0.6650)
Cagayan -0.2774*** -0.4542* -0.2519*** 0.5583 -0.5079*** -0.4203 -0.6512*** 0.2702
(0.0562) (0.2662) (0.0586) (0.4399) (0.0535) (0.5041) (0.0536) (0.7044)
Cluzon 0.1824*** -0.7888*** 0.3891*** -0.3434 0.0367 -0.8926* 0.0534 -1.7700***
(0.0425) (0.2930) (0.0409) (0.3127) (0.0345) (0.4670) (0.0341) (0.5538)
Sluzon 0.1543*** -1.3184*** 0.1530*** -0.5827** -0.0994*** -0.9498** -0.1728*** -1.3341**
(0.0396) (0.2158) (0.0396) (0.2932) (0.0328) (0.4405) (0.0325) (0.6652)
Bicol 0.1189** -0.2054 0.3237*** 0.2419 -0.0292 0.2433 -0.0620 0.8424
(0.0509) (0.2751) (0.0490) (0.2916) (0.0444) (0.4556) (0.0437) (0.5731)
Wvisayas -0.0212 -0.3078 0.0858* 0.1393 0.0003 0.0146 -0.1513*** -0.5952
(0.0462) (0.3078) (0.0444) (0.3047) (0.0390) (0.4757) (0.0384) (0.5325)
Cvisayas -0.2053*** 0.1852 0.0179 0.3845 -0.2765*** 1.6874*** -0.4318*** 1.9738***
(0.0491) (0.3229) (0.0471) (0.3204) (0.0417) (0.5010) (0.0412) (0.5958)
Evisayas -0.2757*** -0.0696 0.1047* 0.5886* -0.1603*** 0.7802* -0.2623*** 1.6265***
(0.0563) (0.2721) (0.0535) (0.3451) (0.0482) (0.4716) (0.0479) (0.5989)
Mindanao -0.5727*** -0.9668*** -0.3361*** -0.1727 -0.6118*** -0.4993 -0.6189*** -0.1023
(0.0399) (0.2293) (0.0388) (0.3049) (0.0342) (0.4313) (0.0332) (0.5957)
(NCR omitted)
CAR N.A. N.A. -0.5632*** 0.0799 -0.7393*** 0.8793 -0.8415*** 1.0146
N.A. N.A. (0.0788) (0.4685) (0.0760) (0.7852) (0.0730) (0.9683)
constant 2.5312*** -10.1558*** 2.4867*** -7.4854*** 3.3444*** -20.7812*** 3.2247*** -33.3022***
(0.2246) (2.0500) (0.2168) (1.5172) (0.1984) (2.2932) (0.2099) (5.3819)
R2 0.0560 0.1389 0.0562 0.1366 0.0575 0.1618 0.0526 0.1263
Number of obs 16541 6495 18429 6628 24124 7557 24165 8340
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES
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Table A4.3: Two-Part model coefficient estimates on Domestic Remittances (continued)
Table A4.3b: the 1997-2006 FIES
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
slection level slection level slection level slection level
ltotex -0.3234*** 5.2854*** -0.3170*** 9.6918*** -0.2829*** 6.3205*** -0.2817*** 10.0841***
(0.0140) (0.3703) (0.0129) (0.9839) (0.0125) (0.8111) (0.0133) (0.7532)
empsh -0.3324*** -5.3677*** -0.3853*** -6.6932*** -0.3179*** -5.0367*** -0.3212*** -2.2948**
(0.0399) (0.7454) (0.0378) (1.0770) (0.0382) (0.8803) (0.0396) (1.0718)
age0-6 0.2561*** -8.1698*** 0.1819*** -10.4487*** 0.3096*** -7.7852*** 0.4850*** -4.1418***
(0.0556) (1.1339) (0.0561) (1.7948) (0.0551) (1.0529) (0.0589) (1.4574)
age7-14 0.1940*** -3.5662*** 0.1812*** -8.1687*** 0.3616*** -5.9915*** 0.3778*** -3.5607***
(0.0487) (0.9508) (0.0481) (1.4409) (0.0473) (1.0060) (0.0494) (1.1670)
age15-24 0.0451 0.4305 0.0795* -2.0614 0.1051*** -0.4650 0.1650*** -1.0956
(0.0420) (0.9484) (0.0412) (1.5962) (0.0376) (1.1298) (0.0410) (1.1174)
(age25+ omitted)
hage 0.0002 -0.3214*** -0.0059* -0.6577*** -0.0058* -0.2237*** -0.0023 -0.4644***
(0.0033) (0.0713) (0.0034) (0.1512) (0.0031) (0.0569) (0.0035) (0.1504)
hage2 0.0001*** 0.0030*** 0.0001*** 0.0060*** 0.0001*** 0.0024*** 0.0001*** 0.0051***
(0.00003) (0.0007) (0.00003) (0.0014) (0.00003) (0.0005) (0.00003) (0.0015)
hfemale 0.0457* 3.0133*** 0.0291 5.5943*** 0.0932*** 3.6874*** 0.0344 4.8916***
(0.0270) (0.7086) (0.0256) (1.2293) (0.0264) (0.7075) (0.0252) (0.9828)
hmarried -0.0855*** -0.7140 -0.1240*** -0.9583 -0.0659** -0.8612 -0.0892*** -1.1194
(0.0262) (0.6673) (0.0253) (1.1266) (0.0257) (0.5970) (0.0252) (0.8831)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.0143 0.3711 0.0621*** -0.4821 0.0459*** -0.0621 0.0594*** 0.2430
(0.0186) (0.2553) (0.0185) (0.3593) (0.0175) (0.2128) (0.0184) (0.3081)
hedu3 -0.0545** 0.8675** 0.0020 -0.3946 0.0033 -0.3993 0.0141 0.0356
(0.0213) (0.3600) (0.0208) (0.5050) (0.0200) (0.4230) (0.0208) (0.4350)
hedu4 -0.2056*** 3.9950*** -0.1391*** 5.7160*** -0.1329*** 2.0966* -0.1947*** 3.4360***
(0.0323) (1.0029) (0.0303) (1.5676) (0.0302) (1.1216) (0.0313) (1.2949)
hnojob 0.0746*** 3.4795*** 0.0175 2.7592*** -0.0417* -0.8477 -0.0128 1.1212
(0.0242) (0.5690) (0.0226) (0.7460) (0.0252) (0.5725) (0.0241) (0.7724)
urban -0.0147 -0.4652* 0.0195 -2.2606*** N.A. N.A. 0.0817*** -1.7719***
(0.0165) (0.2616) (0.0159) (0.3476) N.A. N.A. (0.0167) (0.3794)
agri -0.2129*** -1.7537*** -0.2028*** -0.9076** -0.2878*** -1.5886*** -0.2372*** -1.4632***
(0.0190) (0.2097) (0.0187) (0.3666) (0.0167) (0.2047) (0.0178) (0.3314)
Ilocos -0.0824** 0.4148 0.0425 -3.2056* -0.1129*** 0.6818 0.3272*** -4.2360***
(0.0383) (0.7661) (0.0387) (1.8249) (0.0349) (0.7063) (0.0364) (1.2162)
Cagayan -0.4797*** 3.6596*** -0.3324*** -5.7505*** -0.3446*** 2.5362 0.1950*** -2.7900**
(0.0438) (1.3042) (0.0439) (1.7168) (0.0372) (1.9551) (0.0388) (1.2669)
Cluzon -0.0639** -0.6548 0.3756*** -8.7741*** 0.1103*** -1.6225*** 0.6846*** -6.4805***
(0.0308) (0.6792) (0.0306) (1.5275) (0.0309) (0.6083) (0.0319) (1.2850)
Sluzon -0.2264*** -0.0724 0.2213*** -7.2676*** 0.1514*** -1.8248*** 0.5388*** -5.7391***
(0.0284) (0.6445) (0.0281) (1.5770) (0.0275) (0.6053) (0.0285) (1.1940)
Bicol 0.0739** 2.3919*** 0.3363*** -4.1841*** 0.1524*** 2.5489*** 0.8019*** -1.6867
(0.0373) (0.7049) (0.0369) (1.4508) (0.0346) (0.9499) (0.0377) (1.1728)
Wvisayas 0.0259 2.0288*** 0.3123*** -3.9548** 0.0936*** 1.2392* 0.4556*** -2.8680**
(0.0337) (0.7029) (0.0333) (1.5495) (0.0331) (0.7352) (0.0346) (1.2584)
Cvisayas -0.3055*** 2.5105*** 0.1124*** -4.3699*** -0.1992*** 0.7012 0.2383*** -1.7712
(0.0370) (0.7072) (0.0362) (1.4620) (0.0339) (0.7624) (0.0352) (1.1695)
Evisayas -0.1940*** 3.7868*** 0.0343 -2.9147** 0.0319 3.1727*** 0.4509*** -2.1442*
(0.0383) (0.8415) (0.0370) (1.4641) (0.0360) (0.8466) (0.0386) (1.1579)
Mindanao -0.5569*** 1.4017** -0.2406*** -4.1624*** -0.4509*** 0.6750 0.0449 -3.6007***
(0.0287) (0.6622) (0.0283) (1.5177) (0.0271) (0.7902) (0.0279) (1.1103)
(NCR omitted)
CAR -0.5536*** 3.1600*** -0.1720*** -6.8113*** -0.4550*** 1.7175* -0.0783* -0.3776
(0.0446) (1.1547) (0.0418) (1.6398) (0.0410) (0.8979) (0.0427) (1.9898)
constant 3.3143*** -40.2575*** 3.2170*** -70.0993*** 3.1896*** -53.6032*** 2.7142*** -88.2694***
(0.1689) (3.8514) (0.1606) (8.5320) (0.1564) (8.7016) (0.1687) (7.2321)
R2 0.0559 0.1242 0.0625 0.1349 0.0518 0.1059 0.0638 0.1245
Number of obs 38442 11746 39615 13128 40408 16573 36852 16381
1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
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Table A4. 4: Two-Part model coefficient estimates on International Remittances
Table A4.4a: the 1985-1994 FIES
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
slection level slection level slection level slection level
ltotex 0.6247*** 18.1464*** 0.4408*** 17.3766*** 0.5004*** 26.0939*** 0.4569*** 30.3992***
(0.0270) (1.0344) (0.0247) (0.9866) (0.0206) (1.3195) (0.0203) (1.3517)
empsh -0.8028*** -17.0495*** -0.8400*** -12.0883*** -0.8778*** -22.0428*** -0.6268*** -14.7398***
(0.0880) (2.2862) (0.0751) (2.4536) (0.0672) (3.0300) (0.0614) (3.2138)
age0-6 -0.2677** -7.2044** -0.6569*** -3.9488 -0.5255*** -14.4026*** -0.4648*** -10.2853**
(0.1137) (3.2801) (0.1033) (3.6628) (0.0877) (4.2380) (0.0850) (4.5710)
age7-14 -0.0948 -7.2268** -0.2820*** 1.2152 -0.2751*** -9.4140*** -0.2549*** 0.5698
(0.1002) (2.8389) (0.0883) (2.8344) (0.0761) (3.6230) (0.0729) (3.8165)
age15-24 -0.0230 -4.5325* -0.2113*** -0.0289 -0.2267*** -1.6739 -0.1843*** 1.3625
(0.0864) (2.5774) (0.0774) (2.2757) (0.0665) (3.0365) (0.0640) (3.2879)
(age25+ omitted)
hage -0.0263*** -0.4945** -0.0002 -0.5131*** -0.0191*** -0.5580* -0.0055 -0.8636***
(0.0067) (0.2055) (0.0062) (0.1845) (0.0052) (0.2901) (0.0053) (0.3097)
hage2 0.0003*** 0.0040** 0.000026 0.0044** 0.0002*** 0.0042 0.0001* 0.0058**
(0.00007) (0.0020) (0.00006) (0.0018) (0.00005) (0.0029) (0.00005) (0.0029)
hfemale 0.7783*** 15.6216*** 0.7325*** 19.2084*** 0.7639*** 27.7325*** 0.6818*** 30.3864***
(0.0555) (1.3498) (0.0489) (1.4244) (0.0419) (1.7835) (0.0403) (2.0764)
hmarried 0.4545*** 9.0017*** 0.3696*** 12.4523*** 0.3678*** 18.8563*** 0.4173*** 20.3017***
(0.0624) (1.4798) (0.0552) (1.3913) (0.0463) (1.8835) (0.0442) (2.1664)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.0537 -1.4770 0.0249 -2.5898** 0.0902*** -2.4601* 0.0555* -3.7177**
(0.0419) (1.2183) (0.0363) (1.0680) (0.0314) (1.3929) (0.0300) (1.4788)
hedu3 0.1304*** -2.5384** 0.1287*** -2.1763* 0.2312*** -0.5197 0.1844*** -2.8679*
(0.0410) (1.2549) (0.0403) (1.2142) (0.0343) (1.5948) (0.0329) (1.6861)
hedu4 0.0289 -7.3486*** 0.1681*** -6.2019*** 0.0809* -4.4341** 0.0476 -1.6958
(0.0571) (1.7398) (0.0522) (1.6839) (0.0453) (2.2304) (0.0443) (2.4483)
hnojob 0.3447*** 5.9053*** 0.3377*** 8.4661*** 0.3104*** 13.0562*** 0.3142*** 18.3040***
(0.0414) (1.1361) (0.0390) (1.3523) (0.0331) (1.6018) (0.0315) (1.7945)
urban -0.0400 -3.3873*** -0.0732** -2.3001** -0.0882*** -5.4940*** -0.0228 -3.5212***
(0.0345) (1.0878) (0.0311) (0.9922) (0.0264) (1.2984) (0.0252) (1.2755)
agri -0.4417*** -5.0616*** -0.3854*** -3.4054*** -0.3753*** -4.8397*** -0.3884*** -5.8558***
(0.0425) (0.9564) (0.0378) (0.8776) (0.0326) (1.0751) (0.0311) (1.2003)
Ilocos 0.4837*** 2.0562 0.5997*** 0.3296 0.5367*** 8.7408*** 0.4079*** 12.3261***
(0.0552) (1.3130) (0.0546) (1.3583) (0.0475) (1.9487) (0.0472) (2.1001)
Cagayan 0.0358 4.6687** -0.0551 5.0591* -0.0755 9.8453*** 0.1001* 11.9970***
(0.0724) (2.1633) (0.0735) (2.7009) (0.0640) (3.2392) (0.0584) (2.9003)
Cluzon 0.1143** 1.6987 0.1626*** -0.2799 0.1166*** 8.9329*** 0.0863** 10.9994***
(0.0486) (1.3078) (0.0447) (1.3943) (0.0374) (1.8893) (0.0363) (2.0122)
Sluzon -0.0632 2.8049** -0.1161** 2.2502 0.0319 6.1113*** -0.0686** 8.7604***
(0.0472) (1.3265) (0.0452) (1.4257) (0.0356) (1.8246) (0.0347) (1.9840)
Bicol -0.2785*** 8.4049** -0.3762*** 1.1053 -0.2927*** 8.4965*** -0.2990*** 8.9963***
(0.0718) (3.3914) (0.0699) (2.9187) (0.0608) (2.9882) (0.0559) (3.2608)
Wvisayas -0.0792 1.4823 -0.1535*** 3.9901* -0.1165** 6.4518** -0.1326*** 9.0823***
(0.0604) (1.8541) (0.0540) (2.1880) (0.0470) (2.5938) (0.0446) (2.8686)
Cvisayas -0.2220*** 4.2678** -0.2902*** 5.1522** -0.1702*** 11.7784*** -0.3623*** 8.9909***
(0.0688) (1.8508) (0.0622) (2.2376) (0.0511) (3.4545) (0.0505) (2.6942)
Evisayas -0.1785** 6.8356** -0.2476*** 0.6256 -0.0797 8.9062*** -0.2012*** 18.9408***
(0.0845) (2.7733) (0.0752) (1.7595) (0.0640) (3.1966) (0.0631) (2.7783)
Mindanao -0.6205*** 0.7726 -0.5314*** 0.5874 -0.3461*** 5.1995*** -0.3561*** 7.3366***
(0.0544) (1.5096) (0.0476) (1.9555) (0.0392) (1.9388) (0.0372) (2.2809)
(NCR omitted)
CAR N.A. N.A. 0.1245 -0.8151 0.0922 7.1473 -0.0663 7.9814**
N.A. N.A. (0.0844) (2.7497) (0.0763) (4.4814) (0.0739) (3.4530)
constant -6.9677*** -161.3130*** -5.4761*** -161.1161*** -5.9058*** -257.2098*** -5.8996*** -307.5587***
(0.2975) (10.8069) (0.2785) (11.0517) (0.2377) (13.8320) (0.2482) (15.5267)
R2 0.2437 0.3474 0.1963 0.3562 0.1970 0.3263 0.1719 0.3388
Number of obs 16541 2511 18429 2858 24124 4257 24165 4813
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES
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Table A4.4: Two-Part model coefficient estimates on International Remittances (continued)
Table A4.4b: the 1997-2006 FIES
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
slection level slection level slection level slection level
ltotex 0.4590*** 36.0549*** 0.4996*** 63.9438*** 0.5738*** 65.5815*** 0.5400*** 91.2867***
(0.0162) (1.3245) (0.0152) (2.9828) (0.0152) (3.0456) (0.0154) (7.8208)
empsh -0.8608*** -24.8206*** -0.8010*** -30.0206*** -0.5660*** -1.3995 -0.5660*** 11.3171
(0.0509) (3.2190) (0.0483) (6.6516) (0.0484) (5.8038) (0.0487) (8.5391)
age0-6 -0.5311*** -15.6275*** -0.6455*** -17.1595* -0.5067*** -9.6696 -0.3796*** 9.3963
(0.0673) (4.8737) (0.0678) (8.8510) (0.0676) (7.8953) (0.0700) (12.3754)
age7-14 -0.3861*** 3.4142 -0.5619*** -7.9767 -0.3743*** -2.0372 -0.2367*** 14.1609
(0.0594) (4.2469) (0.0579) (6.4744) (0.0579) (6.7238) (0.0584) (9.3031)
age15-24 -0.1961*** 2.2849 -0.2942*** 5.0262 -0.2662*** 3.9599 -0.1706*** -0.8258
(0.0512) (3.5383) (0.0498) (6.5546) (0.0463) (5.8157) (0.0487) (7.9203)
(age25+ omitted)
hage -0.0078* -0.8777*** -0.0125*** -0.8938* -0.0212*** -1.2813*** -0.0176*** -1.6900**
(0.0041) (0.2858) (0.0041) (0.5160) (0.0038) (0.4450) (0.0041) (0.7317)
hage2 0.0001*** 0.0067** 0.0001*** 0.0052 0.0003*** 0.0085* 0.0002*** 0.0119
(0.00004) (0.0028) (0.00004) (0.0047) (0.00004) (0.0043) (0.00004) (0.0076)
hfemale 0.7329*** 49.7969*** 0.6954*** 64.2408*** 0.5601*** 83.5081*** 0.5690*** 78.3348***
(0.0331) (2.1563) (0.0314) (3.7814) (0.0323) (4.9694) (0.0296) (4.9633)
hmarried 0.3591*** 32.0830*** 0.4046*** 42.5852*** 0.2727*** 58.1599*** 0.3065*** 51.6698***
(0.0359) (2.1560) (0.0343) (3.7260) (0.0343) (4.7055) (0.0323) (6.1455)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.0761*** -4.7551*** 0.1219*** -7.0772*** 0.0749*** -8.2225*** 0.0930*** -15.5790**
(0.0252) (1.5566) (0.0251) (2.3006) (0.0237) (2.2455) (0.0236) (6.3262)
hedu3 0.1785*** -3.9431** 0.1938*** -8.2865*** 0.1915*** -14.9801*** 0.2120*** -23.4510***
(0.0271) (1.6945) (0.0268) (2.6727) (0.0254) (2.7103) (0.0252) (7.5583)
hedu4 -0.0081 -4.7992* -0.0067 -7.8471** -0.0227 -16.1607*** 0.0494 -27.8690**
(0.0362) (2.6277) (0.0351) (3.9891) (0.0351) (4.0710) (0.0346) (11.4420)
hnojob 0.3117*** 17.2697*** 0.2874*** 27.5977*** 0.1954*** 30.0024*** 0.2151*** 34.9584***
(0.0263) (1.7943) (0.0247) (3.1231) (0.0272) (3.7546) (0.0255) (5.0444)
urban -0.0630*** -7.4940*** -0.0858*** -10.3029*** N.A. N.A. -0.0930*** -15.8876***
(0.0205) (1.3239) (0.0198) (1.9869) N.A. N.A. (0.0189) (3.2363)
agri -0.4231*** -6.1374*** -0.4136*** -3.4192 -0.3785*** 0.8165 -0.3909*** 1.3958
(0.0276) (1.2914) (0.0278) (2.2498) (0.0233) (2.1093) (0.0232) (2.6963)
Ilocos 0.7693*** 6.1392** 0.6336*** 19.9282*** 0.6464*** 31.9068*** 0.9449*** 14.9140***
(0.0410) (2.5290) (0.0404) (5.0347) (0.0374) (3.8483) (0.0386) (5.6580)
Cagayan 0.3593*** 7.1701** 0.2781*** 8.5567 0.3509*** 41.1180*** 0.7188*** 13.2818**
(0.0487) (2.9928) (0.0475) (5.2773) (0.0422) (5.0461) (0.0427) (5.7706)
Cluzon 0.1949*** 5.7043** 0.2050*** 6.5444 0.3997*** 19.6662*** 0.4507*** 14.5367*
(0.0333) (2.3624) (0.0325) (4.0485) (0.0333) (3.0999) (0.0339) (7.8026)
Sluzon 0.0473 8.8995*** 0.0394 7.1719 0.0758** 22.9035*** 0.2268*** 19.5350***
(0.0310) (2.4876) (0.0300) (4.6320) (0.0306) (4.5589) (0.0312) (5.6869)
Bicol -0.2151*** -2.7110 -0.1175** 12.1252* -0.1147*** 33.5573*** 0.1412*** 13.1386*
(0.0493) (3.3005) (0.0475) (6.6448) (0.0437) (6.4586) (0.0439) (7.8852)
Wvisayas 0.2107*** 6.5113** 0.2254*** 16.6399*** 0.1812*** 38.2194*** 0.3876*** 19.9934***
(0.0381) (2.7187) (0.0371) (5.3920) (0.0382) (5.6386) (0.0391) (6.0006)
Cvisayas -0.0441 5.6225 0.0380 8.7631* 0.1214*** 28.5319*** 0.2855*** 20.4130***
(0.0447) (3.4441) (0.0420) (5.2128) (0.0389) (5.9033) (0.0400) (7.7660)
Evisayas -0.0163 14.5491*** -0.0179 14.4936** 0.1146** 32.9753*** 0.3886*** 32.2326**
(0.0490) (3.6726) (0.0459) (6.0804) (0.0449) (5.1621) (0.0456) (14.5602)
Mindanao -0.0921*** 5.7638** -0.0602* 10.8075** 0.0401 27.6165*** 0.2288*** 18.0168***
(0.0319) (2.3078) (0.0308) (4.5017) (0.0302) (4.0498) (0.0308) (5.7804)
(NCR omitted)
CAR 0.1987*** 8.1783** 0.2621*** -3.5702 0.2390*** 25.6758*** 0.4921*** 11.9145*
(0.0475) (3.7532) (0.0443) (5.1272) (0.0452) (5.2292) (0.0459) (6.6245)
constant -6.0863*** -378.5570*** -6.4808*** -698.4159*** -7.1424*** -762.3839*** -7.0553*** -1032.68***
(0.1987) (15.2653) (0.1898) (35.2324) (0.1897) (38.2077) (0.1976) (84.7213)
R2 0.1702 0.3569 0.1664 0.2928 0.1678 0.3035 0.1524 0.2546
Number of obs 38442 6637 39615 7155 40408 7896 36852 8197
1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
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Table A4. 5: Tobit marginal effect estimation results
Table A4.5a: Domestic Remittances (Y=inrem)
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
1985 FIES 1988FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
ltotex -0.0570 -0.1203*** -0.2965*** -0.2694*** -0.6086*** -0.5231*** -0.2436*** 0.1482
(0.0356) (0.0337) (0.0457) (0.0736) (0.0650) (0.1075) (0.0899) (0.1397)
empsh -0.6111*** -0.8804*** -1.4635*** -1.9067*** -2.0731*** -3.3709*** -2.6692*** -2.9842***
(0.0986) (0.1006) (0.1466) (0.2219) (0.1946) (0.2973) (0.2412) (0.3500)
age0-6 0.0853 -0.1364 -0.3257* -0.1110 -0.0079 -0.3489 -0.0227 2.2836***
(0.1485) (0.1453) (0.1940) (0.2808) (0.2634) (0.4199) (0.3366) (0.5253)
age7-14 0.1058 -0.0605 -0.0256 0.2149 0.2982 -0.1302 0.5836** 1.7204***
(0.1176) (0.1118) (0.1643) (0.2386) (0.2300) (0.3553) (0.2828) (0.4232)
age15-24 0.0214 0.1631 -0.0415 0.3735 0.3314 0.3894 0.5533** 1.0223***
(0.1066) (0.1119) (0.1518) (0.2615) (0.2171) (0.3451) (0.2706) (0.3742)
(age25+ omitted)
hage -0.0222*** -0.0407*** -0.0534*** -0.0730*** -0.0491*** -0.1372*** -0.0731*** -0.1296***
(0.0085) (0.0107) (0.0141) (0.0225) (0.0172) (0.0325) (0.0192) (0.0431)
hage2 0.0003*** 0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0017*** 0.0011*** 0.0019***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004)
hfemale -0.0158 0.2273*** 0.3797*** 0.2495 0.4446*** 0.7935*** 1.1465*** 1.0990***
(0.0725) (0.0879) (0.1198) (0.1632) (0.1592) (0.2665) (0.2255) (0.3095)
hmarried -0.3443*** -0.3177*** -0.6143*** -1.1212*** -0.6097*** -1.0628*** -0.5784*** -1.0786***
(0.0842) (0.0869) (0.1234) (0.1961) (0.1583) (0.2650) (0.1918) (0.2898)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 -0.0107 0.0216 -0.0014 0.0437 0.1125 0.3162*** 0.2108** 0.4672***
(0.0405) (0.0385) (0.0553) (0.0819) (0.0783) (0.1170) (0.0921) (0.1360)
hedu3 0.0557 0.0388 0.0020 -0.0731 -0.1261 -0.0520 -0.0551 0.1373
(0.0430) (0.0518) (0.0706) (0.1027) (0.0937) (0.1401) (0.1241) (0.1650)
hedu4 -0.0397 -0.1553* 0.0523 -0.4779*** -0.5539*** -0.5949** -0.5499** -1.2363***
(0.0835) (0.0805) (0.1321) (0.1739) (0.1558) (0.2591) (0.2678) (0.3101)
hnojob 0.4050*** 0.2716*** 0.3627*** 0.5903*** 0.8638*** 0.5783*** -0.2754 0.1889
(0.0806) (0.0785) (0.1010) (0.1461) (0.1498) (0.1913) (0.1699) (0.2481)
urban 0.1422*** -0.1165*** -0.1774*** 0.1812** -0.1296* -0.1760* N.A. 0.2310*
(0.0382) (0.0387) (0.0507) (0.0708) (0.0733) (0.1032) N.A. (0.1347)
agri -0.3070*** -0.3099*** -0.4386*** -0.4620*** -0.9644*** -1.1664*** -1.5419*** -1.7588***
(0.0335) (0.0339) (0.0479) (0.0717) (0.0688) (0.0993) (0.0881) (0.1149)
Ilocos -0.0493 0.3297*** -0.2285** -0.6062*** -0.3186* 0.1615 -0.3957* 2.2143***
(0.0758) (0.0970) (0.1038) (0.1503) (0.1686) (0.3481) (0.2031) (0.4046)
Cagayan -0.3875*** -0.2182** -0.9538*** -1.6457*** -1.2052*** -2.1064*** -1.1767*** 1.5203***
(0.0675) (0.0943) (0.0920) (0.1323) (0.1680) (0.2649) (0.2577) (0.4149)
Cluzon 0.0618 0.5499*** -0.0836 -0.1869 -0.3349** 1.3129*** 0.1928 4.5295***
(0.0853) (0.0924) (0.0984) (0.1321) (0.1428) (0.2749) (0.2073) (0.4417)
Sluzon -0.0718 0.1341* -0.3828*** -0.7574*** -0.8518*** 0.6146** 0.3922* 3.4110***
(0.0632) (0.0744) (0.0863) (0.1271) (0.1236) (0.2639) (0.2050) (0.3731)
Bicol 0.0788 0.5292*** -0.0991 -0.2030 0.4615** 1.6462*** 1.1719*** 6.4449***
(0.0861) (0.1001) (0.1104) (0.1540) (0.1889) (0.3306) (0.3085) (0.5124)
Wvisayas -0.0751 0.1875** -0.0373 -0.6236*** 0.3623** 1.6941*** 0.6112** 3.5085***
(0.0800) (0.0851) (0.1085) (0.1280) (0.1771) (0.3290) (0.2409) (0.4568)
Cvisayas -0.2186*** 0.1137 -0.4119*** -1.0589*** -0.8513*** 0.3280 -0.7432*** 2.0491***
(0.0744) (0.0879) (0.1023) (0.1291) (0.1409) (0.2870) (0.1889) (0.3949)
Evisayas -0.3101*** 0.3017*** -0.2962*** -0.6535*** -0.2517 0.0760 0.7570*** 3.5766***
(0.0699) (0.1084) (0.1099) (0.1468) (0.1771) (0.2877) (0.2672) (0.4449)
Mindanao -0.7647*** -0.4165*** -1.2354*** -1.7921*** -1.7816*** -1.5701*** -1.9239*** 0.2845
(0.0520) (0.0664) (0.0855) (0.1250) (0.1224) (0.2472) (0.1602) (0.2955)
(NCR omitted)
CAR N.A. -0.6208*** -1.1587*** -1.9249*** -1.4161*** -1.4359*** -1.7197*** -0.0708
N.A. (0.0834) (0.1072) (0.1529) (0.1569) (0.2756) (0.2109) (0.4949)
Pseudo R2 0.0244 0.0205 0.0200 0.0169 0.0158 0.0124 0.0112 0.0103
F 16.7653 24.4244 27.6319 16.9183 42.7096 30.2057 30.0027 34.9553
Log pseudolikelihood -24895 -26765 -35858 -41607 -62708 -74346 -84986 -87809
Uncensored obs 6495 6628 7557 8340 11746 13128 16573 16381
Number of obs 16541 18429 24124 24165 38442 39615 40408 36852
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Table A4.5: Tobit marginal effects estimation results (continued)
Table A4.5b: International Remittances (Y=exrem)
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
1985 FIES 1988FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
ltotex 1.7631*** 1.9508*** 3.7225*** 4.8931*** 5.2937*** 9.6051*** 10.6978*** 16.8868***
(0.0826) (0.0995) (0.1443) (0.1881) (0.1650) (0.3544) (0.3792) (1.1489)
empsh -2.1476*** -2.9248*** -5.5233*** -5.2348*** -8.0159*** -12.1478*** -7.0589*** -10.2702***
(0.1869) (0.2375) (0.3733) (0.4685) (0.4336) (0.7203) (0.6889) (1.3082)
age0-6 -0.7699*** -1.9958*** -3.1334*** -3.5933*** -4.7657*** -8.9670*** -6.5424*** -6.2811***
(0.2422) (0.3282) (0.4849) (0.6412) (0.5819) (0.9884) (0.9463) (1.6556)
age7-14 -0.4154* -0.7575*** -1.7424*** -1.5404*** -2.5564*** -7.4610*** -4.4593*** -2.9086**
(0.2135) (0.2755) (0.4238) (0.5543) (0.5127) (0.8336) (0.8297) (1.3626)
age15-24 -0.1723 -0.5656** -1.0540*** -0.9482** -1.2376*** -3.1577*** -2.8202*** -2.9692**
(0.1863) (0.2388) (0.3603) (0.4832) (0.4429) (0.7384) (0.6687) (1.1940)
(age25+ omitted)
hage -0.0687*** -0.0237 -0.1257*** -0.1091*** -0.1141*** -0.2357*** -0.3526*** -0.4740***
(0.0144) (0.0193) (0.0296) (0.0408) (0.0351) (0.0605) (0.0539) (0.1006)
hage2 0.0007*** 0.0003 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0023*** 0.0036*** 0.0048***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0010)
hfemale 4.1950*** 6.0798*** 10.2295*** 12.1508*** 17.4278*** 22.9666*** 23.1598*** 27.9649***
(0.3922) (0.4868) (0.6728) (0.8241) (0.9157) (1.2614) (1.5618) (1.6003)
hmarried 0.9082*** 1.3409*** 2.3745*** 3.5176*** 3.9726*** 6.6924*** 6.1835*** 9.1330***
(0.0691) (0.0921) (0.1432) (0.1957) (0.1803) (0.3365) (0.3617) (0.5164)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.0652 -0.0337 0.3095* 0.1270 0.3130 1.2385*** 0.4526 0.8119
(0.0906) (0.1104) (0.1743) (0.2229) (0.2140) (0.3655) (0.3247) (0.6062)
hedu3 0.1556* 0.2741** 1.1393*** 1.1125*** 1.1629*** 2.0659*** 1.5579*** 2.6159***
(0.0906) (0.1305) (0.2160) (0.2636) (0.2428) (0.4154) (0.3667) (0.6389)
hedu4 -0.2027* 0.2009 0.1334 0.2773 -0.3210 -0.5207 -0.9771** -0.6551
(0.1042) (0.1753) (0.2556) (0.3483) (0.2941) (0.4777) (0.4489) (0.9906)
hnojob 1.1742*** 1.8439*** 2.9145*** 4.5072*** 4.4375*** 6.5846*** 5.5884*** 8.6786***
(0.1519) (0.2259) (0.2995) (0.4038) (0.3633) (0.5437) (0.6337) (0.9350)
urban -0.1865** -0.2909*** -0.6724*** -0.3617* -0.8417*** -1.6303*** N.A. -2.8746***
(0.0731) (0.0945) (0.1513) (0.1886) (0.1770) (0.2844) N.A. (0.4514)
agri -0.8979*** -1.0817*** -1.8911*** -2.5503*** -3.0034*** -4.7208*** -4.1510*** -6.8721***
(0.0767) (0.0965) (0.1434) (0.1815) (0.1711) (0.3089) (0.2662) (0.5738)
Ilocos 1.2892*** 2.2561*** 4.2035*** 4.5199*** 9.2888*** 13.4399*** 14.7596*** 29.9851***
(0.2031) (0.3037) (0.4808) (0.5670) (0.7553) (1.2264) (1.1589) (2.7238)
Cagayan 0.2341 0.0484 0.0832 1.6393*** 3.9896*** 4.6589*** 9.0348*** 22.1563***
(0.1807) (0.2409) (0.3650) (0.5571) (0.6585) (0.9627) (1.1119) (2.4062)
Cluzon 0.2787** 0.4811*** 1.1196*** 1.4450*** 1.9983*** 3.3121*** 7.7263*** 13.0875***
(0.1178) (0.1634) (0.2552) (0.3322) (0.3642) (0.5909) (0.7442) (1.7767)
Sluzon -0.0049 -0.2073 0.5020** 0.1604 0.8789*** 0.9918** 2.6098*** 7.0713***
(0.0971) (0.1276) (0.2157) (0.2664) (0.3017) (0.4944) (0.5606) (1.0508)
Bicol -0.2336* -0.8030*** -0.9125*** -1.1731*** -1.5002*** -0.9786 0.5498 4.2950***
(0.1365) (0.1333) (0.2536) (0.3326) (0.3108) (0.6427) (0.6818) (1.3083)
Wvisayas -0.0574 -0.2303 -0.1894 -0.1858 2.3659*** 4.7141*** 5.7410*** 11.7425***
(0.1227) (0.1564) (0.2485) (0.3343) (0.4379) (0.7887) (0.8745) (1.5756)
Cvisayas -0.2392** -0.5451*** -0.2375 -1.5820*** -0.1275 1.0415 3.9052*** 9.0083***
(0.1172) (0.1465) (0.2816) (0.2695) (0.3762) (0.6672) (0.8061) (1.5333)
Evisayas -0.1121 -0.5649*** 0.0591 -0.3029 0.4635 0.4330 3.8168*** 13.0547***
(0.1694) (0.1632) (0.3581) (0.4428) (0.4584) (0.7069) (0.8686) (2.5145)
Mindanao -0.9220*** -1.2551*** -1.3802*** -1.7543*** -0.5323** -0.3293 2.1943*** 6.1568***
(0.0689) (0.0976) (0.1630) (0.2252) (0.2587) (0.4591) (0.4877) (0.9860)
(NCR omitted)
CAR N.A. 0.3752 0.8555 0.0248 2.1589*** 3.7147*** 5.4549*** 13.4992***
N.A. (0.3076) (0.5374) (0.5449) (0.5662) (0.8380) (0.9741) (1.9608)
Pseudo R2 0.1268 0.1032 0.0962 0.0836 0.0822 0.0723 0.0721 0.0594
F 50.2708 48.4030 69.8240 74.5612 112.2230 50.1755 45.2088 23.3218
Log pseudolikelihood -14861 -17644 -27680 -31646 -46194 -53134 -57341 -61506
Uncensored obs 2511 2858 4257 4813 6637 7155 7896 8197
Number of obs 16541 18429 24124 24165 38442 39615 40408 36852
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Table A4. 6: Bivariate Tobit coefficient and marginal effect estimation results
Table A4.6a: Domestic Remittances (Y=inrem)
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors. ME denotes marginal effects.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME
ltotex -0.1750 * -0.0567 -0.3943 *** -0.1196 -1.1085 *** -0.2936 -0.9367 *** -0.2667 -2.3116 *** -0.6019 -1.9018 *** -0.5160 -0.4338 * -0.1500 0.8424 ** 0.3077
(0.0994) (0.1095) (0.1777) (0.2539) (0.2449) (0.3477) (0.2354) (0.3404)
empsh -1.8867 *** -0.6107 -2.8924 *** -0.8775 -5.4975 *** -1.4563 -6.6985 *** -1.9070 -7.8968 *** -2.0563 -12.3885 *** -3.3610 -0.0106 *** -0.0037 -0.0151 *** -0.0055
(0.2882) (0.3039) (0.5261) (0.6964) (0.6859) (0.9967) (0.0005) (0.0007)
age 0-6 0.2621 0.0848 -0.4453 -0.1351 -1.2254 * -0.3246 -0.3891 -0.1108 0.0231 0.0060 -1.2814 -0.3477 5.5369 *** 1.9152 12.8048 *** 4.6776
(0.3891) (0.4246) (0.7399) (1.0114) (0.9892) (1.4880) (0.9425) (1.3372)
age 7-14 0.3363 0.1089 -0.2007 -0.0609 -0.0949 -0.0251 0.7649 0.2178 1.1500 0.2995 -0.4598 -0.1248 7.0881 *** 2.4518 11.4430 *** 4.1801
(0.3410) (0.3894) (0.6247) (0.8485) (0.8430) (1.2605) (0.7806) (1.1005)
age 15-24 0.0675 0.0218 0.5335 * 0.1619 -0.1633 -0.0433 1.3036 * 0.3711 1.2624 * 0.3287 1.4090 0.3823 5.5626 *** 1.9241 9.3204 *** 3.4047
(0.2878) (0.3002) (0.5222) (0.6723) (0.6878) (0.9917) (0.6221) (0.9115)
(age 25+ omitted)
hage -0.0684 *** -0.0221 -0.1335 *** -0.0405 -0.2007 *** -0.0532 -0.2559 *** -0.0729 -0.1877 *** -0.0489 -0.5053 *** -0.1371 -0.2142 *** -0.0741 -0.4152 *** -0.1517
(0.0234) (0.0216) (0.0376) (0.0503) (0.0536) (0.0787) (0.0502) (0.0650)
hage2 0.0010 *** 0.0003 0.0016 *** 0.0005 0.0025 *** 0.0007 0.0032 *** 0.0009 0.0029 *** 0.0007 0.0062 *** 0.0017 0.0031 *** 0.0011 0.0055 *** 0.0020
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006)
hfemale -0.0796 -0.0258 0.6805 *** 0.2065 1.3055 *** 0.3458 0.7919 ** 0.2254 1.5162 *** 0.3948 2.6487 *** 0.7186 1.9636 *** 0.6792 2.4149 *** 0.8822
(0.1841) (0.1787) (0.2926) (0.4006) (0.4119) (0.5385) (0.4008) (0.5110)
hmarried -1.0090 *** -0.3266 -0.9984 *** -0.3029 -2.1581 *** -0.5717 -3.6240 *** -1.0318 -2.2917 *** -0.5968 -3.8366 *** -1.0409 -2.2678 *** -0.7844 -3.2991 *** -1.2052
(0.1853) (0.1768) (0.2911) (0.4118) (0.3944) (0.5526) (0.4199) (0.5347)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 -0.0373 -0.0121 0.0729 0.0221 -0.0020 -0.0005 0.1552 0.0442 0.4317 0.1124 1.1453 * 0.3107 0.7954 ** 0.2751 1.3988 ** 0.5110
(0.1559) (0.1557) (0.2599) (0.3645) (0.3716) (0.5955) (0.3960) (0.5919)
hedu3 0.1730 0.0560 0.1241 0.0377 0.0176 0.0047 -0.2605 -0.0742 -0.4699 -0.1224 -0.1886 -0.0512 0.2322 0.0803 0.4474 0.1634
(0.1549) (0.1765) (0.2941) (0.4154) (0.4083) (0.6436) (0.4268) (0.6243)
hedu4 -0.1218 -0.0394 -0.5225 ** -0.1585 0.2110 0.0559 -1.7804 *** -0.5069 -2.2205 *** -0.5782 -2.2987 *** -0.6236 -2.1731 *** -0.7517 -4.308014 *** -1.5737
(0.2114) (0.2231) (0.3611) (0.5252) (0.5148) (0.7547) (0.5277) (0.7454)
hnojob 1.1377 *** 0.3683 0.8307 *** 0.2520 1.2750 *** 0.3378 1.9453 *** 0.5538 3.0460 *** 0.7932 2.0136 *** 0.5463 0.7141 * 0.2470 2.4637 *** 0.9000
(0.1576) (0.1623) (0.2724) (0.3533) (0.3645) (0.5581) (0.4195) (0.5274)
urban 0.4370 *** 0.1415 -0.3857 *** -0.1170 -0.6603 *** -0.1749 0.6440 ** 0.1833 -0.4875 -0.1270 -0.6307 -0.1711 N.A. 0.8138 * 0.2973
(0.1368) (0.1380) (0.2318) (0.3258) (0.3065) (0.4939) N.A. (0.4726)
agri -0.9696 *** -0.3139 -1.0562 *** -0.3205 -1.7113 *** -0.4533 -1.6671 *** -0.4746 -3.9251 *** -1.0221 -4.5159 *** -1.2252 -4.7327 *** -1.6371 -4.9205 *** -1.7975
(0.1573) (0.1627) (0.2721) (0.3845) (0.3965) (0.6356) (0.3952) (0.6126)
Ilocos -0.1545 -0.0500 0.9929 *** 0.3013 -0.9118 * -0.2415 -2.3301 *** -0.6634 -1.2680 * -0.3302 0.5856 0.1589 -1.6166 ** -0.5592 4.9730 *** 1.8166
(0.2240) (0.2754) (0.4713) (0.6069) (0.6658) (0.8758) (0.6530) (0.9517)
Cagayan -1.3727 *** -0.4444 -0.7827 ** -0.2375 -4.6315 *** -1.2269 -7.7574 *** -2.2085 -5.4356 *** -1.4154 -9.3445 *** -2.5352 -3.8868 *** -1.3444 3.2512 *** 1.1877
(0.2858) (0.3151) (0.5962) (0.8239) (0.6819) (1.2222) (0.6796) (1.0440)
Cluzon 0.1815 0.0588 1.5991 *** 0.4852 -0.3318 -0.0879 -0.6862 -0.1954 -1.3268 *** -0.3455 4.4807 *** 1.2156 0.7255 0.2509 10.2423 *** 3.7415
(0.1847) (0.2090) (0.3265) (0.4725) (0.5136) (0.8336) (0.5605) (0.7511)
Sluzon -0.2331 -0.0755 0.4319 ** 0.1310 -1.5425 *** -0.4086 -2.9007 *** -0.8258 -3.5290 *** -0.9189 2.2045 *** 0.5981 1.1564 ** 0.4000 8.6124 *** 3.1461
(0.1901) (0.2152) (0.3216) (0.3992) (0.4777) (0.6551) (0.4748) (0.6276)
Bicol 0.2264 0.0733 1.5315 *** 0.4647 -0.3845 -0.1018 -0.7388 -0.2103 1.6970 ** 0.4419 5.5006 *** 1.4923 3.5817 *** 1.2389 14.9386 *** 5.4571
(0.2468) (0.2862) (0.4816) (0.6723) (0.6745) (1.0833) (0.5668) (0.9910)
Wvisayas -0.2467 -0.0799 0.5776 ** 0.1752 -0.1489 -0.0395 -2.3853 *** -0.6791 1.3354 ** 0.3477 5.6329 *** 1.5282 1.4832 ** 0.5130 8.2663 *** 3.0197
(0.2027) (0.2454) (0.3798) (0.5945) (0.5644) (0.8351) (0.6066) (0.8875)
Cvisayas -0.7236 *** -0.2342 0.3549 0.1077 -1.6896 *** -0.4476 -4.3206 *** -1.2301 -3.6030 *** -0.9382 1.2144 0.3295 -2.0125 *** -0.6961 4.9978 *** 1.8257
(0.2208) (0.2540) (0.4127) (0.6072) (0.6824) (1.0217) (0.6178) (0.9067)
Evisayas -1.0720 *** -0.3470 0.9124 *** 0.2768 -1.1889 ** -0.3149 -2.5265 *** -0.7193 -0.9854 -0.2566 0.3056 0.0829 2.5694 *** 0.8887 8.8870 *** 3.2464
(0.2900) (0.2839) (0.5419) (0.7664) (0.6417) (1.0427) (0.6218) (1.1137)
Mindanao -2.8049 *** -0.9079 -1.4876 *** -0.4513 -5.5429 *** -1.4683 -7.3888 *** -2.1036 -7.6206 *** -1.9844 -6.1158 *** -1.6592 -5.9963 *** -2.0741 0.4968 0.1815
(0.1886) (0.1931) (0.3352) (0.4388) (0.4643) (0.6372) (0.4584) (0.6496)
(NCR omitted))
CAR -2.6575 *** -0.8063 -6.2571 *** -1.6575 -10.0986 *** -2.8751 -6.6486 *** -1.7313 -5.9331 *** -1.6096 -5.3843 *** -1.8624 1.0725 0.3918
(0.4625) (0.7336) (1.0348) (0.6831) (1.1544) (0.6892) (0.8271)
constant 2.4330 ** 5.5178 *** 15.0072 *** 14.2783 *** 24.2232 *** 21.9451 *** 0.3535 -21.7162 ***
(1.1011) (1.1808) (2.0601) (2.9047) (2.9219) (4.2555) (2.8678) (3.9673)
Scale Factor 0.3237 0.3034 0.2649 0.2847 0.2604 0.2713 0.3459 0.3653
Sigma(1) 5.2143 *** 5.8973 *** 10.7447 *** 14.9657 *** 18.9642 *** 28.6491 *** 20.8131 *** 29.2828 ***
(0.0130) (0.0199) (0.0317) (0.0333) (0.0434) (0.0471) (0.0224) (0.0355)
Sigma(2) 28.0565 *** 33.1112 *** 50.3730 *** 56.4322 *** 74.1763 *** 124.8148 *** 116.4606 *** 155.0845 ***
(0.2753) (0.2815) (0.3698) (0.3991) (0.4697) (0.3485) (0.3428) (0.2541)
rho(1,2) -0.1089 *** -0.0986 *** -0.0864 *** -0.0616 *** -0.0895 *** -0.0850 *** -0.0630 *** -0.0922 ***
(0.0142) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0101) (0.0097) (0.0054) (0.0082) (0.0059)
Log Likelihood -39722.86 -44381.05 -63510.31 -73236.25 -108856.6 -127433.3 -154187.2 -161757.3
Number of Obs 16541 18429 24124 24165 38442 39615 42094 38480
Nonlimit Obs for Inrem 6495 6628 7557 8340 11746 13128 17626 17451
Nonlimit Obs for Exrem 2511 2858 4257 4813 6637 7155 8729 8970
1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES
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Table A4.6: Bivariate Tobit coefficient and marginal effect estimation results (continued)
Table A4.6b: International Remittances (Y=exrem)
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors. ME denotes marginal effects.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME
ltotex 22.7608 *** 1.7480 20.122 *** 1.9397 32.9055 *** 3.7183 35.5968 *** 4.9052 44.6292 *** 5.2796 80.1292 *** 9.6395 90.8563 *** 12.2656 114.6933 *** 18.5574
(0.6415) (0.7157) (0.9136) (1.0010) (1.0964) (1.5768) (1.3920) (1.8450)
empsh -28.1958 *** -2.1654 -30.439 *** -2.9343 -49.01129 *** -5.5383 -38.2944 *** -5.2770 -67.57805 *** -7.9945 -101.4255 *** -12.2015 -0.0600 *** -0.0081 -0.065972 *** -0.0107
(2.1866) (2.1248) (2.8239) (2.9216) (3.2018) (5.0456) (0.0039) (0.0060)
age 0-6 -10.1164 *** -0.7769 -20.625 *** -1.9882 -27.8253 *** -3.1443 -25.96863 *** -3.5785 -39.55563 *** -4.6794 -74.71494 *** -8.9882 -6.2864 -0.8487 11.77153 1.9046
(3.0111) (3.1880) (4.0176) (4.3856) (4.6533) (8.0113) (6.3432) (8.8579)
age 7-14 -5.4706 ** -0.4201 -7.7086 *** -0.7431 -15.4833 *** -1.7496 -11.1699 *** -1.5392 -21.56557 *** -2.5512 -62.35598 *** -7.5014 4.3411 0.5860 24.19381 *** 3.9146
(2.5521) (2.7350) (3.4448) (3.5862) (3.9164) (6.8922) (5.1953) (7.1600)
age 15-24 -2.3382 -0.1796 -5.5652 ** -0.5365 -9.1902 *** -1.0385 -6.7795 ** -0.9342 -10.18586 *** -1.2050 -26.07361 *** -3.1367 -3.4439 -0.4649 3.69655 0.5981
(2.2184) (2.3006) (3.0330) (3.2111) (3.3116) (5.4631) (4.5172) (6.5002)
(age 25+ omitted)
hage -0.8894 *** -0.0683 -0.2819 -0.0272 -1.1401 *** -0.1288 -0.8172 *** -0.1126 -1.0038 *** -0.1188 -2.0821 *** -0.2505 -1.7874 *** -0.2413 -2.2731 *** -0.3678
(0.1863) (0.1880) (0.2342) (0.2561) (0.2650) (0.4549) (0.3892) (0.5384)
hage2 0.0090 *** 0.0007 0.0029 0.0003 0.0118 *** 0.0013 0.0082 *** 0.0011 0.0105 *** 0.0012 0.0199 *** 0.0024 0.0183 *** 0.0025 0.0233 *** 0.0038
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0051)
hfemale 27.2075 *** 2.0895 32.8887 *** 3.1705 49.4694 *** 5.5900 52.4813 *** 7.2319 78.6100 *** 9.2996 114.6261 *** 13.7895 102.0343 *** 13.7746 109.5616 *** 17.7271
(1.0782) (1.1460) (1.4958) (1.5277) (1.6444) (2.6457) (2.4535) (3.2545)
hmarried 16.5253 *** 1.2691 19.3849 *** 1.8687 28.3541 *** 3.2040 34.5352 *** 4.7590 45.7561 *** 5.4130 72.9454 *** 8.7753 67.1375 *** 9.0636 69.7213 *** 11.2809
(1.1435) (1.2420) (1.5282) (1.5779) (1.7063) (2.8250) (2.6437) (3.5480)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.8276 0.0636 -0.3819 -0.0368 2.7455 * 0.3102 0.8995 0.1240 2.5292 0.2992 9.9344 *** 1.1951 3.6654 0.4948 5.1644 0.8356
(1.1638) (1.1827) (1.5430) (1.6562) (1.8350) (3.2614) (2.8292) (3.6143)
hedu3 1.9796 * 0.1520 2.6348 ** 0.2540 9.3699 *** 1.0588 7.5684 *** 1.0429 9.3547 *** 1.1067 16.3798 *** 1.9705 10.9912 *** 1.4838 16.1311 *** 2.6100
(1.1115) (1.3283) (1.6529) (1.8092) (1.9388) (3.3679) (2.9549) (3.8810)
hedu4 -2.8118 * -0.2159 1.9378 0.1868 1.2162 0.1374 1.8156 0.2502 -2.7078 -0.3203 -4.7305 -0.5691 -10.4260 *** -1.4075 -7.3917 * -1.1960
(1.4524) (1.5948) (2.0416) (2.2281) (2.3750) (4.0087) (3.5087) (4.4027)
hnojob 11.3320 *** 0.8703 14.1841 *** 1.3673 20.0252 *** 2.2628 25.3455 *** 3.4926 29.4098 *** 3.4792 44.5104 *** 5.3546 46.8613 *** 6.3263 57.8734 *** 9.3639
(1.0804) (1.1477) (1.4739) (1.5126) (1.6991) (2.7508) (2.5079) (3.2046)
urban -2.4239 *** -0.1862 -3.0275 *** -0.2919 -5.8161 *** -0.6572 -2.5684 * -0.3539 -6.9535 *** -0.8226 -13.1600 *** -1.5831 N.A. -16.9103 *** -2.7361
(0.9221) (1.0060) (1.2986) (1.3849) (1.4571) (2.5366) N.A. (2.9494)
agri -12.6188 *** -0.9691 -12.2898 *** -1.1847 -18.4083 *** -2.0801 -20.4837 *** -2.8227 -29.1008 *** -3.4426 -45.0143 *** -5.4152 -32.51372 *** -4.3894 -44.9063 *** -7.2658
(1.2483) (1.3039) (1.6857) (1.8730) (2.0907) (3.6864) (2.9645) (4.0116)
Ilocos 11.8190 *** 0.9077 15.8765 *** 1.5305 25.1713 *** 2.8444 24.1104 *** 3.3224 48.3145 *** 5.7156 72.7610 *** 8.7531 73.3594 *** 9.9035 116.0306 *** 18.7737
(1.5128) (1.8795) (2.3865) (2.5840) (2.8878) (4.7050) (4.2095) (6.0695)
Cagayan 2.7405 0.2105 0.3807 0.0367 0.5832 0.0659 10.3671 *** 1.4286 25.9350 *** 3.0681 31.9367 *** 3.8420 48.2838 *** 6.5183 90.2805 *** 14.6074
(1.9585) (2.2627) (3.0829) (3.1418) (3.5021) (5.8486) (4.5024) (6.7369)
Cluzon 3.2304 ** 0.2481 4.4535 *** 0.4293 8.5881 *** 0.9705 9.3910 *** 1.2941 14.6205 *** 1.7296 23.9623 *** 2.8827 44.5615 *** 6.0158 62.7131 *** 10.1470
(1.2831) (1.4401) (1.7824) (1.8935) (2.3283) (3.9478) (3.7621) (4.6884)
Sluzon -0.0489 -0.0038 -2.2575 -0.2176 4.0303 ** 0.4554 1.1075 0.1526 6.9487 *** 0.8220 8.0342 ** 0.9665 18.2192 *** 2.4596 36.3097 *** 5.8749
(1.2819) (1.4544) (1.7187) (1.8340) (2.0946) (3.3091) (3.0890) (4.2455)
Bicol -3.3468 * -0.2570 -10.4424 *** -1.0066 -9.1391 *** -1.0327 -9.4929 *** -1.3081 -14.5205 *** -1.7178 -8.3843 -1.0086 4.1847 0.5649 21.3189 *** 3.4494
(1.8857) (2.1752) (3.0190) (3.0833) (3.6835) (5.5703) (4.5299) (6.5036)
Wvisayas -0.6390 -0.0491 -2.5071 -0.2417 -1.7521 -0.1980 -1.4010 -0.1931 16.9002 *** 1.9993 32.6491 *** 3.9277 34.8363 *** 4.7029 56.9037 *** 9.2070
(1.6518) (1.6911) (2.3258) (2.3954) (2.7459) (4.2285) (3.9572) (5.8414)
Cvisayas -3.3258 * -0.2554 -6.5446 *** -0.6309 -2.1999 -0.2486 -13.6461 *** -1.8804 -1.2441 -0.1472 8.3343 1.0026 25.8405 *** 3.4885 45.6693 *** 7.3893
(1.9582) (1.9032) (2.3985) (2.7931) (3.1679) (5.2383) (3.9677) (5.5240)
Evisayas -1.5264 -0.1172 -6.8526 *** -0.6606 0.3716 0.0420 -2.3770 -0.3276 3.7938 0.4488 3.5685 0.4293 25.3264 *** 3.4191 61.7093 *** 9.9846
(2.2811) (2.5213) (3.2165) (3.5050) (3.4098) (5.5777) (4.9127) (6.2255)
Mindanao -15.570 *** -1.1958 -16.018 *** -1.5441 -13.843 *** -1.5643 -14.050 *** -1.9361 -4.531 ** -0.5360 -2.317 -0.2788 16.769 *** 2.2638 37.308 *** 6.0365
(1.4974) (1.5089) (1.9985) (2.0059) (2.2457) (3.5420) (3.1956) (4.3930)
(NCR omitted))
CAR 3.3902 0.3268 6.5686 * 0.7423 0.0549 0.0076 15.8221 *** 1.8718 26.3712 *** 3.1725 33.9276 *** 4.5802 63.3675 *** 10.2529
(2.7689) (3.5705) (4.1478) (3.1545) (5.5465) (4.7727) (6.7131)
constant -245.11 *** -238.69 *** -385.28 *** -442.41 *** -579.17 *** -1027.237 *** -1216.118 *** -1549.853 ***
(7.6090) (8.1454) (11.2735) (12.5188) (13.4090) (20.9545) (17.4417) (23.6004)
Scale Factor 0.0768 0.0964 0.1130 0.1378 0.1183 0.1203 0.1350 0.1618
Sigma(1) 5.2143 *** 5.8973 *** 10.7447 *** 14.9657 *** 18.9642 *** 28.6491 *** 20.8131 *** 29.2828 ***
(0.0130) (0.0199) (0.0317) (0.0333) (0.0434) (0.0471) (0.0224) (0.0355)
Sigma(2) 28.0565 *** 33.1112 *** 50.3730 *** 56.4322 *** 74.1763 *** 124.8148 *** 116.4606 *** 155.0845 ***
(0.2753) (0.2815) (0.3698) (0.3991) (0.4697) (0.3485) (0.3428) (0.2541)
rho(1,2) -0.1089 *** -0.0986 *** -0.0864 *** -0.0616 *** -0.0895 *** -0.0850 *** -0.0630 *** -0.0922 ***
(0.0142) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0101) (0.0097) (0.0054) (0.0082) (0.0059)
Log Likelihood -39722.86 -44381.05 -63510.31 -73236.25 -108856.6 -127433.3 -154187.2 -161757.3
Number of Obs 16541 18429 24124 24165 38442 39615 42094 38480
Nonlimit Obs for Inrem 6495 6628 7557 8340 11746 13128 17626 17451
Nonlimit Obs for Exrem 2511 2858 4257 4813 6637 7155 8729 8970
1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES
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Table A4. 7: Probit marginal effects of international remittances on the probability of
domestic remittances
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Remittance
exrem -0.0052*** -0.0037*** -0.0021*** -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0010*** -0.0006*** -0.0006***
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Welfare level
Bottom 20% -0.0535* -0.1159*** -0.0837*** -0.1844*** -0.1130*** -0.1144*** -0.1374*** -0.1716***
(0.0298) (0.0278) (0.0226) (0.0231) (0.0182) (0.0141) (0.0169) (0.0187)
Bottom 20%-40% -0.0241 -0.0094 -0.1294*** -0.0721** -0.0516* -0.0686*** 0.0085 0.0106
(0.0463) (0.0421) (0.0334) (0.0351) (0.0272) (0.0263) (0.0283) (0.0312)
Middle -0.0672 -0.1159** -0.1216*** -0.0813** -0.1157*** -0.1297*** -0.0894*** -0.0880***
(0.0487) (0.0462) (0.0356) (0.0377) (0.0284) (0.0279) (0.0295) (0.0315)
Top20%-40% -0.2010*** -0.0694* -0.0923*** -0.1033*** -0.1647*** -0.1419*** -0.1542*** -0.1418***
(0.0403) (0.0377) (0.0293) (0.0310) (0.0239) (0.0233) (0.0228) (0.0242)
Top20% -0.0351 -0.0831*** -0.0480** -0.0588*** -0.0350** -0.0319** -0.0979*** -0.0789***
(0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0200) (0.0203) (0.0168) (0.0143) (0.0141) (0.0151)
Family composition
empsh -0.0615*** -0.1054*** -0.1613*** -0.1224*** -0.1293*** -0.1526*** -0.1258*** -0.1295***
(0.0228) (0.0201) (0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0149) (0.0158)
age0-6 0.1413*** 0.0903*** 0.0396 0.0863*** 0.0786*** 0.0533*** 0.1152*** 0.1930***
(0.0320) (0.0296) (0.0246) (0.0257) (0.0193) (0.0202) (0.0214) (0.0233)
age7-14 0.1248*** 0.0584** 0.0480** 0.0937*** 0.0645*** 0.0585*** 0.1334*** 0.1513***
(0.0281) (0.0258) (0.0217) (0.0221) (0.0169) (0.0173) (0.0184) (0.0196)
age15-24 0.0456* -0.0021 -0.0250 0.0179 0.0154 0.0284* 0.0375** 0.0649***
(0.0239) (0.0216) (0.0185) (0.0195) (0.0145) (0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0163)
(age25+ omitted)
Head characteristics
hage -0.0055*** -0.0043** -0.0033** -0.0022 -0.0003 -0.0025** -0.0028** -0.0013
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014)
hage2 0.000084*** 0.000069*** 0.000061*** 0.000051*** 0.000032*** 0.000053*** 0.000059*** 0.000049***
(0.000020) (0.000018) (0.000015) (0.000015) (0.000011) (0.000012) (0.000012) (0.000013)
hfemale 0.0349** 0.0329** 0.0605*** 0.0293** 0.0524*** 0.0419*** 0.0595*** 0.0365***
(0.0171) (0.0157) (0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0106)
hmarried -0.0275* -0.0398*** -0.0358*** -0.0475*** -0.0085 -0.0247** -0.0122 -0.0198*
(0.0164) (0.0150) (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0095) (0.0097) (0.0102) (0.0103)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 -0.0060 0.0071 -0.0023 0.0004 0.0040 0.0229*** 0.0146** 0.0220***
(0.0108) (0.0094) (0.0079) (0.0083) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0073)
hedu3 0.0105 -0.0073 0.0044 -0.0071 -0.0170** 0.0028 -0.0006 0.0038
(0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0095) (0.0098) (0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0078) (0.0082)
hedu4 -0.0213 -0.0572*** -0.0394*** -0.0571*** -0.0700*** -0.0552*** -0.0464*** -0.0769***
(0.0182) (0.0160) (0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0116) (0.0121)
hnojob 0.0686*** 0.0599*** 0.0317*** 0.0437*** 0.0442*** 0.0231*** -0.0054 0.0082
(0.0144) (0.0141) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0099) (0.0097)
Urban/Rural
urban 0.0411*** -0.0336*** -0.0228*** 0.0282*** -0.0067 0.0060 N.A. 0.0294***
(0.0098) (0.0090) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0057) (0.0057) N.A. (0.0066)
Farming
agri -0.0813*** -0.0637*** -0.0614*** -0.0500*** -0.0719*** -0.0721*** -0.1041*** -0.0892***
(0.0101) (0.0091) (0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0070)
Region
Ilocos 0.0372** 0.0785*** -0.0027 -0.0492*** -0.0200 0.0276* -0.0401*** 0.1398***
(0.0189) (0.0195) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0130) (0.0145) (0.0134) (0.0145)
Cagayan -0.1047*** -0.0893*** -0.1507*** -0.1934*** -0.1416*** -0.1057*** -0.1257*** 0.0853***
(0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0109) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0156)
Cluzon 0.0722*** 0.1509*** 0.0193 0.0283** -0.0177* 0.1506*** 0.0439*** 0.2726***
(0.0169) (0.0163) (0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0106) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0115)
Sluzon 0.0585*** 0.0563*** -0.0312*** -0.0557*** -0.0724*** 0.0865*** 0.0609*** 0.2197***
(0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0090) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0109)
Bicol 0.0451** 0.1220*** -0.0103 -0.0173 0.0249* 0.1298*** 0.0628*** 0.3108***
(0.0200) (0.0195) (0.0153) (0.0157) (0.0133) (0.0146) (0.0138) (0.0126)
Wvisayas -0.0111 0.0305* 0.0011 -0.0468*** 0.0122 0.1256*** 0.0397*** 0.1887***
(0.0176) (0.0169) (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0134)
Cvisayas -0.0709*** 0.0053 -0.0893*** -0.1424*** -0.0965*** 0.0457*** -0.0725*** 0.1014***
(0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0126) (0.0120) (0.0106) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0141)
Evisayas -0.0973*** 0.0381* -0.0527*** -0.0856*** -0.0607*** 0.0163 0.0172 0.1873***
(0.0195) (0.0205) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0119) (0.0135) (0.0142) (0.0148)
Mindanao -0.2098*** -0.1249*** -0.1920*** -0.2022*** -0.1769*** -0.0810*** -0.1660*** 0.0247**
(0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0093) (0.0097) (0.0083) (0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0111)
(NCR omitted)
CAR N.A. -0.1818*** -0.1994*** -0.2333*** -0.1589*** -0.0526*** -0.1635*** -0.0250
N.A. (0.0203) (0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0104) (0.0140) (0.0132) (0.0167)
Wald chi2 1250.44 1306.88 1638.17 1608.11 2506.36 2941.84 2728.74 3049.59
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0634 0.0607 0.0619 0.0559 0.0603 0.0674 0.0542 0.0666
Log pseudolikelihood -10378.663 -11307.698 -14068.356 -14700.641 -22233.903 -23465.176 -25870.045 -23629.638
Number of obs 16541 18429 24124 24165 38442 39615 40408 36852
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Table A4. 8: Tobit marginal effects of international remittances on the level of domestic remittances
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
1985 FIES 1988 FIES 1991 FIES 1994 FIES 1997 FIES 2000 FIES 2003 FIES 2006 FIES
Remittance
exrem -0.0292*** -0.0208*** -0.0185*** -0.0181*** -0.0234*** -0.0164*** -0.0129*** -0.0156***
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0052) (0.0022) (0.0036)
Welfare level
Bottom 20% 0.0866 -0.1323 -0.0941 -0.9760*** -0.5275*** -0.5690*** -0.8122*** -1.4207***
(0.0902) (0.0912) (0.1311) (0.1887) (0.1866) (0.1940) (0.1908) (0.2799)
Bottom 20%-40% -0.0005 0.0947 -0.6899*** -0.5321* -0.2876 -0.8560** 0.4578 1.0129**
(0.1458) (0.1547) (0.2093) (0.3105) (0.3112) (0.4200) (0.3409) (0.4957)
Middle 0.0585 -0.0697 -0.3678 0.0057 -0.7189** -0.5872 0.2184 0.3080
(0.1682) (0.1878) (0.2477) (0.3632) (0.3494) (0.4956) (0.4065) (0.5753)
Top20%-40% -0.3395* -0.2439 -0.3106 -0.9785** -1.1749*** -3.0878*** -1.3076** -1.0847
(0.1820) (0.1899) (0.2601) (0.3973) (0.3418) (0.8084) (0.5089) (0.6898)
Top20% 0.5139*** 0.2006 0.6533** 1.7797*** 0.9520*** 3.3853*** 1.3266** 3.3919***
(0.1917) (0.1547) (0.2660) (0.4981) (0.3106) (0.7927) (0.6653) (0.8598)
Family composition
empsh -0.7242*** -0.9683*** -1.6183*** -2.0509*** -2.3139*** -3.6271*** -2.7912*** -3.2394***
(0.0984) (0.1024) (0.1514) (0.2275) (0.1986) (0.3106) (0.2425) (0.3528)
age0-6 0.0070 -0.1916 -0.3812** -0.0894 -0.1625 -0.4735 -0.1134 2.2947***
(0.1468) (0.1439) (0.1926) (0.2793) (0.2627) (0.4186) (0.3341) (0.5201)
age7-14 0.0904 -0.0792 -0.0206 0.3852 0.2820 -0.1047 0.5515* 1.8815***
(0.1168) (0.1102) (0.1636) (0.2398) (0.2284) (0.3544) (0.2833) (0.4255)
age15-24 0.0170 0.1513 -0.0155 0.5070** 0.3559* 0.5651* 0.5742** 1.2075***
(0.1042) (0.1114) (0.1518) (0.2577) (0.2152) (0.3362) (0.2617) (0.3776)
(age25+ omitted)
Head characteristics
hage -0.0278*** -0.0426*** -0.0555*** -0.0734*** -0.0537*** -0.1353*** -0.0772*** -0.1314***
(0.0083) (0.0106) (0.0138) (0.0222) (0.0170) (0.0312) (0.0189) (0.0421)
hage2 0.000353*** 0.000492*** 0.000673*** 0.000902*** 0.000771*** 0.001626*** 0.001101*** 0.001908***
(0.000080) (0.000100) (0.000128) (0.000204) (0.000160) (0.000299) (0.000186) (0.000426)
hfemale 0.2333*** 0.4712*** 0.7340*** 0.5794*** 1.0644*** 1.3299*** 1.6377*** 1.7057***
(0.0835) (0.0991) (0.1452) (0.1883) (0.1931) (0.3396) (0.2684) (0.3696)
hmarried -0.1690** -0.1689** -0.3762*** -0.8291*** -0.2429 -0.6590** -0.2845 -0.6400**
(0.0778) (0.0804) (0.1191) (0.1838) (0.1553) (0.2737) (0.1846) (0.2993)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 -0.0158 0.0124 0.0048 0.0778 0.1148 0.3869*** 0.2149** 0.5353***
(0.0400) (0.0380) (0.0547) (0.0831) (0.0778) (0.1172) (0.0949) (0.1385)
hedu3 0.0581 0.0410 0.0343 -0.0275 -0.0850 0.1005 -0.0292 0.2199
(0.0424) (0.0510) (0.0694) (0.1003) (0.0930) (0.1367) (0.1147) (0.1668)
hedu4 -0.1092 -0.1737** -0.0522 -0.6685*** -0.6409*** -0.9164*** -0.7133** -1.5973***
(0.0857) (0.0816) (0.1276) (0.1837) (0.1551) (0.2759) (0.3133) (0.3322)
hnojob 0.5667*** 0.4003*** 0.5222*** 0.8147*** 1.1666*** 0.8789*** -0.0709 0.5233*
(0.0895) (0.0877) (0.1069) (0.1603) (0.1598) (0.1961) (0.1670) (0.2733)
Urban/Rural
urban 0.1247*** -0.1302*** -0.1747*** 0.2047*** -0.1427** -0.1227 N.A. 0.2018
(0.0375) (0.0383) (0.0499) (0.0708) (0.0727) (0.1000) N.A. (0.1331)
Farming
agri -0.3133*** -0.3117*** -0.4706*** -0.5356*** -0.9874*** -1.3131*** -1.5622*** -1.8845***
(0.0334) (0.0337) (0.0475) (0.0709) (0.0686) (0.1028) (0.1041) (0.1155)
Region
Ilocos -0.0320 0.3369*** -0.1537 -0.4533*** -0.1532 0.5059 -0.1847 2.7783***
(0.0762) (0.0967) (0.1061) (0.1551) (0.1759) (0.3665) (0.2216) (0.4281)
Cagayan -0.3840*** -0.2270** -0.9301*** -1.5743*** -1.1347*** -1.9492*** -1.0284*** 1.9794***
(0.0662) (0.0931) (0.0911) (0.1300) (0.1712) (0.2600) (0.2837) (0.4319)
Cluzon 0.0708 0.5493*** -0.0079 -0.0105 -0.2132 1.6692*** 0.3800 5.0592***
(0.0855) (0.0921) (0.0995) (0.1356) (0.1458) (0.2889) (0.2311) (0.4636)
Sluzon -0.0699 0.1217* -0.3443*** -0.6515*** -0.7758*** 0.8197*** 0.5216** 3.8017***
(0.0627) (0.0735) (0.0857) (0.1282) (0.1236) (0.2669) (0.2207) (0.3845)
Bicol 0.0735 0.4934*** -0.0994 -0.1450 0.4559** 1.7315*** 1.3058*** 6.8217***
(0.0843) (0.0983) (0.1102) (0.1562) (0.1884) (0.3349) (0.3221) (0.5280)
Wvisayas -0.0883 0.1682** -0.0150 -0.5265*** 0.4536** 1.9098*** 0.7922*** 3.9650***
(0.0768) (0.0838) (0.1090) (0.1296) (0.1809) (0.3391) (0.2606) (0.4642)
Cvisayas -0.2050*** 0.0986 -0.4046*** -1.0573*** -0.8164*** 0.4365 -0.6457*** 2.3204***
(0.0731) (0.0868) (0.1021) (0.1283) (0.1405) (0.2885) (0.1935) (0.4007)
Evisayas -0.2982*** 0.2805*** -0.2901*** -0.6188*** -0.1943 0.1364 0.9114*** 3.9421***
(0.0690) (0.1067) (0.1095) (0.1472) (0.1781) (0.2879) (0.2796) (0.4563)
Mindanao -0.7734*** -0.4456*** -1.2270*** -1.7416*** -1.7432*** -1.4594*** -1.8193*** 0.5476*
(0.0508) (0.0649) (0.0840) (0.1213) (0.1215) (0.2422) (0.1587) (0.2981)
(NCR omitted)
CAR N.A. -0.6240*** -1.1333*** -1.8535*** -1.3498*** -1.2013*** -1.6041*** 0.2564
N.A. (0.0816) (0.1061) (0.1498) (0.1582) (0.2738) (0.2051) (0.5112)
Pseudo R2 0.0298 0.0235 0.0229 0.0192 0.0183 0.0147 0.0123 0.0118
F 15.69 20.96 23.75 17.01 36.24 30.19 30.92 34.13
Log pseudolikelihood -24757 -26682 -35755 -41507 -62546 -74168 -84890 -87682
Uncensored obs 6495 6628 7557 8340 11746 13128 16573 16381
Number of obs 16541 18429 24124 24165 38442 39615 40408 36852
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Chapter 5
Table A5. 1: Pooled regression results on expenditure levels (including remittance dummy
variables)
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
mean 10th 50th 90th mean 10th 50th 90th
dexrem 0.235*** 0.216*** 0.228*** 0.256*** 0.291*** 0.275*** 0.292*** 0.332***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.019) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
dinrem -0.064*** -0.045*** -0.074*** -0.061*** -0.080*** -0.047*** -0.083*** -0.085***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
dbothrem 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.136*** 0.143*** 0.235*** 0.234*** 0.242*** 0.225***
(0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.024) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019)
empsh 0.446*** 0.381*** 0.464*** 0.480*** 0.465*** 0.413*** 0.474*** 0.530***
(0.018) (0.027) (0.019) (0.032) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.023)
age0_6 -0.288*** -0.296*** -0.276*** -0.294*** -0.289*** -0.287*** -0.277*** -0.293***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
age7_14 -0.229*** -0.222*** -0.221*** -0.229*** -0.227*** -0.208*** -0.228*** -0.231***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
age15_24 -0.089*** -0.080*** -0.091*** -0.087*** -0.092*** -0.058*** -0.087*** -0.105***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
(age 25+ omitted)
hfemale 0.065*** 0.024 0.078*** 0.114*** 0.035*** 0.022* 0.032** 0.037**
(0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.024) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
hage 0.0008 0.0027 0.0037** -0.0007 0.0010 0.0012 0.0014 -0.0034
(0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0022)
hage2 0.000001 -0.000030 -0.000026 0.000032 -0.000006 -0.000021 -0.000010 0.000058***
(0.000016) (0.000023) (0.000017) (0.000029) (0.000013) (0.000017) (0.000016) (0.000021)
hmarried -0.015 0.019 0.003 -0.036 -0.003 0.026** 0.006 -0.044**
(0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.023) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.134*** 0.090*** 0.125*** 0.165*** 0.142*** 0.123*** 0.138*** 0.162***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012)
hedu3 0.395*** 0.310*** 0.389*** 0.475*** 0.416*** 0.328*** 0.396*** 0.503***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.018) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
hedu4 0.865*** 0.748*** 0.857*** 0.984*** 1.012*** 0.849*** 0.997*** 1.165***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.015) (0.024) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
hnojob 0.088*** 0.052*** 0.087*** 0.119*** 0.084*** 0.043*** 0.093*** 0.135***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.019) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
urban 0.147*** 0.120*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.185*** 0.157*** 0.179*** 0.212***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
agri -0.248*** -0.183*** -0.248*** -0.297*** -0.248*** -0.173*** -0.241*** -0.313***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Ilocos -0.532*** -0.551*** -0.515*** -0.515*** -0.463*** -0.450*** -0.461*** -0.451***
(0.015) (0.026) (0.018) (0.029) (0.014) (0.021) (0.019) (0.024)
Cagayan -0.410*** -0.551*** -0.413*** -0.302*** -0.355*** -0.389*** -0.349*** -0.343***
(0.019) (0.029) (0.021) (0.034) (0.016) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026)
Cluzon -0.265*** -0.314*** -0.247*** -0.240*** -0.284*** -0.262*** -0.266*** -0.292***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.014) (0.023) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019)
Sluzon -0.269*** -0.364*** -0.265*** -0.205*** -0.242*** -0.298*** -0.227*** -0.228***
(0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.022) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
Bicol -0.537*** -0.621*** -0.550*** -0.481*** -0.521*** -0.574*** -0.508*** -0.509***
(0.016) (0.025) (0.018) (0.030) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023)
Wvisayas -0.397*** -0.459*** -0.398*** -0.370*** -0.405*** -0.456*** -0.413*** -0.356***
(0.014) (0.022) (0.016) (0.026) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021)
Cvisayas -0.594*** -0.737*** -0.596*** -0.482*** -0.565*** -0.698*** -0.561*** -0.455***
(0.015) (0.023) (0.017) (0.027) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023)
Evisayas -0.615*** -0.681*** -0.593*** -0.581*** -0.607*** -0.671*** -0.607*** -0.556***
(0.016) (0.028) (0.020) (0.032) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023)
Mindanao -0.501*** -0.622*** -0.506*** -0.404*** -0.569*** -0.641*** -0.546*** -0.515***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.021) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
(NCR omitted)
CAR -0.361*** -0.411*** -0.364*** -0.303*** -0.348*** -0.411*** -0.345*** -0.278***
(0.023) (0.037) (0.027) (0.043) (0.015) (0.021) (0.019) (0.025)
constant 9.514*** 9.033*** 9.407*** 10.024*** 9.932*** 9.406*** 9.887*** 10.548***
(0.044) (0.064) (0.048) (0.079) (0.037) (0.048) (0.044) (0.061)
R-squared 0.5798 0.3158 0.3674 0.3677 0.5845 0.3072 0.3717 0.3861
Number of obs 24165 24165 24165 24165 39615 39615 39615 39615
1994 FIES 2000 FIES
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Table A5. 2: Interquantile regression results on expenditure gaps
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
50th-10th 90th-50th 90th-10th 50th-10th 90th-50th 90th-10th
dexrem 0.012 0.028 0.040 0.017 0.040** 0.057***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020)
dinrem -0.030** 0.013 -0.016 -0.036*** -0.002 -0.038***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
dbothrem -0.009 0.007 -0.002 0.007 -0.016 -0.009
(0.019) (0.028) (0.031) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026)
empsh 0.083*** 0.016 0.099** 0.060*** 0.056** 0.116***
(0.025) (0.035) (0.046) (0.022) (0.026) (0.033)
age0_6 0.020 -0.017 0.003 0.010 -0.016* -0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
age7_14 0.001 -0.008 -0.007 -0.020** -0.003 -0.024**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
age15_24 -0.011 0.004 -0.007 -0.029*** -0.018** -0.047***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
(age25+ omitted)
hfemale 0.053*** 0.037 0.090*** 0.009 0.006 0.015
(0.020) (0.023) (0.028) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019)
hage 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 -0.005** -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
hage2 0.000003 0.000058* 0.000061 0.00001 0.000068*** 0.000078***
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00003)
hmarried -0.015 -0.040* -0.055* -0.021 -0.050*** -0.071***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.029) (0.018) (0.014) (0.021)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.035** 0.040*** 0.075*** 0.014 0.024** 0.038**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015)
hedu3 0.079*** 0.086*** 0.165*** 0.068*** 0.107*** 0.175***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017)
hedu4 0.109*** 0.128*** 0.236*** 0.149*** 0.168*** 0.317***
(0.025) (0.021) (0.034) (0.020) (0.015) (0.023)
hnojob 0.034* 0.032 0.066** 0.050*** 0.042*** 0.092***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.029) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018)
urban 0.029** 0.00009 0.029** 0.022** 0.033*** 0.055***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
agri -0.064*** -0.049*** -0.113*** -0.068*** -0.072*** -0.140***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.021) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Ilocos 0.036 -0.00016 0.036 -0.012 0.010 -0.001
(0.029) (0.028) (0.039) (0.024) (0.030) (0.036)
Cagayan 0.138*** 0.112*** 0.249*** 0.041* 0.005 0.046
(0.035) (0.038) (0.044) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030)
Cluzon 0.067*** 0.007 0.074*** -0.004 -0.026 -0.030
(0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023)
Sluzon 0.098*** 0.060*** 0.159*** 0.071*** -0.001 0.069***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
Bicol 0.071** 0.069** 0.140*** 0.066*** -0.001 0.065**
(0.028) (0.027) (0.035) (0.021) (0.028) (0.026)
Wvisayas 0.061** 0.028 0.089*** 0.044* 0.057** 0.100***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023) (0.027) (0.025)
Cvisayas 0.141*** 0.114*** 0.255*** 0.137*** 0.106*** 0.243***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.036) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
Evisayas 0.088*** 0.012 0.100** 0.064*** 0.050* 0.115***
(0.034) (0.039) (0.041) (0.021) (0.027) (0.031)
Mindanao 0.116*** 0.102*** 0.218*** 0.094*** 0.031 0.125***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016) (0.020) (0.025)
(NCR omitted)
CAR 0.048 0.061 0.109* 0.066*** 0.067** 0.133***
(0.040) (0.044) (0.058) (0.024) (0.027) (0.030)
constant 0.374*** 0.616*** 0.991*** 0.481*** 0.662*** 1.142***
(0.078) (0.086) (0.096) (0.056) (0.058) (0.081)
Number of obs 24165 24165 24165 39615 39615 39615
1994 FIES 2000 FIES
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Table A5. 3: Mean regression results on expenditure levels by types of remittances
Note: Parentheses denote standard errors. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
dnorem dexrem dinrem dbothrem dnorem dexrem dinrem dbothrem
empsh 0.4930*** 0.3582*** 0.4182*** 0.3995*** 0.5560*** 0.4291*** 0.3600*** 0.3818***
(0.0250) (0.0539) (0.0330) (0.0694) (0.0201) (0.0438) (0.0259) (0.0655)
age0_6 -0.2843*** -0.2849*** -0.2955*** -0.2664*** -0.2655*** -0.2840*** -0.3104*** -0.3490***
(0.0102) (0.0196) (0.0134) (0.0276) (0.0080) (0.0163) (0.0109) (0.0241)
age7_14 -0.2166*** -0.2783*** -0.2373*** -0.2231*** -0.1973*** -0.2428*** -0.2637*** -0.2977***
(0.0099) (0.0198) (0.0134) (0.0264) (0.0081) (0.0168) (0.0108) (0.0253)
age15_24 -0.0832*** -0.1423*** -0.0821*** -0.0584** -0.0989*** -0.1175*** -0.0752*** -0.0778***
(0.0091) (0.0197) (0.0120) (0.0254) (0.0074) (0.0164) (0.0098) (0.0244)
(age25+ omitted)
hfemale -0.0153 0.1707*** 0.0123 0.1316*** -0.0607*** 0.2359*** -0.0381* 0.0672*
(0.0227) (0.0261) (0.0258) (0.0372) (0.0178) (0.0212) (0.0206) (0.0375)
hage 0.0008 -0.0060 0.0023 -0.0003 0.0052*** -0.0066* -0.0001 -0.0067
(0.0024) (0.0049) (0.0028) (0.0062) (0.0020) (0.0039) (0.0024) (0.0055)
hage2 0.00001 0.00006 -0.000023 0.000025 -0.000034* 0.00007* -0.000009 0.000066
(0.000025) (0.000048) (0.000026) (0.00006) (0.00002) (0.000037) (0.000022) (0.00005)
hmarried -0.0351* 0.0718** -0.0864*** -0.0358 -0.0512*** 0.0941*** -0.0556*** -0.0314
(0.0194) (0.0314) (0.0239) (0.0400) (0.0162) (0.0250) (0.0197) (0.0413)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.1426*** 0.1212*** 0.1176*** 0.1236*** 0.1245*** 0.1893*** 0.1519*** 0.1084***
(0.0106) (0.0294) (0.0142) (0.0361) (0.0088) (0.0256) (0.0116) (0.0350)
hedu3 0.4132*** 0.3573*** 0.3718*** 0.3545*** 0.4227*** 0.4311*** 0.3806*** 0.3614***
(0.0131) (0.0310) (0.0178) (0.0381) (0.0101) (0.0260) (0.0143) (0.0355)
hedu4 0.9266*** 0.7454*** 0.8314*** 0.7482*** 1.0640*** 0.8559*** 1.0290*** 0.8387***
(0.0198) (0.0370) (0.0314) (0.0521) (0.0146) (0.0294) (0.0269) (0.0492)
hnojob 0.0460** 0.1125*** 0.0788*** 0.0973*** 0.0366** 0.1017*** 0.0633*** 0.1476***
(0.0186) (0.0249) (0.0206) (0.0320) (0.0144) (0.0212) (0.0167) (0.0326)
urban 0.1432*** 0.1607*** 0.1408*** 0.1194*** 0.1876*** 0.1904*** 0.1736*** 0.1767***
(0.0098) (0.0235) (0.0129) (0.0345) (0.0081) (0.0191) (0.0106) (0.0279)
agri -0.2606*** -0.2875*** -0.2102*** -0.2130*** -0.2562*** -0.3009*** -0.2153*** -0.2753***
(0.0105) (0.0329) (0.0135) (0.0436) (0.0087) (0.0312) (0.0110) (0.0418)
Ilocos -0.5495*** -0.5004*** -0.5480*** -0.5558*** -0.5112*** -0.4012*** -0.4233*** -0.5010***
(0.0239) (0.0341) (0.0288) (0.0551) (0.0208) (0.0314) (0.0301) (0.0520)
Cagayan -0.4336*** -0.2614*** -0.5146*** -0.2268** -0.3448*** -0.3603*** -0.3879*** -0.4877***
(0.0244) (0.0517) (0.0416) (0.1020) (0.0199) (0.0402) (0.0345) (0.0798)
Cluzon -0.2892*** -0.2749*** -0.2789*** -0.2238*** -0.3020*** -0.2594*** -0.2925*** -0.3299***
(0.0192) (0.0298) (0.0233) (0.0340) (0.0167) (0.0271) (0.0230) (0.0439)
Sluzon -0.2995*** -0.2054*** -0.3009*** -0.2343*** -0.2530*** -0.1449*** -0.3124*** -0.1912***
(0.0172) (0.0301) (0.0232) (0.0403) (0.0148) (0.0261) (0.0230) (0.0444)
Bicol -0.5509*** -0.4038*** -0.5984*** -0.4876*** -0.5335*** -0.3872*** -0.5819*** -0.4832***
(0.0223) (0.0600) (0.0279) (0.0668) (0.0201) (0.0530) (0.0262) (0.0670)
Wvisayas -0.4101*** -0.2348*** -0.4713*** -0.4223*** -0.4512*** -0.2366*** -0.4674*** -0.3105***
(0.0196) (0.0417) (0.0253) (0.0519) (0.0190) (0.0349) (0.0249) (0.0540)
Cvisayas -0.5872*** -0.5179*** -0.6882*** -0.5016*** -0.5844*** -0.4008*** -0.6297*** -0.5292***
(0.0205) (0.0492) (0.0290) (0.0943) (0.0199) (0.0422) (0.0283) (0.0674)
Evisayas -0.6223*** -0.5888*** -0.6593*** -0.7663*** -0.6251*** -0.4808*** -0.6430*** -0.6696***
(0.0227) (0.0573) (0.0288) (0.0780) (0.0191) (0.0479) (0.0273) (0.0695)
Mindanao -0.5018*** -0.4500*** -0.5737*** -0.4622*** -0.5714*** -0.5377*** -0.6144*** -0.5454***
(0.0158) (0.0343) (0.0238) (0.0481) (0.0139) (0.0288) (0.0228) (0.0495)
(NCR omitted)
CAR -0.3321*** -0.4310*** -0.4640*** -0.4098*** -0.3404*** -0.3254*** -0.4280*** -0.2388***
(0.0285) (0.0627) (0.0585) (0.0817) (0.0208) (0.0336) (0.0335) (0.0626)
constant 9.4947*** 9.8851*** 9.5751*** 9.6604*** 9.8065*** 10.2350*** 10.0854*** 10.4790***
(0.0628) (0.1296) (0.0770) (0.1672) (0.0514) (0.1080) (0.0669) (0.1522)
R-squared 0.5730 0.4790 0.5311 0.4513 0.5965 0.4664 0.5031 0.4685
Number of Obs 12732 3093 6620 1720 21439 5048 11021 2107
1994 FIES 2000 FIES
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Chapter 6
Table A6. 1: Coefficient estimates of the Two-Part model on education expenditure share (%) with
the absolute amount of remittances
Note: (a) Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) The selection equation was estimated using the probit model with all sample households, while
the level equation was computed using OLS only with sample households with positive amount
of remittances. The dependent variable of the selection equation is a dummy variable denoting
whether households spend money on education or not, whereas the budget share of
education expenditure (%) was used for the variable of the level equation.
slection level slection level slection level slection level
lpctotex 0.2548*** 0.0141*** 0.2199*** 0.0175*** 0.1515*** 0.0214*** 0.1245*** 0.0267***
(0.0245) (0.0009) (0.0219) (0.0008) (0.0161) (0.0007) (0.0168) (0.0009)
inrem 0.0027** .000195*** 0.0016 .000102*** 0.0022*** .0000842*** 0.0024*** .000149***
(0.0012) (0.00005) (0.0012) (0.00004) (0.0008) (0.00003) (0.0007) (0.00003)
exrem 0.0017*** .0000305** 0.0015*** .0000631*** 0.0008*** .0000393*** 0.0022*** .0000362***
(0.0004) (0.00001) (0.0004) (0.00001) (0.0002) (0.00001) (0.0002) (0.00001)
age7_14 2.2137*** -0.0086*** 2.1301*** -0.0058*** 2.1123*** -0.0082*** 2.2235*** -0.0060***
(0.0312) (0.0013) (0.0293) (0.0011) (0.0230) (0.0010) (0.0238) (0.0010)
age15_24 0.7461*** 0.0166*** 0.8166*** 0.0241*** 0.7859*** 0.0265*** 0.7249*** 0.0295***
(0.0266) (0.0009) (0.0242) (0.0008) (0.0188) (0.0007) (0.0188) (0.0007)
hfemale 0.1523*** 0.0039** 0.0391 0.0021 0.1642*** 0.0051*** 0.1455*** 0.0045***
(0.0512) (0.0019) (0.0434) (0.0018) (0.0333) (0.0018) (0.0315) (0.0017)
hage 0.0113*** 0.0004*** 0.0020** 0.0002*** -0.0049*** 0.0002*** -0.0045*** 0.0002***
(0.0010) (0.00004) (0.0009) (0.00004) (0.0007) (0.00003) (0.0007) (0.00003)
hmarried 0.3059*** 0.0055*** 0.2153*** 0.0068*** 0.4128*** 0.0077*** 0.3700*** 0.0097***
(0.0469) (0.0017) (0.0401) (0.0018) (0.0304) (0.0017) (0.0288) (0.0017)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.2519*** 0.0048*** 0.2244*** 0.0053*** 0.2350*** 0.0035*** 0.2261*** 0.0033***
(0.0316) (0.0009) (0.0284) (0.0009) (0.0235) (0.0008) (0.0233) (0.0008)
hedu3 0.3545*** 0.0089*** 0.3139*** 0.0104*** 0.3848*** 0.0099*** 0.3942*** 0.0116***
(0.0379) (0.0012) (0.0344) (0.0012) (0.0271) (0.0010) (0.0268) (0.0011)
hedu4 0.4346*** 0.0137*** 0.4443*** 0.0203*** 0.4799*** 0.0185*** 0.5433*** 0.0170***
(0.0566) (0.0020) (0.0515) (0.0020) (0.0376) (0.0017) (0.0386) (0.0019)
hnojob -0.3466*** -0.0060*** -0.2164*** -0.0056*** -0.1740*** -0.0039*** -0.1423*** -0.0021
(0.0435) (0.0016) (0.0341) (0.0015) (0.0254) (0.0013) (0.0261) (0.0014)
urban 0.0941*** -0.0033*** 0.1082*** -0.0031*** 0.0360* -0.0061*** 0.0111 -0.0064***
(0.0304) (0.0010) (0.0256) (0.0009) (0.0207) (0.0008) (0.0210) (0.0009)
agri -0.1886*** 0.0003 -0.2110*** -0.0007 -0.2382*** 0.0007 -0.1904*** 0.0018**
(0.0314) (0.0010) (0.0286) (0.0010) (0.0242) (0.0009) (0.0230) (0.0009)
Ilocos 0.0292 0.0068*** -0.1312** 0.0206*** 0.1083** 0.0202*** 0.3220*** 0.0269***
(0.0635) (0.0021) (0.0580) (0.0021) (0.0480) (0.0022) (0.0451) (0.0019)
Cagayan 0.0543 0.0157*** -0.1635*** 0.0286*** 0.1555*** 0.0267*** 0.3521*** 0.0406***
(0.0686) (0.0027) (0.0631) (0.0028) (0.0516) (0.0022) (0.0485) (0.0024)
Cluzon -0.0670 0.0013 -0.2000*** 0.0092*** -0.0146 0.0120*** 0.2192*** 0.0215***
(0.0522) (0.0014) (0.0463) (0.0013) (0.0385) (0.0014) (0.0415) (0.0016)
Sluzon -0.0351 0.0077*** -0.1554*** 0.0214*** 0.0554 0.0141*** 0.3309*** 0.0257***
(0.0507) (0.0016) (0.0434) (0.0015) (0.0344) (0.0013) (0.0371) (0.0015)
Bicol 0.0022 0.0084*** -0.0294 0.0200*** 0.2758*** 0.0162*** 0.4128*** 0.0272***
(0.0650) (0.0019) (0.0599) (0.0020) (0.0485) (0.0017) (0.0493) (0.0019)
Wvisayas 0.1694*** 0.0061*** -0.0138 0.0127*** 0.2779*** 0.0151*** 0.3940*** 0.0267***
(0.0574) (0.0018) (0.0522) (0.0015) (0.0421) (0.0016) (0.0446) (0.0018)
Cvisayas -0.0621 0.0068*** -0.1620*** 0.0170*** 0.1370*** 0.0198*** 0.2916*** 0.0314***
(0.0603) (0.0018) (0.0536) (0.0017) (0.0456) (0.0018) (0.0457) (0.0019)
Evisayas -0.0628 0.0061*** -0.2542*** 0.0143*** 0.1534*** 0.0213*** 0.3582*** 0.0315***
(0.0710) (0.0021) (0.0641) (0.0020) (0.0480) (0.0020) (0.0517) (0.0021)
Mindanao -0.0020 0.0074*** -0.0705 0.0198*** 0.0863** 0.0210*** 0.3033*** 0.0314***
(0.0483) (0.0014) (0.0436) (0.0014) (0.0348) (0.0013) (0.0362) (0.0014)
(NCR omitted)
CAR 0.0103 0.0223*** 0.0943 0.0311*** 0.2782*** 0.0371*** 0.4353*** 0.0437***
(0.0857) (0.0036) (0.0853) (0.0036) (0.0521) (0.0024) (0.0525) (0.0026)
constant -4.0793*** -0.1271*** -3.1078*** -0.1744*** -2.5188*** -0.2153*** -2.4752*** -0.2885***
(0.2301) (0.0088) (0.2215) (0.0084) (0.1733) (0.0079) (0.1829) (0.0094)
R2 0.4105 0.1417 0.3978 0.1615 0.4177 0.1704 0.4254 0.1962
Number of obs 18429 12664 24165 17857 39615 28833 38480 27188
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
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Table A6. 2: Coefficient estimates of the Two-Part model on education expenditure (Philippine
pesos, in real terms) with the absolute amount of remittances
Note: (a) Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) The selection equation was estimated using the probit model with all sample households, while
the level equation was computed using OLS only with sample households with positive amount
of remittances. The dependent variable of the selection equation is a dummy variable denoting
whether households spend money on education or not, whereas the absolute amount of
education expenditure (in real terms) was used for the variable of the level equation.
(c) CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005)
slection level slection level slection level slection level
lpctotex 0.2548*** 5808.86*** 0.2199*** 7393.52*** 0.1515*** 11891.56*** 0.1245*** 11156.62***
(0.0245) (280.37) (0.0219) (260.53) (0.0161) (485.76) (0.0168) (385.15)
inrem 0.0027** 42.41** 0.0016 45.27*** 0.0022*** 50.22*** 0.0024*** 66.42***
(0.0012) (16.49) (0.0012) (12.77) (0.0008) (17.02) (0.0007) (20.79)
exrem 0.0017*** 19.11*** 0.0015*** 31.59*** 0.0008*** 27.68*** 0.0022*** 32.99***
(0.0004) (4.81) (0.0004) (4.35) (0.0002) (4.67) (0.0002) (7.14)
age7_14 2.2137*** 292.26 2.1301*** 974.97*** 2.1123*** 1426.53*** 2.2235*** 1543.70***
(0.0312) (280.85) (0.0293) (270.08) (0.0230) (317.46) (0.0238) (304.17)
age15_24 0.7461*** 3126.56*** 0.8166*** 5080.92*** 0.7859*** 6615.40*** 0.7249*** 7042.28***
(0.0266) (203.79) (0.0242) (181.59) (0.0188) (223.81) (0.0188) (224.44)
hfemale 0.1523*** -613.84 0.0391 -670.04 0.1642*** -133.84 0.1455*** -282.91
(0.0512) (432.81) (0.0434) (439.45) (0.0333) (590.95) (0.0315) (601.88)
hage 0.0113*** 72.77*** 0.0020** 37.36*** -0.0049*** 42.59*** -0.0045*** 40.67***
(0.0010) (9.87) (0.0009) (8.69) (0.0007) (9.70) (0.0007) (10.24)
hmarried 0.3059*** 1357.05*** 0.2153*** 1585.01*** 0.4128*** 3196.05*** 0.3700*** 3509.62***
(0.0469) (340.42) (0.0401) (407.94) (0.0304) (550.70) (0.0288) (562.29)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.2519*** 467.68*** 0.2244*** 344.86** 0.2350*** -499.27*** 0.2261*** -390.04**
(0.0316) (147.66) (0.0284) (152.26) (0.0235) (174.27) (0.0233) (176.85)
hedu3 0.3545*** 1172.33*** 0.3139*** 1375.22*** 0.3848*** 446.80 0.3942*** 781.62***
(0.0379) (213.44) (0.0344) (223.75) (0.0271) (274.04) (0.0268) (252.78)
hedu4 0.4346*** 4684.13*** 0.4443*** 7445.05*** 0.4799*** 9076.11*** 0.5433*** 8038.26***
(0.0566) (534.58) (0.0515) (597.78) (0.0376) (567.27) (0.0386) (635.54)
hnojob -0.3466*** -1429.25*** -0.2164*** -2047.98*** -0.1740*** -1666.27*** -0.1423*** -652.15
(0.0435) (393.53) (0.0341) (356.10) (0.0254) (419.36) (0.0261) (498.08)
urban 0.0941*** -489.22** 0.1082*** -392.22** 0.0360* -1301.02*** 0.0111 -685.47***
(0.0304) (207.70) (0.0256) (187.79) (0.0207) (257.77) (0.0210) (262.39)
agri -0.1886*** 529.31*** -0.2110*** 718.90*** -0.2382*** 2417.75*** -0.1904*** 2243.47***
(0.0314) (172.73) (0.0286) (166.45) (0.0242) (242.20) (0.0230) (232.27)
Ilocos 0.0292 119.32 -0.1312** 2645.71*** 0.1083** 141.79 0.3220*** 3953.97***
(0.0635) (403.71) (0.0580) (562.89) (0.0480) (740.90) (0.0451) (640.28)
Cagayan 0.0543 1282.81** -0.1635*** 4110.27*** 0.1555*** 1130.55 0.3521*** 5897.10***
(0.0686) (499.31) (0.0631) (696.07) (0.0516) (778.53) (0.0485) (727.39)
Cluzon -0.0670 -626.39* -0.2000*** 735.72* -0.0146 -895.69 0.2192*** 4011.70***
(0.0522) (336.30) (0.0463) (396.16) (0.0385) (622.17) (0.0415) (636.77)
Sluzon -0.0351 1144.96** -0.1554*** 2948.74*** 0.0554 412.08 0.3309*** 5015.87***
(0.0507) (482.97) (0.0434) (428.59) (0.0344) (609.03) (0.0371) (564.43)
Bicol 0.0022 1067.38** -0.0294 2663.48*** 0.2758*** 1620.29* 0.4128*** 5458.19***
(0.0650) (424.66) (0.0599) (448.02) (0.0485) (873.01) (0.0493) (688.98)
Wvisayas 0.1694*** 569.26 -0.0138 1358.73*** 0.2779*** 114.62 0.3940*** 4105.26***
(0.0574) (405.68) (0.0522) (376.25) (0.0421) (642.58) (0.0446) (558.59)
Cvisayas -0.0621 1190.06*** -0.1620*** 2229.45*** 0.1370*** 1105.41* 0.2916*** 5680.22***
(0.0603) (427.16) (0.0536) (390.69) (0.0456) (627.52) (0.0457) (591.18)
Evisayas -0.0628 841.14* -0.2542*** 1930.22*** 0.1534*** 2025.14*** 0.3582*** 5676.27***
(0.0710) (444.96) (0.0641) (412.72) (0.0480) (697.82) (0.0517) (655.77)
Mindanao -0.0020 665.17* -0.0705 2767.41*** 0.0863** 1111.10* 0.3033*** 5399.95***
(0.0483) (361.87) (0.0436) (382.67) (0.0348) (569.25) (0.0362) (515.24)
(NCR omitted)
CAR 0.0103 2027.82*** 0.0943 4000.25*** 0.2782*** 4055.76*** 0.4353*** 6635.30***
(0.0857) (615.39) (0.0853) (908.15) (0.0521) (798.23) (0.0525) (752.88)
constant -4.0793*** -53056.22*** -3.1078*** -72502.00*** -2.5188*** -119119.01*** -2.4752*** -120533.88***
(0.2301) (2626.75) (0.2215) (2630.43) (0.1733) (4735.52) (0.1829) (4172.26)
R2 0.4105 0.2316 0.3978 0.2672 0.4177 0.2810 0.4254 0.2864
Number of obs 18429 12664 24165 17857 39615 28833 38480 27188
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
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Table A6. 3: The Tobit estimation results of marginal effects on education expenditure share (%)
with remittance dummy variables
Note: Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lpctotex 0.00622*** 0.00792*** 0.00874*** 0.01005***
(0.00036) (0.00034) (0.00030) (0.00032)
Bottom 20% 0.00157** 0.00177** 0.00432*** 0.00318***
(0.00075) (0.00076) (0.00066) (0.00064)
Bottom 20-40% 0.00449*** 0.00724*** 0.00708*** 0.00701***
(0.00150) (0.00143) (0.00125) (0.00125)
Middle 0.00776*** 0.00896*** 0.00803*** 0.01056***
(0.00183) (0.00185) (0.00153) (0.00155)
Top 20-40% 0.01025*** 0.01454*** 0.01616*** 0.01730***
(0.00178) (0.00174) (0.00137) (0.00140)
Top 20% 0.00547*** 0.00573*** 0.00645*** 0.00867***
(0.00124) (0.00109) (0.00086) (0.00090)
dinrem 0.00041 0.00046 0.00008 0.00013 0.00139*** 0.00149*** 0.00122*** 0.00134***
(0.00034) (0.00034) (0.00036) (0.00036) (0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00032)
dexrem 0.00432*** 0.00412*** 0.00424*** 0.00400*** 0.00513*** 0.00488*** 0.00559*** 0.00534***
(0.00075) (0.00074) (0.00066) (0.00066) (0.00058) (0.00058) (0.00060) (0.00059)
dbothrem 0.00167** 0.00154** 0.00283*** 0.00270*** 0.00457*** 0.00449*** 0.00505*** 0.00495***
(0.00077) (0.00077) (0.00073) (0.00073) (0.00081) (0.00081) (0.00062) (0.00062)
age7_14 0.01620*** 0.01622*** 0.01659*** 0.01663*** 0.01790*** 0.01790*** 0.01959*** 0.01952***
(0.00038) (0.00039) (0.00037) (0.00037) (0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00034) (0.00034)
age15_24 0.01117*** 0.01122*** 0.01558*** 0.01560*** 0.01783*** 0.01781*** 0.01800*** 0.01801***
(0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00034) (0.00034) (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00032) (0.00032)
hfemale 0.00308*** 0.00303*** 0.00195*** 0.00179** 0.00416*** 0.00407*** 0.00388*** 0.00376***
(0.00074) (0.00074) (0.00075) (0.00075) (0.00069) (0.00069) (0.00063) (0.00063)
hage 0.00020*** 0.00020*** 0.00005*** 0.00006*** -0.00004*** -0.00004*** -0.00004*** -0.00004***
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
hmarried 0.00418*** 0.00417*** 0.00476*** 0.00469*** 0.00747*** 0.00744*** 0.00759*** 0.00757***
(0.00060) (0.00060) (0.00065) (0.00065) (0.00057) (0.00057) (0.00053) (0.00053)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.00332*** 0.00346*** 0.00361*** 0.00364*** 0.00312*** 0.00328*** 0.00272*** 0.00302***
(0.00039) (0.00039) (0.00041) (0.00040) (0.00037) (0.00037) (0.00036) (0.00036)
hedu3 0.00553*** 0.00549*** 0.00617*** 0.00602*** 0.00688*** 0.00685*** 0.00725*** 0.00731***
(0.00051) (0.00051) (0.00052) (0.00052) (0.00044) (0.00044) (0.00046) (0.00046)
hedu4 0.00832*** 0.00780*** 0.01228*** 0.01168*** 0.01232*** 0.01183*** 0.01195*** 0.01115***
(0.00091) (0.00091) (0.00104) (0.00105) (0.00083) (0.00083) (0.00088) (0.00089)
hnojob -0.00390*** -0.00397*** -0.00298*** -0.00308*** -0.00284*** -0.00298*** -0.00180*** -0.00199***
(0.00057) (0.00057) (0.00056) (0.00056) (0.00047) (0.00047) (0.00050) (0.00050)
urban -0.00028 -0.00029 -0.00028 -0.00032 -0.00164*** -0.00164*** -0.00187*** -0.00198***
(0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00039) (0.00039) (0.00034) (0.00034) (0.00037) (0.00037)
agri -0.00111*** -0.00122*** -0.00154*** -0.00167*** -0.00132*** -0.00149*** -0.00058* -0.00103***
(0.00039) (0.00039) (0.00040) (0.00040) (0.00036) (0.00037) (0.00035) (0.00036)
Ilocos 0.00153* 0.00200** 0.00598*** 0.00686*** 0.00771*** 0.00820*** 0.01025*** 0.01111***
(0.00084) (0.00086) (0.00094) (0.00097) (0.00101) (0.00103) (0.00093) (0.00095)
Cagayan 0.00522*** 0.00563*** 0.00864*** 0.00937*** 0.01125*** 0.01180*** 0.01652*** 0.01758***
(0.00117) (0.00118) (0.00131) (0.00133) (0.00113) (0.00115) (0.00123) (0.00126)
Cluzon -0.00029 -0.00007 0.00132** 0.00183*** 0.00347*** 0.00382*** 0.00786*** 0.00838***
(0.00059) (0.00059) (0.00059) (0.00061) (0.00064) (0.00066) (0.00077) (0.00078)
Sluzon 0.00197*** 0.00217*** 0.00606*** 0.00654*** 0.00483*** 0.00504*** 0.01071*** 0.01100***
(0.00066) (0.00067) (0.00069) (0.00071) (0.00059) (0.00060) (0.00069) (0.00070)
Bicol 0.00306*** 0.00323*** 0.00709*** 0.00754*** 0.00791*** 0.00808*** 0.01239*** 0.01271***
(0.00081) (0.00082) (0.00096) (0.00097) (0.00084) (0.00084) (0.00094) (0.00095)
Wvisayas 0.00309*** 0.00343*** 0.00429*** 0.00490*** 0.00736*** 0.00772*** 0.01216*** 0.01279***
(0.00075) (0.00076) (0.00071) (0.00073) (0.00076) (0.00077) (0.00091) (0.00092)
Cvisayas 0.00180** 0.00166** 0.00480*** 0.00503*** 0.00831*** 0.00838*** 0.01294*** 0.01312***
(0.00075) (0.00074) (0.00080) (0.00081) (0.00089) (0.00089) (0.00093) (0.00094)
Evisayas 0.00198** 0.00206** 0.00326*** 0.00363*** 0.00958*** 0.00967*** 0.01391*** 0.01413***
(0.00089) (0.00089) (0.00089) (0.00090) (0.00095) (0.00095) (0.00105) (0.00106)
Mindanao 0.00255*** 0.00276*** 0.00667*** 0.00705*** 0.00863*** 0.00891*** 0.01264*** 0.01299***
(0.00060) (0.00060) (0.00065) (0.00066) (0.00060) (0.00060) (0.00065) (0.00066)
(NCR omitted)
CAR 0.00649*** 0.00676*** 0.01326*** 0.01404*** 0.01676*** 0.01702*** 0.01953*** 0.02021***
(0.00158) (0.00160) (0.00192) (0.00195) (0.00127) (0.00129) (0.00138) (0.00140)
Sigma 0.04866 0.04861 0.05510 0.05501 0.06304 0.06295 0.06545 0.06532
(0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00083) (0.00083) (0.00067) (0.00067) (0.00075) (0.00075)
Log pseudolikelihood 17175.27 17195.568 22684.387 22720.024 32483.624 32525.631 29252.572 29316.836
Pseudo R2 -0.1626 -0.1640 -0.1571 -0.1589 -0.1919 -0.1934 -0.2293 -0.2320
No. of Obs (uncensored) 12664 12664 17857 17857 28833 28833 27188 27188
No. of Obs (total) 18429 18429 24165 24165 39615 39615 38480 38480
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
272
Table A6. 4: The Tobit estimation results of marginal effects on education expenditure
(Philippine pesos, in real terms) with remittance dummy variables
Note: (a) Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lpctotex 2085.01*** 2866.07*** 4228.88*** 3914.31***
(94.44) (94.46) (148.08) (114.46)
Bottom 20% 182.12 116.96 746.07*** 486.32***
(116.40) (124.95) (139.24) (136.56)
Bottom 20-40% 706.78*** 1531.75*** 1673.61*** 1267.08***
(210.30) (215.98) (230.76) (229.97)
Middle 1784.29*** 1807.89*** 2216.11*** 2297.13***
(293.56) (299.57) (343.97) (290.76)
Top 20-40% 2671.05*** 4788.41*** 4538.49*** 5008.86***
(455.31) (379.57) (563.37) (366.64)
Top 20% 3717.53*** 4597.93*** 8469.53*** 7024.02***
(485.33) (383.25) (689.59) (415.05)
dinrem -4.97 27.32 -19.51 -0.90 228.98** 212.75** 99.68 138.50*
(62.20) (62.03) (69.01) (68.20) (96.45) (91.61) (73.68) (72.53)
dexrem 875.00*** 798.51*** 838.05*** 726.41*** 1001.44*** 941.06*** 1423.32*** 1329.75***
(173.35) (170.89) (152.30) (149.75) (171.39) (166.97) (170.83) (167.88)
dbothrem 183.69 187.49 548.18*** 556.36*** 586.96*** 635.74*** 866.96*** 955.54***
(139.44) (139.20) (172.38) (171.28) (205.13) (204.85) (164.52) (163.24)
age7_14 3440.16*** 3422.69*** 3949.55*** 3946.57*** 5710.87*** 5572.57*** 5650.68*** 5492.47***
(129.27) (124.87) (107.80) (106.33) (176.92) (162.98) (143.44) (136.42)
age15_24 2028.66*** 2086.85*** 3138.73*** 3212.24*** 4410.47*** 4482.41*** 4231.05*** 4282.69***
(63.04) (62.99) (79.84) (80.69) (97.38) (98.04) (94.97) (94.09)
hfemale 369.27*** 302.61** 378.18** 270.77 1182.47*** 1043.28*** 944.59*** 791.56***
(133.92) (134.88) (176.77) (175.09) (203.66) (201.50) (181.88) (179.02)
hage 33.38*** 35.38*** 6.13* 8.61*** -13.57*** -8.36** -11.26*** -7.03**
(3.08) (3.18) (3.21) (3.19) (3.72) (3.59) (3.39) (3.32)
hmarried 986.18*** 994.40*** 1258.05*** 1279.22*** 2604.17*** 2581.59*** 2395.41*** 2334.08***
(108.54) (109.44) (142.01) (141.99) (161.90) (161.45) (146.65) (145.48)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 434.64*** 535.87*** 407.26*** 488.13*** 265.85*** 528.98*** 209.42*** 471.09***
(62.81) (64.12) (68.13) (67.85) (75.31) (74.85) (73.04) (72.82)
hedu3 820.66*** 914.66*** 932.80*** 1018.95*** 947.89*** 1320.06*** 944.39*** 1300.16***
(86.09) (87.06) (95.04) (94.13) (100.34) (94.78) (97.89) (96.46)
hedu4 2238.24*** 1838.48*** 3823.24*** 3163.84*** 4596.54*** 3728.06*** 4059.65*** 3252.93***
(227.04) (212.65) (295.04) (278.68) (262.58) (254.65) (277.24) (265.47)
hnojob -651.74*** -700.34*** -636.45*** -701.30*** -650.29*** -698.03*** -163.24 -271.76*
(114.04) (114.07) (118.69) (118.15) (137.52) (135.17) (144.42) (141.71)
urban -31.61 -15.84 2.09 57.29 -324.71*** -144.96* -175.47* -103.83
(73.47) (72.98) (73.71) (73.29) (92.78) (84.57) (93.95) (92.00)
agri -57.78 -225.49*** -19.23 -303.48*** 340.90*** -296.66*** 398.67*** -213.47***
(62.13) (59.84) (70.00) (68.70) (88.43) (84.15) (84.37) (78.01)
Ilocos -77.28 115.45 555.73** 1022.24*** 274.77 935.52*** 1650.02*** 2241.58***
(145.07) (149.65) (217.10) (230.77) (267.04) (279.33) (248.63) (259.69)
Cagayan 353.51* 531.17*** 919.55*** 1292.89*** 604.19** 1385.60*** 2367.70*** 3129.95***
(186.45) (190.27) (278.59) (285.71) (293.50) (305.79) (293.63) (309.05)
Cluzon -295.91** -120.77 -156.16 291.77* -390.05* 389.49* 1607.24*** 2226.47***
(119.07) (122.56) (147.40) (158.23) (214.18) (220.64) (244.10) (254.51)
Sluzon 246.13 331.98** 574.63*** 916.03*** 90.47 600.83*** 2176.08*** 2540.27***
(162.87) (163.37) (163.13) (170.97) (215.39) (215.14) (220.85) (225.06)
Bicol 369.14** 355.87** 748.60*** 915.92*** 1018.11*** 1216.34*** 2577.01*** 2732.55***
(159.96) (156.82) (185.11) (187.60) (323.96) (324.37) (283.64) (285.06)
Wvisayas 351.57** 452.96*** 313.39** 642.97*** 567.50** 944.29*** 2078.92*** 2480.24***
(149.26) (151.22) (151.71) (159.88) (236.30) (241.12) (228.72) (235.45)
Cvisayas 265.12* 114.95 401.17** 486.26*** 649.44*** 842.85*** 2374.71*** 2562.34***
(152.27) (144.76) (158.95) (159.24) (239.97) (239.53) (241.58) (243.65)
Evisayas 242.81 224.95 233.75 373.55** 1080.65*** 1194.81*** 2623.09*** 2756.01***
(165.71) (163.13) (169.63) (171.19) (266.88) (264.94) (275.10) (274.54)
Mindanao 187.10 285.76** 728.07*** 936.87*** 608.70*** 913.56*** 2220.19*** 2466.85***
(128.90) (130.24) (151.14) (153.95) (205.46) (205.93) (192.54) (194.30)
(NCR omitted)
CAR 369.26 499.66** 1461.10*** 1896.45*** 1828.23*** 2482.29*** 2944.00*** 3469.19***
(232.85) (238.50) (383.89) (400.94) (326.65) (335.60) (320.46) (330.41)
Sigma 10296.83 10170.78 12844.16 12677.32 19773.47 19372.44 18866.71 18559
(538.69) (520.46) (385.06) (375.99) (752.12) (708.11) (460.87) (445.29)
Log pseudolikelihood -137827 -137643 -197673 -197410 -331770 -331138 -311964 -311455
Pseudo R2 0.0210 0.0223 0.0199 0.0212 0.0195 0.0214 0.0200 0.0216
No. of Obs (uncensored) 12664 12664 17857 17857 28833 28833 27188 27188
No. of Obs (total) 18429 18429 24165 24165 39615 39615 38480 38480
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
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Table A6. 5: The Tobit estimation results of marginal effects on education expenditure share (%)
with the absolute amount of remittances
Note: Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lpctotex 0.00601*** 0.00756*** 0.00847*** 0.00961***
(0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00026) (0.00028)
Bottom 20% 0.00148 0.00182 0.00437*** 0.00319***
(0.00120) (0.00119) (0.00104) (0.00111)
Bottom 20-40% 0.00455** 0.00727*** 0.00724*** 0.00730***
(0.00187) (0.00176) (0.00153) (0.00162)
Middle 0.00782*** 0.00905*** 0.00797*** 0.01058***
(0.00188) (0.00186) (0.00157) (0.00158)
Top 20-40% 0.01026*** 0.01435*** 0.01643*** 0.01750***
(0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00120) (0.00120)
Top 20% 0.00463*** 0.00433*** 0.00508*** 0.00669***
(0.00080) (0.00084) (0.00065) (0.00067)
inrem 0.000089*** 0.000089*** 0.000053*** 0.000054*** 0.000053*** 0.000056*** 0.000075*** 0.000076***
(0.000014) (0.000014) (0.000011) (0.000011) (0.000007) (0.000007) (0.000008) (0.000008)
exrem 0.000024*** 0.000022*** 0.000036*** 0.000035*** 0.000021*** 0.000021*** 0.000026*** 0.000025***
(0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002)
age7_14 0.01616*** 0.01618*** 0.01642*** 0.01646*** 0.01780*** 0.01781*** 0.01941*** 0.01937***
(0.00033) (0.00033) (0.00034) (0.00034) (0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00032)
age15_24 0.01110*** 0.01114*** 0.01545*** 0.01545*** 0.01771*** 0.01767*** 0.01782*** 0.01780***
(0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00029) (0.00029) (0.00030) (0.00030)
hfemale 0.00252*** 0.00252*** 0.00105 0.00093 0.00372*** 0.00362*** 0.00336*** 0.00328***
(0.00068) (0.00068) (0.00066) (0.00066) (0.00059) (0.00059) (0.00056) (0.00056)
hage 0.00020*** 0.00020*** 0.00007*** 0.00007*** -0.00003** -0.00003** -0.00003** -0.00002**
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
hmarried 0.00396*** 0.00398*** 0.00429*** 0.00421*** 0.00720*** 0.00715*** 0.00737*** 0.00737***
(0.00056) (0.00056) (0.00058) (0.00059) (0.00050) (0.00050) (0.00048) (0.00048)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 0.00338*** 0.00350*** 0.00371*** 0.00371*** 0.00326*** 0.00338*** 0.00288*** 0.00310***
(0.00041) (0.00041) (0.00044) (0.00044) (0.00041) (0.00041) (0.00041) (0.00041)
hedu3 0.00563*** 0.00555*** 0.00632*** 0.00610*** 0.00708*** 0.00696*** 0.00761*** 0.00752***
(0.00053) (0.00053) (0.00053) (0.00053) (0.00047) (0.00047) (0.00047) (0.00047)
hedu4 0.00864*** 0.00818*** 0.01238*** 0.01196*** 0.01234*** 0.01198*** 0.01220*** 0.01160***
(0.00082) (0.00082) (0.00089) (0.00089) (0.00074) (0.00074) (0.00077) (0.00077)
hnojob -0.00431*** -0.00436*** -0.00367*** -0.00376*** -0.00299*** -0.00316*** -0.00222*** -0.00241***
(0.00049) (0.00049) (0.00049) (0.00049) (0.00043) (0.00043) (0.00045) (0.00045)
urban -0.00025 -0.00026 -0.00025 -0.00031 -0.00161*** -0.00165*** -0.00183*** -0.00198***
(0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00037) (0.00037) (0.00034) (0.00034) (0.00035) (0.00035)
agri -0.00116*** -0.00121*** -0.00176*** -0.00178*** -0.00163*** -0.00168*** -0.00096** -0.00121***
(0.00039) (0.00039) (0.00041) (0.00042) (0.00039) (0.00039) (0.00038) (0.00038)
Ilocos 0.00181** 0.00225*** 0.00626*** 0.00703*** 0.00820*** 0.00854*** 0.01132*** 0.01200***
(0.00082) (0.00083) (0.00094) (0.00096) (0.00093) (0.00094) (0.00093) (0.00095)
Cagayan 0.00513*** 0.00552*** 0.00882*** 0.00947*** 0.01149*** 0.01189*** 0.01734*** 0.01817***
(0.00101) (0.00102) (0.00112) (0.00113) (0.00105) (0.00106) (0.00109) (0.00110)
Cluzon -0.00034 -0.00014 0.00128* 0.00168** 0.00380*** 0.00402*** 0.00823*** 0.00858***
(0.00064) (0.00064) (0.00066) (0.00067) (0.00068) (0.00069) (0.00077) (0.00078)
Sluzon 0.00184*** 0.00204*** 0.00604*** 0.00646*** 0.00492*** 0.00507*** 0.01080*** 0.01100***
(0.00064) (0.00064) (0.00066) (0.00067) (0.00062) (0.00062) (0.00070) (0.00070)
Bicol 0.00270*** 0.00291*** 0.00677*** 0.00722*** 0.00788*** 0.00804*** 0.01231*** 0.01265***
(0.00083) (0.00083) (0.00095) (0.00096) (0.00090) (0.00090) (0.00096) (0.00097)
Wvisayas 0.00286*** 0.00321*** 0.00418*** 0.00474*** 0.00746*** 0.00776*** 0.01233*** 0.01287***
(0.00074) (0.00075) (0.00079) (0.00080) (0.00079) (0.00080) (0.00090) (0.00091)
Cvisayas 0.00152** 0.00143* 0.00458*** 0.00481*** 0.00831*** 0.00835*** 0.01296*** 0.01308***
(0.00077) (0.00077) (0.00084) (0.00084) (0.00088) (0.00088) (0.00092) (0.00092)
Evisayas 0.00168* 0.00178** 0.00299*** 0.00336*** 0.00950*** 0.00958*** 0.01403*** 0.01423***
(0.00088) (0.00089) (0.00098) (0.00099) (0.00091) (0.00092) (0.00104) (0.00105)
Mindanao 0.00235*** 0.00255*** 0.00655*** 0.00691*** 0.00850*** 0.00873*** 0.01269*** 0.01297***
(0.00060) (0.00060) (0.00064) (0.00065) (0.00061) (0.00061) (0.00065) (0.00065)
(NCR omitted)
CAR 0.00671*** 0.00696*** 0.01338*** 0.01406*** 0.01709*** 0.01721*** 0.01983*** 0.02033***
(0.00133) (0.00133) (0.00155) (0.00157) (0.00110) (0.00111) (0.00119) (0.00120)
Sigma 0.04863 0.04858 0.05503 0.05494 0.06303 0.06293 0.06537 0.06523
(0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00029) (0.00029)
Log pseudolikelihood 17185.71 17205.836 22707.593 22743.44 32484.837 32530.866 29281.082 29345.245
Pseudo R2 -0.1633 -0.1647 -0.1583 -0.1601 -0.1919 -0.1936 -0.2305 -0.2331
No. of Obs (uncensored) 12664 12664 17857 17857 28833 28833 27188 27188
No. of Obs (total) 18429 18429 24165 24165 39615 39615 38480 38480
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
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Table A6. 6: The Tobit estimation results of marginal effects on education expenditure
(Philippine pesos, in real terms) with the absolute amount of remittances
Note: (a) Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lpctotex 1977.39*** 2663.77*** 3960.88*** 3525.02***
(60.51) (68.66) (75.91) (72.81)
Bottom 20% 162.53 122.08 738.63** 474.67
(234.92) (256.50) (293.63) (289.00)
Bottom 20-40% 717.46* 1514.24*** 1666.82*** 1294.42***
(367.01) (379.84) (432.27) (424.25)
Middle 1775.63*** 1788.09*** 2143.75*** 2172.49***
(370.07) (402.12) (444.04) (414.17)
Top 20-40% 2604.87*** 4621.01*** 4470.51*** 4940.02***
(292.43) (321.59) (338.40) (314.52)
Top 20% 3486.18*** 4138.37*** 7967.06*** 6133.81***
(153.37) (176.61) (179.92) (171.12)
inrem 16.92*** 14.86*** 17.49*** 14.90*** 20.83*** 15.22*** 26.25*** 22.60***
(2.66) (2.63) (2.25) (2.23) (2.05) (2.03) (2.12) (2.10)
exrem 8.63*** 6.83*** 13.62*** 11.19*** 11.00*** 8.05*** 14.46*** 11.82***
(0.70) (0.70) (0.78) (0.78) (0.62) (0.62) (0.54) (0.54)
age7_14 3398.09*** 3394.06*** 3853.32*** 3870.87*** 5601.79*** 5508.43*** 5449.74*** 5358.85***
(65.06) (64.49) (74.18) (73.54) (87.85) (86.51) (83.93) (83.01)
age15_24 1999.61*** 2060.11*** 3075.53*** 3151.29*** 4323.67*** 4416.57*** 4104.27*** 4173.10***
(61.63) (61.20) (70.24) (69.83) (81.71) (80.65) (77.64) (76.95)
hfemale 63.22 82.59 -108.35 -109.24 611.87*** 677.47*** 391.17*** 386.11***
(127.19) (126.25) (139.79) (138.52) (165.91) (164.24) (144.31) (142.74)
hage 35.24*** 36.77*** 9.91*** 11.50*** -9.86*** -5.75 -6.54** -3.45
(2.66) (2.64) (3.11) (3.08) (3.60) (3.55) (3.29) (3.25)
hmarried 813.29*** 869.72*** 967.30*** 1042.89*** 2244.99*** 2346.36*** 2073.67*** 2097.57***
(110.85) (108.99) (126.23) (124.38) (139.92) (137.08) (125.02) (123.39)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 452.11*** 544.17*** 439.02*** 505.30*** 303.00*** 545.02*** 267.87** 492.08***
(80.79) (80.60) (93.93) (93.43) (115.05) (114.60) (105.79) (105.88)
hedu3 844.08*** 926.31*** 956.96*** 1025.09*** 999.66*** 1338.13*** 1071.91*** 1356.86***
(101.79) (101.82) (113.06) (112.84) (129.66) (129.68) (120.36) (120.92)
hedu4 2332.25*** 1936.78*** 3856.12*** 3251.10*** 4676.07*** 3826.73*** 4243.97*** 3488.03***
(172.61) (166.17) (210.00) (202.06) (224.01) (214.14) (214.21) (205.57)
hnojob -847.79*** -844.15*** -989.01*** -977.72*** -955.52*** -890.04*** -585.40*** -586.06***
(96.97) (96.00) (105.13) (104.24) (122.72) (121.37) (117.91) (116.64)
urban -11.01 -2.49 20.23 64.42 -287.79*** -134.43 -137.41 -90.74
(74.20) (73.52) (81.17) (80.48) (95.92) (94.45) (91.68) (90.82)
agri -63.92 -219.85*** -68.30 -314.87*** 266.60** -319.82*** 301.62*** -225.40**
(78.38) (77.66) (90.77) (90.00) (113.93) (111.29) (102.08) (100.84)
Ilocos -38.94 147.91 571.45*** 1006.28*** 235.00 899.14*** 1676.35*** 2260.69***
(152.79) (155.96) (188.99) (196.93) (231.64) (240.40) (226.51) (234.49)
Cagayan 364.10** 526.15*** 983.87*** 1315.37*** 683.25*** 1400.55*** 2431.27*** 3138.62***
(184.47) (187.36) (223.43) (229.56) (255.76) (266.18) (253.71) (264.48)
Cluzon -314.88*** -145.68 -179.46 230.92 -357.91** 376.96** 1479.20*** 2076.72***
(121.05) (122.81) (136.18) (141.59) (176.42) (183.81) (194.15) (200.93)
Sluzon 225.93* 308.17** 587.97*** 894.83*** 101.43 578.87*** 2031.95*** 2393.82***
(123.59) (123.69) (135.88) (138.83) (163.18) (165.68) (175.38) (177.68)
Bicol 307.07* 303.75* 684.54*** 848.38*** 975.64*** 1174.43*** 2339.08*** 2544.35***
(159.03) (157.71) (191.35) (193.17) (237.03) (237.16) (240.04) (241.31)
Wvisayas 312.99** 414.90*** 300.18* 603.20*** 489.12** 878.94*** 1935.24*** 2344.41***
(141.61) (142.50) (161.13) (165.27) (204.06) (207.03) (219.43) (223.92)
Cvisayas 218.80 82.39 376.14** 452.63*** 609.26*** 803.80*** 2210.74*** 2422.45***
(150.02) (146.27) (172.34) (172.28) (224.43) (224.26) (226.50) (227.58)
Evisayas 194.89 183.42 171.69 308.42 1030.90*** 1151.64*** 2428.34*** 2609.71***
(171.35) (169.55) (202.28) (203.75) (235.54) (234.37) (255.52) (256.41)
Mindanao 187.78 270.11** 740.99*** 923.53*** 579.99*** 869.78*** 2127.44*** 2376.39***
(114.64) (114.51) (133.49) (134.25) (162.37) (162.16) (162.65) (162.88)
(NCR omitted)
CAR 439.43* 550.09** 1508.48*** 1895.39*** 1885.97*** 2495.09*** 2906.72*** 3397.44***
(234.03) (235.72) (299.69) (308.93) (267.17) (274.69) (277.21) (283.98)
Sigma 10256.39 10147.86 12747.46 12613.43 19663.31 19319.28 18642.72 18415.52
(65.60) (64.82) (68.42) (67.64) (83.09) (81.54) (81.14) (80.06)
Log pseudolikelihood -137770 -137611 -197529 -197316 -331598 -331057 -311622 -311243
Pseudo R2 0.0214 0.0225 0.0206 0.0217 0.0200 0.0216 0.0211 0.0223
No. of Obs (uncensored) 12664 12664 17857 17857 28833 28833 27188 27188
No. of Obs (total) 18429 18429 24165 24165 39615 39615 38480 38480
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
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Table A6. 7: The CLAD estimation results on education expenditure (Philippine pesos, in real
terms) with remittance dummy variables
Note: (a) Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005)
Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME
lpctotex 4861.334*** 1737.302 8640.827*** 2961.088 14070.13*** 4042.920 18661.45*** 3508.236
(492.57) (789.25) (1336.59) (2467.45)
dinrem -81.57275 -29.152 -216.251 -74.106 595.6771 171.162 1458.2** 274.133
(232.48) (377.75) (509.92) (985.46)
dexrem 1567.397*** 560.143 1578.442*** 540.910 1982.116*** 569.543 3637.771*** 683.878
(274.90) (363.44) (663.57) (1093.30)
dbothrem 1036.951*** 370.577 1865.123*** 639.151 1263.569 363.075 3931.692*** 739.134
(333.29) (470.11) (1087.91) (1057.06)
age7_14 4771.594*** 1705.232 7603.892*** 2605.745 10966.64*** 3151.162 13889.35*** 2611.111
(338.04) (706.10) (763.94) (1757.86)
age15_24 6225.428*** 2224.791 9236.679*** 3165.278 16957.96*** 4872.711 24411.49*** 4589.208
(589.47) (701.89) (1512.06) (3653.73)
hfemale 465.3332 166.297 1500.875*** 514.328 2936.775*** 843.855 3068.342*** 576.829
(278.84) (420.88) (856.36) (994.18)
hage 63.87226*** 22.826 50.3741*** 17.262 27.16871 7.807 65.64162* 12.340
(11.98) (15.08) (27.69) (33.60)
hmarried 2417.644*** 863.997 4815*** 1650.032 8799.169*** 2528.359 11794.36*** 2217.266
(462.63) (777.88) (1439.52) (1463.43)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 1039.982*** 371.660 757.7817 259.681 1096.767* 315.146 3224.648** 606.214
(292.04) (463.34) (973.97) (2211.86)
hedu3 2724.645*** 973.711 3016.166*** 1033.597 3952.317*** 1135.661 7350.664*** 1381.879
(361.00) (410.52) (1057.94) (2190.28)
hedu4 4141.34*** 1479.997 5861.418*** 2008.624 8855.355*** 2544.503 13302.5*** 2500.787
(518.38) (685.52) (1131.14) (2167.14)
hnojob -1444.354*** -516.171 -1196.446*** -410.005 -1464.59*** -420.836 -1307.828 -245.864
(424.09) (452.56) (732.57) (1055.10)
urban 184.8969 66.077 -67.17163 -23.019 -349.087 -100.307 791.4567 148.789
(231.11) (456.26) (554.50) (1041.26)
agri -222.2343 -79.420 583.7274* 200.035 3260.414*** 936.849 501.5383 94.286
(254.51) (535.24) (757.40) (1539.20)
Ilocos -866.6627* -309.721 1233.136 422.578 1619.881** 465.458 10882.39*** 2045.821
(652.47) (947.91) (1023.12) (1733.34)
Cagayan 1118.337*** 399.662 1122.423 384.638 3737.734*** 1074.003 14434.1*** 2713.521
(533.91) (794.98) (1414.91) (1882.20)
Cluzon 12.4438 4.447 641.3446 219.780 1203.915*** 345.934 9341.608*** 1756.164
(253.77) (476.78) (835.11) (1762.63)
Sluzon -221.91 -79.304 1356.211*** 464.754 1690.4*** 485.721 10258.29*** 1928.495
(310.74) (509.54) (676.30) (1439.62)
Bicol 1195.329*** 427.177 1884.464*** 645.779 1944.499 558.734 11757.54*** 2210.344
(427.52) (771.09) (1765.18) (1998.72)
Wvisayas 758.7936*** 271.171 892.1611 305.731 3072.093*** 882.737 12353.99*** 2322.473
(366.99) (590.53) (948.55) (1772.48)
Cvisayas -650.4806* -232.463 219.8643 75.344 2538.68* 729.466 10844.43*** 2038.685
(545.70) (748.35) (1458.14) (2119.36)
Evisayas -350.72 -125.337 -1162.056 -398.220 1622.194 466.122 12825.12*** 2411.043
(542.51) (1095.75) (2198.35) (3490.92)
Mindanao 402.1553* 143.719 1691.723*** 579.729 2834.321*** 814.416 12876.2*** 2420.645
(253.54) (630.41) (806.99) (1429.57)
(NCR omitted)
CAR 1387.585* 495.883 4482.355*** 1536.039 8223.374*** 2362.910 14653.26*** 2754.721
(798.80) (784.52) (1171.13) (2294.68)
constant -56523.74*** -102740.1*** -175986*** -255383.8***
(5775.56) (9776.49) (16563.09) (32697.19)
Scale factor
Pseudo R2
No. of Obs (uncensored)
No. of Obs (total)
0.099
11383
39615
0.188
0.100
7234
38480
0.085
6586
18429
0.343
0.086
8281
24165
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
0.357 0.287
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Table A6. 8: The CLAD estimation results on education expenditure (Philippine pesos, in real
terms) with the absolute amount of remittances
Note: (a) Parentheses denote the standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) CPI=28.46 in 1988, =52.85 in 1994, =77.04 in 2000, and =106.24 in 2006 (=100 in 2005)
Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME
lpctotex 4192.493*** 1650.244 8070.836*** 2804.169 12870.68*** 3787.940 16178.74*** 3329.507
(549.04) (737.72) (1562.70) (2038.05)
inrem 26.89594*** 10.587 34.36305*** 11.939 46.12908* 13.576 50.8708* 10.469
(10.52) (11.40) (17.00) (25.71)
exrem 15.45862*** 6.085 22.14917*** 7.696 23.54781*** 6.930 31.0494*** 6.390
(2.69) (4.58) (4.45) (7.58)
age7_14 4432.436*** 1744.690 6831.86*** 2373.693 10280.84*** 3025.730 12355.67*** 2542.738
(363.59) (745.47) (1264.42) (1419.04)
age15_24 5543.767*** 2182.131 9073.627*** 3152.583 16291.3*** 4794.655 22169.09*** 4562.293
(654.04) (1184.33) (1712.91) (3603.73)
hfemale -193.4187 -76.133 189.7294 65.920 1077.51 317.120 881.3076 181.369
(430.91) (581.96) (618.97) (1499.80)
hage 51.68049*** 20.342 51.15223*** 17.773 32.933** 9.692 62.64341* 12.892
(11.93) (14.45) (19.30) (47.57)
hmarried 1477.771*** 581.678 4084.87*** 1419.266 7070.255*** 2080.831 9635.255*** 1982.889
(526.13) (798.05) (1337.75) (2131.19)
(hedu1 omitted)
hedu2 915.4505*** 360.338 860.9355*** 299.127 914.8505* 269.248 2464.492* 507.181
(329.45) (519.16) (1565.31) (2070.45)
hedu3 2297.549*** 904.358 3048.631*** 1059.231 3536.338*** 1040.772 6478.107*** 1333.163
(368.57) (486.44) (1801.77) (1833.59)
hedu4 3593.144*** 1414.329 5935.336*** 2062.201 8751.035*** 2575.497 11835.42*** 2435.673
(542.52) (841.97) (1833.71) (2037.85)
hnojob -1266.801*** -498.637 -2191.917*** -761.570 -2632.965 -774.902 -1231.068 -253.348
(546.02) (496.24) (1042.50) (952.92)
urban 290.4911** 114.343 39.78424 13.823 -257.1402 -75.678 518.8231 106.771
(188.37) (393.87) (627.08) (750.20)
agri -225.6832 -88.833 209.3231 72.728 2816.659*** 828.964 1733.755** 356.798
(237.38) (406.43) (1003.63) (1141.59)
Ilocos 80.80803 31.808 1213.899*** 421.763 1308.554 385.118 9936.133*** 2044.809
(487.70) (691.41) (1622.46) (1435.12)
Cagayan 797.0111* 313.719 1065.997 370.375 4055.066*** 1193.437 12598.36*** 2592.682
(518.94) (732.36) (1407.26) (1621.39)
Cluzon -140.7937 -55.419 455.6004 158.296 1815.991 534.460 8298.389*** 1707.769
(283.22) (497.99) (1043.48) (1699.82)
Sluzon -72.74641 -28.634 1412.881*** 490.898 1814.62*** 534.057 9506.358*** 1956.363
(357.37) (478.26) (901.63) (1453.25)
Bicol 1275.023*** 501.873 1907.739* 662.834 1919.492 564.921 11077.9*** 2279.779
(392.49) (720.70) (1717.41) (1691.25)
Wvisayas 593.7508 233.711 982.7861* 341.464 2724.773** 801.922 10671.86*** 2196.218
(361.05) (515.11) (1084.93) (1485.52)
Cvisayas -314.7867 -123.906 752.2902* 261.379 3030.732** 891.968 9285.466*** 1910.905
(557.27) (457.84) (1306.65) (1818.32)
Evisayas -485.3035 -191.025 -1425.463 -495.269 1111.688 327.178 11416.76*** 2349.515
(414.20) (958.11) (2584.55) (2393.01)
Mindanao 357.0499 140.542 1764.972*** 613.230 2779.985** 818.171 11941.02*** 2457.405
(226.29) (494.28) 951.8984 (1358.10)
(NCR omitted)
CAR 1377.764*** 542.314 4369.714*** 1518.234 8352.308*** 2458.149 15360.68*** 3161.154
(682.01) (706.46) (1036.34) (2435.97)
constant -48011.74*** -95812.7*** -160974.5*** -220829.7***
(6387.67) (9109.71) (20130.31) (28067.74)
Scale factor
Pseudo R2
No. of Obs (uncensored)
No. of Obs (total) 18429 24165 39615 38480
0.083 0.090 0.102 0.102
7254 8396 11659 7919
1988 FIES 1994 FIES 2000 FIES 2006 FIES
0.394 0.347 0.294 0.206
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Appendix II Estimating marginal effects and impact
effects of a bivariate probit model
The bivariate probit model can be written as follows:
1111 uXy 
  , 1y = 1 if 01 
y
= 0 otherwise
(A-1)
2222 uXy 
  , 2y = 1 if 02 
y
= 0 otherwise
where 0)()( 21  uEuE , 1)()( 21  uVaruVar , and 0),( 21  uuCov . y1 and y2 are
the dummy variables on whether households receive remittances from within the
Philippines and abroad, respectively.
The joint probabilities to receive both internal and international remittances, only
internal remittances, only international remittances, and no remittance are written as
follows. For convenience, let 111 cX  and 222 cX  .
(A-2) 11 = Prob  ,,]1,1[ 2121 ccBVNyy 
(A-3) 10 = Prob   ,,]0,1[ 2121 ccBVNyy
(A-4) 01 = Prob   ,,]1,0[ 2121 ccBVNyy
(A-5) 00 = Prob  ,,]0,0[ 2121 ccBVNyy 
where BVN denotes the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate normal
distribution. The likelihood function for the bivariate probit is given by:
(A-6) 


)1)(1(
00
)1(
01
)1(
1011
21212121 yyyyyyyy
bip
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Taking natural logarithms where )(log eL  yields the log likelihood function for the
bivariate probit model as:
(A-7)    
   

N
i
N
i
N
i
N
i
eeeebip yyyyyyyyL
1 1 1 1
0021012110211121 log)1)(1(log)1(log)1(log
By maximising the above log likelihood function, the parameters we estimate ( 1 , 2
and  ) can be computed.
For a continuous variable, Z , which appears in 1X  and 2X  , the marginal effects of the
bivariate probit model can be given by:
(A-8) Marginal Effects for internal remittances
=    
Z
ccBVN
Z
ccBVN
ZZ 









  ,,,, 21211011
(A-9) Marginal Effects for international remittances
=    
Z
ccBVN
Z
ccBVN
ZZ 









  ,,,, 21210111
For a dummy variable, D, which also appear in 1X  and 2X  , the impact effects of the
bivariate probit model can be expressed as:
(A-10) Impact Effects for internal remittances
=        0,,,1,,,0,,,1,,, 21212121  DccBVNDccBVNDccBVNDccBVN 
(A-11) Impact Effects for international remittances
=        0,,,1,,,0,,,1,,, 21212121  DccBVNDccBVNDccBVNDccBVN 
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Appendix III Measuring Regional differences
(A-12) nivdXvbXeduc iiiiii ,,2,1,   
where id is a (10  1) vector of regional dummy variables.

i is a (10  1) vector of
regional dummy coefficients. The parameters i measure the regional differentials for
the ten regions compared with NCR, omitted as a base category. Based on the estimated
obtained by the equation (A-12), the location-weighted averages of regional dummy
coefficients are defined as:
(A-13) 

 
11
1
ˆ
j
jj
where ˆ is a (11  1) vector, including the estimated regional coefficients for ten
regions and zero for the base region, NCR.  is a proportion of each region. The
renormalized regional coefficients i is a (11  1) vector, which measure the regional
differentials for each of eleven regions compared with this overall mean impact on the
budget share for education. They are given by:
(A-14)    ji ˆˆ
This renormalized regional coefficients i are also given by:
(A-15)    ji eZ  ˆˆ
where e is a (11  1) vector of ones. Z is a (11  11) matrix constructed as a (11  11)
identity matrix putting zero at the intersection of a NCR row and NCR column. This is
defined as follows:
(A-16)

















100
000
1
0
0001




Z
Using the above expression, the variance-covariance submatrix of the normalized
regional coefficients i can be easily derived as:
(A-17)       eZCovVareZCovVar )ˆ()ˆ(
To test the statistical significance of the regional parameters, we can derive the standard
errors from the diagonal elements of the submatrices )ˆ(CovVar  .
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Appendix IV Selection of instruments in the
instrumental-variables (IV) probit and Tobit models
In order to possibly select more appropriate instrumental variables to control for a
potential endogenous issue, we conducted the tests for the instrumental-variables (IV)
probit and Tobit estimators: (1) Test for over-identifying restrictions; (2) Tests for weak
instruments; (3) Test for regressor exogeneity. Using all possible combination of
instrumental variables, the test results are reported in Table A4.9 and Table A4.10 for
Chapter Four, while in Table A6.9 and Table A6.10 for Chapter Six.
(1)Test for over-identifying restrictions
The stata command overid after ivprobit or ivtobit with the twostep option tests the
over-identifying restrictions. Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-square statistic (see
Newey, 1987; Lee, 1992) is reported to test the joint null hypothesis that the excluded
instruments are valid instruments, which are uncorrelated with the error term and
correctly excluded from the estimated equation. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we
need to cast doubt on the validity of the instruments. The following stata command was
used after running ivprobit or ivtobit:
*for ivprobit*
overid, depvar(depvar)
*for ivtobit*
oderid
(2)Tests for weak instruments
When instruments are weak, point estimators derived from the ivprobit or ivtobit are
biased and Wald tests become unreliable. The stata command rivtest after ivprobit or
ivtobit tests whether the coefficient on the endogenous regressor is significant. This
reports the minimum distance version of the Anderson-Rubin (AR) test statistic, which
is a joint test of the structural parameter and the overidentification restrictions. In
addition, for the models with more than one instrument, the AR test statistic can be
decomposed into the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test and the J overidentification test. The
former tests only the structural parameter, while the latter tests only the
overidentification restrictions. This J statistic evaluated at the null hypotheses is
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different from the Hansen J statistic evaluated at the parameter estimate. A combination
of the LM and J tests (LM-J) are also reported. Similarly, the minimum distance
versions of the conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) combines the LM and J tests and
simultaneously tests both the structural parameter and the overidentification restrictions.
All of these tests are robust to weak instruments as the instruments get weaker, the
confidence interval around the parameter of interest gets wider. The ci option is used to
estimate 95 per cent confidence intervals (or confidence sets). The term “confidence set”
is used as it may comprise the union of two or more disjointed intervals. If the
confidence intervals derived from weak-instrument robust tests get wider than the Wald
test, instruments become weak and point estimates are biased. In order to conduct the
test, the stata command used after ivprobit or ivtobit is as follows:
rivtest, ci points(#) gridmult(#)
The points (#) option specifies the number of equally spaced values over which to
calculate the confidence sets, and the gridmult (#) option specifies that the grid is #
times the size of the Wald confidence interval to calculate confidence sets. An increase
in # will improve precision though it will also increase the time to compute the
confidence sets.
(3)Test for regressor exogeneity
In order to test for regressor endogeneity, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test is
conducted. The test was first proposed by Durbin (1954), and then independently by Wu
(1973) and Hausman (1978). The test investigates whether a regressor is endogenous or
exogenous. If the null hypothesis that a regressor is exogenous is rejected, we conclude
that a regressor is potentially endogenous. We can obtain the DWH statistic using the
following stata command:
quietly regress endogvar [indepvars] [instrumentvars], robust
quietly predict v1hat, resid
*for ivprobit*
quietly probit depvar [indepvars] v1hat, robust
test v1hat
*for ivtobit*
quietly tobit depvar [indepvars] v1hat, ll(0) robust
test v1hat
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where depvar and indepvars are a dependent variable and independent variables used in
the model equations, and endogvar and instrumentvars denote an endogenous regressor
and the instrumental variables used in the analysis. v1hat is the error term from the first-
stage equation of the instrumental variable (IV) models.
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Table A4. 9: Selection of instruments in the ivprobit model in Chapter 4 (y=dinrem)
Note: The results of remittance coefficients are computed using the twostep option.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Selection of instruments
Migrant's education level (=1 if completed tertiary; =0 otherwise) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Length of stay abroad (months) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female Migrant (=1 if female; =0 if male) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Migrant's age (years) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remittance coefficient
exrem -0.0065 -0.0061 -0.0054 -0.0068 -0.0104 -0.0047 -0.0059 -0.0054
p-value (0.0120) (0.0240) (0.0370) (0.0200) (0.0190) (0.0760) (0.0860) (0.0620)
Testing for regressor endogeneity
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
chi2 11.71 11.84 11.94 11.93 11.81 12.07 12.25 12.15
Prob > chi2 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Testing for overidentifying restrictions
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-sq statistic
Chi-sq 4.113 3.864 0.861 3.960 1.732 0.246 3.867 0.838
p-value (0.2496) (0.1449) (0.6502) (0.1380) (0.4206) (0.6200) (0.0492) (0.3600)
Tests for weak instruments
Wald test
chi2 6.31 5.07 4.36 5.42 5.54 3.14 2.94 3.49
p-value (0.0120) (0.0243) (0.0368) (0.0199) (0.0186) (0.0762) (0.0863) (0.0617)
95% Confidence Set [ -.01164,-.001438] [-.011328,-.000784] [ -.01046,-.000331] [ -.01256,-.001081] [-.019073,-.001741] [-.009992, .000501] [-.012565, .000837] [ -.01112, .000267]
Conditional Likelihood Ratio test
statistic 8.10 6.31 4.85 7.28 9.40 3.35 3.87 3.91
p-value (0.0072) (0.0161) (0.0346) (0.0101) (0.0047) (0.0736) (0.0575) (0.0541)
95% Confidence Set [-.015555,-.002103] [-.015079,-.001471] [-.012358,-.000422] [-.018253, -.00215] [-.034478,-.003842] [-.011369, .000406] [-.021845,-.000036] [-.013573,-.000155]
Anderson-Rubin test
chi2 12.13 10.11 5.71 11.12 11.08 3.60 7.62 4.74
p-value (0.0164) (0.0176) (0.1268) (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.1655) (0.0221) (0.0935)
95% Confidence Set [-.017272, -.00153] [-.015079,-.001471] [-.015484, .000999] [-.017609, -.00215] [-.051011,-.002383] [ -.01343, .001583] [-.015828,-.001916] [ -.01517, .000803]
Lagrange Multiplier test
chi2 6.75 5.23 4.67 5.81 7.85 3.31 2.80 3.73
p-value (0.0094) (0.0222) (0.0306) (0.0159) (0.0051) (0.0687) (0.0941) (0.0534)
95% Confidence Set
[-.015841,-.002103]
U [ .016501, .037681]
[-.015966,-.001175]
U [ .017166, .046748]
[-.012074,-.000707]
U [ .027996, .046183]
[-.019219,-.001828]
U [ .01363, .038107]
[-.033991,-.003842]
U [ .009287, .019499]
[-.011075, .000112]
U [ .036908, .052805]
[-.027861, .001469]
U [ .010493, .087953]
[-.013253,-.000155]
U [ .025721, .05]
J overidentification test
chi2 5.39 4.88 1.03 5.31 3.23 0.28 4.82 1.01
p-value (0.1456) (0.0870) (0.5965) (0.0704) (0.1985) (0.5936) (0.0281) (0.3151)
Lagrange Multiplier & J overidentification test
Is H0 rejected at 5% level? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
95% Confidence Set [-.016414,-.001817] [-.016558,-.000879] [-.012358,-.000422] [-.020185,-.001506] [-.037395,-.003842] [-.011663, .000406] [-.031621, .002221] [-.013892, .000164]
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Table A4.9: Selection of instruments in the ivprobit model in Chapter 4 (y=dinrem) (continued)
Note: The results of remittance coefficients are computed using the twostep option.
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Selection of instruments
Migrant's education level (=1 if completed tertiary; =0 otherwise) Yes
Length of stay abroad (months) Yes Yes Yes
Female Migrant (=1 if female; =0 if male) Yes Yes Yes
Migrant's age (years) Yes Yes Yes
Remittance coefficient
exrem -0.0099 -0.0078 -0.0135 -0.0037 -0.0066 -0.0220 -0.0100
p-value (0.0350) (0.0780) (0.0350) (0.2850) (0.1640) (0.1800) (0.1300)
Testing for regressor endogeneity
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
chi2 11.93 12.09 12.01 12.47 12.20 12.29 12.28
Prob > chi2 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Testing for overidentifying restrictions
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-sq statistic
Chi-sq 1.797 0.287 0.733
p-value (0.1801) (0.5918) (0.3920)
Tests for weak instruments
Wald test
chi2 4.45 3.10 4.44 1.14 1.94 1.79 2.29
p-value (0.0349) (0.0785) (0.0351) (0.2855) (0.1641) (0.1804) (0.1302)
95% Confidence Set [-.019115,-.000701] [-.016525, .00089] [-.026016,-.000942] [-.010369, .003054] [-.015815, .002682] [-.054301, .010211] [-.022931, .002949]
Conditional Likelihood Ratio test
statistic 7.46 3.94 9.43
p-value (0.0092) (0.0600) (0.0039)
95% Confidence Set [-.039613, -.00345] [-.026628, .000244] [ -.07011,-.004685]
Anderson-Rubin test
chi2 9.17 4.23 10.14 1.16 2.25 6.83 3.35
p-value (0.0102) (0.1204) (0.0063) (0.2807) (0.1338) (0.0090) (0.0671)
95% Confidence Set [-.041163,-.002934] [-.036888, .00171] [-.131314,-.003982] [-.012508, .00331] [ -.02499, .001997] [-.473628, -.00666]U [ .054878, .429538] [-.068443, .000537]
Lagrange Multiplier test
chi2 5.98 3.81 8.27
p-value (0.0144) (0.0508) (0.0040)
95% Confidence Set [-.043229,-.002934]U [ .008432, .02238]
[-.025162,-.000244]
U [ .017345, .028582]
[-.067296,-.005389]
U [ .007274, .012902]
J overidentification test
chi2 3.18 0.42 1.86
p-value (0.0744) (0.5175) (0.1721)
Lagrange Multiplier & J overidentification test
Is H0 rejected at 5% level? Yes No Yes
95% Confidence Set [-.049428,-.002417] [-.027116, .000244] [-.081366,-.004685]
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Table A4. 10: Selection of instruments in the ivtobit model in Chapter 4 (y=inrem)
Note: The results of remittance coefficients are computed using the twostep option.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Selection of instruments
Migrant's education level (=1 if completed tertiary; =0 otherwise) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Length of stay abroad (months) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female Migrant (=1 if female; =0 if male) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Migrant's age (years) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remittance coefficient
exrem -0.0958 -0.0805 -0.0609 -0.1232 -0.1757 -0.0404 -0.1094 -0.0815
p-value (0.1410) (0.2340) (0.3550) (0.0950) (0.0900) (0.5590) (0.2140) (0.2740)
Testing for regressor endogeneity
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
F 11.75 11.91 11.97 11.70 11.87 12.14 11.98 11.93
Prob > F (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Testing for overidentifying restrictions
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-sq statistic
Chi-sq 6.136 5.682 0.922 5.251 4.271 0.004 5.237 0.565
p-value (0.1052) (0.0584) (0.6307) (0.0724) (0.1182) (0.9507) (0.0221) (0.4523)
Tests for weak instruments
Wald test
chi2 2.17 1.42 0.85 2.79 2.88 0.34 1.55 1.20
p-value (0.1407) (0.2341) (0.3552) (0.0950) (0.0896) (0.5593) (0.2135) (0.2735)
95% Confidence Set [-.223177, .031635] [-.213175, .052115] [-.190088, .068237] [-.267796, .021433] [-.378484, .027141] [-.175941, .095174] [-.281831, .062987] [-.227476, .064408]
Conditional Likelihood Ratio test
statistic 2.34 1.44 0.84 3.30 4.27 0.34 1.85 1.20
p-value (0.1503) (0.2504) (0.3810) (0.0842) (0.0591) (0.5711) (0.1894) (0.2857)
95% Confidence Set [-.306668, .043635] [-.292656, .072052] [-.216749, .080402] [-.395022, .018824] [-1.01212, .000723] [-.188709, .107942] [-.530252, .079226] [-.257601, .069965]
Anderson-Rubin test
chi2 8.45 7.12 1.76 8.47 8.33 0.34 7.01 1.77
p-value (0.0764) (0.0683) (0.6240) (0.0372) (0.0397) (0.8437) (0.0300) (0.4133)
95% Confidence Set [-.278071, .022188] [-.218226, .019951] [ -.27473, .131135] [ -.32199,-.021749] [-.830037,-.022038] [-.234347, .15358] [-.259373,-.056213] [-.306736, .102721]
Lagrange Multiplier test
chi2 1.78 1.09 0.80 2.44 2.68 0.34 1.17 1.17
p-value (0.1826) (0.2958) (0.3697) (0.1184) (0.1015) (0.5622) (0.2789) (0.2799)
95% Confidence Set [-.335264, .057934]U [ .60841, 1.68792]
[-.329871, .101824]
U [ .652606, 1.7765] [-.209502, .080402]
[-.459939, .043168]
U [ .416441, 1.90142] [-3.01505, 2.66371] [-.188709, .107942] [-2.52315, 2.30431]
[-.257601, .069965]
U [ 1.47031, 1.96165]
J overidentification test
chi2 6.67 6.02 0.95 6.03 5.65 0.00 5.84 0.60
p-value (0.0830) (0.0492) (0.6206) (0.0490) (0.0594) (0.9504) (0.0157) (0.4387)
Lagrange Multiplier & J overidentification test
Is H0 rejected at 5% level? No No No No No No No No
95% Confidence Set [-.356711, .072232] [ -.3522, .109267] [-.216749, .08765] [-.492397, .059397] [-3.01505, .137286] [-.196315, .115548] [-.481881, .059878] [-.273979, .078154]
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Table A4.10: Selection of instruments in the ivtobit model in Chapter 4 (y=inrem) (continued)
Note: The results of remittance coefficients are computed using the twostep option.
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Selection of instruments
Migrant's education level (=1 if completed tertiary; =0 otherwise) Yes
Length of stay abroad (months) Yes Yes Yes
Female Migrant (=1 if female; =0 if male) Yes Yes Yes
Migrant's age (years) Yes Yes Yes
Remittance coefficient
exrem -0.1543 -0.0831 -0.2970 -0.0439 -0.0346 -0.5933 -0.1766
p-value (0.1580) (0.4360) (0.0560) (0.6270) (0.7660) (0.1780) (0.2610)
Testing for regressor endogeneity
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
F 12.02 12.16 11.83 12.20 12.30 12.08 12.11
Prob > F (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Testing for overidentifying restrictions
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-sq statistic
Chi-sq 4.334 0.842 1.506
p-value (0.0374) (0.3588) (0.2197)
Tests for weak instruments
Wald test
chi2 1.99 0.61 3.66 0.24 0.09 1.81 1.26
p-value (0.1584) (0.4362) (0.0556) (0.6271) (0.7664) (0.1785) (0.2611)
95% Confidence Set [-.368795, .06012] [ -.29233, .126096] [-.601064, .007069] [-.221246, .133351] [-.263079, .193815] [-1.45773, .271038] [-.484666, .131432]
Conditional Likelihood Ratio test
statistic 2.96 0.61 6.94
p-value (0.1030) (0.4617) (0.0136)
95% Confidence Set [-1.39982, .056252] [-.464648, .19276] [-2.26764,-.083725]
Anderson-Rubin test
chi2 7.04 1.45 8.35 0.23 0.09 6.94 1.46
p-value (0.0297) (0.4837) (0.0154) (0.6295) (0.7680) (0.0084) (0.2274)
95% Confidence Set [-.581533,-.052051] [-.535084, .239717] [-2.81362,-.083725] [-.247894, .159999] [-.335871, .279425] [-12.6947,-.181075]
U [ 1.46801, 11.508]
[-1.27423, .143161]
Lagrange Multiplier test
chi2 1.66 0.56 5.32
p-value (0.1975) (0.4562) (0.0211)
95% Confidence Set [-3.15674, 2.84807]
[ -3.0121,-2.74209]
U [-.476387, .19276]
U [ .744512, 2.84587]
[-2.86481,-.083725]
U [ .155141, .547564]
J overidentification test
chi2 5.38 0.90 3.03
p-value (0.0204) (0.3434) (0.0817)
Lagrange Multiplier & J overidentification test
Is H0 rejected at 5% level? No No Yes
95% Confidence Set [ -1.8932, .068286]
[ -3.0121,-2.19034]
U [-.535084, .227978]
U [ .685815, .850167]
[-4.55393,-.066663]
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Table A6. 9: Selection of instruments in the ivtobit model in Chapter 6 (y=educsh)
Note: The results of remittance coefficients are computed using the twostep option.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Selection of instruments
Ownership of durable goods
Refrigerator (number) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Washing machine (number) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Television set (number) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remittance coefficients
exrem 0.000717 0.000820 0.000831 0.000538 0.001054 0.000597 0.000427
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
inrem 0.000335 0.000357 0.000360 0.000295 0.000409 0.000308 0.000270
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Testing for regressor endogeneity
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
chi2 19.85 19.85 20.05 20.13 20.06 20.20 20.54
Prob > chi2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Testing for overidentifying restrictions
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-sq statistic
Chi-sq 25.311 13.222 17.476 1.466 N.A. N.A. N.A.
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.226)
Tests for weak instruments
Wald test
chi2 82.03 85.00 73.52 44.22 74.05 37.71 13.41
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
95% Confidence Set [ .000561, .000872] [ .000646, .000994] [ .000641, .001021] [ .000379, .000696] [ .000814, .001294] [ .000407, .000788] [ .000198, .000655]
Conditional Likelihood Ratio test
statistic 122.11 133.72 120.54 53.04
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
95% Confidence Set [ .000634, .000965] [ .000698, .001069] [ .000719, .001135] [ .000391, .000711]
Anderson-Rubin test
chi2 146.84 146.76 137.54 54.51 137.21 47.03 14.88
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
95% Confidence Set null set null set null set [ .000382, .00072] [ .000845, .001317] [ .000421, .000795] [ .000215, .000664]
Lagrange Multiplier test
chi2 109.26 125.00 108.50 52.65
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
95% Confidence Set
[-.001454,-.001437]
U [ .000625, .000973]
[-.001425,-.001307]
U [ .000698, .001069]
[-.001381,-.001221]
U [ .000719, .001135] [ .000391, .000711]
J overidentification test
chi2 37.59 21.76 29.03 1.86
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.172)
Lagrange Multiplier & J overidentification test
Is H0 rejected at 5% level? Yes Yes Yes Yes
95% Confidence Set null set null set null set [ .000382, .00072]
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Table A6. 10: Selection of instruments in the ivtobit model in Chapter 6 (y=educ)
Note: The results of remittance coefficients are computed using the twostep option.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Selection of instruments
Ownership of durable goods
Refrigerator (number) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Washing machine (number) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Television set (number) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remittance coefficients
exrem 333.73 330.17 340.27 329.58 336.87 320.82 342.13
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
inrem 137.41 136.48 138.87 136.41 137.96 134.26 139.15
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Testing for regressor endogeneity
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
chi2 29.89 29.97 30.17 29.94 30.29 30.06 30.36
Prob > chi2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Testing for overidentifying restrictions
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-sq statistic
Chi-sq 0.212 0.138 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
p-value (0.900) (0.711)
Tests for weak instruments
Wald test
chi2 154.93 132.63 115.80 127.78 88.11 89.74 59.26
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
95% Confidence Set [ 281.182, 386.282] [ 273.98, 386.364] [ 278.294, 402.243] [ 272.437, 386.725] [ 266.531, 407.21] [ 254.446, 387.201] [ 255.023, 429.238]
Conditional Likelihood Ratio test
statistic 293.87 249.13 223.62 239.86
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
95% Confidence Set [ 288.027, 391.231] [ 281.299, 391.656] [ 286.366, 408.08] [ 279.881, 392.108]
Anderson-Rubin test
chi2 294.06 249.26 223.63 240.01 168.69 164.34 115.14
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
95% Confidence Set [ 270.335, 417.77] [ 268.687, 407.422] [ 272.456, 428.945] [ 267.055, 408.14] [ 275.693, 413.835] [ 263.093, 393.453] [ 266.37, 442.331]
Lagrange Multiplier test
chi2 293.57 248.94 223.6 239.62
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
95% Confidence Set -281.07 U
[ 288.027, 391.231]
-283.098 U
[ 281.299, 391.656]
[ 286.366, 408.08] [ 279.881, 392.108]
J overidentification test
chi2 0.49 0.32 0.04 0.4
p-value (0.781) (0.571) (0.851) (0.529)
Lagrange Multiplier & J overidentification test
Is H0 rejected at 5% level? Yes Yes Yes Yes
95% Confidence Set [ 285.079, 394.18] [ 278.146, 394.81] [ 282.889, 411.558] [ 276.674, 395.314]
